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Instrumental accounts of policy start at the policy document—the framework for action—
and move on from there, identifying gaps, criticising shortcomings or praising proposals. 
Critical and interpretive reviews of policymaking regard it as a process to be examined 
rather than an outcome to be managed. At the core of this thesis, the Biofuels Industrial 
Strategy of South Africa presents a new terrain in which to examine the policy process 
before such instrumental approaches become pertinent. In doing so, pervasive underlying 
'win-win' and 'pro-poor' narratives and associated discourses articulated and legitimised by 
constituent vested interests, global and local networks (the biofuels assemblage) and the 
power relations between them are scrutinised as part of the 'messy politics' of policymaking. 
Through such an investigation, the thesis adds to the understanding of policymaking in South 
Africa and seeks to instil the importance of interpretive approaches to analysing 
policymaking. Ultimately, decisions around biofuels highlight the importance of meaning 
and cognitive frameworks that policymakers bring to the table and the symbolic nature of 
policy.  
 It must, for example be made clear what purpose policy actually fulfils rather than 
simply subscribing to social constructions of instrumental success or failure. There is a 
lingering if not hegemonic supposition that although South Africa has 'good' policy, 
implementation 'fails' due to capacity. While this may be the case, it is inadequate as an 
explanation of 'policy failure', where remedial action then becomes more about improving 
capacity, which may only serve to reify the abstract disjuncture between policy and practice. 
Rather an attempt should be made to 'problematise' what makes policy either 'good' or 'bad' 
but more so unpack the taken for granted in policymaking and how policy itself is part of 
wider sense making processes whilst also fulfilling symbolic roles beyond the merely 
instrumental. 
 Given an inescapable reality in which politics and knowledge share a dialectic 
relationship in policymaking, we should rethink the veracity and technocratic assumptions of 
evidence-based policymaking and the value of 'knowledge' in policymaking processes over 
and above the way policymakers frame and interpret issues themselves. Considering 
'evidence' to be a deus ex machina or panacea, as it is in New Public Management proposals, 
may very well be short sighted. Neglecting the interpretive and political aspects of 
policymaking, especially within the technical realms of renewable energy in general and 
biofuels in particular is equally myopic. 
 Deconstructing the nature of the policymaking process around biofuels has wider 
implications or findings for the South African context. One can see, for example, the 
perseverance but slight reconfiguration of the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) and a large-
scale technological fetish that continues to control the vision and direction of renewable 
energy transitions (and policies thereof) in the country. Corporate networks are, however, 
only part of the picture and decisions and decision makers involved in the process extend 
beyond an 'MEC elite', but increasingly include ANC political gatekeepers who inscribe their 
own ideologies and meanings into policy. These are especially acute in the form of narratives 
surrounding decisions made, such as the broad-brush exclusion of maize in the face of an 




If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are 
rich. 




























Biofuels development could induce a paradigm shift in agriculture and rural 
development. Sustainable biofuels production can provide up to 1.1million jobs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
(Cockerill and Hongo, 2005).  
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RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE 
Two issues of importance need to be clarified before continuing. The first is racial 
classifications used in this thesis. Although the terms 'Black', 'Coloured', 'Indian' or 
'White' may be considered or construed as racist (and outside of South Africa this is 
sometimes the case), the South African government uses them as formal 
categorisations and the terms are widely employed in political and popular discourse. 
I have thus elected to retain such classifications within this thesis, even though I am 
sceptical as to their ultimate value (as I am of most monolithic categorisations).
1
 
Furthermore, 'coloured' in South Africa is a racial categorisation in itself, referring to 
a heterogeneous ethnic group possessing ancestry from Europeans, and various 
Khoisan and Bantu tribes of Southern Africa, with a significant proportion of such 
people residing in the Western Cape province of South Africa. It is not used as a 
derogatory term as may be construed from its use in the United States of America 
and elsewhere.  
 
Second, biofuels are a complex technology spanning a variety of disciplines (from 
agricultural economics to chemical engineering) and thus there may be sections of 
this thesis replete with associated jargon. Where possible, I have provided some 
description of terms as footnotes, have moved technical discussions to appendices or 
have attempted to write descriptions using non-technical terms. There are of course 





                                                 
1
 It could be argued that such categorisations are indeed a hangover from apartheid era planning but, 
for example, are used in the national census and remain an important means of measuring the 







At the COP17 negotiations in Durban, the South African Department of Energy 
arranged their own colloquium, bringing to the fore a range of issues around 
sustainable or renewable and conventional (fossil based) energy in the country. 
Amongst the range of topics was biofuels. One of the presentations, by the 
Employment Creation Fund, highlighted a 'new' focus on the 'green economy' and 
citing a project intending to develop 500,000 hectares of canola in the Eastern Cape 
to produce biodiesel. We will encounter this canola project as part of what I have 
termed a South African biofuels 'assemblage' (Cf. Smith 2010) or agro-industrial 
imaginary that is seemingly regaining some legitimacy after years of patiently 
pushing the 'biofuels' cause; largely in anticipation of a reassessment of the Biofuels 
Industrial Policy that was released in 2007 (DME 2007). This policy forms the basis 
of my thesis, which argues that policymaking is far more complex than existing 
reviews encourage us to believe.  
 
At COP17, the debates were complex, raising among other issues the importance of 
policies, and more so getting policies right through—according to the Hon. Minister 
of Energy, Ms Dipuo-Peters—'sophisticated policy processes' that are inherently 
reliant on consultation and scientific foundations. Discussants were quick to identify 
the challenges of misaligned policy whilst at the same time appeared resolute on the 
need for evidence, rather than considering the more tricky details of how that 
evidence would be used and more so where it might come from. It is such taken-for-
granted dynamics, amongst others, that form the content of my interrogation of the 
Strategy and characterise the 'messy' reality of policymaking.  
 
At the very same negotiations, the Minister of Energy declared industrial biofuels 'on 
track', the policy a success and implementation towards targets likely to be realised 
as planned. As much as one learns to take such political proclamations with a modest 
(if not substantial) amount of scepticism, such optimism belies a far bleaker picture 
and far more convoluted trajectory. Immediately following the release of the 
strategy, vested interests within the industry and wider assemblage decried the vague 
and contradictory nature of the final Strategy, criticising its logic and lack of support 
for the industry. The situation has not changed significantly since 2007 so, to 'those 
in the know' and from 'whispers in the corridors', the Minister's claims could neither 
be further from the truth nor is it clear what is meant by the 'success'. In essence, this 
thesis attempts to identify both how and why the policy changed and its so-called 
'success'. 
 
After completing my MSc, which looked at institutions around food security in South 
Africa, I was appointed as a consultant within the Office of the Presidency to assist 
with the development of the War on Poverty Campaign. My 'job' was primarily 
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devising the institutional arrangements required for a full rollout of the programme. 
Through this experience, I encountered policymaking first hand but the experience 
was bittersweet. My 'hard science' grooming had once assured me that people were 
rational, policy-making was rational, and that with enough research, policies should 
be too, or at least get better as one goes along. I quickly learned that matters of fact, 
if one subscribes to such a doctrine, matter less than—or are perhaps equally 
dependent on—the political aspirations, vested interests and ideological drivers at 
work as well.  
 
In the proposal phases of the PhD, I looked for a new policy that I could unpack, 
which, although different substantively, might resonate with what I had observed 
within the War on Poverty processes. A focus on institutions and government 
operations in my MSc had also driven me closer to interpretive policy studies as an 
area of interest; one undersubscribed to in South Africa considering the plethora of 
instrumentalist approaches and 'getting policies right'. (Obviously there are variations 
to such theme (policies differ in technical affinity) and there are exceptions to the 
rule, however, development as a particularly messy and 'wicked' policy problem 
appears deserving of far greater scrutiny.) A long interest in renewable energy and a 
matching of expertise with my primary supervisor, biofuels appeared apt. On paper, 
it seemed like there might be something to it. With a scoping of various documents 
produced by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) suggesting things were 
happening, meeting with policymakers to obtain their perspectives seemed possible, 
even if perhaps optimistic. Given the somewhat limited scholarship into dynamic 
policy-making processes in South Africa, there was certainly scope for a detailed, 
constructively critical analysis and review.  
 
In one of my first interviews, the respondent set the scene for me with some alarm. 
"You're researching the biofuels strategy; how brave of you!" Not only did this 
respondent understand the complexity of biofuels as a 'development' technology but 
he also understood, from his experiences within the DME, the socio-political 
dynamics that, in some cases, conspired towards biofuels' quick demise and in other 
cases campaigned for their long and prosperous future. The situation, or at least 
government's approach was schizophrenic, involving manifold voices from both 
internal and external interests—multiple streams if you like—with stakeholder 
involvement being in a continuous state of flux. There was little consensus on the 
specific goals and objectives and even when there was it did not appear to last very 
long whereas interpretations differed as to what consensus meant. Although such 
complexity was largely unknown to me at the time, grappling with it further has it 
echoed some of my original thoughts on policymaking processes in South Africa, 
while also leading me into new areas of understanding.  
 
Overall, this thesis traces my personal journey through the South African biofuels 
assemblage over the last three years. It details the original development of the 
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strategy, one both convoluted and contradictory. It describes how past current and 
the likely future projects match little with the original aspirations of the strategy (but 
not some of the agro-industrial imaginary underlying it), although this too is only 
half true, is open to interpretation and the success of which may be something 
entirely intractable. Finally an attempt is made to analyse what all this means and 
how it might reflect the minister's call for sophisticated policymaking. Any such call 
will need to acknowledge the important and not necessarily positive role politics, 
actor-networks, narratives and institutional configurations play within the 
policymaking process - factors that are neither easily circumvented nor necessarily 
manageable.  
 
This thesis is, however, one interpretation and necessarily incomplete. Through 
interviews, open discussion, presentations, news paper reports, facilitations and a 
range of other activities that have peppered my engagement with the research, I have 
found there to be a plethora of 'smoke and mirrors', 'stories within stories' and 'blatant 
lies', intermixed with 'straight-forward', 'well-meaning' aspirations, proposals and 
approaches. Through some rigour I have tried to grasp as full a picture as I can, 
eroded in part by time and financial constraints and the willingness of key players to 
engage with me. In so doing, I have completed over 70 interviews with government 
officials and informants close to the policy processes. I have attended biofuels 
workshops in government, private sector and civil society environments, interacting 
closely with stakeholders on all fronts. Although a work in progress, as most policy 
research is, the preliminary review provides a wealth of detail and surprising twists 
and turns in South Africa's engagement with biofuels from a policy perspective. The 
lessons learned are important ones, with ramifications not only for biofuels policy in 
South Africa and biofuels policies elsewhere but also for policymaking in South 
Africa in general. The work should be of interest to policymakers and academics 
alike, not through providing specific substantive or remedial recommendations but to 
engage in reflexivity and debate about a crucially important and yet significantly 
under-researched aspect of governance in South Africa's teenage democracy.  
 
As is customary, it must be stated that two peer-reviewed papers have emerged from 
the work in this thesis. The first was a theoretical paper I wrote in response to the 
rather rudimentary conceptual frameworks prevailing in the food-versus-fuel debate 
in South Africa (Ruysenaar 2011b). The second was a comparative piece with a 
colleague, Shishusri Pradhan. This paper was essentially a summary of some of the 
important outcomes of our theses with similar research approaches highlighting the 
role of narratives and networks in policymaking around biofuels in South Africa and 
India (Pradhan & Ruysenaar 2014). Some aspects of the research have also been 
presented at conferences in Sri Lanka (PISCES), Botswana (the Peoples Energy 
Network 2011), and Ireland (Universitas21). Two further papers are pending 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OUTLINE 
We live in a time of rapid technical and economic change characterised by increasing 
reliance on technical expertise to solve increasingly complex problems of global 
extent (see for example Leach et al. 2005). As Fischer (1990, p.14) suggests of this 
new amorphous post-industrial society,
1
 there are primary defining features that 
include:  
the central importance of science and technology for economic growth, a 
high degree of organisational interdependence, increasingly centralised 
forms of economic and political decision making, greater reliance on 
technical experts and rapid rates of economic and technological change.  
 
Experts also warn us that the world is in crisis, or, according to John Beddington 
(2009), faces a perfect storm of food shortages, scarce water and insufficient energy 
resources. As a central challenge, the latter energy crisis is increasingly characterised 
by 'peak oil', in which maximum global oil production has tentatively been 
reached—though debate remains—and will now enter the downward phase of the 
production cycle.
2
 As these crises converge, biofuels, as the archetypal technology of 
the emerging bio-economy (Smolker 2008), are proposed as renewable and 
sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels, whilst providing a range of other benefits by 
responding to these global and interconnected challenges. Nevertheless, their uptake 
involves trade-offs to be made between social, economic and environmental costs 
and the grand claims of biofuels have seemingly over sold their actual potential (see 
below). At the same time, the expectation that biofuels have 'something for everyone' 
and that future breakthroughs are equally enticing has been a powerful motif in the 
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 It is perhaps wrong to specify this term as part of this discussion as there are a plethora of apt 
terminologies that identify with significant changes in society since the industrial revolution—
these include, amongst others, the post-industrial, information economy and the administrative 
state (see for discussion Beniger 1986). 
2
 Numerous experts at least suggest that global output will be reached by 2020 (Schmidt et al. 2012, 
p.7). On debates around peak oil in the South African context see Hender et al. (2007)). Peak oil 
is not the only energy crisis; energy security is increasingly defined at a range of levels and 
involves multiple energy sources. Whereas wealthier commuters face shortages and fuel-price 
hikes, local villagers and the urban poor without access to grid electricity and living in ‘energy 
poverty’ face rising coal and fuel-wood costs for cooking and heating (International Energy 
Agency 2008; Sanchez & Scott 2009). Increasing criticism is also directed at the dominant grid 
technologies such as coal and nuclear power given their contribution to climate change and other 
social and environmental externalities with increasing calls for a third-industrial revolution 




development of policies that seek to promote and govern this new technology (Birch 
& Ponte 2014). 
 
South Africa, being one of the first countries in Africa to publish a formal strategy 
around industrial biofuels, has not been exempt from the global hype around biofuels 
emerging in the early 2000s. The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of South Africa 
(hereafter the Strategy/BISSA) evoked widespread criticism, from both industry and 
the wider public. However, there has been only limited interrogation of the 
development of the Strategy or at least an examination of policy processes through 
which decisions were made.
3
 Given the complexity of this new technology, and the 
often highly emotive nature of arguments for and against their use (see below), the 
South African biofuels policy offers a useful opportunity to examine decision-
making with regard to Fisher's (1990) defining features of the age, as described 
above, in the developing world context. In the next section, I will therefore provide 
some context of the global hype, whilst also locating the South African case study. 
Thereafter I will elaborate on the aims and rationale of the study.  
 
It is also worth noting that biofuels are one (somewhat estranged) element of a wider 
South African renewable energy complex (see Appendix E), which is emerging 
because of specific political economies of energy transitions in South Africa. Baker 
et al. (2014) provide a recent an important contribution to this area, looking broadly 
at the renewable energy sector and energy transitions in South Africa (see also 
Tsikata & Sebitosi 2010). This is an important facet to the overall debate (and can be 
extended to the international level), in which competing visions for the future of 
energy and the route through which energy transitions will occur and are occurring 
are subject to powerful incumbents and other nuances within the sector. Especially 
important is the close linkages between the state and core businesses. In South 
Africa, the latter reflects a continuing but shifting Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC), 
which I discuss later (see also Appendix E for a brief theoretical overview). The 
direction of energy transitions also have deep historical roots that have created niches 
for some industries and locked out others, while there is also the importance of local 
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 As there was a draft and final version of this strategy, when discussing the draft I name it the draft 
Strategy. When referring to the final versions I will use either: Strategy, final Strategy or BISSA, 




political economies shaping and being shaped by exogenous factors (Baker et al. 
2014). I take such issues further, honing into the political economy of the biofuels 
assemblage, in which similar issues arise and emphasise the nuance of policymaking, 
in which much of the struggles over the future play out. While there has been some 
focus on renewable energy policies, grappling for example with the pitfalls of half-
hearted policy (Sebitosi & Pillay 2008), looking at technical and economic barriers to 
the poorly performing sector (Tsikata & Sebitosi 2010; Pegels 2010) and proposing 
ways forward (Winkler 2005), biofuels are particularly interesting and may offer 
some greater insight.   
SETTING THE SCENE: BIOFUELS (POLICIES) AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BIOFUELS 
STRATEGY 
 
Biofuels, or the more apt term 'agrofuels' (Cf. McMichael 2010a), are liquid fuels 
produced from agricultural biomass. As policymakers tend to homogenise 
technically complex phenomena into easily digestible formats—an activity I am most 
interested in within this thesis—I have provided a technical overview of biofuels in 
Appendix A, rather than digress from the discussion at this point. The more 
important subject here is that to both industrialised and developing countries alike, 
biofuels initially provided a lucrative opportunity, most notably for (agricultural) 
development. It is suggested, for example, that Biofuels: 
could induce a paradigm shift in agriculture and rural development. 
Sustainable biofuels production can provide up to 1.1million jobs in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Cockerill and Hongo 2005). 
Although part of a wider bio-economy and renewable energy complex, biofuels have 
an especially interesting trajectory. The promotion of biofuels as a 'silver bullet' for 
many of the world's most profound ills, was a proposition forged within the abstract 
realms of a global discourse, capturing the imagination of pundits, policymakers and 
a range of other actors in diverse contexts. In 2003, for example, a European Union 
Biofuels Directive (Official Journal of the European Union 2003) announced a new 
opportunity of global scope, not only presenting trade opportunities through a new 
policy-driven market but also establishing mobilising metaphors that permeated 




missions and political utterances.
4
 Eager market players and developers merged with 
political protagonists and a legion of optimists who saw manifold opportunities in the 
new phenomenon. From the North, ever-present objectives of ensuring national 
energy security
5
 and meeting greenhouse gas emission reductions targets
6
 have been 
clear drivers. Biofuels provided yet another panacea being a clean energy-security 
solution, reducing emissions and creating a new developmental path for the rural and 
agricultural sectors, especially in developing countries (Cf. Charles et al. 2007; 
Cushion et al. 2010). Africa was quick to react, with a cohort of countries forming 
the Pan-African Non-Petroleum Producers Association
7
 or "Green Opec" (Biopact 
Team 2006). 
 
From precarious origins (Cadenas & Cabezudo 1998) biofuels have found support 
within the new aspirations of a global bio-economy (Smolker 2008), a strategic 
element of low-carbon energy transitions (Robèrt et al. 2007) and have themselves 
become part of what may be considered a globally integrated socio-technological 
assemblage (Mol 2007; Smith 2010) or global biofuels imaginary (Birch & Ponte 
2014). Encouraged by policy measures, global production of biofuels was estimated 
to be over 35 billion litres in 2006 (Commission of the European Communities 2006) 
increasing to over 100 billion litres in 2010 (International Energy Agency 2013).
8
 
While it is possible to talk of a global extent, and as the notion of a global biofuels 
assemblage suggests, it is also necessary to recognise that "there are distinct regional 
                                                 
4
 The ongoing Renewable Energy Directives (RED) in the EU continues this trend.  
5
 One of the significant drivers of biofuels production is declining global oil reserves with increasingly 
rapid consumption. It is predicted that by 2025 the global demand for petroleum will have increased 
between 40-50 per cent (Johnston & Holloway 2007). At the same time, the rate at which 
conventional oil production can be increased has been reduced by the lack of refining capacity, and the 
fact that nearly 50% of the world’s proven and probable conventional light crude oil reserves have 
already been consumed (USGS, 2004). Collective fears of diminishing fuel supply and energy security 
have thus pushed up oil prices not only making biofuels more financially competitive but are a 
reminder that at some point petroleum will need to be replaced. 
6
  For example, the EU has proposed mandatory biofuel blends with petroleum of five per cent by 2015, and 
10 per cent by 2020 (although these are currently under scrutiny and will be further reviewed in 2014). 
Being unable to meet its biofuel target due to insufficient agricultural land available in Europe, their 
demand has created an international biofuels market.  
7
 Member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo (Democratic Republic), Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia. 
8
 World biofuels production grew by 13.8%  in 2010; biofuels accounted for 0.5% of global primary 
energy consumption. Growth was driven by North America (+17.7%) and South and Central 
America (+14.2%). It should also be mentioned that this is not the first time there has been hype 
around biofuels and spiking production, as similar occurrences have happened in the 1970s in the 





patterns and alliances that cohere around various aspects of this polymorphous 
industry" (Hollander 2010, p.699).  
 
The biofuels phenomenon allows for reviews through varying analytical frameworks. 
James Smith's  (2010) conceptualisation of a global biofuels assemblage highlights 
the global extent of the 'biofueled' future. This global assemblage encompasses the 
tangible configurations through which global forms of techno-science, economic 
rationalism, and expert systems gain significance and shape interests, producing 
'global' knowledge about global forms and striving to replace socially, politically, 
and spatially context-bound forms of knowledge (ibid, p.10). Smith (2010) argues 
the outcome is actually the globalisation of risk. Others look more at the 
configuration of the global biofuels commodity or value chains (Ponte 2013), how 
such a network is constituted and governed, and, for example, the implications for 
sustainability (Mol 2007).  
 
An emerging focus on low-carbon energy transitions also has implications for our 
understanding of the development of a global biofuels regime. Theories of transition 
allow analysis of deep structural changes, providing both a description of the process 
of transition but also providing tools to explain it. From the 'energy transitions' 
literature—which draws from existing understanding of socio-technical transitions—
there is a distinct understanding that multi-level perspectives are important (see 
Baker et al. 2014). Here, global and national (macro-)levels are characterised by 
'regimes'—which forms the ‘deep structure’ stabilizing the  existing socio-technical 
system (Geels 2004; Geels 2011).
9
 Regimes are characterised by path-dependency 
and structural lock in (a "techno-institutional complex"), which resist change and 
hinders the emergence of alternative technological trajectories (Unruh 2000, p.817). 
An outline of the South African energy regime is provided in Appendix E and later 
discussions though Baker et al.(2014, p.4) describe it succinctly as incorporating "the 
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 Regimes, as with the widening perspective of 'governance', increasingly include non-state actors and 
institutions that are equally important in performing and directing the governance apparatus and 
defining the trajectory of (agrofuel) capitalism. For an example of this in the fledgling biofuels 
assemblage see Bailis and Baka (2011). Philip McMichael (1997; 2009) has written extensively 
on global food regimes, and more recently the global agro-food-fuels-feed complex (McMichael 




state-run, coal-generated, publicly funded electricity sector [ESKOM at the core] and 
related institutions, policies and structures at the national level".  
 
Niches are more micro-level spaces in which small networks innovate—Geels (2011, 
p.27) refers to this as "radical innovation"—and begin to agitate the overriding 
regimes in which they reside.  Schot and Geels (2008) suggest the viability of such 
niches depends on three internal niche-level processes, which consist of the shaping 
and alignment of expectations; the formation of a social actor-network and, finally, 
learning processes. In my thesis we will see the existence of such a niche comprising 
the 'project level', though were actually supportive of, rather antagonistic to, a wider 
biofuels regime; being instrumental in the development of the biofuels regime in the 
first place and constitutive of a biofuels assemblage that extended beyond any niche 
boundaries. (The multi-level perspective is of course problematic when considering 
historical trajectories and attempting to neatly separate things. For example, the 
biofuels assemblage could itself be considered a niche and partner to other 
innovations within the wider renewable energy sector or as antagonistic to the 
existing fossil-fuels regime, but the biofuels assemblage comprises or is solidified 
around certain niche, landscape and regime components). 
 
The latter raises the importance of the external environment, which influences both 
the macro-level and the micro-level; it acknowledges the importance of history and 
context. Geels (2011, p.28) considers the landscape to include "demographical 
trends, political ideologies, societal values and macro-economic patterns" and 
influences dynamics at the regime and niche levels. My addition to this literature 
considers the policy dimension to such transitions, further contributing to empirical 
evidence of how political economy factors and other niche, regime and landscape 
factors act to transform policy (and that the policymaking process is one lens through 
which these countervailing forces become most apparent). Primarily, my interest 
resides in the discursive practices through which, for example, niche actors define 
and propagate certain ideas within policy, and the way ideas are transformed and 





Hype, Mobilising Metaphors and the Meta-narrative of Biofuels to the Rescue 
 
Although only a caricature of biofuels’ rise to fame—to give the de-contextualised 
technological phenomena human-like agency—the articulation of global ‘win-win’ 
narratives within the international biofuels discourse has had significant 
repercussions. According to Borras et al. (2010), it is these ‘win-win’ narratives that 
has been the basis of the emerging global ‘biofuels complex’. They suggest further 
that:  
[t]his ‘win-win’ narrative is reflected in diverse policy debates in Europe 
(Franco et al. 2010) and in the United States (Hollander 2010 and Gillon 
2010), and has dominated the framing of the biofuels debate globally 
(Borras et al. 2010, p.573). 
 
In general, descriptions of the ways in which biofuels policies have been developed 
on the backing of such powerful and appealing storylines, appear to reflect a 
common pattern or meta-narrative. Such a meta-narrative matches a generalised 
blueprint proposed by Godin (2009), of how storylines are used to give meaning to 
science, technology and innovation and their elevation onto the political and policy 
agenda. The suggestion that something new and quite different from the past is 
happening in the economy initiates the storyline. The new phenomenon or change, 
once named, will generate positive returns, with such outcomes "either in the form of 
hype, hyperbole or utopia" (Godin 2009, p.17). Furthermore, narratives then need to 
be verified by statistics to qualify the new phenomenon and validate that a change is 
happening. Thereafter it is essential that policies be developed. Fundamental, and 
crucial to the overall critique of the agency of such narratives, is that all this is based 
on the premise that science technology and innovation "are good for you or society" 
(ibid.,p. 14). Godin finally proposes that a narrative "generally ends with policy 
recommendations, a series of policy objectives are defined, obstacles and conditions 
are identified, and targets suggested" (2009, p.19). This should not be taken to mean 
that there may be no truth in narratives, but rather emphasises their action over and 





While promoting developmental issues amongst others, the elevation of biofuels onto 
the (global) political agenda—as a ‘new’ green technology—substantially compares 
to Godin’s (2009) overall characterisation. Biofuels presented a wealth of benefits, 
even if unsubstantiated and premised on the political aspirations of the North. Fact-
finding missions (such as that for the EU mandatory blending) ordained increased 
biofuels production, which, when following best practices and providing adequate 
support measures, would allow biofuels markets to deliver this range of benefits. Key 
to all of this is getting the policy right and, as I will discuss in later chapters, there 
was no absence of recommendations as to how to do so.  
Confronting Complexities: Policy Perspectives and the Example of South Africa 
As a technology, biofuels embody a problematic duality in which a range of 
technical benefits are couched with developmental aspirations of rural development 
and job creation, even where such promises often appear intractable in their 
implementation and contradictory in their assumptions, especially in the complex 
industrial sector and rural landscapes of South Africa. That is, however, the essence 
of narratives, especially global narratives; they posit powerful arguments while 
excluding local contingencies, abstracting from the very real situations that most 
often depart from such unsubstantiated storylines. With a rising tide of anti-biofuels 
sentiment emerging from project-level reviews that contrast the earlier predictions 
(Cf. Matondi et al. 2010), the appropriateness of biofuels is highly contested. There 
has also been the onset of a range of unintended consequences that have further 
challenged on-going support (see below).  
 
When it comes to advancing any form of bioenergy, the ultimate outcome will 
depend on those implementing bioenergy activities and on the goals envisioned. At 
its simplest, 
the challenge is to create a policy and market environment that supports the 
design and implementation of bioenergy activities that contribute to 
sustainable development (Kartha et al. 2005, p.4).  
As the political-economy approach to commodities suggests, it is not so much what 
the crop is used for (biofuels or otherwise) but how this is actually achieved that 




‘bad’ approaches to biofuels, and these approaches are generally articulated, or 
steered through policies. It is therefore necessary to improve our understandings of 
how biofuels policies have been developed and reviewed. Summing up the situation, 
Von Braun (2007) argues that even though many of the plans to expand biofuels in 
developed and developing countries have been made with very little analytical basis, 
they have now become policy. Such a pronouncement does not, however, give much 
insight as to why such a situation prevails or what an analytical basis might comprise 
(Cf. Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010; Gillon 2010; Pradhan & Ruysenaar 2014). This 
opens up to scrutiny the complex relationship between the discourse and narratives 
of biofuels and the processes involved in developing policies around the ‘new’ and 
‘exciting’ technology.  
The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of South Africa 
A relatively superficial or ‘normalised’ description of the South Africa biofuels 
policy conforms to Godin’s (2009) pattern closely. Initially, building on some 
impressive historical cases such as Brazil, with hype escalated by international 
enthusiasm and policies being formalised within the industrialised countries such as 
the EU and USA, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME)
10
 in South Africa 
decided to pursue biofuels by drafting an industrial-based biofuels strategy. A final 
version was submitted and accepted to Cabinet in 2007. The formal policy process—
the articulation rather than implementation of the policy—was ostensibly set in 
motion two years earlier when the Cabinet approved the development of an industrial 
strategy targeted at ‘creating jobs’ and linking the so-called ‘first and second 
economies’ (Mtwa 2007). Aspirations of linking South Africa’s dual economy, that 
is the so-called ‘first’ (agro-industrial commercial agriculture) and ‘second’ (poor 
peasant farmer) economies in rural South Africa as well as creating jobs therein, 
reflected a strategic drive towards using biofuels as a means of rural development. 
The additional and expected range of ‘win-win’ narratives were not absent. 
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This Department subsequently split into the Department of Energy (DoE) and the Department of 




The responsibility of developing a clear and rational strategy was entrusted to an 
interdepartmental Biofuels Task Team (BTT), which was to oversee all aspects of the 
policy development—evidence-based policymaking would be the basis for any way 
forward. After completing a Feasibility Study (Biofuels Task Team 2006), the Task 
Team produced a draft Strategy later in 2006 (DME 2006), which Cabinet then 
insisted required public consultation. A year later in December 2007, after public 
outcry, Cabinet released the final Biofuels Industrial Strategy for South Africa (DME 
2007). In a dramatic shift in approach, the final Strategy accepted by the Cabinet 
excluded maize, due to food security concerns, and rejected jatropha (Jatropha 
Curcas) due to environmental considerations. The final Strategy removed any 
mandatory blending and reduced the cap on total blending from 4.5% to 2% of the 
national blend; it therefore looked significantly different from its predecessor.  
 
South Africa, therefore, departs somewhat from the meta-narrative above, or at least 
experiences in other African countries, insofar as there was a broad reversal of the 
strategy, notably in its decision to exclude maize and declining necessary support to 
industry. Clearly, there is nuance at the local level, though it should be noted that a 
similar reversal of support (at least for first-generation biofuels) has occurred in the 
international sphere. The early and extensive ‘hype’ around biofuels faded not only 
due to contingencies at local levels but also as policymakers and proponents 
confronted the inherent complexity and onset of multiple unintended consequences. 
The global food crisis of 2008, for example, was blamed to various degrees on 
increased maize-to-ethanol production, landing the food-versus-fuel debate on the 
global political agenda; the issues reverberating through local debates. The basis of 
this debate is whether the production of biofuels competes with food production, 
thereby limiting both the availability of food supplies and decreasing its accessibility 
through increased prices (Eide 2008; Mitchell 2008; Cf. Ruysenaar 2011; Chapter 7; 
Appendix C). Poor energy ratios and greenhouse gas savings, amongst other issues, 
have also resulted in increasing media opposition and far wider academic scrutiny.
11
 
Biofuels went from being a prized new development franchise, as the quote above 
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 In addition to debates around food-versus-fuel there are also the emerging threats of large-scale land 
acquisitions or ‘land-grabbing’ (e.g. Cotula 2012), ecological and climate related threats from 
indirect land use change (Searchinger et al. 2009; Tilman et al. 2009), poor energy outputs and 




suggests to a "crime against humanity".
12
 While it is common for contrary views to 
develop when considering development interventions, the broad reversal in opinions 
of biofuels is novel (Smith 2009a).  
 
In South Africa too, research into the potential benefits and drawbacks of biofuels 
links them intrinsically to a complex mix of debates surrounding climate change, 
fuel, feed and food security, as well as becoming fashionably aligned to 
‘development’.
13
 The issue is that all these topics are susceptible to different 
interpretations, normally comprising diametrically opposite views that need to be 
taken into consideration when making decisions. Yet with some momentum behind 
them, biofuels remain firmly on the global and local agenda, so decisions as to their 
future will continue to be important. Some scholars insist a more balanced view be 
taken given such persistent and widespread support (Birch & Ponte 2014; Daschle 
2007; Cf. Mathews 2007; 2008). Even a more balanced view, however, appears to be 
one of deep cleavages and polemics. If anything, biofuels are better known for their 
complexity and resultant confusion than any specific benefits, whether practical or 
perceived. Such contrast is not inconceivable, given the rush toward a ‘biofueled 
future’ being based on, in part, policymakers faith in the wide-ranging, almost 
mystical, professed gains, which have risen to the status of blueprint narratives for 
‘development’ and more specifically ‘rural development’ (Birch & Ponte 2014; e.g. 
Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010; Pradhan & Ruysenaar 2014).  
RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The above discussion highlights that a ‘northern’, policy-based, ‘win-win’ biofuels 
agenda of global extent has prefaced significant policy shifts in the global South 
(although Brazil is an obvious outlier or rather a ‘Southern’ leader within the 
assemblage), though both the priority and judgements of their actual value are no 
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 In 2007, Jean Ziegler the United Nations’ independent expert on the right to food called for a five-
year moratorium on biofuel production to halt what he called a growing "catastrophe’’ for the 
poor and that it was a “crime against humanity’’ to devote agricultural land to biofuel production. 
13
 Development itself is a wholly problematic term (see for example Sachs 2010) as will become clear 
in later sections and will be considered more thoroughly in the main thesis. One would have to 





longer ubiquitous and only positive; counter narratives have emerged. The rational of 
this thesis emerges from the situation in which policymakers are confronted by a 
range of issues that need to be considered when making decisions whether or not to 
support biofuels and how to manage their uptake. To understand how decisions are 
made, it is imperative to examine how policymakers are engaging with both the 
reality (configured around historical and present political economies and transitions) 
and the hype; the type of information used to weigh up such decisions and who 
actually decides. Despite widespread criticisms of biofuels policies—South Africa 
included—there is limited research into how those policies have actually been made.  
 
To date there has been some scholarly evaluation and theories of how the South 
African biofuels policy was developed (described later in the thesis), though these do 
not detail the nuances of the shifting narratives and wavering support of the 
stakeholders and how these relate to the decisions made. Few lessons are therefore 
learned as to what such decisions suggest about the wider context of renewable (and 
non-renewable) energy and rural development in South Africa, how these realms 
define the scope of policies, a closer appreciation for what policymaking actually 
means and incorporates meaning and how it acts, especially symbolically. Such an 
instance is reflected by the general remarks that the strategy was crafted 
exceptionally poorly, at least depending to whom one talks, with the insistence being 
that politics trumped economics (Adams et al. 2009). The details of how and why 
politics trumped economics and how this is important to policymaking are left 
unexamined if not entirely sidelined. Part of the answer is that the expectations 
placed on biofuels made them both very easy to support (or not support) but very 
difficult to operationalise. One could perhaps suggest the former revolves around 
different processes than the latter and thus requires critical reflection. In relation to 
how policies in South Africa might mean or act (see concluding chapter), the policy 
process therefore provides a useful lens with which to interrogate wider issues of 
rural development (agro-industrial complexes) and energy transitions in the face of 





To build on this broad rationale, the next few paragraphs will reiterate some 
emerging concerns in particular relation to South Africa and the corresponding aims 
of the research.  
 
The above discussion has begun to suggest that international discourses and their 
provocative narratives—that is knowledge and received wisdom—both initiate and 
may circumscribe policies in local contexts. A first main overarching aim is to 
interrogate this process further and illustrate how such processes unfold. Such a 
focus has to consider not only what international discourses and narratives mean for 
policymaking in local contexts but acknowledge that such interactions equally take 
shape in response to the characteristics of local contexts and are driven by local 
players and imaginaries. While Godin’s (2009) schema essentialises the importance 
of narratives for policymaking (see also Chapter 2), they do not act alone. They are 
part of wider discourses or modes of thinking and encounter local structural and 
ideological differences in local contexts. In this case, South Africa is particularly 
interesting and unique. Its historical reputation as a technological leader, with a 
highly competent industrial and scientific sector and an abundance of resources at its 
disposal, has been eclipsed by a woeful development trajectory based on segregation 
and elitist control through institutionalised racism (see Chapter 3). The understanding 
that an Energy-Minerals Complex (MEC) emerging during the partheid era exerts 
significant influence over the political economy and continuing macro-economic 
trajectory is especially significant though is also in a state of flux. So too is South 
Africa's current prominence within the global South, as an emerging economy and 
partner (or competitor—or colloquially considered as a briquette) within the BRICS 
countries, makes it even more imperative that the gaps between the rich and poor are 
closed given the perception that the means exist with which to do so. The ANC-led 
government, meanwhile, has proudly self-proclaimed a development-state status for 
South Africa, though such a classification appears amorphous and outside of current 
capacities (see Edigheji 2010a; Chapter 3; Chapter 8). In this context, the conflicts 
concealed within the win-win narratives become increasingly acute and problematic, 
especially when the high-tech nature of biofuels themselves (and the socio-technical 
imaginary developing around them) have to be reined in to meet the needs of 




public and especially the poor are completely forgotten or marginalised within this 
mix of interested and affected parties.  
 
An important part of the context and the value of researching the policy process in 
South Africa is that policymaking has been problematic in its own right. (It is not just 
decisions around new technologies to be used for development that make 
policymaking of interest, though they do add additional dimensions.) Through nearly 
two decades of democracy, the South African government has faced significant 
challenges in converting development policies and strategic goals—in which 
defining the problem can be more difficult or contentious than designing the 
solution—into reality, especially for the benefit of many millions of poor and 
vulnerable within the country. That is, despite being known for good policy, South 
Africa is beleaguered by poor implementation. This situation suggests that there are 
questions as to whether the South African Biofuels Industrial Strategy will meet the 
expectations provisioned. If one were to be instrumental or deductive about 
analysing such a policy, untangling the disjuncture or relationship between the policy 
objectives (what the policy says), the outputs (what people do in response) and the 
outcomes (what tangible results emerged) would be sufficient as an analysis. 
However, such an approach takes for granted the unwritten aims of the strategy, 
leaves unexamined the role of the state in contrast to other powerful entities and 
interests and 'black boxes' the processes through which such policy objectives are 
entwined and become implicit within the strategy. It also leaves the social 
construction of policy success or failure unexamined. A focus on only what is 
explicit leaves a whole area of enquiry neglected and hides the important nuances 
when deciding to decide. It therefore does not allow us to unpack and contextualise 
the meta-narrative proposed above. A second overarching aim is thus to consider not 
whether the policy will meet its prescribed objectives but the symbolic value of such 
policy, how prevailing objectives were legitimised and decided on as part of a 
process imbued with unequal power relations and complex historical and emerging 
socio-technical transitions, drawing on very specific evidence or 'knowledges'. 
 




In South Africa, there is a tendency on the part of many analysts and 
scholars to ignore implementation and operationalisation, but a more 
serious weakness is a frequent engagement in deductive approaches 
through which they remind us what is wrong with … policy before telling 
us what the actual policy is. They are often unfamiliar with the goals and 
intentions of policy as they refuse to consult primary texts, often because 
they are removed from the behind-the-scenes reality, and too lazy to 
familiarise themselves with primary information and to engage with 
decision-makers (Landsberg 2012, p.2). 
Büscher (2009, p.3951) also suggests there is an unhelpful division between a 
technical, quantitative bias and "simplistic ideas about policy processes and 
dynamics" and more thorough qualitative and interpretive approaches. Such a 
reliance on quantifiable data may not be as useful as other methods such as process-
tracing (George & Bennet 2005), which may tell us much more about how 
government decisions are made. Evaluating policy thus remains locked into more 
instrumental 'implementation-based' assessments, generally demanding technical 
fixes when the policy objectives have not been met (see Box 1; Chapter 3). The idea 
here being that a policy handed down to the bureaucracy has encountered an 
'implementation deficit' (Hogwood & Gunn 1984; Pressman & Wildavsky 1984). 
Thus, if policies are failing to achieve their outcomes, it is usually considered a 
technical issue relating to poor implementation to be dealt with through better 
management. Under the pretence of failing 'implementation', little focus is given to 
the policymaking process itself (Omamo 2004). Recent anthropological research into 
development projects illustrates how this maybe too simplistic (see Box 2 of Chapter 
2). What appears to be 'good policy' is quite possibly also 'unimplementable' policy 
as David Mosse (2004; 2005) has shown. A corollary here might suggest that 'bad' 
policy is equally prone to tenuous value judgements and not indicative of the ability 
to implement it, as the two issues—policy and implementation—may comprise 
different activities or are too closely aligned to be separated out so neatly. In 
separating the two, the mechanisms to create good policy may be very different to 
those that make it implementable (ibid). When combing them, policymaking can be 
likened to incremental 'muddling through', in which Lindblom (1959) suggests that 
implementation is a part of rather than apart from policy. Managers and street level 
bureaucrats then make their own decisions and interpret and implement policy in 





This thesis uses the drafting of the biofuels strategy as a case study in which some of 
these policy processes (described further in Chapter 2) may be examined in more 
detail to provide a deeper understanding of policymaking as a socially-dynamic 
political process in South Africa, over and above a purely technical process. It also 
means moving beyond industry perceptions of the biofuels policy as a failure and 
assessing what precisely is 'wrong' with the government's decided trajectory. By 
interrogating value-judgements of whether policy is 'good' or 'bad', the aim of this 
thesis, is to provide a nuanced investigation as to what makes such 'judgements' 
possible, given the existing challenges in and conceptualisations of policymaking in 
South Africa (see Chapter 3). In doing so, and based on the theoretical proposals 
discussed in the next chapter, it is the drivers and complexities of policymaking that I 
aim to illustrate better. That is, narratives are not propagated by themselves; they are 
fashioned through complex networks and forged through existing practices and 
perceptions of what those practices are or should be (Chapter 4); they are subjected 
to received wisdoms and institutionally bounded rationalities (Chapter 5); legitimised 
by fact finding and evidence gathering (Chapter 6) and, finally, dramatically shift in 
the face of uncertainty and perceived risks (Chapter 7). Narratives and the resulting 
policies may have entirely different objectives than those made explicit in documents 
and formal communications; they also reconfigure and permeate the actions and 
outcomes of various actors, institutions and politics.  
 
In considering how the government and its wider constituents 'make policy', and who 
decides what the expectations are, the importance of power within such processes 
also needs far greater examination. Power here refers not only to overt power 
(pluralist interest-based behavioural power 'over') and covert power (shaping the 
agenda) but of Lukes's (1974) third, invisible power, which moves beyond any 
coercive conception of power or conflict to latent conflict and shaping interests; an 
agent of power over and one that is interest shaping and perhaps of subconscious 
domination.
14
 There is also then a need to identify with the mechanisms of power. 
For Marxists, this relates to class structure (Hill 2005). Foucault considers power to 
be everywhere, existing in diffuse forms, embodied and enacted rather than 
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 One might better consider these dimensions as forms of power (Gaventa 2006) rather than 
‘dimensions’, the latter being measurable instances of the same thing rather than differing in 




possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive (Gaventa 2003). Power is 
inseparable from and expressed through/by knowledge, or rather power-knowledge 
(Foucault 1980). By this, power transcends politics and is rather an everyday, 
socialised and embodied phenomenon, in which discourse is essential to its 
operation. Such a situation compels us to problematise policymaking and consider 
what knowledge has framed such policy processes, not to provide solutions but 
understand how such problems are constructed, and how certain realities are sold as 
solutions; it 'makes the familiar strange' as Colebatch (2009b) would proposition. As 
an example, we have to ask what satisfies as evidence, how it is produced and by 
whom. When asking how narratives and discourses are confronted by and compel 
decisions, the question needs to be asked whether biofuels, as a mechanism for rural 
development, is the influence of discourse and discursive power or one of sound 
empirically justified practice. The answer to that is also directly linked to how 
allegiances and actor-networks influence such decisions, and why the influence of 
politics and power insists that no technology is neutral or benign within 
policymaking processes.  
 
Overall, the above discussion suggests that policymaking is important—but not only 
in a technical/instrumental sense—and, more so, it requires examination as a 
dynamic activity. For this reason, my main aim in this thesis matches a more 
'interpretive' approach when investigating what could be best termed the knowledge-
policy interface (see Chapter 2). My objective is to provide a more nuanced, 
situational perspective, focussing on the processes involved in the development of 
the South African strategy, rather than taking the South African strategy as a given or 
trying to bind the operations of officials to a specific normative model. Unpacking 
misconceptions and the details of what the Strategy actually says are not neglected, 
as some commentators have conflated 'having a policy' with 'making progress'. This 
is not to suggest that instrumental studies are unimportant, and that policies cannot 
be broadly demarcated as such. It is, however, important to determine whether 
technical analyses are the dominant factor in the biofuels policy process, or whether 
decisions have been primarily driven by politics. As part of this situational 
perspective, I propose to dissect the dynamics of policymaking, suggesting that there 




and policymaking, while insisting that the two are inherently connected (e.g. Mosse 
2005) and may co-evolve as socio-technical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim 2009). 
Building on Mosse's (2004) paper, Büscher (2009, p.3953) highlights of the South 
African case: 
energy policies seem to increasingly reflect development policies more 
broadly about which recent anthropological 'ethnography of aid' concludes 
that "they generate mobilizing metaphors ('participation', 'partnership', 
governance', 'social capital') whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of 
conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow 
compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to 
distribute agency and to multiply criteria of success within project systems" 
(Mosse 2004, p.663). What this means in practice, often, is that 
increasingly contradictory realities are often represented or supposed to be 
'solved' by policies that do not acknowledge contradictions but rather 
'organise' or frame social realities such that they can be better managed.  
The Crux of the Matter 
When taken together, the above rationale and aims attempt to answer a question I 
was confronted with repeatedly in research interviews. One version was "why on 
earth would you want to study such a disaster of a strategy?" Such a question 
highlights both the perceived failure of the strategy (my study being a post-mortem 
thereof) but also the focus of most stakeholders on the instrumental desire to get 
policy right. Such ambitions, as important as they are, fall within an overall bias 
towards policy analysis rather than seeing value in policy research or policy process 
analysis (see Box 1). Rarely do such analyses tell us why things go wrong when they 
do, and how that failure is constructed, let alone deconstructed. Similarly, most 
people take the failure of the strategy as a given—there is not much point in looking 
backwards or even sideways—and move onto more interesting issues. This too is 
important as, although perhaps too dismissive of the past, policies are generally 
forward looking. Such a sentiment was clearly suggested by a current member of the 
Biofuels Task Team when discussing any chance of revising the strategy: "We won't 
bother rewriting the strategy; we are focusing on regulations now (BTT member E 
2013)." Once a certain direction has been articulated and the governance apparatus 







The same respondent followed on by highlighting the need for greater capacity being 
the reason why the government has taken so long to sort the regulations out. As 
mentioned above, part of interpreting and unpacking the policy process one has to 
reconfigure the questions of 'capacity'. Existing assumptions subscribe to the policy-
implementation binary that dominates South African policymaking discourse. My 
thesis argues that we need to move past such a binary, by which ideas of capacity 
become far more revealing and embedded within a far more complex situation. 
While there has been much focus on the implementation of policy in South Africa, 
little has been devoted to how and what knowledge finds its way into decisions and 
whether it is possible to provide a deeper understanding of policymaking as a social 
process, over and above been a purely technical process within the South African 
context (although characteristically the two usually run somewhat parallel).  
 
Given the broad aims detailed above, the thesis aims to add to various bodies of 
knowledge by making the following broad contributions that will be detailed through 
the thesis and the conclusions. Reflecting on the title of the thesis, I primarily detail 
empirically the genesis and anatomy of the biofuels policy in South Africa, adding to 
Box 1: Policy Studies 
There is some interchange of the terms policy analysis, policy research, and policy studies so 
some clarification on their use in this thesis is appropriate. I conform to Fisher’s (2003) 
categories in which policy studies is a general field of enquiry. A subset of this is, policy 
analysis, has an “applied orientation and seeks to identify the most efficient alternative for 
dealing with a current problem” (Young 1997, 1). Such analyses reflect the linear assumptions 
or instrumentality of policy whereby ex ant (a priori, pre hoc, prospective) analyses are 
undertaken before the selection and implementation of a policy (Puentes-Markides, 2007). The 
purpose of such an analysis is both ‘predictive’ (to anticipate likely effects that might result 
from the adoption of a particular policy) and ‘prescriptive’ (providing recommendations to 
achieve a particular result). Thereby, ex ant analyses inform the processes of decision-making 
and deliberation. In stages subsequent to policy formulation and implementation, ex post (a 
posteriori, post hoc, and retrospective) policy evaluation is undertaken. Ultimately, ex post 
evaluation determines whether policy implementation satisfies established policy outputs, 
objectives and outcomes (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Puentes-Markides, 2007). In less 
technical jargon, policy analysis provides information for making-decisions and identifies so-
called ‘implementation gaps’ to be managed and corrected afterwards. Both ex-post and ex-ant 
analyses are transfixed on research ‘for’ the policy process; considering it an instrumental 
process that can be improved by more data and the instrumental use of positivistic research. As 
Hill (2004) suggests, there is the separate research agenda questioning the nature ‘of’ the policy 
process: policy research in Fischer’s (2003) nomenclature, or, otherwise as ‘policy-process 






existing reviews. As the first phase of what is set to be a long and convoluted 
process, the drafting of the initial and final strategy needs documenting in its own 
right, to allow for a detailed record. As part of this historical detail, important 
findings emerge that shed light on wider debates and which are illustrative of wider 
dynamics within South Africa. These conform to the major socio-technical realms of 
the agro-economy and renewable-energy transitions within the country.  
 
Though the thesis discounts the purely instrumental understanding of policy, and at 
the same time, it illustrates that even as instrumental policymaking the biofuels 
strategy is deeply flawed. The evidence upon which it was based was myopic and 
unclear, at worst suggesting far different decisions should have been made. If we are 
to be entirely instrumental, a comprehensive diagnosis should be at the core of any 
strategic planning. That the evidence use in such a diagnosis has been clearly flawed 
is one overarching indictment on the policy itself. However, it is not enough to 
question the evidence or provide more of it; it is imperative that a critique is levelled 
toward the rationalisation of so-called 'evidence-based policy itself, unpacking the 
networks of support and discursive structures behind the evidence. While the 
biofuels policy illustrates policymaking may be a challenge to the realisation of 
South Africa as a developmental state, it equally highlights shortcomings in the 
appeal to evidence-based policy as a solution. Not only does one have to reiterate the 
importance of the politics of evidence (see Chapter 6), in which evidence is subject 
to and created within existing power relations and discursive frameworks and 
therefore may not provide the truth-value expected, but ignoring that policymaking is 
political (or assuming that politics is avoidable) is highly problematic and short-
sighted. Simply 'subscribing' to evidence-based policymaking is not a credible 
solution, or at least, entails its own shortcomings and dangers. Whereas critiques 
emerging from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge or 'Science Studies' literature 
suggest that the promise of scientific solutions to policy problems may be somewhat 
dubious, it appears that in South Africa the quality of the evidence itself is highly 
problematic, not only in terms of rigour, but in terms of the political meanings it is 
subjected to. Evidence-based policy discourse may therefore overvalue the 




when the real importance lies in getting the politics right in the seeming face of a 
rising anti-intellectualism within the political hierarchy. 
 
Ultimately, the main conclusions and findings allow us to decipher how do policies 
mean in South Africa: the socio-political and institutional scaffold insists policies  
have to be vague but, increasingly such policies reflect an anti-intellectualism and 
over subscription to abstract accounts of, for example the duality of the rural 
economy. In so doing, policies become anti-developmental based upon mismatched 
and hegemonic global win-win narratives and local misconceptions (despite rhetoric 
suggesting otherwise) and increasingly reflect anti-democratic overtones and a return 
to technological fetish and limited participation in policymaking processes beyond 
core-networks and elitist representation. Issues such as these are encountered 
throughout the thesis, and will be returned to in the concluding chapter.  
THESIS SUMMARY 
The introduction raises numerous areas of research and contextual clarifications that 
the remainder of the thesis addresses. Some of the discussion in the following 
chapters may appear diffuse or disconnected, however, I have weaved these strands 
together to present a holistic picture and make clear the ways they fit together. For 
this reason, the thesis may in places shuffle between themes and issues, as 
maintaining a strict logical flow is difficult given the nature of the topic. Certain 
discussions thus may rely on information provided later in the thesis or in the 
appendices. Where this is the case, I have provided references to relevant sections. 
The same can be said for how I deal with the local and international levels. Biofuels, 
as an interconnected global assemblage (Smith 2010; Mol 2007) present a challenge 
in that the local and international are interconnected and transcend any neat 
distinctions – that is, regimes and niche's interact and are connected in complex ways 
through networks and flows. For this reason, in the remaining chapters, I will discuss 
South Africa with some inclusion of the international where relevant.  
 
The theoretical and methodological framework, discussed in the next chapter is 




begins to—that 'problematising' policy processes reflects a greater appreciation for 
taken-for-granted power and politics within policymaking. As I will discuss in the in-
depth methodology chapter, there are three broad categories of how policymaking 
(and especially the use of knowledge within them) has been conceptualised. The first 
two fall roughly within an instrumentalist framework in which policy is largely 
rational, designed to match specific purposes and knowledge is inherently 'good' (in 
terms of utility). The third more critical approach suggests that policies are constructs 
of power, developed through discourses and narratives, actor-networks and 
institutional configurations that all have a bearing on the resultant policy. Existing 
power relations are therefore embedded and expressed within policy (Jones 2009). 
Broadly, one could thus consider that I take a critical approach rather than a 'problem 
solving' one, the latter of which:  
takes for granted the framework of existing power relations and institutions 
and is concerned with the smooth functioning of the system. By contrast, 
critical theory calls the very framework into question and seeks to analyze 
how it is maintained and changed (Ford 2003, p.121 drawing on Cox 
1981).  
Considering that a wide variety of technologies and solutions are at the heart of 
international and national debates around biofuels, discourse and narrative analysis 
fits well with some of the focus and complexities of the study, helping to identify 
how policy ideas (the problems, technologies and solutions) are articulated and 
communicated. Furthermore, a network analysis helps sort out actors and their 
interests, the way they organise and mobilise and how various groups of stakeholders 
form alliances or disperse at certain stages of the policy process as well as create and 
disseminate knowledge.  
 
Overall, the theory chapter therefore provides a conceptual framework through which 
the policy process analysis is guided, discussing both the empirical data gathering 
and analytic frames. As an interpretive policy-process analysis, the two key data 
sources have been in-depth discussions with policy-makers involved in developing 
the policy, as well as textual analysis of the policy documents themselves. An 
interpretive approach, however, should acknowledge the contribution of what Stone 
(2002) refers to as the 'rationality project'; theories from this well-populated literature 





To 'ground' the empirical study, Chapter 3 (as well as further descriptions given in 
Appendix C&E) provides a literature review of current understandings of 
policymaking in South Africa but also the institutional structure of the governance 
apparatus. In a sense, this literature review is also a meta-analysis, which forms part 
of the wider problematisation of the biofuels policy and policymaking processes in 
South Africa in general.  
 
In Chapter 4, I begin more of an empirical discussion by describing the biofuels 
projects in South Africa and looking at their inclusion in policymaking processes, 
both at the provincial and national levels. Although the details of this chapter are 
important to the national biofuels strategy, I will outline the development of a 
provincial strategy. Here, despite a global hype dictating some initial terms of 
reference and creating (legitimising) a space for biofuels, their translation into policy 
has not been straightforward, although the provincial and national developments do 
follow similar patterns as each other. The importance here is that, from the outset, 
biofuels have been driven by specific mandates and issues that reflect hegemonic 
developmental discourses and narratives that abstract from local realities and thus 
easily weld together a diverse set of interests at national and local levels. To justify 
such a position, I will discuss the types of projects that have begun to emerge, 
compared to the limitations and overriding context within which a biofuels 
programme would have to operate, as well as the key drivers involved (specifically 
key actors and agencies). This first empirical chapter therefore also presents an 
introduction to some of the major players—that a discussion of the project level 
introduces some of the major policy players already says something!—and sets the 
stage for the empirical review at national level. Chapter 4 also brings into focus the 
government's flagship project: the Cradock bioethanol plant. In keeping with the 
direction of the thesis, I have focussed mainly on the links the project has with 
national policymakers but have also included an associated appendix detailing its 
origins (Appendix D). This project highlights not only individual nuances at a project 






In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I present the empirical findings from the national-level 
reviews. Chapter 5 looks at the emergence of the biofuels strategy, the prevailing 
interests in the strategy and the importance of policy frames when 'deciding to 
decide'. This chapter also provides insight into the emerging discourses and 
narratives and way in which they are used to garner support. Chapter 6 considers the 
idea of evidence-based policy in the case of biofuels (and somewhat in general), in 
which I critique the Feasibility Study through a Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) rubric. The final empirical chapter is an empirical narrative describing and 
problematising the nuances of the strategy's development up to the release of the 
final draft. Two existing studies of the policy are also brought into the discussion to 
compare and contrast my own findings.  
 




CHAPTER 2: POLICY MATTERS … BIOFUELS POLICY REVIEWS, THEORIES 
OF POLICYMAKING AND THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
‘Policy’ is a nebulous term describing something that mediates all of our lives. It is 
ubiquitous, encountered in the organisation(s) of schools, businesses, government 
and most realms subject to collective action. Public policy, however, carries with it 
some particular nuance. Public policymaking is distinctive because it is assumed that 
public-sector (collective) approaches to many social problems are desirable, 
necessary and ultimately unavoidable (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004). That such policies 
are ‘public’ makes them inherently important to the citizenry but also suggests we 
question the implied instrumentality of government policy with as much interest as 
we show the problems they are expected to resolve (though the two are, of course, 
not mutually exclusive).  
 
Anderson (1997, p.2) defines policy as “a relatively stable, purposive course of 
action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of 
concern”. Policy is a phenomenon that encompasses a wide range of definitions but 
may essentially be considered ‘declarations or plans’ as well as ‘actions on the 
ground’ (Court & Young 2003, p.4). These definitions are, however, rudimentary 
and policymaking is far more complex. Policy, for example, may be purposive but 
purposes can be defined retrospectively (Hogwood & Gunn 1984) and problem 
solving can be incremental and a process of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959). 
As Michael Hill (2005) highlights, policies imply a web of decisions that change 
over time, with complicated linkages to existing policies, operating within what are 
usually crowded policy spaces. One also has to recognise that policy processes are 
important for what is excluded as much as for what is included
1
, how actions may be 
taken without decisions being made, how actions differ compared to what is said 
(e.g. Lipsky 1980) and the way policies may be used to construct success and 
legitimise existing practices (e.g. Mosse 2004; Colebatch 2009). Policy therefore 
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 Dye (1998, p.1) provides a clear indication of this when considering that public policy “is whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do”, although one has to recognize that the shortcoming here 
is that choosing not to do something means it has made it onto the political agenda. As Bachrach 
and Baratz (1962) suggest, covert power within policymaking processes means that many issues 




needs to be seen as what happens rather than what policymakers say will happen. Its 
analysis can vary from interrogating the structural features through which it is made, 
to investigating the processes and the various participants’ actions or agency. One 
could further differentiate, as Michael Hill (2005) does, that one can undertake 
research both for and—as is the focus here—of the policy process. Harold Lasswell 
(1951), the so-called ‘father’ of policy science, maintained that there should be a 
science of and for the policymaking process (see also Torgerson 1985; Box 1 in the 
previous chapter). Keeley and Scoones (1999) frame the two as shifting from ‘policy 
analysis’ to ‘policy-process analysis’. 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined that the biofuels Strategy in South Africa presents 
a fertile terrain in which to examine policymaking in South Africa, which I intend to 
do so in the form of policy-process analysis. At the core of the analysis, is the 
explicit importance of how certain forms of knowledge and its surrounding actor-
networks inform policy and policymaking. The point being to unpack the underlying 
assumptions, discourses and narratives in which, and through which, the Strategy has 
been developed and framed. In addition, it seeks to impart some emphasis on wider 
networks within the policy-process, configured in this case around a new technology, 
and not necessarily limited to only political ones. This agenda will attempt to 
understand the drivers of the strategy, as a complex social dynamic, rather than 
expressing the strategy as some kind of given. The focus then becomes not only the 
stabilisation of a particular interpretation or ‘policy model’—or the power that lies in 
the narratives that maintain the definition of the problem (Roe 1991)—but also the 
way in policy interpretations are produced and sustained socially (see Latour 1996; 
Mosse 2005; Mosse 2004).  
 
To contextualise such an approach, in this chapter I begin by discussing aspects of 
the existing reviews of biofuels policies internationally. First, I identify some of the 
common themes within biofuels’ strategies and policies internationally. Second, I 
examine how this literature, focussed on policy review, falls short of in-depth 
investigations into how the strategies were developed. Third, I provide an overview 
of those studies that begin to take on a policy-process analysis that is similar to my 




policy-process and its analysis may be understood, extending on the introductory 
discussion in more theoretical terms. Thereafter, I will discuss the empirical 
methodology.  
A BRIEF EXCURSION INTO EXISTING BIOFUELS POLICY RESEARCH 
There are two main axes within the existing literature around biofuels policies in 
Africa (although the same is true for international reviews). The first, itself 
comprising two main themes, focuses on the policy documents themselves rather 
than how they are produced. Within this  first ‘axis’ then, the authors first tend to 
outline the policy responses taken by African governments, highlighting the purpose 
and intent of the policies—what the policies say or what they plan to do—and 
second, provide recommendations of what they should say and/or do. The second 
major axis within the literature comprises scholarly investigations into the processes 
through which policies are made. These studies are thus policy-process analyses that 
ask why the policies are made the way they are.  
The First Axis: Silhouettes and Situational Analyses 
A proliferation of biofuels policies over the last ten years has been matched by 
equally numerous situational reviews of the policy characteristics specific to, for 
example, different African countries (Mangoyana 2009; Jumbe et al. 2009; Practical 
Action 2010; COMPETE 2009; Diaz-Chavez et al. 2010), international comparisons 
(e.g. Sorda et al. 2010; Talamini et al. 2013) and collective characteristics or 
differences into specific focuses such as the types of feedstock or scales of 
production (Jull et al. 2007). In some cases, the focus has been to what extent 
policies set up an enabling environment (Jumbe et al. 2009). Others have grappled 
with the tensions inherent in the designs and objectives of necessarily complex 
policies (COMPETE 2009; Davison et al. 2010).
2
 Common themes explored in the 
above situational reviews involve types of feedstock approved, licensing criteria and 
laws regulating the industry, production quotas and a host of other important 
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 Merging the financial imperatives and fuel security interests of powerful multinationals and 
governments in the North with the needs of rural development in the South, the two of which may 




considerations needed to govern a biofuels industry, or roll out bioenergy based 




In addition to more content-based assessments of ‘what polices say’, some 
researchers have provided analyses of the feasibility of biofuels production within 
certain countries. Notably, many governments (for example Kenya, Swaziland, South 
Africa and even the SADC secretariat from a regional perspective) have undertaken 
feasibility reports to assess their potential to produce biofuels (feedstock). While 
being extremely important, these reviews do not delve into the policymaking process 
itself (see below). Additionally, while most authors highlight in some way the 
importance of policy, they do not estimate how feasible the resulting policy 
proposals are from an implementation perspective. Being a nascent phenomenon, 
there are limited longitudinal studies documenting the degree of success of policies 
and resultant projects, other than that of major biofuels producers (though see case 
studies of Haywood et al. 2009; Martin et al. 2009; Schut et al. 2010). Confusing the 
matter further is that, in many cases, biofuel production is occurring within a 
regulatory or institutional void making it difficult to demonstrate any policy 
successes (Von Braun 2008). Producers are largely left to their own devices and 
sustainability criteria or related principles are not mandatory. It is also here where 
Charles et al. (2007) foresee the need for a ‘bio-pact’ between the North and South. 
The North, in their opinion, might better sanction exploitative producers and enforce 
standards more rigorously. Nevertheless, there are also important considerations 
made as to whom the benefits of biofuels should go and what countries have done to 
achieve their objectives. 
 
While detailing what policies say, the situational reviews are silhouettes that mask a 
far more complex reality. The shadowed snapshot keeps hidden important details, 
trivialising both the political and social interactions involved in policymaking. This 
is not to reduce the obvious importance of these reviews but rather to emphasise that 
the transfer through which, and contexts in which individual policies are derived 
require greater attention. In response, there is a multitude of prescriptions suggesting 
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how to develop such policies, providing recommendations of what policies should 
say and what they should attempt to achieve. 
The First Axis Continued: Recommendations for Effective Biofuels Policies (and 
Policymaking?) 
Jull et al. (2007) provide an early but informative review of biofuels policies 
internationally (though mainly developing countries). Their focus was to promote a 
discussion about the needs of biofuels policies but not necessarily provide a 
prescriptive framework. They do, however, provide a comprehensive summary of the 
existing generic structures of biofuels policies as well as a schematic framework of 
important issues to be considered (such as those noted above). They outline two 
major types of strategy employed by policymakers thus far to regulate the biofuel 
industry, these are: 
 creating regulatory frameworks for bioenergy or biofuels by passing 
legislation specifically on the subject and,  
 committing to produce biofuels by formulating policies that are not legally 
binding but designed to complement existing national legislative frameworks. 
In undertaking or considering these types of strategy, Jull et al. (2007), also highlight 
the multi-sectoral/dimensional nature of biofuels in which policymakers need to 
include, for example, a variety of environmental protection, economic and social 
development measures. In the case of the first especially, there is a strong reliance on 
existing legislation and institutional arrangements, such environmental impact 
assessment regulations. If these are already weak, or worse, inoperable, adding a 
biofuels agenda to the mix is likely to exacerbate the situation. Jull et al. (2007), 
conclude that a firm legal basis is fundamental to properly regulate and support the 
development of bioenergy. Furthermore, they argue that countries that have sound 
policies to promote the production and use of bioenergy will be at the forefront of 
realizing the economic and environmental benefits of this sector. Governments 
therefore need to promote institutional capacity building within their ministries at the 
national level, to ensure coordination within government as well when following 
consultative approaches, which ensure that industry groups and NGOs are 





With many situational analyses of the types of policies and general circumstances, 
there is a definitive tension exposed within the African context with pressure on 
African governments to get the policy right. In response, experts and institutions 
have provided a number of recommendations to ensure that solid regulatory 
frameworks are established (e.g. COMPETE 2009; Cooper & McAlinden 2012; 
Mabee 2007). Calls are strong for evidence-based policies, taking into consideration, 
for example, rigorous feasibility (Mangoyana 2009). A technical approach to 
policymaking is clearly privileged, relying largely on evidence-based policymaking. 
Many of these recommendations come from existing thematic research such as 
around land tenure (Cotula et al. 2008) and best practices from Brazil (Hira & de 
Oliveira 2009) and also involve ensuring appropriate mechanisms such as mandatory 
blending and incentives (Cf. Lawrence 2010; Cf. Miranda et al. 2011; e.g. 
Ziolkowska et al. 2011).  
 
A standard emphasis in any new development franchise is sustainability and biofuels 
have been no different. There are range of frameworks establishing the relevant 
policy criteria (e.g. Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 2010) and specific 
mechanisms such as certification (Scarlat & Dallemand 2011), as well as some case 
studies exploring how these criteria are beginning to or may ultimately be achieved 
(Amezaga et al. 2010; Chalmers & Archer 2011). Franco et al. (2010) take this a step 
further, contrasting optimistic assumptions of the sustainability and benefits of 
biofuels according to EU policy with what happens in reality in other countries.  
 
The reviews within this first thread of literature pre-empt more complex policy-
processes in highlighting that, even at a technical level, there are no clear cut or ‘win-
win’ situations when it comes to incentives, tax rebates or subsidies and other 
stipulated policy measures but that they involve a range of negotiations and trade-
offs. Similarly, despite recognising tensions and providing concomitant 
recommendations of how to get policies ‘right’, incorporating a range of agendas that 
accompany multiple stakeholders, while doing so quickly enough to ensure a 
competitive advantage, suggests that such recommendations may be poorly 




range of stakeholders, with very different vested interests, though many of the 
recommendations around biofuels policy consider the challenge of accommodating 
such a diverse group with different influential power unproblematic. In the same way 
real world complexities may be trivialised within policy (Mangoyana 2009), so too 
are those of policymaking as social and political process when recommending 
engagement. Such a situation therefore necessitates that the process itself is 
examined. In the next section, I provide some examples of studies that have begun to 
do so, as these are especially important in informing the research I present in later 
chapters. These studies also preface the theoretical underpinning of my study, which 
I describe immediately after them.  
The Second Axis: Interrogating the Making of Biofuels Policies Internationally 
The second major thread of biofuels policy reviews entertains research of 
policymaking itself, though the approaches and findings differ between studies. 
Some authors have begun to unpack the lessons of the biofuels experience from a 
more rigid political-science perspective, attempting to model the process. Charles et 
al. (2007), for example, contextualise the activities of policymakers dealing with 
biofuels within a political-science rubric. They thereby classify the current processes 
engaged by policymakers as predisposed towards incremental changes (an original 
theory of policymaking developed by Lindblom) in policy, mostly existing 
agricultural policy, when what is necessary are higher order mixed-scanning models 
(a model originally proposed by Etzioni).
4
 In another example, Delshad (2012) 
provides an empirical model of the influence between the media, Congress and the 
President to identify “who influences whom” in the agenda-setting phases of the US 
biofuels policy. He highlights (2012, p.194) that “these actors have comparatively 
little agenda-setting power over one another; instead, their agendas are all influenced 
by factors outside of their direct control.” Such factors include the maize price (or 
rather lobbying from agro-industrial networks), as well as biofuels being 
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 According to Etzioni (1967), there are three ways of making decisions in social policy, namely: the 
rationalistic one, which involves having sufficient information to make rational decisions, the 
incremental (or science of muddling through), which uses imperfect information to do the best 
one can, mixed scanning, which is a hybrid of the two. The latter involves scanning the situation, 
rather than getting all the possible information and then making either the fundamental decisions 
(similar to rationalist but not based on perfect knowledge) or incremental ones (which are taken in 




overshadowed by issues of wider public interest. Both these examples focus on 
modelling the decisions taken and are therefore less descriptive of how such 
decisions come about. They do begin to show the complexity that supposedly 
technical decisions can encounter.  
 
In addition to these more rigid, instrumental and model-based studies, other scholars 
have moved towards more critical and interpretive studies of policymaking around 
biofuels. Critical studies, being similar to that undertaken in this thesis, have 
scrutinised discourses and actor-networks, multiple dimensions of the policy process 
and power and vested interests (Fortin 2011; Franco et al. 2010; Gillon 2010; Nagar 
2009; Pradhan & Ruysenaar 2014; Sharman & Holmes 2010). These authors suggest 
that any assessment of the dynamics of the policymaking must interrogate the nature 
of evidence, not only how it becomes credible, but also that which is taken for 
granted when it is provided. As Sharman & Holmes (2010) highlight, for example, in 
their critique of the European Union’s ten per cent biofuels directive in 2009, 
technical reviews and what the policies say are bound up in dynamic policy-based 
evidence gathering and biased relationships that are never mutually exclusive or 
automatic. These studies also begin to highlight that biofuels policies match other 
developmental policies, in which policy statements are usually the product of a 
compromise between potentially conflicting views and interests within an 
organisation or network of actors and as such they often deliver somewhat hazy 
policy messages (see also Cabral and Scoones 2006). It is then the job of the 
researcher to interpret how these come about, which is what I intend on doing for the 
South African case study.  
 
Substantiating the need for interpretive assessments of policy, Douglas Torgerson 
(1985, pp.52–53) proposes that within policy (and in understanding it) there is: 
an internal tension, a dialectic opposition between knowledge and politics. 
Through the interplay of knowledge and politics, different aspects of the 
phenomenon become salient at different moments . . . the presence of 
dialectical tension means that the phenomenon has the potential to develop, 
to change its form. However, no particular pattern of development is 
inevitable.  
This knowledge-politics interface can already be seen to set apart the types of 




based studies of the second axis are premised on the assumption that knowledge is 
predominantly positivistic and used in a utilitarian way to make policies better. The 
interpretive studies mentioned comprise a second category, which is far more critical 
and suggests that what counts as legitimate knowledge and the way it is generated 
are actually political activities. 
 
To situate these two different categories better, in the next section I shall outline 
some theoretic understanding of the interplay between knowledge and policymaking 
from the instrumental perspective of knowledge straightforwardly informing 
policymaking to critiques of power-knowledge. I will therefore extend on the 
conceptualisation of policy briefly presented in Chapter 1 by expanding on the public 
policy process and its analysis from two main philosophical perspectives: positivism 
and interpretivism.
5
 The discussion then moves towards a more refined outline of 
recent theories stemming from each of these philosophies, taking further the 
discussion on knowledge in and of the policy process. For the positivists, focus is on 
causality of decisions made and how these may be modelled. Interpretive 
approaches, which “search for subtle influences such as material forces, discourses, 
and ideologies that act so as to condition the content of policy” (Dryzek 2002, p.32), 
allow a much wider appreciation of the complexities of policymaking; they are 
equally pertinent to the biofuels strategy in South Africa. The theoretical discussion 
culminates in, amongst other issues, the meaning-making behaviour and social 
constructions through which policies are developed and legitimised, highlighting the 
importance of power and its extension from agency and structure to the realms of 
discourse and structuration. 
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 These two broad categories are by no means homogenous, with both being underscored by diverging 
schools of thought that, in the social sciences at least, remain deeply antagonistic in some 
respects. One should also take cognizance of Dryzek’s (2002) post-positivist ‘travelogue’, in 
which the relative value of technocratic (positivistic) and critical (post-positivistic/interpretive) 
studies varies according to socio-political contexts (technocratic evaluations, for example, are 
more appropriate in Australia than in the USA) and depending on the problems confronted 




INTRODUCING POLICY RESEARCH AND STUDYING THE POLICY PROCESS 
Policy research or policy-process analysis shares a common history with policy 
analysis (see distinction of Box 1, Chapter 1). Although appeals in the 1950s for a 
‘science’ of policymaking within policy studies were broad (Lasswell 1951; Cf. 
Torgerson 1985),
6
 the overbearing thrust of ‘neo-positivist’ or empiricist approaches, 
as Fischer (2003) describes them, crowded out other relevant policy research 
approaches. There followed a new enthusiasm for the instrumentality of 
policymaking. Polices, such as the ‘War on Poverty’, stimulated political scientists to 
study aspects neglected before, at a time when it became plausible to believe that 
public action could solve perennial social problems.
7
 The challenge is that by 
focussing on technical rationality (both in research and analysis) these approaches 
reduce “emotional and conflict-ridden political questions by translating them into 
scientific and technical answers” (Fischer 2003, p.14; Fischer 2007). There was an 
obvious overlap, then, between rationalist conceptions of analysis ‘for’ the policy 
process and the positivistic research programme ‘of’ the policy process. Although 
cleavages remain, the dominant neo-positivist policy community, which reside 
mostly within political science and economic disciplines, is increasingly being 
matched by more interpretative approaches that draw on multi-method approaches 
across disciplines such anthropology, sociology, and a ‘linguistic’ turn following a 
focus on language and meaning as espoused by Jürgen Habermas (1981; 1989).  
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 Harold Lasswell (1951) envisioned a multidisciplinary enterprise and called for the study of the role 
of knowledge in and of the policy process. As Torgerson (1985) suggests, despite criticisms of 
positivist and technocratic dominance in policy science, Lasswell actually envisioned something 
closer to the post-positivistic suggestions that have emerged in response to such domination.  
7
 At their most desperate, some of these social problems have come to be regarded, following Rittel 
and Webber (1973), as ‘wicked problems’. These defy any definitive formulation, have no 
discernible completion (you do not know if or when the problem is solved), are value based rather 
than true or false, there is no immediate test of solution but rather ‘waves of consequences’. There 
is limited potential for trial and error (or rather there are major consequences for inadequate 
responses with limited chances to reverse prior decisions); wicked problems are unique but may 
be symptomatic of other (wicked) problems, are determined, I would suggest, through social 
construction, which directs too the direction of their solution (or as the original paper outlines, the 
choice of their explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution). Wicked problems 
have recently been subsumed within a wider literature around complexity and policymaking for 




An Initial Mapping of the Policy Process 
The essential point of the above discussion and one indicated by the different types 
of biofuels policy analyses above is that the notion of policy is inextricably linked to 
processes through which decisions are made. An original, overarching approach to 
modelling the policy process was one of separating it into discrete stages; generally 
considered as ‘stagist’ models or, as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, p.1) refer to 
it, the “stages heuristic”. When considered this way, the policy process is ‘linear’ and 
involves some degree of trial and error based on best available evidence. This 
instrumental view of top-down prescriptive policy provides a modelling of how 
things should work (Sabatier 1986), assigning the decisions taken by those with 
authority to do so
8
 as a starting point and thereafter dividing it into distinct units or 
stages, such as: problem identification, agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, 
implementation, and evaluation (Sabatier 1986; Anderson 1994 cited in Koontz 2003 
see also Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Such an approach implies that policymaking 
proceeds in a systematic fashion, starting at the beginning and finishing at the end. It 
is a model that has been critiqued over the past few decades as being inadequate to 
account of the complexity involved in making decisions, and it has been accused, at 
times, of confusing things more than it illuminates them (John 2012). Peter John 
(2012, p.28), for example, criticises the simplification of stagist models as being 
incapable of capturing the “change and messiness in public decision making”. 
 
Jann and Wegrich (2007) argue, however, that the situation is paradoxical in that the 
model is constantly criticized but frequently employed to configure both policy 
research and analysis.
9
 Birkland (2001, p.223) also defends it, considering there to 
“still be life in the notion of stages” in that it helps structure thinking and piece 
together parts of the policy process. Similarly, deLeon (1999) suggests that before 
discarding it to the dustbin of abandoned paradigms we need to consider its value in 
imposing some order on an otherwise chaotic political process, drawing attention to 
particular decisions made and important outcomes amidst the complexity. A useful 
perspective with which to consider the value of the linear or stagist model is by 
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 This is generally referred to as authoritative choice. 
9
 I too am guilty of this, given that my empirical narrative of the policy starts (somewhat) at the start 




classifying it as a useful recipe by which policymakers and policy analysts make 
decisions—and indeed planning frameworks for analysis often prescribe such a 
recipe—while recognising that it is inadequate for explaining how and why such 
decisions were made. 
 
Moving from the extreme simplification of the stages heuristic, Clay and Schaffer 
(1984) venture towards its polar opposite and despairingly consider the whole life of 
policy—at least in a rural development context—as a chaos of purposes and 
accidents. This conceptualisation obscures as much as the stages perspective, as it 
masks observable patterns of decision-making, that underlie such chaos and leaves 
open what the purposes are and how one might classify the ‘accidents’. Additionally, 
while there may be life in the stages model, and without resorting to a chaos of 
purposes and accidents, scholars have considered the process as far more 
complicated than the linear view maintains with one group of commentators referring 
to it as one of disjointed incrementalism or the science of muddling through 
(Lindblom 1959).
10
 The policy process can therefore be considered incremental, 
while also being highly nuanced and affected by social structures (institutions) and 
individual agency.  
 
Once one acknowledges these complexities, theoretical understandings become 
equally cumbersome. Policy itself encompasses “a variety of institutional forms and 
practices in a range of settings” (Jenkins 2007, p.26); such practices include 
processes, activities or actions (Neilson 2001). John (2012) highlights that policy 
reflects the concrete decisions emanating from the political sphere, having specific 
outputs and outcomes, with identifiable participants, operating and negotiating within 
multiple institutional structures. Rudimentary definitions of policy are also deceiving 
in that policy and policy processes, what might be referred to as generic institutions 
of modern ‘governmentality’, “are ‘political technologies’, enmeshed in the relations 
of power between citizens, experts and political authorities” (Foucault 1991 cited in 
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 Lindblom (1959) provided an early critique of ‘rational’ decision-making in which he criticized the 
idea of decision-making as a comprehensive search for the optimal route to the achievement of 
known ends. He suggests that means and ends are not separable; analysis is normally limited 
rather than comprehensive; policy successes are achieved through incremental changes; and, that 
good decisions are not so much ones that achieve objectives but that people agree with the 




Keeley 2003, p.23). Policies are, therefore, inherently political, power laden, context 
bound and continually in a state of flux. Policy is thus an ambiguous concept, 
difficult to circumscribe in a single meaningful definition of public policy. As Bauer 
(1968, p.25) suggests:  
the making of public policy is amongst the most serious and important of 
activities of government, the complexity of the process and the difference 
between its intended and actual results renders it resistant to both adequate 
conceptualization and adequate research. 
The situation is one in which the dynamics of interest “in policy are played out in a 
whole gamut of theoretical and observable spaces” (Jenkins 2007, p.8). Explaining 
causality in these situations, as I will discuss in the theory section below, has 
therefore taken on multiple frameworks, which include singular aspects such as 
institutions, exogenous determinants, rational actors or a combination of these, which 
are ‘synthetic’ models such as Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF), Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams and windows or Peter John’s 
(2012) evolutionary model. This presents both challenges and weaknesses for policy 
scholars, opening up a range of theories to work with while confronting a widespread 
conceptual muddle.  
 
As a social scientist, my general approach is one of researcher as bricolier in which 
one can expand from instrumental perspectives towards more nuanced and discrete 
interpretations of the policy process, building on the mounting evidence. This 
coheres somewhat with what John (2012) proposes in his book Analysing Public 
Policy, in which he builds on a range of theoretical proposals from policy studies. He 
insists, however, that causality or explanation be at the heart of policy studies and 
laments that these are generally discounted at the cost of description. Keeley and 
Scoones (1999), conversely, embrace and emphasise the importance of such 
‘description’ as a meaningful way to understand the contingency of policymaking 
processes. As Steinberger (1995) maintains, the different typologies of the analysis 
of policy processes are not antithetical but rather reflective of the different 
descriptions that can be offered to elucidate and specify socially constructed 





Peter John’s (2012) focus is, however, devoted to understanding how policies vary 
(between sectors and places) and their dynamics (stability and change) but his 
evolutionary explanation still cannot provide a rigorous explanation of the 
substantive factors involved. Incorporating ideas-based approaches—what he calls 
the “genie in the bottle”—suggests that investigators need to appraise the context in 
which ideas and interests constantly seek to dominate decision-making and interact 
with institutions, patterns of interest-groups and socio-economic factors that are 
slowly (and sometimes abruptly) changing overtime. Such an approach, and one to 
which I conform, reflects Pollit and Bouckaert’s (2004) move away from the 
enslavement by a single theory. Their general stance is one of ‘critical modernist’ 
accepting the importance of empirically testing theories and hypotheses, although 
accepting that “this is only one kind of test, and that arguments concerning whether 
the appropriate conditions for falsification have been met will never cease” (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert 2004, p.23). Their focus is thus more of a radical modernity rather than 
wholly supporting post-modernity, whereby, they submit, “reality is socially 
constructed, but not all constructions have equal claim to our credulity and certainly 
some constructions prove more durable than others” (ibid). Nevertheless, such terms 
need to be situated within a much broader philosophical space before moving into 
detailed discussion of specific frameworks.  
Philosophical and Epistemological Considerations in Researching Policy 
The philosophy of research essentially asks questions of an ontological (e.g. what 
kinds of things are there?) and epistemological nature (e.g. what is the character of 
our knowledge or how do we know?) with the purpose of establishing what is ‘true’. 
In modern social sciences, there are two overarching philosophies—positivism and 
interpretivism—that answer these questions somewhat differently.  
 
Positivism has a long and rich historical tradition dating back to philosophers such as 
Plato.
11
 It is so embedded in our society that knowledge claims not grounded in 
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 If one considers the sophists as early advocates of anti-positivism, it could be argued that 
interpretivism is no stranger to historical philosophical debates. That is an argument, however, 
that I am not willing to indulge. As with the rise to fame of positivism, the seventeenth century 
onwards is perhaps the more important intellectual background in which interpretivism emerged 




positivist thought are simply dismissed as ‘ascientific’ and therefore invalid 
(Hirschheim 1985, p.33). Positivists
12
 believe that reality is stable and can be 
observed and described from an objective viewpoint (Levin 1988). Given its success 
in understanding physical reality—establishing ‘laws’ that govern and can be used to 
predict natural phenomena—the objective approaches of the physical sciences 
appeared apposite, or at least were advocated for social explorations as well. By 
implication, empiricism—theories induced by observation—and later logical 
positivism—theories deduced by logical hypotheses and verified by observation (i.e. 
hypothetico-deduction)—were viewed as appropriate for social science explanations; 
although it was recognised that human phenomena were not identical to those of 
nature and the ‘tools’ therefore differed in social science. Ontologically this 
paradigm, and associated methodology, with its concern to establish causal or 
statistical relationships, necessarily reduces people and their behaviours to 
quantifiable variables. Social phenomena can be attributed to specific causal 
relationships, which can be isolated and observed repeatedly. Thus, 
epistemologically, testing hypotheses and objective knowledge claims reflect the 
philosophical belief that there is an external, objective reality and sensory experience 




 argue there is no such objective reality and it is only through 
subjective interpretation that ‘reality’ can be understood. In a policy perspective, the 
“ontological and epistemological presuppositions include “phenomenology, 
hermeneutics and some critical theory from Continental Europe and symbolic 
interactions, pragmatism, and ethnomethodology” (Yanow 2007, p. 110; see also 
Fischer 2007). Although the various schools of thought differ, as they do in 
positivism, there is a general view that, even if the social sciences are to be objective, 
                                                                                                                                          
factum, in which the truth is ‘made’ rhetorically (a precursor to constructionism), departing from 
the all-encompassing, hypothetico-deduction espoused by Descartes. (He did not entirely reject it, 
but questioned its applicability to the science of the civil society). Thereafter, hermeneutic 
philosophers (Dilthey building on the work of Schleiermacher) and phenonomologists, continued 
along similar veins of subjective understanding, in which humans were “purposive creatures 
whose lives were bounded by a reality which has meaning” (Hughes 1990, p.90). 
12
 This section necessarily reduces a wide array of prominent philosophers, Bacon, Descartes, Mill, 
Durkheim, Russell and Popper, who while subscribing broadly to a positivistic paradigm by no 
means had similar approaches or ideas as to what this meant.  
13
 In this paradigm too, there are countervailing thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Weber, Marx, Freud, 




they can only be through subjective accounts. It is here where theorists such as Max 
Weber, were less than apologetic for granting the ‘interpretive understanding’ as the 
distinctive form of knowledge and distinctive means towards objective knowledge 
(Weber & Parsons 2012). He thus considered the distinction between the physical 
and social sciences not as ontological but methodological, with the appropriate 
methodology being one of verstehen. There are also practical reasons why, for 
example, the hypothetico-deductive approach becomes problematic in social 
sciences. Experiments in social science are not as ‘controlled’ as in hard science and 
ceteris paribus assumptions do not hold true in social systems; our view of the world 
is theory-laden and we do not occupy a ‘view from nowhere’ (to borrow perhaps 
inappropriately from Nagel 1986). “Society is essentially a product of the human 
mind, is subjective, and emotive as well as intellectual” (Hughes 1990, p.90).  
 
Both philosophies propose that the forces that impel social actors in their actions may 
not be known by them themselves, but may be retrieved through the deployment of 
some special and debatable method (Hughes 1990). In positivism, this called for 
empiricist methodologies and later hypothetico-deduction. In response, interpretivists 
called for, for example, methods of hermeneutics, historical materialism and 
verstehen. All encounter philosophical difficulties. In this thesis I do not seek to 
contribute to a long-standing epistemological debate within the philosophy of social 
science (and within social sciences themselves), over the validity of positivistic and 
interpretive approaches; I seek to emphasise the two may be compatible and even 
complementary as much as they are contradictory or mutually exclusive. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this thesis, both positivism and interpretivism need 
to be discussed with specific reference to ‘policy’ as both philosophies have provided 
important theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks with which to interrogate 
and conceptualise the policy process. 
Positivistic Approaches to Policy and the Quest for Causality 
The typical characteristic of positivistic approaches in policy studies, especially 
within political science, is that of identifying causation (John 2012), and generating 




to explain why decision-makers make the decisions they do; at its extreme trying to 
apply these explanations to persons at all places in all times. As positivistic 
approaches also have a propensity for measuring things, a quantitative
14
 bias in 
explanations and an inclination for modelling, has become the basis through which 
policy analysis informs a “rational model” of decision-making. For the purposes of 
this thesis, however, it is not necessary to supply an exhaustive description of this 
extensive theoretical framework, however, a short description is useful as it 
introduces the reader to concepts and terms that are used in policy research and later 
in the thesis.  
Frameworks, Models and Synthetic Approaches 
In general, it must be remembered that theory in social science is usually based on 
claims about the nature of human action and power relationships, and seeks to 
provide a coherent and consistent account of reality. Sometimes the more wide-
ranging theories are called frameworks. These “organise diagnostic and prescriptive 
inquiry” (Ostrom 1999, p.40). Individual theories developed within such frameworks 
generate models, which are more restricted assumptions about social and political 
relationships from which hypotheses can then be derived and tested (John 2003). 
Specifically, about policy, the stagist model described above is one such model; there 
are others. 
 
Examples of what Sabatier (2007) might suggest as more useful models explaining 
the policy process, at least more than the stages heuristic, includes, for example, the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework of Elinor Ostrom (1999). In this 
model, physical and material conditions, attributes of community, and rules in use 
impact on an action arena (not entirely divorced from other action arenas) where 
actors make decisions as homo-economicus based roughly on rational decision-
making processes with complete information and maximising expectations. Another 
is the Multiple Streams model in which there are three streams—problems, policies 
and politics—that flow through the policy system. These streams are largely 
                                                 
14
 This should not be taken to imply that positivism is quantitative and interpretivism is qualitative as 




independent, except during policy windows (so-called windows of opportunity, 
usually instigated through the initiative of a policy entrepreneur). In these opportune 
moments, the streams combine to result in specific decisions being taken. Kingdon’s 
(1984) multiple streams model proposes that problems are not uniquely identified but 
coalesce with other streams. As Jones (2009) notes, it is a process in which “choices 
seek problems and solutions seek issues, rather than vice versa”. One could extend 
the metaphor of policy windows to one in which moments of intervention occur 
within certain ‘policy spaces’ (Brock et al. 2001; Grindle & Thomas 1991) such as 
within specific organisational and institutional contexts. Both are attempts to frame 
policymaking within spatial (though usually abstract or conceptual) and temporal 
boundaries. Gaventa (2006) further suggests that such spaces may be inter alia 
closed, invited, or claimed, with power within them being visible, hidden and 
invisible and that the type of physical spaces in which such windows occur are 
important for whom they bring together. I will raise the importance of the latter when 
considering actor-networks later on.  
 
Within the instrumentalist and more dynamic realms of positivist research into the 
policy process, there are also a group of ‘synthetic’ frameworks—meaning they 
synthesise a range of theories—that are used to explain the way policies are 
developed and change. The ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ and ‘Punctuated 
Equilibrium’ are two of the major synthetic models that provide, more-or-less, a 
close working model of ‘reality’. For example, in looking at stability and change in 
policy, which explores the dissemination of policy ideas through institutional and 
organisational sites and structures, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (devised by 
Sabatier (1988), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), see also Mintrom and Vergari, 
(1996)) shows coalitions and policies as ‘reactionary’, which essentially brings 
stability to a policy subsystem. While attempting to explain causality, they also argue 
that policies are, however, a function of contextual aspects in which the policy 
process is situated. Mintrom and Vergari (1996), for example, examine four aspects 
that shape policymaking including scope of the community, the relevant timeframe, 




crises or incentives. Although not an exhaustive list,
15
 the above theories and models 
suggests there are usually multiple causal factors, which defy easy simplification.  
 
Another synthetic framework explaining the policy process is Peter John’s 
Evolutionary model. In his book describing the model, John (2012; see also John 
2003) provides an informative and more general overview of the process, in which 
the connections between models are left to the interpretation of the reader. He 
highlights how, to best ‘explain’ policymaking and its multi-faceted character, one 
could draw from existing political-science theories—broadly configured around five 
causal mechanisms, which include institutions; groups and networks, exogenous 
determinants; rational actors and finally ideas-based approaches. Each of these is 
contingent on the others and no one is logically or empirically prior.  
While useful in confining dominant features that help explain how decisions are 
made, a great deal of the policymaking process is left unexamined in positivistic 
assumptions. From early theorising of policymaking within a ‘bounded rationality’ 
and policymakers being ‘satisficers’ (Simon 1957),
16
 to more recent appraisals of 
ideas, norms and interests in neo-institutionalism (March & Olsen 1984), empiricist 
models cannot provide adequate explanation for something that is an inherently 
interpretive (and interpreted) activity (Fischer 2003). Peter John, as a leading neo-
positivistic theorist working within the political sciences, considers synthetic 
approaches—his evolutionary approach being one of them—as the best means to 
“take into consideration the complexity, fluidity and changeability of the modern 
policy process as its baseline” (John 2012, p.183). However, he also admits that even 
his evolutionary theory attracts some of the criticism as other synthetic approaches… 
“in that sense the quest for a theory of public policy may never be completed” (2012, 
p.177). With such a shortcoming in mind, it is useful then to look at how interpretive 
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 The focus on how policies are made differs between disciplines and on the type of policy being 
made. Policy transfer literature provides another umbrella category for more specific types of 
policy innovation processes and the why and what of those processes. For example, Dolowitz and 
Marsh (14:26:20) draw out more narrow concepts such as policy diffusion, policy convergence 
and policy learning, also tending to reflect a more linear approach to the policy process. The 
nature of policy is, however, one in which different policy solutions, and problem streams need to 
combine at the appropriate moment for a policy to develop (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 356; see 
also Evans and Davies, 1999).  
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 ‘Satisficing’, is a neologism describing the deviation of the ‘administrative man’ from being purely 
rational in decision-making to a point where satisfaction and sufficing are the bases for decisions 





approaches move between the strictures of these models, especially by taking a more 
critical perspective of knowledge and power within the policy process. Such 
approaches match the second major axis of (more critical) biofuels policy reviews 
outlined above, and correspond with the analysis undertaken in later chapters.  
The ‘Interpretive Turn’ and Interpreting Policy Knowledge and Political 
Legitimisation 
As policymaking can be considered a high-order cognitive activity (see Jenkins 
2007) and includes an increasing array of people, interpretive approaches may be 
justified on the basis that actions are best explained in reference to ‘the beliefs and 
preferences of the actor’ rather than the search for ‘logical or structural processes’ 
that determine events (such as the rationality of markets or path-dependency of 
institutions). It has been argued that, “governing practices can only be understood 
through the beliefs, and actions of individuals located in traditions and in response to 
dilemmas” (Bevir & Rhodes 2003, pp.18–19). Colebatch (2009) similarly suggests 
that as more people emerge through various networks and ideas of government shift 
to governance, it becomes increasingly important to acknowledge what all these 
diverse stakeholders, with distinct and divergent understandings of policy problems 
and agendas for action, add to the policy process. That is, the object of analysis shifts 
from an ‘objective’ assessment of causation to understanding ‘how policies mean’ 
(e.g. Yanow 2007).  
The Importance of Language and its Relation to Power 
Interpretive approaches therefore interrogate policies from a somewhat different tack 
to positivistic ones. Amidst a plethora of ‘isms’, and ‘posts’, meaning is considered 
to be at the centre of individual and collective endeavours (Yanow 2007; Hodgson & 
Irving 2007a). Post-empiricism has evolved “as a critique in the way in which neo-
positivistic theoretical approaches have been subsumed into “pluralism, rational-
choice theory, neo-institutionalism, policy learning and advocacy-coalition theory” 
(Fischer 2003, p. 22; see below). However, the very nature of interpretive projects 
has made it difficult to turn them into a specific empirical project in the same way 




and utilise, in cases, vastly different approaches. Central to most—and following 
roughly in the footsteps of Weber’s verstehen—is that policymaking is a meaning-
making process in which there is a “discursive struggle to create and control systems 
of shared social meanings” (Fischer 2003, p.13; see also Stone 2002). Such meaning-
making practices are informed by hermeneutic perspectives, which (Yanow 2007, p. 
114):  
leads to a focus on policy-relevant texts, such as legislative records, agency 
correspondence, annual reports, minutes from community board meetings, 
and so on. Newspaper reports may also be data sources—as a kind of 
surrogate for interviews—providing contemporaneous accounts of key 
actors and their views along with more general sentiment at the time, 
especially for periods when the researcher was not or could not be present. 
Following the linguistic turn of Habermas, language is also crucial in policy and 
central to interpretive approaches. As Fischer (2007, p. 238 citing Fischer 2003; 
Gottweis 2006) highlights, his classification of argumentative policy: 
links post-positivist epistemology with social theory and methodology and 
encompasses theoretical approaches such as discourse analysis, frame 
analysis and interpretative policy analysis. Although these different 
approaches are hardly synonymous, they nevertheless share the special 
attention they give to argumentation and language and the process of 
utilizing, mobilizing and weighing arguments and signs in the 
interpretation and praxis of policymaking and analysis. 
Infused within meaning-making processes and the centrality of language (see also 
below), is the importance of power and knowledge, which are expressed through 
them. Habermas (1989) emphasises the importance of communication in securing 
and acceptance of the unequal distribution of power and the policy consequences that 
flow from it. Lukes (1974), in his radical response to pluralist theories of overt power 
(Dahl 1978) and theories of covert power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962) considers a third 
type of power, which involves the exercise of power to shape peoples preferences so 
that neither overt nor covert conflicts may exist but there remains a latent conflict. 
Foucault (1980) makes a similar argument through his understanding of discourse 
and ‘power knowledge’ but looks at diffuse mechanisms of power rather than Lukes 
‘dimensions’. A discourse is an “ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through 
which meaning is given to phenomena” (Hajer 1995, p.44). In a policy sense, 
discourses impose frameworks that limit what can be experienced, or the meaning 
that experience can encompass, and thereby influence what can be said and done by 




“specific and distinguishable mediums through which communicative action takes 
place” (Purvis & Hunt 1993, p.485).  
 
Language and discourse are of critical importance because the specific words chosen 
inevitably affect the subjects meaning or importance to ourselves and to those with 
whom one is communicating (people may also not decode the message in the way 
the communicator intends). Discourse encompasses or circumscribes the concepts 
and ideas relevant for policy, and the interactive processes of communication and 
policy formulation that serve to generate and disseminate these ideas (Schmidt & 
Radaelli 2004). These discursive structures (concepts, metaphors, linguistic codes, 
rules of logic, etc), often taken for granted, contain cognitive and normative elements 
that determine what policy-makers can more easily understand and articulate, and 
hence, which policy ideas they are likely to adopt (Campbell 2002).  
 
Even the labels we give to phenomena determine what is told and untold; categories 
and classifications are then not neutral but indicative of the value system of the 
speaker or writer (Britton 2007).
17
 As such, discourses and their counterpart 
categorisations shape certain problems, distinguishing some aspects of a situation 
and marginalising others. Important here is the use of language in policy-making and 
discourse analysis, the ‘framing’ of issues to be tackled and making policy solutions 
seem obvious and unquestionable. When considering framing and solutions there 
appears to be a bias towards finding tools to attack problems rather than trying to 
determine whether the problems have been framed properly in the first place (Keeley 
and Scoones 1999); one of the reasons solutions find problems rather than vice-versa 
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 Consider here the terms ‘land acquisition’ and ‘land grabbing’, which while both describe similar 
activities and are used synonymously, have entirely different political meanings and are derived 
from different biases. The former is a more neutral classification implying subtle nuances and is 
favoured by academics whilst the latter is politically charged having an implicit value judgement, 
and is readily found within radical (leftist) movement and civil society groups. Both allow certain 
issues to be discussed and set the mood for how they will be discussed and are understood.  
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 It is equally important to suggest that although this discussion is focused on communication and 
discourse in policymaking, policies themselves may also become ‘frames’ of reference and are as 




Similar to labelling and classification is the notion of a storyline or narrative, which 
is used to frame issues. At their most ambitious, narratives can become ‘blueprints’ 
for development (Roe 1991), which are explicitly programmatic and in addition to 
identifying the nature of the problem, they provide the solution. The importance of 
narratives more generally is that they are an attempt to bring order to the complexity 
encountered when making policy (Rein & Schön 1993). Their effect is to bring 
clarity to a policy debate and allow for policy coalitions and a common 
understanding of the policy content (Roe 1991). As Du Toit (2012) notes:  
a successful policy narrative is one that manages to make the case for a 
particular course of action, but does so in a way that shows where this 
particular initiative or aim will fit in with a vast array of others; they have 
to create certainty (which is why ‘evidence’ is so important) and evidence 
can be used to ‘rhetorically buttress arguments’ rather than describe reality.  
By limiting the room for manoeuvre and the expression of alternatives, narratives 
concretise policies, which, in effect, become hegemonic, doing the work of 
overriding discourses. To interrogate such issues, it is necessary to consider what 
narratives are encountered; how these narratives are formed, by whom and in/for 
whose interests. Similarly, as policies are both shaped and interest shaping, one 
needs to identify in what context these narratives are deployed and what impact this 
might have on the way policy proposals are envisaged. Importantly, policy stories are 
stories of ‘what is’ and ‘what is to be done’. And it is the ‘what is to be done’ that is 
important because it needs to speak to issues of resources, overlap with departmental 
prerogatives, political marketability and the impact on political reputations, 
ideologies, common sense and so on.  
 
Within the interpretive approach to researching the policy process, language is 
clearly important, not only as the basis through which social phenomena are 
conceptualised but also as a medium through which other activities are undertaken. 
Policies are, for example, part of on-going processes of negotiation and bargaining 
between multiple actors over time (Dobuzinskis 1992). Here politics is central to 
why and how things are done. Reflecting the importance of policymaking as a 
political practice, Sumner and Tiwari (2009, p.81), consider policy processes as 
largely concerned with power, primarily ‘power over’ (domination and control), but 




(dignity and self esteem). There is ultimately an unclear line between those who 
‘make’ policy and those who ‘influence’ policy; that policy processes are non-linear 
and highly iterative, and, evidence used in policymaking is contestable rather than 
positivistic or absolute. We have thus returned to the original dialectic between 
knowledge and politics within policymaking proposed by Torgerson (1986; above). 
Discourse, as we can see from the above, is an important feature of this interface but 
other factors are equally so. Some of these are outlined in the above models but those 
guiding my research specifically will be discussed in the next sections.  
Knowledge and Political Legitimisation in the Policy Process 
The importance of power as a crosscutting issue is one that many positivist theories 
tend to neglect, or at least marginalise, which makes interpretive approaches 
particularly useful, although power itself remains an elusive concept to theorise and 
model. As noted in the introductory chapter, and as the discussion of discourse 
suggests, power is more diffuse than pluralists and other political scientists would 
suggest and is bound up within knowledge making processes. From this perspective, 
discourse becomes one element of a wider framework of what Jones (2009, p.11) 
considers politics and legitimisation, in which:  
power is infused throughout the knowledge process, from generation to 
uptake. Knowledge will often reflect and sustain existing power structures, 
and is used in the policy process in processes of contest, negotiation, 
legitimisation and marginalisation. 
If we reconfigure the analysis to one of knowledge in policy, we are able to trace 
some of these associated dynamics.
19
 How knowledge and politics/power combine 
are then a function of various interlocking domains (combining theories above), 
which Jones (2009) and Keeley and Scoones (2003; 1999) summarise as political 
interests or groups, actor-networks, institutions and discourses. (It should not be 
neglected that what counts as credible knowledge is itself politically determined.) As 
I have discussed discourses at length already, I will summarise the importance of 
political interests and actor-networks.  
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 Keeley and Scoones (1999; 2004) isolate the three major directions of policy process analysis that 
may be used to draw out key elements (see also Cabral and Scoones, 2006): that policy reflects 
political interests, which are also representative of structural constraints on decision-making; that 





Political Interests and Actors and Networks20 
As the name suggests, these approaches assume knowledge (at least rational or 
objective knowledge) as subordinate to political interests and particular types of 
knowledge prevail as a result of political interactions. The structure of the interaction 
and constituent interests are dynamic, with different theories developed to match 
these divergent circumstances. Keeley and Scoones (1999) isolate three dominant 
themes—society-centred following Dahl’s (1978) pluralism, state-centred following 
Skocpol (1985; see also Evans et al. 1985; Cf. Jessop 2001), and bureaucratic 
highlighting the bureaucratic role being beyond just managerial but policy orientated 
as well. These themes have evolved into a more generalised framework involving 
‘network’-based approaches.  
 
Different models of the policy process prescribe different relationships between key 
stakeholders—generally in terms of power over but also in terms of power to, with, 
and within (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002)—whilst also identifying the key players 
within such ‘networks’, namely, the state, bureaucracy, NGO’s, the private sector 
and the citizenry (although the latter are often excluded in discussion and in 
practice). Common examples of networks include iron triangles (e.g. Adams 1981), 
advocacy-coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993) issue networks (Heclo 1978), 
policy subsystems (e.g. Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991) or as Colebatch (2009b) describes 




The importance of a network-approach to political interests within the policy process 
is three-fold. First, it reworks early precedence given to either ‘the state’, 
‘bureaucracy’ or ‘society’, when theorising political power and domination in 
policymaking and rather obliges a review of the historical context in which these 
have come to overshadow one or the other. Different types of networks come with 
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 To avert any confusion a distinction must be made here from Actor-Network Theory (e.g. Latour, 
2005) and what social and political scientists have called actors and networks or actor-networks. 
The former is far more specific and derives from the discipline of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), whereby networks, which include non-human elements, generate and propagate 
certain types of (technical) knowledge especially. The latter is a more generalized term reflecting 
the importance of networks both as a whole and due to the actors within them.  
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 From a slightly different perspective one could also include epistemic communities, though I will 




their own characteristics and relationships and differ between socio-political 
contexts. That is, it leads to an appreciation of “particular state formations [as would 
be important in the case of South Africa’s young democracy], lack of homogeneity in 
the state and bureaucracy, political patronage and lines of affiliation that have formed 
over time” (Keeley & Scoones 1999, p.19). Second, network-approaches highlight 
the importance of interactions, bargaining and coalitions as processes (as described 
above) and, third, that knowledge results from core beliefs and the negotiated 
positions reached by political actors. Knowledge is then not the prime mover in 
policymaking, which emerges as a reflection of interests, although from where such 
interests emerge and whose interests are important cannot be taken for granted. There 
is equal overlap here with a widening focus on governance, which, when simplified 






Box 2: Governance 
The term ‘governance’ is employed across different disciplines and it would be 
wrong to claim homogeneity between these usages (Stoker 1998; Jordan et al. 
2005). Jordan et al. (2005) highlight some consistent definitions from a political 
science perspective, which refer to governance as the shifting ability of the state to 
steer society, marked by a growth in multi-level government structures. Other 
pragmatic descriptions consider governance, as the “exercise of authority in a 
given area and a synonym for efficient management within a specific system” 
(Hewitt de Alcantara 1998). Alternatively, governance could signify “a change in 
the meaning of government referring to the new method by which society is 
governed” (Stoker 1998, p.17); which some consider implies a distinction between 
traditional government and new governance (Jordan et al. 2005). The new method 
of rule generally implies an increased role for non-state actors in policymaking and 
even implementation. This includes the rise of ‘new’ policy instruments driven by 
market mechanisms and voluntary agreements in lieu of the traditional legislative 
capacity of the state (Zito et al. 2003). It is generally accepted that the shift to 
‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ reflects increasing power being devolved to 
non-state actors who now participate in a more complex ‘heterarchy’ rather than a 
system characterized by hierarchical ‘command and control’ or market-based 
‘anarchy’ (Jessop 2003). However, many of these governance structures still rely 




To extend a policy, research project, or development initiative to other spheres, 
networks require actors who are protagonists or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Hart & 
Victor 1993). These actors play crucial roles in publicising an issue, succinctly 
defining the urgency of a problem and offering the possibility of a solution (Keeley 
& Scoones 2004). Whereas networks imply association, actor-orientated approaches 
prioritise individual agency over and above that of structural collectives or aggregate 
interest groups in which they reside. Shifting the focus to individual agency moves 
away from macro-processes in which particular forms of knowledge dominate as a 
result of political bargaining and the exercise of power between groups, and suggest 
that the micro-level is also composed of the practices and actions of multiple 
interacting actors within groups; actions are not only limited to those of rational 
homo-economicus. Political interests are equally important here as, often policy 
proposals emerge from the decisions of one or more powerful actors.  
 
Beyond individual interests, agency should also been seen in terms of knowledge 
creation. By this, attention has to be focussed on activities at “knowledge interfaces” 
in which “new forms of insight and action, and new directions of the policy process” 
may emerge (Keeley and Scoones 1999, p. 20 citing Long and Long 1992; Mosse et 
al. 1998). Policy entrepreneurs and their ‘interpretative communities’, for example, 
allow for additional ‘enrolment’ but such actor-networks are important in developing 
knowledge in the first place (Latour 1996). That is, by drawing on Latour’s Actor-
Network Theory and other theories from the science studies literature, one recognises 
the micro-details or simultaneity of network formation and knowledge formation. By 
acts of ‘translation’ through chains of persuasion and influence, “scientific facts are 
only as strong as the networks that uphold them” (ibid; Cf. Yearly 2005; Chapter 6). 
Networks are therefore generated by and generate knowledge, and are part of a 
process that may be deconstructed to expose its constituent parts.  
 
The above discussion of knowledge generation through actor-networks emerges 
largely from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and related ‘Science Studies’ 
disciplines. I consider the STS literature further when considering evidence-based 
policy in Chapter 6, so some background is useful here, as it draws attention to the 




studies of science interrogate the assumed independence of science/knowledge and 
policy, illustrating how the two are co-produced (Barnes and Edge 1992; Jasanoff 
1996; see also ‘mutual construction’ of Shackley and Wynne 1995) and often used to 
sanction or legitimise each other, or exist in the absence of one another. Weinberg’s 
(1972) ‘trans-science’ is one example here, in which policies are usually developed 
before the science is complete (or asks questions beyond science’s capabilities) and 
thus policy is made in the face of continuing uncertainty (see also Yearley 2005). 
Ultimately, knowledge is neither ‘unproblematically’ incorporated into the policy 
process, nor is science the bearer of truth, presenting clear evidence to resolve 
identified problems (Keeley and Scoones 1999). 
Policy Development the Role of Policy and Policymaking in/for Development 
Having discussed some of the main theoretical perspectives of the policy process, 
which guide the research in later chapters, in this section I briefly show some of their 
importance to research into development policy. According to Mosse (2005), who 
bridges science and technology studies with development studies, it is possible to 
outline three major schools of thought when discussing policymaking in 
‘development’ (these roughly but not exactly coincide with some of the theories of 
policy described above). The first is an instrumental view of policy, which tends to 
see policy in its own terms as the rational assimilation of evidence and best practices 
that is then communicated to the implementers. Development policy in this context is 
the application of technical solutions, which, through continued monitoring and 
implementation, are adjusted accordingly to ensure outputs and (more difficultly) 
outcomes are met.  
 
The second perspective is more critical of development policy and is part of a wider 
discussion around the social construction of ‘development’. Proponents in this school 
aim to uncover hidden agendas of neo-colonial control, economic exploitation and 
the export of western ideologies hidden within policies (see Escobar 2012). If one 
takes a less radical approach, this critical perspective also raises important 
considerations of discourse and received wisdom in the policy process (Cabral & 




These considerations urge the analysis of knowledge-power that may make policies 
technically impeccable and institutionally provocative—they speak the right 
language—but remain bounded to the discourses through which they were created 
(Ferguson 1990). A synopsis of the ‘development apparatus’ developing policy, as 
outlined by Ferguson (1990), suggests: 
i. development institutions generate discourses;  
ii. discourses are constructs or a particular kind of object knowledge; the 
discourse creates a structure of knowledge around that object;  
iii. interventions are then organised on the basis of this knowledge, which 
while failing (as they do not match particular realities) have alternative or 
regulatory effects (described by Ferguson as the expansion and 
entrenchment of bureaucratic power in Lesotho).  
Ferguson thus refers to this development apparatus as an ‘anti-politics machine’ that, 
while considered apolitical, still performs a political function. The complex 
relationship between the intentionality of planning and the strategic intelligibility of 
outcomes is perhaps the single most important theme.  
 
The third school of thought draws on ethnographical studies of bureaucracies and 
policymaking, for example, interrogating further the constitution of Ferguson’s 
‘complex relationship’ and dissecting the intricacies of Ferguson’s three steps. 
Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour (1987; 1996), Mosse (2005; 2004) situates 
himself apart from the first two interpretations above and focuses far more on the 
complexity of policy as an institutional and social practice, opening up the ‘black 
box’ of implementation. From this perspective, greater attention needs to be given to 
the ‘social life’ of projects, where the organisations and professionals, diversity of 
interests behind policy models and the perspectives of actors themselves all need to 
be considered (Mosse 2004, p.644). While much of his argument complies with that 
of existing sociological interpretations of the policy process, and hints at an 
overarching structuration argument, David Mosse reorders the process and makes us 
consider why ‘good policy’ is ‘unimplementable’. Here he argues that discourses 
become the end, rather than the means, of development because coherent and 




relationships’ than contradictory development realities. By this, networks take on a 
character not held together by a particular discourse (such as they are in advocacy-
coalitions) but are actively rearticulating it.  
 
Based on his research, Mosse makes five propositions about policy in development. 
The first two maintain that policy functions to mobilise political support and 
legitimate (rather than orientate) practice; while development interventions are 
driven instead by the exigencies of organisations and relationships (Mosse 2004, 
p.648-54; 2005, p.14-17). That is, development workers do what is required 
according to local demands while policymakers focus on political alliances. This too 
has been recognised in bureaucracies in general (e.g. Dalton 1959). When 
development policy works well, it is because local players are able to reinterpret their 
practical activities to be expressions of policy, and policy makers are able to present 
the results of local action as policy successes. The third proposition is that an 
essential part of development work is maintaining this overall system of 
representation, not just technical and operational matters (Mosse 2004, p.654-58; 
2005, p.17-18).  
 
The fourth and fifth propositions deal with the ways in which successes and failures 
are portrayed within policy. When projects fail, it is because ‘policy’ has failed them. 
Essentially, changes in policy also change the discourse but not the action on the 
ground, so that what was previously successful is now by definition a failure; even if 
there have been no changes in implementation (Mosse 2004, p.658-61; 2005, p.18-
20). Successes and failures are measured against policy, which obscures the effects 
of actual projects (Mosse 2004, p.662). In the end, policymaking, unlike project 
management escapes accountability. “Perhaps good policy is not implementable, but 
it is absolutely central to what happens in arenas of development, and it is important 
to know how” (Mosse 2004, p.667; 2005, p.20). Policy is also more important than 
we think because it operates at levels of power and influence, which are driven by 
other forms of motivation than its ostensible object, which in Mosse’s case is good 
development practice (see also Keeley and Scoones 1999; 2004). I reflect on such a 
situation in the concluding chapter by emphasising the symbolic nature of 





The anthropological approach Mosse advocates can further identify far more 
nuanced and subjective reflections as to how policy happens – in fact becomes the 
discourse. The approach is considered relevant for my purposes, to begin to assess 
the credibility of ‘biofuels for development’, and the appropriateness of technical 
approaches to ‘development’. Essentially, in the case of biofuels, in South Africa I 
suggest that it is important to consider discourse as being both a means and an end, 
identifying how they have gained prominence and the manner in which their 
currency is maintained. In the next section, I will outline how exactly I do so.  
PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE: THE RESEARCH METHODS 
The methodology and focus of this study have evolved over time. The nature of these 
changes is important and enables the reader to understand the research objectives 
described in the introduction. Following an initial literature review and desktop 
assessment, two main areas of concern were the development of the final Biofuels 
Industrial Strategy document, and the issue of how the strategy’s objectives matched 
with ‘successes’ on the ground. While the latter appears extremely instrumental, it 
was not to be a simple ‘gap analysis’, but rather an enquiry into how projects framed 
activities (and their success) in response to, and as part of the emerging policy 
framework. At the time of writing my original proposal in Edinburgh, there were a 
couple major biofuel projects being proposed in South Africa, which, I assumed 
naively, would be ‘established’ in a matter of months. After a first research visit to 
the South Africa in 2009, however, it emerged that biofuels projects were relatively 
non-existent as the industry was awaiting some serious policy changes. An interview 
with a representative of the South African Biofuels Association
22
 sums the situation:  
[Interviewer] I am interested in discussing the biofuels industry in 
South Africa. 
[Respondent] Biofuels industry … What biofuels industry? (SABA 
respondent, 2010).  
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 This ‘industry’ association later changed its name to the South African Bioenergy Association in 




In one sense, such responses serve to contrast the exaggeration apparent in 
magazines, online and in the news, with the reality of the situation. However, the 
lack of projects made the investigation into the policy process and its influence on 
the wider ‘industry’ more pressing (and interesting), especially given the business-
centric lobbying, before the final Strategy was promulgated. Meeting with some 
respondents, who would, I think, not object being called ‘lefties’, their interpretation 
seemed to suggest the entire policy process was about ‘greedy’ maize farmers trying 
to make huge profits by selling maize to ethanol producers, who were then 
undermined by the ANC. It was a believable story, one echoed by the press and 
headline-catching debates of food-versus-fuel that have been ongoing (see Chapter 
7), but the process was far more politicised and multifarious. It presented fertile 
ground for an interpretive investigation of policymaking. Indeed, maize farmers were 
important, and their hopes were certainly dashed when the final policy was released, 
but they were not the only players. They were actually, relatively insignificant 
compared to the government actors, the quasi-governmental organisations of the 
Central Energy Fund and Industrial Development Corporation, amongst other 
project-level players. It was not only the maize farmers that have been sidelined 
(even though their fate dominated the biofuels discourse at the time) but also the 
industry in general. For this reason, I embarked on a ‘post-mortem’ of the industry 
(see Table 3 of Chapter 5) looking specifically at how these other players were 
involved and interacted with the policy process and its development; considering 
them as policymakers, rather than outsiders awaiting further guidance.  
 
Through the review of external (non- and quasi-government) players and the 
interaction and overlap of the ‘policy’ and the ‘industry’—not in terms of actual 
project activities on the ground but rather the activities of key role players—I began 
mapping out the policy subsystem and its links to the development of a biofuels 
assemblage in South Africa. (Although there is value in documenting the rise (or 
demise) of the new fledgling biofuels industry and its relation to policy, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I do not detail this emergent assemblage, except where it ties 
in with the policy’s development. I also limit the study to the development and 
promulgation of the final Strategy, although this is by no means the end of the story.) 




national level and within the Eastern Cape, where two major biofuels projects were 
and continue to be proposed (a map of these can be found in Chapter 4). These 
projects are the Industrial Development Corporation’s vanguard Cradock sugar beet-
based bio-ethanol plant, and a German-sponsored canola-based biodiesel project in 
the former Transkei. In addition, I also met with a range of other stakeholders and 
project managers involved in other defunct and/or slowly progressing (small and 
large-scale) projects, most notably the Mabele (sorghum) project in the Free State, 
which is now the leading private-sector initiative in the country. With an important 
policy entrepreneur on their team, this project remains equally important to the 
policy’s continuing development.
23
 These interviews were used to bolster the 
discussions with government officials involved in the policy processes, which are 
described next.  
Methodology and Methods 
The overall methodology was developed through a literature review and 
understanding of best practices developed within the original research proposal. This 
research uses a number of research techniques to obtain, assemble and interpret 
information germane to the inquiry. The two main methods were:  
 Interviews with key stakeholders in which their testimonies would be used to 
identify how people perceived the policy process and its changes over time. 
 Discourse and content analysis in which key texts and policy documents were 
analysed with respect to the rhetorical claims made, narrative framings and 
their relation and meaning to context. This included interrogating national 
and local policies and relevant ‘grey’ literature.  
 
In addition to the original literature review, which set out the wider context in the 
proposal stages and informed the conceptual underpinnings and analytical 
framework, content analysis continued to inform much of the research. While a 
quantitative approach to textual analysis has not been followed (eg Sengers et al. 
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 A full discussion of these projects is provided in Chapter 4 as they form part of a complex web of 
government and non-government actors and organisations and their discussion falls better within 





2010), content has been reviewed for recurring or prominent themes and the socio-
cognitive frames through which they are drawn; largely revolving around 
modernising techno-economic rationales but peppered with aspirations of ecological 
and social improvements. Key to this approach was also looking for rhetorical claims 
that departed from or were contradicted by dominant themes within the texts that 
they appeared but also clarifying who were crafting such texts and thus making 
inferences about the characteristics and effects of such communication. For example, 
the Feasibility Study (see Chapter 6) is riddled with such contradictions. The 
executive summary, for example, suggests a wealth of benefits (ecological 
modernisation and social upliftment in the second economy), whilst the actual 
content of the document denies and contradicts such possibilities.  
 
Media excerpts were especially important in identifying some of the popular 
discourse around biofuels, topics of central importance, and the wider public interest. 
Research documents investigating biofuels in South Africa have also been important 
in both setting the scene and highlighting prominent discourses and conceptual 
frameworks used in justifying and legitimising support. The examination of key 
national policies, for example, Energy White Papers and strategy documents of the 
Department of Energy (and its forerunner the Department of Minerals and Energy), 
Strategic Plans and programme documents of the Biofuels Task Team, and 
provincial documents, especially regarding the Eastern Cape’s own policy 
developments, was undertaken to supplement the interview data. Reviewing these 
documents not only provided clear outlines of the strategies being researched but 
also helped to situate the Industrial Biofuels Strategy in wider energy and 
development policy frameworks. The various strategy documents also outline 
institutional arrangements and procedures that are used to inform the interviews and 
the findings. The documents are described in their relevant contexts within later 
chapters. 
 
With some understanding of the policy context, as mentioned above, in 2010 I 
embarked on a six-month fieldtrip to South Africa. Sampling for the research was 
non-random (Kelley et al. 2003), purposively seeking out experts in the population 




inherent bias. Non-random sampling is useful, however, when descriptive comments 
about the sample itself (in my case the policy subsystem) are desired. As an 
idiographic and interpretive enquiry into the development of the Strategy is the basis 
of the assessment undertaken here, non-random sampling is considered a valid 
approach for the research. The main interviewees chosen were from government 
sectors (primarily main members of the Biofuels Task Team), as well as academics 
and consultants in the field. Use was made of ‘snowball’ sampling, commonly 
applied in stakeholder analyses of development projects (ibid., see also Grimble and 
Chan 1995). In this type of sampling, key informants help to identify others with 
knowledge and information to assist in the understanding of or involvement in the 
topics being researched. I recognise that the inherent bias in this approach may 
indeed leave certain players out (and certainly, some important stakeholders only 
emerged through document analysis, media interviews and other means) though it is 
still useful to discern associated networks or an anecdotal ‘who’s who’. The resulting 
stakeholder analysis is cross scalar, moving from national to local levels and between 
(see Appendix B for a list of informants). At the national level, nearly forty 
interviews were concluded with respondents who predominantly had a direct 
involvement in the formal policy process, either as consultants or as government 
officials, or whose activities were closely related to the Strategy’s development. 
  
Initial interviewees were from the national Department of Energy (DoE), as they 
were the controlling or co-ordinating entity of the Biofuels Task Team. Interviews 
with the DoE and other members of the Biofuels Task Team were deemed sufficient 
to give an adequate representative overview of the status and some of the processes 
of developing the Biofuels Strategy. These semi-structured interviews were iterative, 
with ideas continuously adapted to the needs of the research, as further understanding 
of interviewees, the institutional environment and key points of interest were 
grasped. This was consistent with the organic nature of qualitative interviewing 
(Babbie & Mouton 2001). These preliminary interviews were then used to map wider 
research activities and provided additional inputs and data (documents as well as 





In this first fieldtrip in 2010, a number of challenges were encountered. Most 
notable, was that most of those people involved in the Strategy’s development were 
no longer in the same positions they held at the time (the final version of the strategy 
was released in 2007) and were therefore difficult to locate. This meant time 
available for research was lost in the search for informants. Those that were still 
available were, in many cases, no less difficult to meet with and thus a second 
fieldtrip in 2011 was arranged to address this issue and gather more data. These and 
further interviews with ‘industry’ players were completed in this second fieldtrip. 
The latter interviews also included a two-month field trip to the Eastern Cape to 
engage with key stakeholders within the Province, as well as meet the project 
managers and wider community of the Cradock ethanol plant.  
 
The research primarily relies on the use of semi-structured stakeholder interviews as 
part of the case study approach. As this research project is only an initial study, 
qualitative interviews were deemed sufficient to gather the necessary data. While 
questionnaires and other quantitative procedures would certainly bolster the research, 
given the flux of people within the department and overall interpretative focus these 
were not undertaken. Interview content was either recorded and transcribed (where 
respondents did not object to being recorded), and/or notes were taken during the 
discussion and important points summarised after the interviews. Interview 
summaries were coded using QSR Nvivo 8 software, for qualitative analysis and 
easy reference. The coding system was ad hoc and iterative, being adapted as new 
themes emerged in new interviews (also resulting to re-analysis and coding of 
previous summaries). There were of course overriding themes guiding the interviews 
(Appendix B; below). The coding in Nvivo was useful for three main reasons. First, 
it was instrumental to the analysis by allowing quick referral to themes as mentioned 
above. Second, the Nvivo coding was used to annotate topics requiring further 
questioning in future interviews, which were then incorporated within the interview 
questions where applicable. These would include both issues that were not fully 
understood (requiring clarity) and new topics that had been mentioned but were not 
known about but appeared interesting (required exploration). Finally, the software 




going research, given the orientation towards ‘snowballing’. That is, people 
mentioned in interviews could be coded to ensure follow up was taken.  
 
All interviews were conducted in English and all officials had a good understanding 
of the jargon and technical content involved in government programmes. I managed 
to establish a good rapport with many of the interviewees, some of whom I have 
sustained contact with given our similar interests. The semi-structured interviews 
were designed a priori, according to various topics depending on the nature of the 
respondents (national, provincial or local) and the themes to be addressed (see 
Appendix B). General guiding themes were maintained for each sub-set of 
stakeholders, allowing for some comparison across interviews. The semi-structured 
approach to interviews was chosen given its flexibility to permit a more open 
dialogue between interviewer and respondent. To reduce researcher bias, questions 
were kept as simple and straightforward as possible and allowed for much latitude 
and personal discretion on the part of the respondent, however, obviously certain 
points were prioritised and emphasised. In all discussions, I generally focussed on (i) 
how people fitted into the process but also (ii) where they came from 
organisationally or in terms of their professional background, to understand why or 
how they thought about issues that were confronted in their negotiations and what 
their focus areas were. The emphasis was not just about finding out what they wanted 
to achieve but why. 
 
In summary, semi-structured interviews were undertaken and analysed using Nvivo 
to see how people and their associated institutions/agencies/projects were involved in 
the policy process, obtain their views on how the process unfolded, who they thought 
were important to the process, as well as other themes specific to the biofuels policy 
(for example, their views of food-versus-fuel, where they see the greatest challenges, 
et cetera). The analysis also considered the knowledge respondents’ cited for their 
arguments, which adds to the discourse analysis and an understanding of narratives at 
work. Additionally content analysis is used to interrogate the nature of knowledge in 
the media and policy documents to determine how these influence or are represented 




Reflecting on the Research Approach: Some Procedural Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
A value-critical approach to research insists that the ‘positionality’ of the researcher 
is not taken for granted, that research is never purely objective (approaches are 
always theory laden and/or subjective) and meaning-focussed analysis is always 
highly contextualised. Inherent weaknesses in the interview process were 
acknowledged and in some cases explicitly encountered, given the racial, socio-
economic and demographic characteristic of the researcher (white, male, middle-
class, English speaking, experience as policy consultant et cetera). Being white in the 
new South Africa is a particularly thorny issue, especially when it comes to 
researching the ‘new’ government. Preconceptions and racial tensions can direct 
responses and social conduct, at its worst confronting open racism from all quarters 
and at its more subtle pigeonholing and pre-classifying discussions into somewhat 
polemic rhetorical categories of white-versus-black, us-versus-them, old-versus-new. 
This was not always the case but it is important to recognise that as a white male 
talking to mostly black (often female) officials, who have lived through the 
tribulations of apartheid, one is left trying to internalise different perceptions with, 
perhaps, varied success and an uneasy sense of self. Overall, however, the impact on 
the findings and indeed the interviews was limited, given the rich data and discussion 
provided, and it is likely that one can overindulge these subtleties in lieu of a more 
straightforward and uncontroversial research programme. The rapport gained 
between researcher and respondent on most occasions was indeed a sign of the 
absence of any racial tension or ‘baggage’ and an eagerness to ‘get on with the job’.  
 
In hindsight, the initial decision to attempt an in-depth study into the policy-related 
dynamics of both the project- and policy-level, left questions remaining in each case. 
It is unlikely, however, more interviews were possible in practical terms given the 
time available to undertake the research.
24
 Had documentation been more accessible, 
especially that of meetings held by the Biofuels Task Team (the main policymakers), 
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 This is perhaps the greatest limitation when researching government policy in a specified 
timeframe. Twice, involving two separate (but key) informants, I travelled over 500km to attend 
meetings that were cancelled due to unforeseen circumstances (in which political superiors had 
requested meetings ‘that morning’). One can see how quickly time runs out. It was also difficult 





as well as communication between the various stakeholders (especially project-
managers), this may have necessitated fewer interviews, better background 
information to draw on and more time for additional or repeat interviews. However, 
this was not the reality or the situation and such documentation has not been 
forthcoming. At the same time, the dismal performance of the industry made 
research at the project level relatively difficult. People were frustrated with anything 
to do with biofuels and the discussions were difficult to explore given that, frankly, 
the policy was a ‘failure’ and there was not much more people want to say. I have 
also had to be circumspect when interrogating the project level. There were, for 
example, interesting histories to be documented regarding projects in the North West 
Province but these were left aside for a greater focus on the projects in the Eastern 
Cape, as they were more instrumental to the national policy process. As such, 
questions remain, as do issues to be addressed concerning the relationship between 
projects, policymaking and policy implementation as a continuing and dynamic 
process. From this research, it is apparent that the Cradock biofuels project is a 
useful basis for exploring the development of the industry during and after the initial 
five-year pilot phases. Some of this data has been incorporated into the thesis but this 
only touches the surface of an extremely peculiar project (see Chapter 4 and its 
associated Appendix D). The same is true for the proposals for canola (oilseed rape) 
plantations in the Eastern Cape, a case study to which I hope to return. The nuances 
of these project-level assessments are especially interesting when viewed in relation 
to the existing theories of ‘global’ biofuels commodity chains, or assemblages, as 
local contrasts and similarities can be used to tease apart some of the theoretical 
standpoints in novel ways (see Chapter 8).  
  
There was, however, value in taking both a policy and a project approach given their 
complementary role within the overall policy process. For example, in a brief visit to 
the Eastern Cape in the first research phase, I ventured to find out more about the 
policy that was drafted in the Province. Although I gathered limited data—despite 
the commendable support of some of the main government officials involved—the 
discussion of where the policy came from only made sense after interviews a year 
later with project managers of the Cradock Plant and the PhytoEnergy project (see 




especially of the PhytoEnergy (or rather KPMG) representatives that had began to 
spur interests in biofuels. This does not mean that the policy was only due to the 
activities of the project managers. Two of the policy-makers involved in developing 
the Eastern Cape’s policy had been to conferences (one of the few groups of people 
that actually succeeded in the ‘early days’ of biofuels were conference organisers and 
consultants), which had also struck a chord with their own departmental or 
developmental interests in the Eastern Cape. 
 
As the analysis of the processes is subjective and based on the accounts of others, 
there is an inherent potential for participant bias and incomplete/censored 
information. However, respondents clearly underscored their vested interests, 
detailed surrounding networks and were open about their ideologies and frames of 
reference, which not only brought any bias to the fore but assisted in understanding 
how or why the policy process was steered in such directions. People were quick to 
suggest that what they were telling me was only their interpretation, one worldview 
amongst many, and prejudiced by their own lived experiences. Far from being a 
weakness, this is exactly the information I was attempting to grasp and it was not 
only policymakers that divulged such data. Commercial farmers in the Eastern Cape 
were, for example, apologetic of their self-professed naivety when it comes to 
politics and their ideological predispositions that favour commercial farmers over 
and above other types of farming. People within ‘the industry’ also suggested a range 
of criteria they felt were important for a biofuels policy but that what happened did 
not conform to their own understandings of the way things ‘should be done’, though 
to varying degrees they understood that this was only one way of thinking about the 
way things ‘could be done’. As one respondent stated in a particularly gruesome 
metaphor, “there are many ways to skin a cat”. 
 
A third important issue, was that of accessing the formal and informal activities, and 
the ‘on the record’ and ‘off the record reports’ of key stakeholders. Although 
respondents have been wilfully open about the policy process and their role in it, 
much if not most involvement was informal, or at least, not formalised. As one of the 




Shaun, there is lots to go on here, but there is no paper trail for 
you to follow, none of this [negotiations between and with 
officials] is written down… and if you were to ask people their 
official position, it will never reflect what has happened in reality 
(Consultant A 2010).  
With some frequency, a few interviewees suggested there was the ‘real story’, and an 
‘official story’. In such cases people, would say, “don’t quote me”, followed by what 
was generally the most important information, tying together how and why certain 
decisions were actually made. In many of the discussions, especially when for clarity 
or in follow up, respondents became much more frank, as better rapport was 
established between the respondents and I, allowing ‘secrets’ to be divulged. 
Countless times, I was told, “this is off the record” and then told of the day-to-day 
arguments and petty politics that people within the process had encountered. These 
came to be important in understanding nuances and contradictions that only made 
sense after the benefit of learning such ‘secrets’. They were important too as many 
policymakers would also indulge in ‘rants’ about their frustrations with the 
policymaking process but that gave a more personalised sense of the process, many 
that resonated with my own experiences as a consultant. To test the validity of some 
such accusations and anecdotes I would try and include them in other interviews—
asking whether they were plausible, cynical, ridiculous—and gauge the kinds of 
responses. The consistency between responses suggests that there is some 
authenticity to their views; at the theoretical level, there is much more to be worked 
out behind the smoke and mirrors in areas where academics (and journalists) have 
little access in South Africa. Most of the time, what I thought was pure cynicism was 
closer to the truth than I had expected. 
 
It should be recognised that the research attempted to unpack the policy process, 
including the knowledge-power component, historically. The passage of time 
between the research undertakings and the actual promulgation of the policy has 
meant that people did not always clearly remember what happened when, or that they 
were fuzzy on the sequence of events. It has meant, however, that people have been 
open in their discussions, as there is now sufficient distance between them and the 
strategy. This is not true of some respondents that are still actively involved in 




rejected or ignored requests for interviews and discussions. Certainly many of these 
stakeholders are busy as many are ‘high up’ within government structures and 
therefore carry heavy responsibilities. At the same time, some have refused out-right, 
illustrating the sensitivities surrounding the biofuels policy, the fragile negotiations 
around ‘implementation’, and in some cases a political reluctance to engage in 
‘difficult’ conversations. From the above, it was at times difficult to separate analysis 
type processes and data collection and as such I would continually reflect on 
interviews and take notes of what I thought were interesting relationships between 
the interviewee and the wider biofuels assemblage or policy sub-system. Who was 
open to discussion and who was not was also important as it essentially reflected 
groups of ‘untouchables’ but also limitations in what data I had and how I might be 
able to work around such limitations. Unfortunately, it is well recognised in policy 
analysis that there will always be limitations as to what data is made available (e.g. 
Hill 2005, p. 10). The political hierarchy were especially difficult to establish links 
with, generally referring interviews to subordinates and technical staff. Out of five 
ministers approached, only one availed their time. 
 
Another weakness to be considered relates to the interviews themselves though also 
had minimal impact on the findings. May (2001) considers that three conditions are 
necessary for the completion of effective interviews. The first is accessibility – 
whether those interviewed have access to or possess the relevant understanding or 
information to enable them to respond. Only in some cases were respondents 
unwilling to respond to questions, but it should be noted that this was usually for 
ethical or political reasons on the part of the respondent rather than them not 
understanding the questions. The second success criterion is cognition of the 
respondent’s role within the research. All interviews were preceded by an 
introductory discussion and the reasons for the interviews. Part of this approach was 
to emphasize the importance of the interviewee’s involvement but also to clarify or 
rather guarantee anonymity
25
 and ensure no one would be put at risk by being 
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  As many people involved in the research are still involved in biofuels policy processes and the 
wider industry, I have elected to not name specific respondents when using quotations but rather 
replace names with interview denominations such as (Interview A, Interview B, et cetera). This 
provides some measure of consistency of who said what but will also be supplemented with some 




involved. When engaging in informal open discussion with informants (for example, 
informal discussions with officials while at conferences or workshops), information 
that was used was not referenced to any specific individuals so there is no risk to 
those involved. Finally, it is also important to motivate respondents to feel that their 
involvement has been of value. All respondents were assured that their contributions 
were valuable, and it was evident from the eagerness shown by most government 
officials interviewed that they were interested in the research. Only in rare cases did 
individuals refuse to become involved. In some cases, it was unfortunate that no 
contact could be made.  
 
One has to emphasise that this thesis can only ever hope to present a partial view of 
the process, and perhaps even only a partial view of an extremely complex policy 
sub-system. Even those closely involved have had different interpretations and 
recollections of ‘how things happened’ and thus my work is to present as full a 
picture as possible and mediate supposed contradictions. The analysis can never be 
an entirely complete one. Equally, the more the subject was researched, the ‘messier’ 
things became. Although a weakness, acknowledging this messiness also presents an 
opportunity. As research in similar areas has shown (du Toit & Neves 2007; du Toit 
2005), reality is complex and it is especially the local circumstances that need to be 
unpacked, rather than relying on idealistic metaphors that serve to mask and obscure 
the true nature of things. Roe (1991) notes similar shortcomings in development 
policies based on arguments, scenarios and narratives that do not stand up under 
scrutiny. The abstractions of policies and even my own analyses of power-
knowledge, narratives and networks serve to reinforce that there is always more to be 
looked at than a blind submission to the simplicity of policy proposals, whilst also 
recognising that such analyses themselves will be necessarily incomplete. We should 
be continually searching amid the veils of glib rhetoric for the wider ‘truth’ and 
hidden details. It is through the above empirical processes that the attempt has been 





This chapter began by reviewing existing biofuels policy analyses. Two categories 
are apparent. The first comprises situational reviews or studies for the policy process, 
often prescribing recommendations to make policies better (both in terms of content 
and often proposing the processes through which they should be made). These types 
of studies take an instrumental approach to policy and policymaking. Analyses 
within the second category are more interested in the process of policymaking than 
the content. Here, two more distinctions could be made between those studies that 
model and theorise the process from more positivistic approaches, which also assume 
an instrumentality of positivistic knowledge, and studies that are more critical and 
interpretive, which are critical of knowledge as part of wider social constructions and 
power relationships. These two distinctions within the second category are indicative 
of a philosophical divide within social science in general and policy studies in 
particular. Policy and policymaking are therefore difficult to define in detail, without 
entering into particularly complicated and contentious debates. Nevertheless, the 
chapter has highlighted an overall theoretical framework for the thesis, defining the 
overarching philosophical position, of which my research follows the interpretive 
and critical approach. It thus deviates from positivistic assumptions about the social 
sciences and positivism as a basis for policy process analyses. This implies that I 
consider there to be value in considering subjective accounts in policy studies and 
that we cannot objectively know and precisely prescribe causation to decisions made 
and knowledge used within policy is equally open to critique. 
 
The discussion then elaborated the epistemological and theoretical perspectives that 
such a philosophical position entails, culminating in a discussion of discourses, 
narratives, political interests and actor-networks (while not neglecting their 
positivistic counterparts). These comprise a general framework for the analysis, 
though need to be considered or complemented by other theories, including 
positivistic explanations of causality, which add to the interpretation of the case 
study. Essentially, as one identifies with more complexity, models become redundant 
and, in Peter John’s (2012) judgment, explanation degenerates to description but not 




description, which provides an account of human action based on a contextual 
understanding of the links and transactions among decision makers. I make no 
apology for aspiring to such descriptions and it is a ‘descriptive’ focus that this thesis 
takes as its point of departure. Armed with the understanding that networks, politics 
and discourses (Keeley and Scoones 2004) are important, but bolstered by micro-
processes involving both structure and agency, or rather in combination, structuration 
(Giddens 1984), the approach is to provide an interpretive gaze on South African 
policymaking.  
 
The specific methods used for the research are then described, with semi-structured 
interviews providing the bulk of the data to be analysed, looking for connections 
between vested interests, the use of knowledge and the processes through which it is 
produced and legitimised. For this reason, the methodological stance insists that 
social construction is foundational to policy processes. Such social construction may 
be detailed through interrogating the subjective interpretations of the actors involved, 
and through engaging with the narratives and discourses that these, policy 
documents, and project proposals exhibit, whilst also acknowledging each of these 
within their formative context and the contests over meaning therein. It should of 
course be remembered that:  
neither policy nor the problems to which it is addressed are natural 
phenomena with an existence of their own, independent of the participants; 











CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICA’S PEOPLE AND POLICYMAKING 
Shaun this topic is ideal because the issues of politics and the ways 
policies are made are an extension of, or rather embedded within the 
biofuels policy; it’s a useful case study… (Former BTT member A, 
2012). 
The above quote comes from one of my later interviews. It was also one of my 
longest. Within the discussion, the respondent shared his experiences of 
policymaking in South Africa, reiterating many of the concerns included in the 
literature review of this chapter, whilst adding many nuances that are not. Without 
extending too much on the details of the interview (these will come later), the point 
was that while there are a numerous existing reviews of policymaking in South 
Africa, they generally take a normative approach. That is, they focus on what ought 
to happen rather than present what actually happens. Acknowledging and 
understanding both is important, of course, and although a pithy suggestion (although 
the introductory chapter suggests others do agree), the review below still suggests a 
rich literature.  
 
The chapter is separated into two main parts. To take further the issues introduced 
above, the second major part of the chapter is a meta-analysis of policymaking 
processes in South Africa. From a reading of the literature, it became apparent that 
some important studies of policymaking are found in nuanced case studies of 
development policy, which highlight some themes in common with those I wish to 
illuminate through the biofuels case study. As such, I provide a review of some of the 
existing policy studies in South Africa, focussing particularly on the various 
development policies and their critiques.  
 
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of the ‘governance apparatus’ 
(borrowing from Van Der Walt 2013) or ‘technologies of government’, describing 
the dominant institutional arrangements, administration and their counterpart 




African National Congress (ANC).
1
 These two broad themes reflect the 
administrative and political domains, which Eakin and Lemos (2006) regard as 
fundamental to understanding the state’s ability to govern. They term this the ‘state 
capacity’, which comprises a political/policy capacity (the ability to make informed 
decisions) and an administrative capacity (that implements those decisions). 
However, it should be remembered that, despite such simple caricatures, “[i]t is 
easier to allude to ‘the government’ than it is to identify it on the ground” (Colebatch 
2000, p.4).
2
 To begin with, a brief discussion of the demographics and 
developmental challenges in the country leads to an outline of the governmental 
machinery through which the state responds. 
GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa, as a middle-income country, faces significant challenges, in which a 
government of limited capacity confronts a range of social ills and ‘wicked 
problems’. According to the 2011 census, South Africa has a population of over 
51million people, increasing from approximately 42million in 1990 (Lehola 2012, 
p.18). Within the census, this aggregate is broken down into five racial categories—
Black, Coloured, Indian and Asian, White, and Other. Blacks account for the 
majority at 79.2%. whilst Coloureds and Whites each constitute 8.9% of the 
population respectively (ibid.,p. 21). The multi-racial make-up of the country is 
matched by an equally diverse multiculturalism; one need only to look at South 
Africa’s eleven official languages and diverse linguistic heritage for evidence of this 
(Mesthrie 2002). Following a peaceful transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa 
prides itself as being a ‘rainbow nation’.  
 
No study of policymaking and development in South Africa can ignore, however, the 
brutal history of dispossession through minority rule and the lasting legacy of 
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 As Rose and Miller (1992, p.193) suggest: “[g]overnment is a domain of strategies, techniques and 
procedures through which different forces seek to render programmes operable, and by means of 
which a multitude of connections are established between the aspirations of authorities and the 
activities of individuals and groups. These heterogeneous mechanisms we term technologies of 
government.” 
2
 Richard Calland, whose work I will expand on later, alludes to similar sentiments. Essentially, while 





apartheid and colonialism beforehand.
3
 It is important to recognise that the transition 
from a totalitarian and securitised state to democracy has been both a process but 
also a defining moment of translation; the primary lens through which we can define 
the current state of affairs (of which policymaking is a part). Fantu Cheru describes it 
aptly: “apartheid has been both an economic disaster and human tragedy” (1992, 
p.17). Beyond the brutality and its legacy, there are important institutional and socio-
political features of apartheid that remain prominent even post apartheid. For 
example, Marquard and Eberhard (2000, p.4) understand apartheid as: 
a form of modernisation, an ideological response to urbanisation and 
industrialisation in a post-colonial society dominated by a settler elite. As 
such, it featured many of the ‘‘social technologies’’ that characterised the 
totalitarian state coupled with an affinity with science and technology and 
social engineering.  
This modernisation ideology had important implications both for the content of and 
process through which policies were developed; technology was tantamount and 
deliberations secretive. As I will describe later, the transition to democracy was 
revolutionary to both these aspects, but in many respects, the country remains 
constrained by apartheid’s divisive legacy, especially in the petrochemical industry 
(see Appendix E). 
Apartheid and its Consequences in Brief 
The overarching feature of apartheid was institutionalised segregation, which built on 
earlier racist, colonial laws, such as the Glen Grey Act of 1894 decreed within the 
Cape Colony. After (English and Afrikaans) South Africa unified in 1910, the 
historian Leonard Thomson outlines two major periods of exclusion that followed—a 
Segregation Era, (1910-48) and an Apartheid Era (1948-1978). During the 
Segregation era, laws such as The Native Land Act (1913) severely constrained black 
peoples’ access to and ownership of land, dividing the country into ‘white-owned’ 
and ‘black-owned’, although with many more restrictions steeped on the latter. It was 
this Act that led Sol Plaaitje (2006, p.12) to proclaim: “[a]waking on Friday morning, 
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 The importance in acknowledging such a past is more than idealistic or sentimental but a pragmatic 
necessity. In the words of Johnson (2010), “[i]f you accept the colonial legacy and build on it, 
you can go beyond it. If you attempt to destroy or reverse it, you end with a failed state. History is 




June 20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a 
pariah in the land of his birth”. 
 
The onset of apartheid in 1948—when the Afrikaans National Party (NP) came into 
power—was not only one of deepening segregation through ‘separate development’ 
but better understood as explicit marginalisation. This policy resulted in the 
formation of Homelands, (also called independent African states or Banthustans) but 
was also one of fulfilling Afrikaner ethnic objectives by forming a republic and 
“Afrikanerizing” the state (see discussion of Thompson 2001, p.188). Strict 
segregation would thus permeate all spheres of life, from the day-to-day constraints 
of petty apartheid to the derisive separate development ideology of grand apartheid.  
 
Within the exclusionary and segregationist apartheid laws, lay the origins of South 
Africa’s current polarised and highly unequal society (Marais 2011; Viljoen & 
Sekhampu 2013). Whites enjoy far greater access to services and wellbeing than non-
whites do. The far-reaching effects of racial segregation have left a majority of the 
population without access to basic services, a pervasive challenge to the post-
democratic ANC-led government (Edigheji 2010b). A significant disparity remains 
post-democracy in which non-whites are “trapped in chronic, structural poverty, 
lacking the assets and entitlements needed to successfully escape poverty over time” 
(Carter & May 1999, p.2). For example, South Africa’s Gini Coefficient, which is a 
simple measure of income inequality,
4
 worsened by increasing from 0.565 to 0.577 
between 1995 and 2000 according to one comparison and 0.68 to 0.73 between 1996 
and 2001 in another (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006; Leibbrandt et al., 2006 cited in 
Bhorat & Kanbur 2006). (In 2009 the Gini Coefficient hovered at 0.66 according to 
the Presidency (2009a).) In 2003, the United Nations development programme 
reported that South Africa was the third most unequal country in the world (United 
Nations Development Programme 2003). These figures remain comparable to some 
of the most unequal societies globally, such as Brazil and Nigeria (Bond 2010), but 
also differ significantly between racial groups; they are much worse amongst blacks 
(Landman 2003). Bhorat and Kanbur (2006, p.13) summarise the situation in which 
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 The Gini coefficient can vary between “0” and “1”. The closer to one (1), the more unequal a 




“the growth-poverty-inequality nexus retains a particular relevance for the future”; 
the first decade of democracy saw rising unemployment, rising poverty, and rising 
income inequality. 
 
There has been some successful redress in response (see below) but significant 
challenges remain. The most pressing for this thesis is that the government’s 
response appears beset by contradictions and gaps between policy and 
implementation. Successes are contrasted, as they are in a recent Economist briefing, 
by a ‘failure of leadership’ (The Economist, 2012; see also Gumede, 2012; Marais, 
2011; National Planning Commission, 2011a; Taljaard, 2010; Thompson, 2007). 
Citizen frustrations of failing implementation has manifest in a variety of 
increasingly violent service delivery protests, though also reflecting a gamut of 
challenges from maladministration, nepotism, fraud, corruption to the failure of 
councillors and administrators to listen to residents (Carrim 2010). The failure in 
leadership thus can be expanded to include a slow but increasingly dire management 
crisis within the government bureaucracy. Once considered to possess superior 
managerial capacity than governments in the rest of the region, allowing it to put in 
place sensible policies (Cheru 1992), government departments in South Africa now 
face an increasing skills shortage and are berated constantly within the media, by 
politicians, within government reports (e.g. National Planning Commission 2011a) 
and by academics (e.g. Kraak 2011). To provide some context to all this, it is worth 
identifying what ‘the government’ means before considering how it appears to be 
‘failing’. 
The Institutional and Administrative Structures of Government 
The Republic of South Africa is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system 
of government and an independent judiciary. Chapter 3 of the Constitution identifies 
the three spheres of government as national, provincial and local, with the ‘local 
level’ further classed as either district, local and metropolitan municipalities (Rep. 
South Africa 1996; Figure 3). Cutting across each of the ‘vertical’ spheres there are 
three ‘horizontal’ realms, comprising a legislature, executive and administration, 
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Complex institutional and political organizations and relationships occur at the municipal (i.e. 
District, Municipal and Metro) level. The categories above are highly generalized and have very 








Despite increasing legislation and guidelines to ensure integration, intergovernmental 
relations have been challenging in practice. While each level has different overall 
mandates and are obliged to co-operate, Chapter 3 41(1)g of the Constitution 
expresses that:  
all spheres of government and intergovernmental relations should exercise 
their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere (Rep. South Africa 1996, p.25).  
In an attempt to integrate government planning, President Mbeki introduced a 
‘cluster’ arrangement in 1999. It brings together ministries and departments into 
related clusters. In South Africa, however, the general theme of ‘joined-up 
government’ must also be seen in an overriding financial context in which 
government departments have to adhere to fiscal arrangements of the National 
Treasury. These arrangements negate a blurring of funds to be used in joint projects. 
Richard Calland (2006, p.54) quotes an insight of Kader Asmal of specific relevance 
here: “as an attempt to strengthen ‘joined up government’, unless budget is allocated 
to the clusters - which it isn’t - then it can’t be ‘joined up decision-making’.”  
 
The most popular interpretation of the three-tier system is that policymaking is the 
proviso of national government, while provinces and local governments are the 
implementers (e.g. National Planning Commission 2011b). In practice, the 
relationship is far more complicated, contested and protracted. Street-level 
bureaucrats do display some autonomy in decision-making, as long as those 
decisions conform to some extent with the overall policy thrust of national 
government. I have argued elsewhere that existing programmes within the provinces 
are, in cases, simply reframed in the language of the new overriding policy, while the 
activities remain the same (Ruysenaar 2012). Similarly, as my discussion on the 
provincial biofuels policy below outlines (Chapter 4), the national policy was 
actually pre-empted by provincial policies, which were later abandoned when, as a 
policy entrepreneur in the Eastern Cape suggested, “national took over” (ECDALA 
official B, 2011). Additionally, complex—if not byzantine—institutional 
arrangements configure roles and responsibilities in very different ways between line 




example, might pass through their hierarchy relatively smoothly,
5
 provincial 
Departments of Agriculture are actually autonomous and as such decisions and 
policies derived within the national Department confronts major institutional 
disjuncture when passing through the hierarchy (Ministry for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs 2005; Drimie & Ruysenaar 2010). Line functions also need not have 
respective provincial or local departments at all. The Department of Minerals and 
Energy (DME) is considered a national competency, comprising a solitary national 
administrative department. It is for this reason, amongst others, that there was a ‘road 
show’ during the development of the biofuels strategy. It was during this road show 
that the DME found that some provinces (or rather provincial Departments of 
Agriculture or Economic Affairs, etc.) had already taken their own initiative around 
biofuels. In the Eastern Cape, because the Department of Agriculture was initiating 
the policy, neither party had much idea of what the other was doing (see Chapter 4).  
 
While much of the focus of this thesis is on the process of policymaking, and 
therefore focussed more at the national and executive levels and processes, it is 
useful to provide some overview of the difficulties encountered in implementation 
(especially as the two are not necessarily easily differentiated). When identifying the 
challenges to implementation, I am explicitly broad (that is, not focussed on specific 
project level attributes) and do not consider the wildly different contexts in which 
government implementation takes place.
6
 Of particular interest, as it is within wider 
policy debates, is the general administrative issues experienced within the 
government bureaucracy. Two significant features, amongst others,
7
 constrain the 
government’s administrative capacity—politicisation and skills deficits.  
 
First, it is necessary to provide some context. Whereas Weberian principles suggest 
that meritocracy and neutral competence are essential to the efficacy of any 
bureaucracy, the South African government has had to balance such demands with 
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 Although the recent textbook crisis suggests that even the more regimented hierarchical line-function 
of Education is not immune to operational challenges, although this is probably less of an 
institutional issue than a leadership one (MacFarlane 2012). 
6
 It is acknowledged that such limited considerations such as these are partly to blame when projects 
and programmes fail; however, such an argument is not the focus here.  
7
 Taljaard (2010), for example, considers continual restructuring (now moving towards a ‘single’, 









 the public service. Ivor 
Chipkin (2008) suggests, for example, that in South Africa transformation in the 
public sector is about two things—improving the efficiency and efficacy of the state 
and, although perhaps contradictory, achieving demographic representation in the 
public service.  
 
In this latter pursuit, the government has succeeded. By 2004, the composition of the 
public service broadly reflected the country’s demographics and nearly 75 per cent of 
all public servants were black. It is also argued, that in terms of ensuring services are 
delivered equally to all, it was vital for the bureaucracy to be representative of the 
country’s demographics and instil the requisite political ideology (see Cameron, 
2010). The pace of transformation varies according to level of government and along 
expertise and gender lines. For example, in 1994, the proportion of black managers 
in the civil service sector was at six per cent; in 1997, this rate had risen to thirty-
eight per cent at national level and sixty-six per cent in the provincial administrations 
(The Economist 1999). In 1995, only 7.9 per cent of public service managers were 
female, but this figure tripled by 2004 (Naidoo 2004) and 34 per cent of senior 
management positions were held by women by 2010 (DPSA 2010). With 
transformation positively progressing, the question is whether there were matching 
skills to follow through on the plans of government. The same could be asked of 
technical decisions around biofuels. As was highlighted by a BTT member, there was 
limited technical knowledge or skills within the Task Team when the strategy was 
initiated (BTT member A, 2010). There were also only a few individuals handling 
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 The origins of BEE took the form of affirmative action, in which the ANC wanted to ensure that 
Blacks were given preference over White counterparts, given the exclusion suffered during 
apartheid. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) provided the impetus for 
affirmative action shortly after the 1994 elections, whilst BEE was formalized through various 
codes of practice promulgated in 2007.  
9
 When talking about transformation, one should distinguish between ‘transformation’ (a completely 
new paradigm shift) to ‘change’ (response to pressures and forces). Constitutional reform has lead 
to transformation and change in almost all spheres of government in SA (Roux 2002). Taljaard 
(2010) distinguishes three major shifts in public sector focus including the ‘rationalisation and 
policy development phases (1994-1999)’—building the ideas of reconciliation and rainbow 
nation, whilst rationalising the service culminating in the White Paper on the Transformation of 
the Public Service; the ‘policy development phase’ (1999-2004)—focussed on modernisation and 
implementation with NPM principles of improving managerialism and ‘allowing managers to 




the policy’s development within the DME itself, who were inexperienced in the face 
of this new and complex technology (former BTT member B, DME, 2010) and 
overstretched by the engagement.  
 
It is understood that a well-functioning administration is foundational to a 
developmental state (von Holdt 2010). To improve efficacy, the operations of the 
South African public service were changed significantly when Thabo Mbeki came to 
power, in the second term of the ANC as ruling party. To improve coordination in 
both decision-making and implementation, President Mbeki not only institutionalised 
the cluster system (see above) but also emphasised that the government bureaucracy 
should replicate the private sector.
10
 With impetus from the austerity and neoliberal 
plans of GEAR (and earlier debates over public administration), he reiterated 
bureaucratic principles in line with New Public Management
11
, having a penchant for 
technocratic governance. That is, there was recognition that an effective 
administration needed highly skilled officials to ensure efficacy and efficiency.  
 
It is important to highlight that it is not only the government bureaucracy facing a 
significant skills shortage. As a Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) 
report describes (2007, p.6): 
South Africa lacks sufficiently skilled professionals, managers and artisans, 
and the challenge is amplified by the uneven quality of education and the 
impact of the apartheid legacy, which located many people a great distance 
from their places of work, thus pushing up the price of labour of the poor. 
In their 2010 report, which summarises four years of experience, South Africa’s 
skills challenge remains as critical as it was at the time of JIPSA’s formation in 
March 2006 (2010, p.3). Considering that the JIPSA was a multi-stakeholder 
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 Apart from ensuring adequate skills, the central doctrine here is that the public sector should 
encourage competitiveness in the same way market principles do (Castilla 2008). 
11
 Academics (see Manning 2001) consider this term a slippery one, presenting a menu rather than a 
discrete or coherent set of ideas per se. It is used here, as it remains a useful label within the 
South African to distinguish between the highly politicized public service during apartheid and 
the supposed move towards a more meritocratic and representative bureaucracy based on market 
principles. Of course, it should be conceded that, like many other developing country contexts, 
the application of NPM principles was probably more rhetorical than operational and indeed there 
was “never a deliberate strategy to adopt the NPM as an embodiment of a benchmark for public 
sector reform to be pursued uncritically” (Fraser-Moloketi 2006, p.15). O’Flynn (2007, p.354) 
highlights seven foundational principles of NPM: hands-on professional management; explicit 
standards and measures of performance; greater emphasis on output controls; disaggregation of 
units in the public sector; greater competition in the public sector; private sector styles of 




working group to rectify an inadequate grasp of exactly what skills South Africa 
requires and fast-track the provision of priority skills (Burtenshaw 2006), its lessons 
are important ones but clearly significant challenges continue and capacity remains 
topical.  
 
It is impossible to go into any deep discussion of the skills shortage here (Bernstein 
2007 provides a useful overview). One could consider, for example, skills deficits in 
terms of qualified or experienced individuals not being available at all or positioned 
unsuitably when they are. One could also split capacity into types, in which there are 
experts available but administrative and managerial capacity are lacking (Calland 
2006). One could also point to unclear processes and systems (Mokgoro 2000), and 
because of this, poor filing systems, a dramatic flux of personnel and very little 
institutional memory. The clearest demarcation of inadequate human capacity in 
government, however, is the high vacancy rate within various departments. Averages 
hover between 20-30 per cent vacancies in government departments, while technical 
skills within local government are sometimes non-existent (Taljaard 2010; Bernstein 
2007).  
 
As much as the ANC instilled principles of a ‘modernised’ and capable civil service 
within public sector reforms post apartheid, the transformation was inherently a 
political project and in many ways actually eschewed New-Public-Management 
(NPM) principles.
12
 The logic of technocratic aspirations seems antithetical to the 
poorly capacitated South African public service, which is further undermined by a 
powerful and important nationalist project predicated on a set of informal rationales 
shaped by the imperative to undo racism and white domination (von Holdt 2010). 
For this reason, there is increasing reliance on experts and consultants from outside 
of government, though the case for evidence-based policy is a tenuous one. Whilst 
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 One has to acknowledge that a clear separation between the political sphere and administrative one 
would be naïve, but what is important is that the processes of modernization were politicized too. 
For the most part, bureaucracies remained hierarchical (Cf. von Holdt, 2010) in much the way 
Weber would have intended whilst ‘customer first’ and accountability, two hallmarks of the NPM 
movement, appear to have made limited appearance in the South African Public Service. Despite 
an intellectualism and preference for NPM in the Mbeki era, there is and has become increasingly 
an anti-intellectualism in the hierarchy of the ANC, which opens up the possibility that politicians 
are not involved in the early policy and fact-finding processes and may even be largely resistant 




South Africa does possess the expertise to create ‘evidence’ outside (and some cases 
within) the government apparatus, the use of such evidence, as proposed within NPM 
discourse, relies on Weberian bureaucracies presumably such as those within the UK 
(Cf. Sanderson, 2002), not the highly politicised agencies of South Africa (Du Toit, 
2012).  
 
Ultimately, there was and remains an increasing tension between or convergence of 
partisan control of the government bureaucracy, in which civil servants’ activities 
depend more on political criteria than professional merit-based norms defined by 
administrations and ruled by law (Cameron 2010).
13
 A full discussion of this issue is 
also out of place here, but is important in so much as it suggests that where sufficient 
capacity exists within the public service, it is susceptible to political aspirations over 
and above neutral compliance and implementation of policy, as is enshrined in the 
Constitution. It is also quasi-technocratic in that, although the government has 
broadly embraced ‘NPM’ ideals during the Mbeki era and its macroeconomic 
policies generally reflect the decisions of technocratic elites somewhat insulated 
from wider political involvement, policymaking is influenced by political 
intervention, especially, for example, via cadre deployment within government 
(Giliomee et al. 2001).
14
 All of this needs to be seen in the context of unrealistic 
aspirations of NPM and an overarching technocratic policymaking, or evidence-
based policy discourse, which I will return to later.  
POLICYMAKING PROCESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The above discussion outlines the broad structural features of the government and a 
sense of the formal dimensions of governance in South Africa. Although the 
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 Rouban (2003, p. 200, cited in Cameron 2010) suggests politicisation is manifest in three ways: 
civil servant participation in political decision-making or in the definition and implementation of 
public policy; politicization in political control over the nomination and careers of civil servants; 
and politicization in the form of political involvement by civil servants as citizens and voters. 
14
 This is a highly complicated issue and the description here is necessarily pithy. There is of course 
much evidence that policymaking in South Africa is indeed technocratic in the sense that it is 
often handled by external expertise, upon which implementation fails. This is one of the central 
themes in Chapter 6. It should also be recognised, as I have been informed that often strategy 
development is handled by external personnel as a means to mediate any conflicts of interest and 





“institutional geometry is spectacular” (Calland 2006, p.8)
15
 the real issue is how 
government actually makes decisions. Part of the answer can be found in existing 
reviews of government performance. Some of these illustrate the importance of the 
above discussion of government administrative practices. For example, the National 
Planning Commission and National Development Plan (NDP) presents the latest and 
most comprehensive interrogation of government functions, so it is worth dwelling 
on some of the issues raised within the diagnostic report (National Planning 
Commission 2011a, p.22), which informed the final plan. They conclude for 
example,  
there is often a significant gap between the aspirations set out in official 
policy and what happens on the ground. The uneven performance of the 
public service results from the interplay between a complex set of factors, 
including tensions in the political/administrative interface (see above), 
instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of 
accountability and authority structures, poor organisational design, 
inappropriate staffing and low staff morale”.  
There is appreciation also in a section entitled ‘policy instability’ that:  
[p]olicy cannot be cast in stone; existing policies do need to be reviewed on 
the basis of a considered assessment of performance, and modified or even 
overhauled when necessary. But too often new policies have been 
implemented in an unconsidered fashion, as new leaders seek to make their 
mark, or as a response to the latest international fad. 
 
The NPC report is one of an array of reviews and investigations, some independent 
but many organised by government. Whereas the majority of these are supposed to 
inform policy, and many probably do, very few actually interrogate the policymaking 
process, or turn a reflexive gaze on how such reviews actually replicate many of the 
challenges they seek to reform. Very few interrogate the importance of politics and 
critically assess processes of policymaking. As a report prepared largely by 
academics, the NPC diagnostic report takes such issues much further than those 
beforehand. Before continuing on the NPC and critical studies of policymaking in 
South Africa, in the next section I will begin a brief review of some ‘linear’ models 
of the policy process and then move on to more critical outlines thereafter.  
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 Calland (2006) recognizes here what Butler refers to in terms of “redrawing diagrams is the easy 
part” in which restructuring is seeing as simply retrofitting ‘organograms’ (structural diagrams of 





Models of Policymaking in South Africa 
There are some generic frameworks of how policymaking is considered in the 
rational, linear sense, as well as some specific academic analyses of policymaking in 
South Africa. As the outline of the linear model of the policy process suggests, one 
can isolate the general progression through which policies are made.
16
 In South 
Africa, this may broadly include four stages involving political objectives or initial 
‘vision’ passing through various policy frameworks, consultation and political 
oversight through cabinet and parliament (Table 1). Other frameworks, as would be 
expected from the discussion of chapter two, add greater complexity to the linear 
conceptualisation. Khosa (2003, p.8) for example, presents three different models of 
the policy process (Table 1) in which: 
[t]he general model assumes that policy-making follows particular steps, 
and the role of various stakeholders can substantially shape policy 
outcomes. The Executive, at the ministerial and presidential level, largely 
drives the executive consultative policy-making model. The panic model is 
mainly driven at the cabinet and presidential level, and this is largely 
shaped by the imperatives of global events and local crises. 
Khosa’s (2003) review takes us closer to the political influences in policymaking, 
although only provides a rough overview. Clearly, the politico-administrative 
interface is important and in some cases, the political is the dominant feature. In the 
next section, I will therefore outline the importance of the ANC and extend into 
nuanced reviews of policymaking around development in South Africa. 
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 It should be noted that there is a difference between a policy and a law. Although I consider policy 
to be more general, some scholars (Roux 2002, p.421) argue “that a policy becomes significant 
for the purpose of public administration only after legislation has been passed”. There may be 
some truth to this as legislation carries with it higher responsibility, however, coercive legislation 











 Education and Training Unit (2007): Generic Stages of Policymaking or 
‘Stagist’ Models in South Africa. 
Khosa (2003): Three models for policy-making. Policy models differ in 
























Stage 1: Ruling party conference provides vision, goals and direction  
This stage could be likened to ‘agenda setting’ in the ‘stagist’ model and takes 
place at the major conferences of the ruling party where policies are negotiated 
General Model: Replicates the linear model described adjacent. Policy 
tools include Discussion Documents, Green Paper, White Paper, Legislation 
and Acts. Each of these involves different degrees of consultation and is 
written by different actors. The RDP is an example here.  
Stage 2: Executive (Ministry) draws up policy on an issue 
National level departments or Ministers (the executive) convert party policy 
into government policy or law. After consultation with interested and affected 
parties (opposition parties, the public, non-government organisations, etc.), it is 
sent to Parliament for debate and approval 
Executive-Consultative Model: Largely driven by the executive at the 
ministerial and/or presidential level, involving stakeholders invited into a 
task team to draw up a policy document. There after a Commission 
Framework may be produced, which may be publicised but may not be 
consultative (although public outcry may lead to a revised Policy 
Framework with an Adopted Policy Framework accepted by the Cabinet, 
President or Parliament. The Industrial Biofuels Strategy will be argued to 
conform closely (but not perfectly) to this model. 
Stage 3: Finalising a policy 
Once a policy has been properly debated, the Department and Ministry finalise 
and publish it as White Paper, also requiring approval of Cabinet and 
Parliament. (A White Paper may also be preceded by a discussion document or 
Green Paper, which is less detailed and may focus more on ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ 
rather than ‘how?’.) As an official statement of intent, the White Paper may 
form the basis of a law with which to achieve certain stipulated objectives. 
Panic Model: Follows the same pattern as the Executive Consultative 
model in which a Discussion Document by the executive and a task team, 
but forgoes any changes in response to public outcry or further consultation 
after the initial Policy Framework Strategy is developed. They are usually 
finalised by Presidential or Ministerial Decree. GEAR is an example here. 
Stage 4: Passing Legislation 
A draft Bill is developed. After undergoing similar processes as Stages 2 and 3, 
it is sent to Cabinet to ensure coherence with other policies and legal advisors 




Policymaking and the Domination of the African National Congress 
If the institutional arrangements of the South African government are based on 
devolved or decentralised governance, the African National Congress, the governing 
political party, works in very different ways. Owing to its heritage as a resistance 
movement, there are strict hierarchies and the institution of the ANC has become 
increasingly centrist, especially during Mbeki’s administration (Gumede 2007). The 
situation is that by its overwhelming majority, the ANC, its ideology, operations and 
own internal dynamics are increasingly the thread through which the fabric of 
governance in South Africa is weaved. Central to this thesis, however, is the means 
through which the ANC conceives and articulates policy, as well as the way in which 
ANC structures influence those of the state’s policymaking procedures.
17
 It should 
also be mentioned that the ANC might not differ in some processes compared to the 
prior regime. Cloete (2005) suggests, for example, that in the post-1947 era in South 
Africa, up to the present, public policies have become acceptable mainly for party 
political or ideological reasons rather than for their technological, rational or 
practical feasibility, and that when policy changes did occur they were primarily 
‘top-down’ decisions with a dearth of input from lower-level policy role-players. 
 
In his book ‘The Anatomy of South Africa’, Richard Calland (2006) devotes 
significant attention to who holds the power. He answers this question by considering 
power through the two dimensions of importance and influence. That is, importance 
derived through some designated authority and influence being the ability to trump 
such authority through process. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
something or someone that is important can but need not be influential and vice 
versa. The importance of Calland’s work, as others (Bond 2005; Gumede 2007) too 
have recognised, is to decipher exactly what power the ANC holds, but the answer 
(or in fact the question) is not a simple one. As an organisation, the ANC falls within 
the category of having significant influence as well as being important —it is an 
“ever-present shadow”—but it is bettered in these categories by the Cabinet, the 
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 This should not be considered a negative value-judgment or criticism. As the ruling political party, 
it is of course the ANC’s prerogative to shape policies in South Africa; the important point is how 




National Treasury (a so-called government within government) and the Presidency. 
The centrality of the Presidency cannot be ignored; “the surest way to influence 
policy from outside government is through direct access to the president’s office” 
(Dorman 2012, p.169). However, that the president is also part of the ANC suggests, 
as Calland details, that the power of the ANC as an organisation is not easily 
circumscribed. 
 
Whereas it is difficult to delineate the extent to which the ANC influences 
government, both being subject to continual flux, there are a few points Calland 
(2006) makes are worth highlighting in their own right: 
 Although advisors can have a lot of influence (on policies), Cabinet Ministers 
have political power over decisions that are made.  
 Cabinet is informed of policy matters through cabinet memoranda (or 
‘memos’). They are produced through a technical process of review and by 
“the time the policy idea reaches the cabinet table, it should be in a finely 
tuned condition” but with the possibility of “tough political decisions” still 
pending (2006, p.48).  
 The political judgment is the culmination of a “non-technical process that 
usually runs parallel to the technical side of the policymaking”. It could be 
broadly defined as the consultative side of policymaking. 
 Depending on the nature or content of the policy, a more elaborate policy-
making process may unfold; each may involve “slight variations according to 
its political needs” (Calland 2006, p.48; see below). 
 The golden rule for lobbyists is get in early … changing a government’s mind 
is more difficult than influencing the original decision.  
 A lot of the time government tends to operate with insufficient 
consultation during the policymaking process. Ideas are kept within the 
executive, perhaps as a result of the complex governmental decision-making 
apparatus now assembled. 
Notwithstanding all the above, the political decision will be informed to some degree 
or other by wider ideological and strategic considerations funnelled into the cabinet 




prepare the Cabinet memos), the Department of Finance (Treasury), and lastly 
through the ANC (especially through the influence of Joel Netshitenzhe during 
Mbeki’s leadership). In theory (and instrumental to a development state), ministers of 
the Cabinet are collectively answerable to the legislature. In practice, this line of 
accountability is weak (Edigheji 2010b; Calland 2006). If anything, the increasing 
strength of political parties has dramatically increased accountability to the party 
rather than to the electorate. As Butler (2009a) notes “the past 100 years have seen a 
mostly irreversible growth in the power of the executive branch around the world” 
(cited by National Planning Commission 2011b, p.14). South Africa is no exception 
and the overwhelming majority of the ANC permeates the functioning of this 
democratic institution too (ibid). So too does the crippling effect of incapacity, which 
is also often inadequate for scrutinising complex legislation. For example, at times 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Minerals and Energy has only had access 
to one researcher (National Planning Commission 2011b citing EGISA 2010, p.23). 
 
Others are more optimistic. Pothier (2012, p.3) suggests: 
[w]e are fortunate to have one of the world’s most open parliaments. Since 
1994, a culture has developed that encourages public involvement in the 
crafting of laws, and CSOs [civil society organisations] have been diligent 
in responding to this openness. Hardly a law goes through the legislature 
without having been influenced to some degree by the comments and 
criticisms of civil society. Almost always, this leads to an improved piece 
of legislation, as the combined wisdom and experience of civil society is 
applied to the Bill in question. 
Unfortunately, his paper also highlights that there is no resources for CSOs to carry 
out their activities.  
Wider Influences on Policy: Enter the Developmental State and Development 
Planning 
Although the constitution provides an impressive and binding institutional scaffold, 
policymaking (and government practice) is convoluted and subject to multiple 
influencing factors, especially political domination pivoted around the ANC and the 




limits the checks and balances in the system, other factors need to be considered too.
2
 
Whereas there are internal factors influencing policy, there are external influences 
too.  
 
In this section, I will provide some examples using ‘development’ policy in South 
Africa as the frame of reference.
3
 The purpose here is two-fold. First, the shifting 
terrain of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) after 1996, illustrates some of the 
complexity of policymaking in a more tangible way, whilst also providing some idea 
of external influences. Second, it provides a backdrop to the ‘rhetorical’ rise of the 
developmental state in South Africa and the Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA), which was the overriding macro-economic 
framework when the Biofuels Strategy was being considered. When read together, 
these two ideas are important as they highlight what the political ideology and 
macro-frameworks have meant for policy and ostensibly for development too. 
Gearing up for Reconstruction 
South Africa’s policy thrust reflects global policy trajectories and is 
committed to a national social transformation project within a decidedly 
neoliberal ideology (Lewis & Naidoo 2007, p.134).  
Prior to the 1994 elections, development policy was largely reflected in macro-
economic or individual, sectoral initiatives. As Crush (1995, p.vii) suggests, the 
language and practice of development in South Africa prior to democratisation was 
“tainted by their association with segregation and apartheid”. After the release of 
Nelson Mandela in 1990, and during the transition to democracy in 1994, a barrage 
of international development expertise working within the ‘discourse of 
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 It should be noted that there are other systemic challenges in which, for example, secrecy, 
impropriety and the failure of accountability coil around each other in a ‘triple helix of 
misgovernance’ (Mail and Guardian Editorial 2013). 
3
 Gumede (2009, p. 19) identifies four such inter-linked planning phases the last of which being when 
the biofuels policy was developed:  
  1994 – 1996: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP);  
  1996 – 2000: the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR);  
  2000 – 2004: the rise of micro-economic reform and an expansionary state; and  






 began to shift the initial and overtly Marxist-leaning policies of the 
incoming ANC.
5
 It should be emphasised though, that it was not only external 
interests at play; local policy entrepreneurs were instrumental in negotiations too 
(e.g. Tomlinson 2002). ‘Growth through distribution’ emerged as a pragmatic and 
acceptable approach, consolidating the redistributive preferences of the ANC, the 
growth fundamentals of the international development apparatus and protecting the 
interests of the incumbent National Party and ‘white capital’.  
 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) articulated the logic and 
plan of action for of this growth and redistribution (Government of National Unity 
1994). Although leading to some initial and remarkable redress,
6
 the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme replaced it, bearing a stricter 
focus on fiscal discipline.
7
 The spirit of the RDP, however, has remained prominent 
in policy thinking and rhetoric from the ANC. It is, for example, made explicit in the 
RDP that ‘the people’ should be consulted and “become part of the decision-making 
process” (Government of National Unity 1994, p.8),
8
 which remains an important 
modus operandi in policymaking processes (see Box 2 further below). Patrick Bond, 
                                                 
4
 By a ‘discourse of development’, Crush (1995) is suggesting that it is not simply a case in which 
aspirations of the ANC were captured by or replaced with the logic of international capitalism 
associated with the West but a more complicated and subtle situation with development itself 
comprising of systems of language and logics, whilst also acknowledging power-laden local and 
international contexts.  
5
 In this section, I follow the South African (leftist) literature that suggests the discourse of 
development is configured around capitalist conceptions of economic progress generally 
considered as neo-liberal (Cf. Castree, 2006) in contrast to Marxist or leftist priorities. It should 
be noted that there is perhaps room to critique such clear demarcations of ‘development 
discourse’ between such camps. As Dirlik (2012, p.2) argues, both Marxism and capitalism are 
contingent on a ‘discourse of developmentalism’ and that the Marxist/socialist alternatives remain 
unconvincing so long as they fail to break out of the ideological space defined by the 
developmentalism that Marxism shares with capitalism (citing also Dirlik 1995). 
6
 Given the Constitution’s provisions that all citizens are entitled to social security, the government 
put in place an extensive welfare system, catering for the aged, disabled, children in need, foster 
parents and many others too poor to meet their basic social requirements (Harsch, 2001; Visser, 
2004).  
7
 The transition from RDP to GEAR is not at all a clear one. Whereas the RDP office was closed in 
1996 and budget for the programme moved to the Ministry of Finance, the rhetoric and individual 
remnants of the programme continued to use its name in operations. The ‘programme’ 
encountered a rhetorical revival in 1998/99 according to Bond (2005). Bond further suggests that 
there was no individual ‘failure’ of the RDP, rather its progressive elements were forgotten or 
contradicted by emerging government policy. Much of this has to do with its populist symbolism 
(whether or not people had benefitted from it, they thought they had regardless) and its 
abandonment as policy. 
8
 Clive Corder (1997) suggests a tension in terms of popular accountability, between technical 





provides an ethnographic outline of how the RDP was developed and thus provides 
some important insights into policymaking as a practice rather than expressed ideal, 
although the importance of his findings for policy processes are more implicit than 
explicit (see also Hentz 2005).  
 
In his book, ‘Elite Transition’, Patrick Bond (2005) provides a leftist critique of the 
retreat from progressive reforms towards neoliberal macroeconomic frameworks. In 
doing so, he traces the development of RDP and its subsequent transformation into 
GEAR. At the heart of this transition is policymaking at its most ambitious and at its 
highest political level too. It should be noted that his early involvement in the process 
provides him at once both important ‘insider’ information but also insists his work is 
read with some idea of his frustration and potential bias. As a prominent and 
outspoken leftist academic, somewhat marginalised during the deliberative process, 
his interpretations would obviously remain less than sanguine about the RDP. His 
exposition thus needs be read along with other scholars, for example, William 
Gumede (2007), Richard Tomlinson (2002) and Ben Turok (2008) who provide 
equally important accounts. Where necessary I add reference to such works within 
the discussion.  
 
Bond (2005, p.10) begins a critique of the RDP, considering it as “an uneven and 
often internally contradictory document, to be sure” and providing some reasons as 
to why. Fundamental to this, as mentioned above, was the homogenising effect of 
‘development discourse’ but Bond takes this further unpacking “Scenario 
Plundering” as one of the most important operational ‘black-boxes’ that, rather than 
providing a basis for deeper analysis,
9
 were tools of negotiation and an “empirical 
basis for corporatist dealmaking in the sphere of macroeconomic policy” (ibid., p. 
39). Bond then unpacks a range of scenario plans and amidst multiple shortcomings 
in many of them and, with some progressive stances and utterances entering the fray, 
he illustrates that the process was important in that it “was remarkably successful in 
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 Although a range of scenarios were prepared from different, if not competing, viewpoints, they were 
all analytically weakened by leaving out what Bond (2005) refers to as the Achilles heel of South 
Africa’s economy: overproduction of luxury goods and capital-intensive technologies of 




drawing in political elites and taming some of their once-radical technical supporters, 
leaving dissidents outside the net” (2005, p.55). 
 
Scenario planning was only part of the story. Bond also illustrates how key 
individuals involved in the policymaking process shifted the power balance in 
neoliberal directions. With Trevor Manual taking over the leadership of the ANC’s 
Department of Economic Planning in 1990, and with Jay Naidoo and Alec Erwin
10
 
being at the apex of COSATU,
11
 progressive voices were increasingly marginalised. 
Through these early processes and under shifting power structures in the ANC and 
incumbent government, “the ground for a massive basic-needs crop failure was sewn 
during the period 1990-93 (2005, p.40). Furthermore “[i]n short, it was critical for 
status quo forces to establish an artificial distinction between the progressive micro-
social policies and what came to be known, ironically, as ‘sound’ macroeconomic 
policy, in part by building a myth: the feasibility of combining a social welfare state 
in the developmental sphere with neoliberalism in the economic sphere. The RDP 
embodies this conceptual feat” (2005, p.39). 
 
It is, however, within these seemingly contradictory objectives that Bond suggests 
that “the policy framework was beset by enough fragmented voices, multiple 
identities and competing discourses to leave even postmodern analysts confounded” 
(2005, p.67), whilst leaving the RDP itself as being open to interpretation. Three 
main political interpretations (or supporters) included leftist (socialist), centre 
(corporatists) and right (neoliberal) perspectives. While elements of each are easily 
identified, what are important are the shifts in which reforms resonating with 
progressive ideals and social upliftment are increasingly abandoned; doublespeak 
within the policy was used not as operational imperatives but rather as a rhetorical 
toolkit for politicians and government officials. This he sums up by suggesting there 
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 Alec Erwin became Minister for Trade and Industry in 1996, moving to Public Enterprises in 2004. 
According to Calland (2006), he was instrumental to the big decisions from 1990 to 2004 but as 
an ex-unionist he was labelled (as was Jay Naidoo) “a convert to economic orthodoxy” (Hentz 
2000, p.151) as deputy Finance Minister after 1994.  
11
 COSATU is the Congress of South African Trade Unions, who with the Communist Party partnered 
with the ANC as part of a tripartite alliance after their unbanning in 1990. Together the three 
would work together towards the establishment of a democratic and non-racial South Africa, 





was limited recognition that all such talk might contribute to a vapid populist 
ideology.
12
 Neither was it sufficiently understood that the RDP mandate would be 
rapidly replaced by sectoral deals and ministerial patronage networks, or that a 
“series of train-wrecks would pulverise progressive aspirations” (ibid., p. 71). It is 
the first of these “train-wrecks” that provides a vivid illustration of policymaking 
within the hierarchy of the ANC and within the, then, Government of National Unity.  
 
In “Train Wreck One”, Bond presents an outline of what went wrong 
organisationally for the RDP, through the development of the RDP White Paper. 
Organisationally, the RDP office was neither in control of spending nor was its 
Minster, Hon. Jay Naidoo politically able to coerce counterpart Ministries—
especially within a relatively conservative Cabinet—or even lower-level 
policymakers. With the odds stacked against the RDP, Bond first questions whether 
Minister Naidoo did enough to ensure the RDP was implemented and ensure a more 
progressive stance. Although Naidoo launched into developing a White Paper (the 
new government’s first), he allocated the drafting of an initial RDP Green Paper to 
“two technocrats (Andre Roux and Ishmail Momomiat) closely associated with the 
ANC’s Neo-liberal wing, which was based at the Development Bank of South 
Africa” (Bond 2005, pp.72–73). After some criticism from the left, there were minor 
attempts to redraft the strategy. Limited time, a new focus on “pleasing the markets” 
and final drafting by big capital (including Bobby Godsell of Anglo-American and 
Rudolf Gouws of Rand Merchant Bank), lead to a strategy approved by Cabinet but 
one prioritising a business-like approach and not tackling the more durable economic 
problems at the time. Inscribed in this process was, thus, a significant shift from the 
initial RDP document(s), with the White Paper amplifying the neoliberal agenda
13
 
(see also Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994).  
                                                 
12
 “Any hope for hegemonising a progressive reading of the RDP was very quickly snuffed. ‘ 
Reconstruction and Development’ soon became code words for patriotism, as society’s traditional 
economic elite (egged on by the ANC’s comprador class) won back the ability to demarcate the 
national project. The charade of exalting the RDP while doing precisely the opposite of what it 
instructed became increasingly popular within government too (Bond 2005, p.72).” 
13
 Bond (2005, p.73) considers this agenda to be one in which ‘the Reserve Bank would continue 
setting ridiculously high interest rates; fiscal discipline to become more extreme; currency 
controls to be lifted at the earliest opportunity; an already export-biased trade policy to grow more 
obsequious to global corporations and to bankrupt more uncompetitive firms—through tariff 





The above discussion begins to highlight the importance of overriding discourses 
(whether planning or plundering) through which policy agendas are set, the 
importance of political ideology, powerful actor-networks (especially between 
politics and business) that are able to sway decisions, and that policymaking in these 
areas is dynamic and contested. What is interesting in all this is that, despite shifts 
towards a neoliberal economic policy (as dominant discourse) the White Paper also 
began to “develop ‘a policy-making methodology and outline government 
implementation strategies within the framework provided by the Base Document’ 
(the original RDP [see Box 2])”. More importantly, the content and structure of the 
RDP White Paper (and indeed later macro-economic or development plans like 
ASGISA and the NDP) features an underlying meta-framework.
14
 While not 
necessarily specifying actions to be taken, these meta-frameworks are normative 
proposals of what should be done or how further frameworks might take shape. They 
are thus frameworks for frameworks, directing the development of further plans, 
models, actions and activities, which are necessarily (hopefully) more concrete. This 
does not mean that that is how they are used. It also takes for granted the very real 
barriers to implementing (let alone planning for) many of their primary 
recommendations (as outlined above). It is such issues that I will reflect on when 
interrogating the Industrial Biofuels Strategy in later chapters. (Office of the 
Presidency 1994) 
                                                                                                                                          
‘pick the winners’ and to de-industrialise those sectors (like clothing, textiles and autos) which 
would not stand the heat of international trade. 
14
 I have borrowed such a term from computer programming language in which developers use the 
term to define “a specialized framework that allows easy integration of other functional specific 
frameworks that work together seamlessly” (Dutt 2003). I do so to show its operational function 
but there are alternative descriptions of the RDP specifically. According to Marais (Marais 2001, 
p.239), for example, the RDP was an ideological reference point that seems to confirm the 
political-historical continuity between the Freedom Charter and the realities of post-apartheid 
South Africa. The important point is not only looking at the content of such frameworks but how 






The outline of the RDP White Paper therefore reads like many of its successors; 
there are bold plans calling on government action at all levels. These grand plans 
(though the diagnostic report of NDP may be an exception) do not account for any of 
the challenges faced at lower levels of government; even though such barriers 
continue to stifle the best-laid plans (see above).
15
 It needs also to be recognised that 
capacity issues can also be a convenient excuse. We should neither ignore that those 
with capacity may abuse it (Butler 2008), nor that bureaucrats “can subsume 
deliberative exercises within conventional processes and return quickly to business 
as usual” (Pereira and Ruysenaar, 2012, p. 46 citing Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006; see 
also Dalton, 1959 for early examples). 
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 For the RDP specifically, implementation soon faltered as "government lacked the capacity to 
implement it" (Visser 2004, p.111). 
Box 2: Policymaking Provisions within the RDP White Paper 
 
“The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is the policy instrument which will 
direct the progress of the transformation strategy. It is a programme of policy development and 
implementation procedures co-ordinated in the Office of the President, and founded in the 
Government of National Unity. As the programme develops, it will integrate the different organs 
of government, centrally, regionally and locally in a concerted drive towards the national goals of 
renewal. Each province will, in time, prepare its own RDP in relation to the central RDP 
initiative…It is the product of on-going consultation, and has been adopted and supported by all 
political parties in the GNU and in parliament, and by all sections of our society. It is designed on 
the foundation of a national consensus and embodies the vision of the future.” (Office of the 
Presidency, 1994, p.6) 
 
The RDP also established a number of “Ministerial Forums between national Ministers responsible 
for Schedule 6 functions and their provincial counterparts … which will also be supported by their 
respective technical committees consisting of senior officials of the provincial and national line-
function departments”. The latter can also play a crucial role with regard to the RDP as their briefs 
include co-operation on, amongst others, policy and strategy formulation and implementation. A 
variety of sectoral negotiating forums has developed a participatory approach to policy 
formulation. 
 
Furthermore, “structured consultation processes at all levels of government will be introduced to 
ensure participation in policy-making and planning, as well as project implementation. Task teams 
will have a key advisory role in policy-making methodology. This methodology will draw on 
project experience extensively, and hence will engage in extensive local-level consultation and 
participation … Expertise for this purpose is broadly defined to ensure proper representation of the 
interests of disadvantaged groups and communities. Similarly, the Government will formulate an 
integrated and sustainable rural development policy in consultation with rural people, their 








Bond (2005) also foregrounds such a danger: “the ‘framework’ would be kept intact, 
but the RDP’s details—especially those where the Left made a strong stand—would 
get lost in the process”, both in terms of developing the White paper and its 
implementation. In the end, the White paper presented “a potentially tasty menu for 
governance, satisfying “the appetite of big business” and fell short of tightening up 
the bureaucracy (Bond 2005, p.75).  
Officials were already doing very well to frustrate Naidoo’s roving bands 
of hammer-wielding technocrats [and] caught on as quickly to learn … 
White Paper rhetoric … and how to make right noises and avoid threats to 
their survival. 
Apart from a somewhat enduring rhetoric, if not an evolving RDP discourse, the 
RDP was replaced in 1996 by GEAR in terms of its macro-economic foundations 
and by sectoral strategies reflecting ‘GEAR’ approaches.  
 
The shift to GEAR represents a paradigmatic reversal from growth through 
redistribution to redistribution through growth. An important difference here is that 
the former expected the state to conduct a people-orientated developmental policy. 
The latter saw South Africa’s economic “salvation” in higher economic growth rates, 
which would “result from a sharp increase in private capital accumulation in an 
unbridled capitalistic system” (Visser 2004, p.9; see also Terreblanche 1999). The 
revisions of GEAR could be interpreted in two ways: as policy where a  
left-of-centre government that had shaken off old ideology and 
pragmatically adopted a macro-framework consistent with global economic 
realities or that it had embarked upon and ideologically-generated neo-
liberal policy, which would undermine the goal of redressing the gross 
inequalities of the apartheid period’ (Weeks 1999, p.796).  
As a macro-economic or fiscal policy, GEAR was successful; however, there is some 
dispute as to its ‘developmental’ benefits.  
 
Others argue that GEAR is not to blame for the economic woes of the country. 
Rather, poverty and unequal wealth distribution is rooted in the lethal cocktail of 
poor education and high unemployment (Bruggemans & Slabbert 2003). What is 
clear is that it marks a clear ideological shift on the part of the ANC but one yet 
unable to deliver sufficient redress to South Africa’s poor and most vulnerable 
citizens. There were pragmatic implications of GEAR, not only in terms of intended 




GEAR a strong focus on participation but also on successive drafting procedures, 
evolving from Green to White Papers (see below). With GEAR, the conditions were 
not negotiable, setting into practice a new approach to policymaking in which policy 
shifts occur in a characteristically sudden fashion, without elaborate consultative 
procedures (see also Table 1 above). 
The Shifting Development (Policy) Context: Constructing the Second Economy 
Subsequent to GEAR, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(ASGISA) was developed to push the South African economy towards a target of six 
per cent growth. Redistribution remained an overriding theme in early macro-
economic policy (1990s), although it has subsequently lost ground to other priorities, 
economic growth being the enduring feature. Another important theme emanating 
from Thabo Mbeki’s incumbency (1999-2008) and one permeating development 
thinking in the country, including the Biofuels Industrial Strategy, is that of the dual 
economy. The second economy, as Mbeki described in 2003,
16
 is a marginalised 
economy disconnected structurally from the first. To Freund (2010) such a view 
revives critical liberal economics from the apartheid era (citing Houghton 1971; 
Wolpe 1972; Natrass 1981) but should by no means be simplified in the way it has 
been in policy rhetoric.  
 
As a recurring theme in the biofuels debate, it is useful to examine the social 
construction of the second economy further (see also Du Toit 2012).
17
 After 
becoming popular in ANC rhetoric much like ‘RDP-speak’ beforehand, it did not 
take long for the idea to attract critical reflection. Policymakers and academics on the 
left were quick to take up the charge. Primarily, academics have attacked a literal 
interpretation of the second economy (Hadland 2007; du Toit and Neves 2007; Cf. 
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 At least two records of his use of the term are in ‘ANC Today’, Letter from the President:  
Characteristics of South Africa’s first and third world economies (28/08/2003) and in an address 
to the National Council of Provinces entitled The second economy, what it is and what is needed 
to meet the growth and development challenges it presents (11/11/2003). 
17
 By ‘construction’, I am guided by post-development theory and its critique of development theory 
by which, architects of ‘development’ automatically assume an existing framework through 
which development is to be implemented. Such a social construction is then not only a product of 




The Presidency, 2006), which inevitably leads to problematic policy solutions in 
which the first is a benchmark/solution to the second (Philip 2010). 
 
Although the second economy appears conceptually (and therefore metaphorically) 
precise, there are practical considerations that do not stand up to scrutiny. The 
disjuncture arises from confusing outcomes—a dualistic economy— with processes 
through which they are created (Philip 2010). The issue then is that the idea of a 
structural disconnection conflates the dichotomy of outcomes (rich and poor) as 
being the same as a disconnection in process (dispossession and exploitation). The 
two are very different and the apparent structural disconnection is perhaps better 
considered as adverse incorporation (du Toit & Neves 2007) or a relationship of 
asymmetrical interdependence (Von Holdt & Webster 2005). Despite there being a 
complex duality in the South African economy (see next chapter and Appendix C for 
discussion), the deep inequality suggests both ends of the spectrum—constructions of 
the very rich and very poor—are a form of distortion and antithetical to an inclusive 
society (Philip 2010). The ‘first economy’, characterised by conspicuous 
consumption, is inappropriate as a benchmark for salvaging the disconnected ‘second 
economy’; Hettne (2009) would compare this to a myopic focus on ‘transition’ rather 
than the more challenging task of transformation of the economy.  
 
It should be noted that the Second Economy Project initiated in 2007, which looked 
into the impact of programmes aimed at the second economy (taking the dichotomy 
for granted), concluded with a strategy document in 2009 suggesting that there is no 
disconnection but the two are a feature of high inequality (Cf. Philip, 2010). 
However, the importance of the second economy for this thesis is its role as a 
powerful overarching political motif during the development of the biofuels strategy. 
I will return to this later but, as an example, it is useful to see that when the 
Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) was announced by 
Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka in February 2006, its aims included 
“eliminating the second economy” (Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006).
18
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 It is important to mention that bioenergy—particularly off-grid, small-scale interventions as part of 
hybrid renewable energy platforms—are probably of immense benefit to solving the problems of 
the so-called ‘second economy’. These have apparently being marginalized by industrial biofuels 





If the second economy was the defining feature, if only metaphorical, of the 
development challenge in South Africa, responding to it was equally proverbial. 
Although explicit strategies such as GEAR, ASGISA, and the New Growth Path, 
present specific macro-economic agendas for the country, the philosophy of the RDP 
also appears to have been rearticulated now in the form of South Africa as a 
‘developmental state’. The idea here is that the state has a central role in 
development, which is as obvious as it is complicated (see discussion in Ayee 2013). 
South Africa’s status as a developmental state is one of self-proclaimed interest and 
appears provisional (Fine 2010; Turok 2010), rather than extant and pragmatic, as 
was the case first of Japan (Johnson 1982) and then of the Asian developmental 
states thereafter (Leftwich 1995). That is, in South Africa, it is less about 
acknowledging an outcome that has come to pass through specific processes and 
more about promoting certain ‘means’ to achieve such ‘ends’ (even if these may 
differ significantly from that of the original ‘developmental states’). Of course, one 
has to accept that an emulation of the East Asian development states is perhaps 
neither realistic, nor coherent (Butler 2010). From a policy perspective, such a 
situation seems to suggest, however, a state that has perhaps over extended its 
aspirations and under extended its capacity, which creates fertile ground for external 
influences, as we shall seen in the case of biofuel production. 
CONCLUSION 
The start of this chapter began by describing that South Africa is a developing 
country, with the government facing a number of deepening challenges. Not only is 
the ANC government plagued by capacity issues and dramatic shifts in its broad 
developmental policy (from the optimistic RDP to more conservative and 
economically focussed GEAR and finally the rhetorical ASGISA), the 
developmental challenges are amongst the most extreme in the world. The transition 
to democracy has thus imparted new freedoms to the country’s people but change has 
been slow and has not translated into economic freedom. The shift has also meant 
new processes in policymaking. Although not dealt with in detail, it should also be 




macro-economic policies but also implies South Africa has to confront emergent 
global challenges (Marquard & Eberhard 2000).  
 
All of these challenges are in some form the subject of policies and confronted by 
policymakers within the country. We could conceptualise the processes through 
which these policies are made as generic models, resorting back to linear 
conceptions. The challenge or gap in such generic conceptions of policy is that they 
fail to interrogate the complex links between actors involved in the process. In a 
similar way, there also needs to be a distinction made between the prevailing ideals 
of NPM and technical approaches above and the messy processes that do (and 
should) occur. It is here, for example, where concerns that ‘professionalising the 
policy process’ means losing sight of citizen-based democracy (Edigheji 2005). 
Similarly, although not explicit in their reviews, critical scholars have raised 
important insights emanating from existing reviews of development policy, although 
have not framed these within specific theoretical frameworks (whilst also potentially 
falling into the overly critical category of development policy critiques defined by 
Mosse (2004)). This is a discussion I take further in the empirical chapters of the 
thesis but, at its simplest, revolves around how these policies are made and continue 
to be made both ‘politically’ and ‘rationally’. Bond (2005) presents a useful, 
ethnographically orientated, policy study, drawing on his experiences within such a 
process. While I have not had such an appreciable role in the South African biofuels 
policy’s development, I ultimately aim to unpack it in a very similar way. The 
important point is that while an ethnographic approach is indeed informative, there is 
added utility in presenting a framework with which to organise the issues that appear 
to dominate, though with a flexibility to incorporate nuance. This is the value of the 
framework approach outlined in Chapter 2, as a scaffold to review the biofuels policy 
interpretively. This creates some room for such reviews to evolve into a more 
systematic empirical project in South Africa. The next four chapters present my 





CHAPTER 4: PROVINCIAL BIOFUELS ‘POLICIES’ AND A SNAPSHOT OF 
BIOFUELS PROJECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The team leading government on biofuels has recommended that the 
Cradock project be used “as a case study for this sector,” Energy Minister 
Dipuo-Peters has told a Renewable Energy Summit in East London (citing 
Dipuo-Peters, 2012). 
If there is one thing a multiple streams model of policymaking tells us, it is that 
demarcating a clear start for any policy development is relatively difficult, as each 
stream, rather than the policy itself, has a source. Circumscribing the ‘policy 
window’ in which each stream comes together is equally tricky. In this Chapter, I 
digress somewhat from a discussion of the national policy, which is the subject of the 
following three chapters, and look rather towards the early projects proposed, the 
projects that have survived and how these have informed a separate policy 
development in the Eastern Cape. The digression is a necessary one as, not only does 
it preview and reinforce some of the arguments I make about policymaking in 
general but it also introduces some of the complex networks that cross the 
provincial/national boundary and permeate the national Industrial Strategy as well.  
 
To foreground the discussion of this chapter, the popular story of the South African 
biofuels industry is that there has been a rise and demise of a range of projects (see 
discussion of Table 2 below), most notably a number of maize-to-ethanol plants, 
though they were not alone. The industry blames the policy and its so-called 
shortcomings—lacking incentives and no mandatory blending—for the projects’ 
ultimate demise.
1
 That is, despite an initial (perhaps premature) enthusiasm, the early 
demise of the biofuels industry was considered a failure of the strategy itself. Such a 
situation opens up two important lines of enquiry. The first is the anticipation and 
construction of success. This is a point to be taken up later when I review how 
political decisions rejected multiple commercial interests and their aspirations for a 
business-cum-agro-industrial-friendly policy. I hope to extend the debate further than 
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 It should also be mentioned that despite some authors (e.g. African Centre for Biosafety 2011) 
dismissing the biofuels sectors as a “non-starter”, the future is unclear and it would be entirely 






 within the policy spelling out a swift demise for 
projects and the conflation of policy failure with that of failed expectations. The 
second line of enquiry, one not unrelated to the first, is to suggest that this so-called 
demise of the biofuels industry is not as clear as people within the industry (and 
those outside of it – see African Centre for Biosafety (2011)) suggest. The point is to 
look at the projects—in this case the Cradock sugar beet and PhytoEnergy canola 
projects in particular—not as independently susceptible to but rather embedded (if 




As the governments’ vanguard project, the Cradock project in the Eastern Cape is an 
important cog within the national biofuels machine. It acts as a type of contact zone 
in which implementation (and more so the project supporters) are fulfilling not only 
practical aspects of implementation but renegotiating the very foundations of the 
strategy, as they have done so through much of the policy process. The canola 
project on the other hand, has informed a different set of interests, with equally 
divergent approaches and standings within the broader policy process. To date both 
have been ‘unsuccessful’ as biofuels projects insofar as actually producing biofuels. 
The projects are, however, important to the policy process (an on-going one), or at 
least are an integral part of the policy system/community and success in this situation 
has a distinctly relative point of view. I have grouped the canola and sugar beet 
projects together into one ‘project stream’ only to illustrate their place in a wider 
policy system. At the project level, they are polar opposites. The second line of 
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 The importance here is that in many interviews I was immediately criticised for referring to an 
‘industry’ as no such ‘industry’ exists (at least not yet). The previous chapter has already alluded 
to why this would be the case, in that the final Strategy itself was devoid of incentives and, 
according to whom one is speaking, turned its back on the industry by excluding maize and 
jatropha. Over and above the lack of incentives, another major downfall of the Strategy and its 
pending implementation is the absence of mandatory blending. In the feasibility study, this was a 
mechanism necessary to sustain the fledgling industry. With no mandatory blending, there is no 
demand, which also sends out the ‘wrong’ market signals. Such a scenario has resulted in many 
of the original international investors now looking elsewhere, while local investments became 
immediately untenable. Those projects able to continue (that is with continued access to funding) 
have now had to take control of policy negotiations in order to get the implementation process 
back on track. 
3
 Considering the 2007 decision as the final decision is ahistorical and fatalistic, as later chapters will 
illustrate. Although many projects never materialised, there has been on-going reworking and 
negotiating of the final decisions taken. Two bioethanol projects—Mabele in the Free State and 
ARDA/Sugar Beet SA in Cradock—and one biodiesel project—PhytoEnergy in the Eastern 
Cape—have been continuing to lobby with the Biofuels Task Team and have managed to, along 
with other factors, sway decisions and shift the level of support provided in ‘the policy’ after it 




enquiry thus extends or anticipates the existence of a wider policy subsystem, 
recognising also that such policy collectives—relatively stable aggregations of 
people from a range of organisations who find themselves thrown together on a 
continuing basis to address policy problems—are not inherent from the start but 
rather emerge (Colebatch 2009a). To begin with, in the next section, I will briefly 
outline the ‘status quo’ of biofuels in South Africa before looking more closely at the 
project-policy interface at the point in time before the strategy had done its so-called 
damage. Added to a general overview, I shall consider the project (and therefore 
policy) proposals and the possibilities they present to rural development, which was 
the overriding driver behind biofuels at the time. Of course, as one of the central 
goals of the biofuels policy, the rural development context and the counterpart 
projects is an important part of the story. 
CONTEXTUALISING ‘WIN-WIN’ NARRATIVES: RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PROPOSED, PAST AND PRESENT BIOFUEL PROJECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A major theme of the global biofuels discourse, and its most provocative narrative in 
developing-country contexts, is that of revitalising rural economies and boosting 
their agricultural sectors. What sets biofuels apart from other renewable energy 
solutions is that it is directly linked to rural development and agricultural reform 
given the demands it places on agricultural products. Although scholars increasingly 
consider the nature of rural development itself as highly contentious, with far greater 
emphasis on rural heterogeneity and moving towards a ‘new narrative’ or post-
Washington Consensus (e.g. Maxwell & Ashley 2001), there appears to be a clear 
focus on homogenising agrofuel production to ensure suitable economies of scale 
(visibly large-scale industrial agricultural production) to meet rising demand. This 
import-driven demand arises mainly due to mandatory blending ratios in the 
European Union (EU), whilst policies in the United States (US) have resulted in a 
significant increase of feedstock used for biofuels production and thereby changed 
global agro-commodity markets (Banse et al. 2008). Regardless of the uncertainties 
and contextual nuances of rural development (see below; Appendix C), by creating 
new and increased (supposedly endless) demand for agricultural produce from 




role in the agro-economy. In South Africa, the possibility of new biofuels markets, 
be they local or international, enthused local producers given the oversupply of 
agricultural produce (and resultant boom-bust price shocks) in the local market—for 
maize especially. Given the potential benefits and rising interests of pursuing 
biofuels production, early on the South African government were clearly considering 
them as a serious developmental issue. 
 
When first engaging in my research, and due partly to my involvement with the 
PISCES consortium, I was struck by the underlying logic of rural development 
within the national biofuels strategy and what seemed to be a contradiction when 
looking at the projects being promoted. In Appendix C, I provide an extended review 
of rural development in the South African context. A lengthy discussion is not 
necessary here, but some points need to be reiterated. The main argument is that 
biofuels have become a development solution that easily falls within a wider social 
construction of the South African rural political economy, which comprises of a so-
called ‘first’ and ‘second economy’. This narrative of two economies, which also 
underscores ASGISA, emerges from the very real situation in which there remains a 
massive inequality (not just in rural areas) resulting from past exploitation and 
dispossession. The rural economy is thus split into a predominantly White 
commercial and industrially orientated large-scale farming sector with a 
predominantly black, peasant agriculture alongside it (sometimes the two share 
adjacent fences and similar resources).  
 
The duality of South African agriculture is increasingly becoming important as 
ideological viewpoints confront one another. The commercial sector, driven 
increasingly by concentration and industrial-modernisation logic are largely set 
against smaller-scale traditional farming or peasant logic. The governmental 
response in South Africa has largely being fashioned with a rhetorical bias towards 
the former, in which peasant farmers need to undergo a transition to commercial-
industrial operations despite macro-economic frameworks and policies somewhat 
undermining their potential to succeed. This confrontation also exists, or is best 
illustrated between different departments within government. The Department of 




the Department of Agriculture is increasingly deregulating the agro-economy. As 
Cousins and Hall (2013) argue: 
[t]oday commercial farming is increasingly concentrated in a shrinking 
number of very large enterprises, still mostly white-owned; while on the 
other, after more than R53 billion has been spent on state-driven land 
reform since 1994, only about eight per cent of commercial farmland has 
been transferred to black farmers, many projects have experienced 
problems and the number of small black famers has not increased 
substantially.  
Little is said about transformation of one sector or the other, whether in terms of 
sustainability or in terms of redressing the ills of the past. Even with the commercial 
sector experiencing a growth in the number of black commercial farmers, they face 
similar challenges within this sector—from harsh climates to risky markets—that 
ultimately close out possibilities of their success. There is also a (political) focus on 
transforming the agricultural sector as a whole—generally reducing a multiplicity of 
goals to simply replacing white farmers with black ones—while maintaining national 
food sufficiency and a productive sector (Pieterse & van Wyk 2005) but the links 
between these two goals are complex and remain blurred. As a development solution, 
biofuels has also encountered current and ‘future’ plans of restitution and 
redistribution within the agricultural sector, though the performance of land reform 
in general has been lacklustre (Lahiff 2008) and, according to recent news reports, 
little has changed with the addition of biofuels (Kings 2012; Radebe 2012; Sonjica 
2013). It is also worth noting that although biofuels appear apt as a Washington-
Consensus style ‘quick fix” for South Africa’s rural development quagmire, such 
approaches to development have proved more tricky than neo-classical textbook 
stories suggest (e.g. Jacobs 2009).  
Biofuels Projects in South Africa 
In 2005, there was much hype in South Africa about the promise of biofuels. 
Historically, South Africa’s relationship with biofuels began in the 1920s when 
ethanol derived from Sugarcane was mixed with petrol (Blanchard et al. 2011). 
Following global trends in the mid-2000s, agricultural lobbies, agribusinesses, and 
commercial farmers in South Africa latched onto biofuels as a potential new (and 
endless) market for a domestic oversupply of maize and new profit streams for 




Officials within the Department of Energy and National Treasury suggest that there 
have been numerous occasions when maize farmers have lobbied government to 
support biofuels.  
In the 70s, there was a renewed interest driven by maize but after 
that, it died out [because] it was more expensive than fuel and 
there were technological issues as well. Then, when the new 
government came in, there was a stigma attached to biofuels as it 
is what the last government tried to use to overcome sanctions 
etc. (Former BTT member A, 2012). 
Why these maize lobbies were never supported is probably more complicated than 
the above quote suggests but what distinguishes their lobbying this time around was 
that the maize lobby were not alone. One can see this by the number of biofuels 
projects (Table 2) that were being proposed at the time the national strategy was 
being contemplated, circa 2005. I compiled Table 2 in the early phases of the 
research, using secondary information from news reports (especially from 
EngineeringNews.co.za using articles published in 2005 and 2006) as well as 
meeting with project managers and department officials dealing with the individual 
projects, licensing agreements and incentives (especially from the Department of 
Trade and Industry). I have kept it complete, which actually makes it dated and 
inaccurate, purely to illustrate the extent of the hype and activity at the time (and 
even this list was not entirely complete). Only three of these projects—Cradock, 
PhytoEnergy and Mabele—are presently ‘active’. Active here does not mean 
producing biofuels, but rather continuing as funded entities, although one could add 
in a fourth project—Hoedspruit to this list. These projects have had the financial 
backing to continue to exist (whether on paper or in practice) while the government 
refines and confirms regulatory measures and incentives, on which most of these 







 Description Partners Status (2005-2012) 
Hoedspruit 
Ethanol Plant in 
Mpumalanga 
Sugarcane and sweet 
sorghum to produce 100 
million litres (see 
Haywood et al. 2008). 
CEF and IDC partnership. 
 
 
This project appears to be feasible, however, has 
stalled pending a final decision on the incentives and 
other details of the strategy. The IDC are focussing on 
Cradock before implementing Hoedspruit.  
Cradock in the 
Eastern Cape 
Originally proposed sugar 
beet for ethanol to 
produce 90 million litres 
of biofuel a year from 
sugar beets (see Haywood 
et al, 2008). 
IDC and Sugar Beet SA (also 
known as ARDA and now 
owned by Provincial 
Government). 
Stories vary but this appears to be the most developed 
“agrofuel” project at present. There is, however, no 
refinery in place (i.e. no production) and only pilot 
sugar beet feedstock plantations were planted, 
however, they have now shifted to grain sorghum to 










 (with IDC and CEF 
initially). 
This project has taken on a co-operative approach 
managed by a company called Ubuhle. They are 
currently looking for funding to proceed. CEF and the 
IDC appear to have pulled out of the project and in my 
last discussions with the project manager, he was 
waiting on funding to proceed.  
Tongaat-Hullet in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Sugarcane to produce 
bioethanol. 
There are two projects noted in various reports, one in Makhatini and one near Tongaat. 
As Tongaat-Hullet has produced bioenergy from bagasse, there were rumours of moving 
to biofuels but nothing has been officially confirmed. Until recent changes in the Sugar 
Act, there was little enthusiasm for biofuels from sugar producers.  
Bizana and Sugarcane and sweet An IDC partnership with J&J According to a project manager, the feasibility looks 
                                                 
*
 Most of these names are towns or areas in which the projects were proposed; as none has really come to fruition, their actual names are not readily available.  
†
Ubuhle is the isiZulu word for beautiful. 





eni in Pondoland  
sorghum for bioethanol. Bioenergy. good and land is being secured, but no ethanol is being 
produced. The IDC is no longer involved and funding 
has not been obtained. Legislation has also been 
problematic.  
PhytoEnergy at 
the East London 
IDZ, Eastern 
Cape 
Biodiesel plant to process 
canola planted through the 




PhytoEnergy, Asgisa-EC and 
KPMG. Asgisa-EC has left the 
project and PhytoEnergy’s 
subsidiaries (PhytoFarming and 
PhytoAmandla) are working 
with the KPMG and DTI. 
This project has been underwritten by German 
interests (PhytoEnergy) and an off take agreement has 
been (or is ready to be) signed. At present, no 
production has occurred and there have been 
significant delays in establishing the refinery. As the 
national strategy has prohibited export, it is not clear 
how an off-take with Germany would work. The 
project has also benefitted from incentives through the 
controversial arms-deal offsets and internal reports 
suggest some financial irregularities further clouding 
its reputation. A feasibility study was produced by 
KPMG South Africa and PhytoEnergy whilst pilot 
projects continue. Asgisa-EC was a partner in the 
early trials but no longer remain part of the project. 
Rainbow Nation 
Renewable Fuels 
at the Coega IDZ, 
Eastern Cape 
Biodiesel plant using Soya 
(ostensibly from the 
Eastern Cape 
Intercropping Programme) 
and imported ‘soya cake’.  
Australia-based National 
Biofuels Group is the primary 
shareholder 
Although the first project to obtain a license to 
produce biodiesel from Soya, the company has yet to 
set up a refinery and if funding is secured it will still 
be a few months before operations begin. The project 
will take advantage of a gap in the Soya market chain 
by importing oil rich cake (not enough is produced in 
South Africa) and selling off the protein cake for 
livestock after extracting the oil for biodiesel. 




Soya Plant in 
Secunda, 
Mpumalanga.  
on Soya.  (Pty) and Lurgi South Africa (a 
subsidiary of German based 
Lurgi AG). 
was released. From a discussion with former project 
managers, the project was financially not viable 








Originally planned to 
produce ethanol from 
maize in Bothaville (Free 
State) the plant was to 
have capacity to produce 
153million litres of fuel-
grade bio-ethanol per year 
[although this seems 
excessive/exaggerated] 
and was expected to come 
online in 2007 (Anon 
2006). By excluding 
maize, the strategy 
derailed these plans.  
Reports vary. “Energy 
Development Corporation 
(EDC), a division of the state-
owned Central Energy Fund, is 
to buy a 25.1% stake in Ethanol 
Africa” (Alexander 2005). 
Ethanol Africa was a consortium 
of commercial famers and other 
private investors including 
Sterling Waterford, who had a 
50% share. The project was then 
financed by Sterling Waterford 
and three other large investors 
(proshare.com) but details are 
hazy.  
The ‘first’ licensed Bio-Ethanol project in South 
Africa funded by Sterling Waterford. This project was 
one of a number of (unrealised) maize-to-ethanol 
projects planned in the Free State, North West and 
Mpumalanga Provinces. Originally a consortium of 
private interests, Sterling Waterford remains the major 
investor and proposes a sorghum-to-ethanol plant to 
bypass the ‘maize ban’. The subsequent cluster of 
seven distilleries in the Free State, North-West and 
Mpumalanga (Sugrue & Douthwaite 2007), were to be 
commissioned from 2008 to 2012 but never happened. 
The Bothaville project was approved for Strategic 
Investment Project (SIP) incentives in 2006 with a SIP 





Biodiesel produced from 
jatropha (with research 
looking into Moringa and 
other indigenous trees).  
Public-Private partnership 
between University of Pretoria 
and Invest North West (part of 
the Department for Economic 
Development and Tourism.  
This project was supposed to produce biodiesel from 
jatropha. According to Diaz-Chavez et al. (2010), 
commercial production of jatropha for this project 
was given the go-ahead in 2007, whilst former 
members of the DME described it to me as defunct in 
2010. In meetings with officials from the North West, 
the project was in the process of being ‘legally 
dismantled’ in 2011. As jatropha was excluded from 
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the final Strategy, it is unlikely there would have been 
adequate support post-2007, however, respondents 






Ethanol Gel from Sugar 
beet. 
CEO Derek Mathews is a 
commercial famer that has 
created a vertically integrated 
farming-biofuel operation 
Although changing feedstock from maize to Sugar 
beet this project has managed to maintain production 
of ethanol gel for clean-cook stoves and employs local 
farmers through a co-operative system. There are 
plans to collaborate with a bus company in 
Johannesburg to run on ‘green fuels’.  
Mapfura-Makhura 
Incubator (MMI) 
near Marble Hall 
in Limpopo 
Sunflower and Soya for 
biodiesel.  
A project developed by the 
Agricultural Research Council 
(ARC) and funded by the 
Department of Science and 
Technology and the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture 
This project is more of a smallholder agro-
development initiative and is currently not producing 
biodiesel but cultivating sunflowers. At present (due 
to limited funds to set up a refinery), the farmers are 
selling their feedstock into the vegetable oils 
(sunflower oil) value chain rather than biofuels per se. 
This project is assisting about 90 farmers, of 10 ha 
each, around the Sekhukhune area (Haywood et al. 
2009). 
D1 Oils, KwaZulu 
Natal or Gauteng 
Bio-diesel with output up 
to 15,000 tonnes 
using imported vegetable 
oil (jatropha) from D1 
plantations in 
Mozambique and Zambia  
D1 plc (UK) and Rolls-Royce 
(UK) 90%; PetroSAF (BEE) 
10% 
Location was initially Durban, but then planned to 
relocate to Gauteng for logistical reasons. Project was 
never completed. The project was approved for offset 
incentives, a site was identified in Krugersdorp 
Gauteng, an EIA submitted and operation expected to 
begin in 2006. Official in the DTI suggested the 









The privately funded Mabele project (owned by Sterling Waterford) and Cradock 
(financed by the Central Energy Fund and Industrial Development Corporation) are 
bioethanol projects that are currently key players at national level. The PhytoEnergy 
canola project is a key player in the Eastern Cape Province but until recently has 
struggled to gain requisite political support outside of the a few ‘hopefuls’ at national 
level.
1
 It has also encountered tensions when working in partnership with provincial 
agencies ASGISA-EC, in which growing canola trials in the Eastern Cape has proved 
extremely difficult. One could argue that it is as ‘active’ as Mabele and Cradock 
although as a biodiesel project has not played a particularly direct or influential role 
in terms of the national policy development (at least not the early policy of 2007). 
Hoedspruit is a fourth major project that, once the strategy is finalised will be the 
IDC’s successor to Cradock, which, as the ministers quote above suggests, is South 
Africa’s vanguard project during the pilot phases (2007-2013). I will unravel some of 
the nuances of these projects in later sections. 
 
Dominating this list of projects were the ones proposed, facilitated and funded by 
parastatal agencies and programmes specifically funded by government to kick-start 
a biofuels industry in the country. Primary funders of the industry, at a national level, 
include the Central Energy Fund (CEF) and Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC). The CEF is the financial ‘arm’ of the Department of Energy, providing 
funding to energy related projects and providing technical support to the DoE. 
Within the CEF, there is then the Energy Development Corporation (EDC)
2
 that has 
been described as (Wilson et al. 2005, p.47): 
…established in January 2004, [the EDC] is a commercial arm of CEF and, 
being close to policymakers, is well placed to act on new initiatives and 
policies that emerge in the energy sector. EDC is well-resourced 
organisation focusing on a number of [renewable energy technologies] 
RETs: solar energy, wind energy, hydro energy, biomass, biogas and low 
smoke fuels and supports energy development through commercial, 
developmental and social projects that meet the goals of NEPAD and 
SADC. EDC is committed to a policy of broad based Black Economic 
                                                 
1
 PhytoEnergy SA, as South African subsidiary of the German PhytoEnergy Group has its project 
managed by secondments from KPMG and has had significant support (mostly financial and 
somewhat political) from the Department of Trade and Industry. 
2
 The website of the EDC describes its role as follows: Being close to the policy makers, EDC is able 
to lobby the relevant government departments and institutions for support when necessary. At the 




Empowerment (BEE) by ensuring that it maximises procurement from 
appropriate sources.  
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) are also a financing institution, set up 
by the government in 1940; it remains owned by the South African government 
under the guidance of the Economic Development Department and also has a 
significant share in Sasol (Hodge 2000). Together with the CEF/EDC, they have 
been part of a policy network with the Department of Energy (amongst others) at 
national level (see Figure 3), which will be described later.  
 
 
Figure 3: ‘Organogram’ of government departments and associated biofuel projects 
 
It is through the Cradock and PhytoEnergy projects that the Eastern Cape becomes 
important for the biofuels policy’s development (beyond the political significance of 
it being a former homeland, home to many of the ANC elite, including Nelson 
Mandela, and a long-term development frontier in South Africa).
3
 At the provincial 
                                                 
3
 The Eastern Cape Province is a product of the transition to democracy, in which part of the former 
Cape Province and two former homelands (the Transkei and Ciskei) were merged together. As 
Schmeding (2009, p.8) describes, “the new province was to inherit a host of burdens of failed 
politics, neglect, under-development, lack of long-term and consequent rural and industrial 
sustainable development planning as well as implications of African traditions”. The Eastern 


































level, Asgisa-EC and various provincial Departments—Agriculture and Economic 
Development (or similar)—formed an interlinked and complex network of 
government agencies pushing forward the biofuels agenda, with private capital 
interests also contributing significantly. Asgisa-EC is especially important but will be 
discussed in later sections.  
 
I have also shaded two projects in Table 2 that depart from the large-scale mind-set 
displayed by the other first-generation biofuels projects described above. The first, 
Silversands Bioethanol, is a small-scale private operation run by Derek Mathews, a 
local commercial farmer. Originally producing ethanol gel from maize, sugar beet 
has since become the preferred feedstock
4
 and there are plans to collaborate with 
City of Johannesburg to produce ‘green fuels’ for their buses. The project has 
survived without incentives, providing biofuels to a niche market, unlike the 
industrial projects. The second, the Mapfura-Makhura Incubator (MMI), is not a 
biofuels project per se but rather an investment platform to assist small-scale farmers 
in producing competitively for the market. Biodiesel appeared to provide one such 
market, although with the price of vegetable oils being well above their relative value 
as biodiesel and with limited support from government (i.e. no incentives and no 
mandatory blending), the project has focussed on the oil market alone. They too have 
some criticism of the strategy. 
The strategy is a problem … because it has not formalised the 
sector so the DME [Department of Energy] has to work hard to 
get things right. I don’t even know if they know that the MMI 
exists. At the moment, it is like we are in this alone (Stakeholder 
interview, 2010).  
 
Although multiple projects were proposed and South Africa was geared 
(agriculturally speaking) to produce requisite feedstock, a Global Agricultural 
Information Network (GAIN) report summed up the South African situation in 2009; 
there is no large-scale production (Esterhuizen 2009). This situation prevails at the 
                                                                                                                                          
landscape characterised by traditional farming and tribal lands, high unemployment, and a lack of 
infrastructure and services.  
4
 The decision for this was a cost-benefit one. Sugarbeet has high glucose content (rather than being a 




time of writing in 2013. Such a statement deserves some context. There is no 
workable biofuel project from agricultural crops, despite many policy statements, 
plans for projects, debates, workshops et cetera. There is, as the above begins to 
highlight, a mix of project types that all have to be included in policy measures if the 
industry is to be managed and beneficial to all relevant stakeholders. The route South 
Africa has chosen in the strategy thus appears myopic and biased with the policy and 
project focus eclipsed by the industrial rationale (for reasons discussed later). 
Regardless, there is little actual emphasis as how such approaches are to meet the 
rural development prerogatives described above. To illustrate this point further, 
focussing again on first generation biofuels, it is worth examining the types of 
biofuels projects currently found in Africa (which itself is a problematic 
generalisation) and what they may mean for rural development and then reflect on 
the South African context through such a lens.  
Project Types: African Examples and a South African Typology 
In a review of projects across Africa, Wolde-Georgis & Glantz (2009) classify three 
emerging types of biofuel projects, which relate to different strategies for 
development: 
 Large vertically integrated plantations directly linked and managed by 
biofuels refineries; 
 Co-operative type contract plantations of biofuels crops by small farmers for 
sale to biofuels refineries; and 
 Small-scale, village-level production with mixtures of both biofuels feedstock 
and food crops. 
For each of these they add cautionary notes. The first two are potentially the most 
damaging, requiring significant government oversight to mitigate any environmental 
and social impacts. Large, vertically integrated projects can be especially damaging 
in this regard and the call for government oversight needs to be questioned in 
contexts when often it is the state that is implementing (or at least partners within) 
such projects (see Future Agricultures, 2011). The third category, which generally 
matches the existing rural economies in Africa, is also not totally innocuous and need 




framework of local needs without disrupting the local ecology, and farmers 
are not alienated from their land or forced to wait until the benefits of 
biofuels trickle down to their level (Wolde-Georgis & Glantz 2009, p.8).  
A range of case studies for the rest of Africa also illustrates the ambiguous nature of 
biofuels and their benefits. Whereas horror stories abound with “land grabs” 
becoming notorious of the ‘biofueled future’, other projects show a less menacing 
nature. In their multi-country review, Diaz-Chavez et al. (2010), in some ways, have 
renewed optimism for biofuels by highlighting that they can actually coexist with 
food security, and do so in many African countries. Drawing on the experiences of 
Tanzania, Kenya Mozambique, Zambia, Mali, and Senegal they conclude that co-ops 
for biofuels and food can be grown without major impacts on food security, however, 
this requires direction from well thought out policies.  
 
Others suggest that questions of the real benefits of biofuels are intrinsic to local 
contexts, especially when disguised under the cloak of win-win narratives. Any 
optimism has to be tempered by work that comes to cautionary conclusions, 
questioning ‘win win’ outcomes (Matondi, et al. 2010; Ariza-Montobio et al. 2010). 
There is a strong sense that far more policy and regulation is needed (Molony and 
Smith, 2010) but there are equally questions of whether the outcomes of legislation 
and compensation are sufficient to promote livelihood opportunities (Sulle & Nelson, 
2009). As an edited collection, even the works within Matondi et al. (2010) highlight 
complex local circumstances in which opposing narratives, be they empirically 
founded or not, can dismantle biofuels projects and their potential benefits, even 
when, for example, food security benefits were beginning to accrue (see specifically 
the Ghanaian example of Prosper Boamah (2010)). The biofuels special edition of 
the Journal of Peasant Studies also provides a range of perspectives through which 
one should view the ‘messy’ reality of foreign acquisitions and agro-industrial 
projects in general and biofuels projects in particular (see Borras et al. 2010).  
 
Closer to the South African case, Haywood et al. (2009) provide a four-way 
classification of biofuels projects already evident within Southern Africa. Type 1 and 
2 projects produce biofuels to meet local needs (Figure 4). These projects are 
typically small and have been initiated in several African countries including Mali, 




Type 1 and Type 2 projects are not considered to have major negative social or 
environmental impacts; indeed, their proponents see potential positive impacts as did 
Wolde-Georgis & Glantz (2009). One should remember that the scale (meaning 
number of projects rather than absolute size) at which this occurs would influence the 
true impact and thus such appraisal is debatable and needs qualification. There is 
always a danger in assuming scaling-up will not create new unforeseen challenges, 
and scaling-up should be seen in terms of numbers of projects (i.e. the impact results 
from a multiplier effect) in addition to scaling up by an increase in size.
5
 
Additionally, as evidenced by field visits
6
 in Tanzania (and for South Africa as 
described above; see Appendix D), small-scale producers and positive impacts are 
also hindered by lacking policy frameworks that could co-ordinate and integrate 
currently isolated projects, as well as provide a blanket of support to a neglected 
sector.  
 
In contrast, Type 3 and 4 projects are dedicated biofuel production enterprises (so-
called “agrofuels” or “ergo-culture” projects established specifically to meet the 
demands for national and international fuel blends (see Mathews, 2007)). Farmers 
benefit from cash income rather than fuel security. Large corporations are the main 
investors in these types of projects. The magnitude of Type 3 and 4 projects could 
result in extensive land transformation, consequential biodiversity losses, unintended 
negative social consequences such as food insecurity and communities displaced 
from their land. Their appropriateness is questionable, especially in developing 
countries (Woods, 2006).  
 
                                                 
5
 At the same time, large-scale projects are too easily demonized. They may well be fortuitous through 
economies of scale and, whereas one should not consider large industrial farms as being 
environmentally friendly and not having some forms of impact per se, the impacts from ‘on-farm’ 
biofuel production may be little more than existing agriculture being undertaken for food or 
cash.(Ruysenaar 2011a) 
6





In a synopsis document compiled for the CURES network, I merged the findings of 
Haywood et al (2009) and a talk presented by Graham Von Maltitz (2011), to better 
represent the dynamics of the South African context (Figure 4b). The situation is 
quite different in South Africa, given the existing commercial farming sector with 
intermediate sized farms (10s to 100s of hectares) already occurring (outside of any 
specific biofuels industry). Thus the four-way classification (Figure 4a) is 
disaggregated into a further six categories (italics of Figure 4b). The intermediate 
farmers—Type B and E—have the potential to produce feedstock for biofuels 
refineries supplying the national fuel mix (for example the proposed Cradock sugar 
beet project) as well as producing for on-farm requirements respectively.  
 
There is of course still the possible inclusion of corporate farmers and small-scale 
growers (which has also become a motivating factor behind the Cradock Project) but 
this relies on policy interventions (Ewing & Msangi 2009; Von Maltitz 2011). From 
a policy perspective, the government can coerce the use of different models and this, 
as mentioned, has been attempted in South Africa (see Chapter 1). The South African 
government, through the Industrial Biofuels Strategy, has preferred to support small-
Figure 4a&b: Typical biofuel projects grouped by scale of farming activity and intended use of the biofuel 




scale and emerging farmers in the former homelands rather than existing commercial 
farms (Figure 5). Mechanisms to try to enforce this have included subsidies and 





From the outline provided in Table 2, and the above discussion, it is obvious that (i) 
the majority of biofuels project are larger-scale (Type 4) projects and (ii) are either 
defunct or very slowly progressing. With a focus on the big four and Cradock 
especially, it is likely to prevail in the near future. There is an interesting dilemma 
here though. It can be linked to the arrow depicted in Figure 5, in which policy is 
used to re-orientate practices to match the desires of the decision-makers. What it 
neglects is how such policies may well co-evolve, that existing practices may define 
policy (even if not explicitly) and that, as Mosse (2004) suggests, success occurs 
when implementation related activities can be rearticulated within policy 
prescriptions. With some idea provided as to the projects occurring at the time, the 
next section turns to an illustrative case study of the co-evolution of the biofuels 
policy of the Eastern Cape.  
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Figure 5: Using policy to re-orientate biofuels production approaches (Von Maltitz 2011 






PLANS AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL: THE FORGOTTEN POLICY OF EASTERN CAPE 
While [the national departments] were doing the road show, 
there were interdepartmental committees that wanted to work on 
the biofuels development strategy and some of these international 
companies came [to provinces] and promised them huge money. 
And then [the province] said no, They want to have their own 
strategy, they were going to have their own strategy before the 
national strategy was developed! But that was also the same issue 
with Mafikeng because North West Province also had their own 
strategy. It was kind of a biofuels development strategy or 
framework or something. And as a province they went ahead 
planting jatropha (Former Biofuels Task Team Member, 2011).
7
  
An important aspect of the biofuels strategy that has not been considered in any of 
the existing literature is the proliferation of earlier policy proposals in the provinces. 
These have been similar in many respects to proposals of the national strategy itself, 
and have been subject to similar types of networks and influences. They also 
highlight the importance of project proposals in directing the strategic directions 
envisioned in the provinces, merging with and morphing existing practices and 
programmes. In my interviews and research, I have come across three of such 
initiatives—Eastern Cape, North West and KwaZulu-Natal—as well as biodiesel 
proposals being made in the City of Cape Town.
8
 I will only focus on the Eastern 
Cape, as this was the most readily available and pertinent policy given that the case 
studies were also in this province.  
Networks and Narratives in the Eastern Cape  
In a confidential strategy document for the Eastern Cape, there appear a few main 
stakeholders including Ken Burn of the Eastern Cape Development Corporation 
(ECDC). According to their website, the ECDC were early investors in biofuels 
within the province. Despite being told by members of the ECDC in 2010 that they 
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 To provide some context here, Mafikeng is the capital city of the North West Province. The reason 
they were trying to plant jatropha, as I later found out, was that it was linked to a University of 
Pretoria research programme and also tied in with some spatial development programmes being 
run by the Province. I could not find out any definitive reasons as to why it failed, only that it was 
mainly ‘political’. It is interesting to note that this respondent also continually referred to the 
policy as the biofuels development strategy, highlighting again the focus on job creation and rural 
development.  
8
 I owe Simon Wilson a debt of thanks for his valuable insights into his work with the City of Cape 




were no longer involved with biofuels projects, their website (as of June 2013) still 
highlights (ECDC 2012): 
The Eastern Cape Provincial Government remains committed to growing 
the bio-fuels industry in the province. This is shown in the fact that 300 000 
hectares have been earmarked for biofuel crops, such as canola and soya 
bean. The ECDC has been involved in growing trials for Canola and Soya 
Bean and these trial (sic) have proved extremely positive. In addition to this 
the Eastern Cape Provincial Government is in the process of finalising and 
formalising the provincial policy on bio-fuels which is directly linked to the 
national policy (sic). Once in place this policy will provide the road-map 
for bio-fuel production in the Eastern Cape.  
Of the range of similarities with its national counterpart, the most significant is that 
its origins are, as will be shown, closely linked to project proposals for biofuels in the 
province and lobbying from within the private sector, the Eastern Cape Department 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs (ECDALA) and some of its affiliates. As an official 
from the ECDALA (ECDALA official B, 2010) described, when developing the 
policy, it was the ECDALA  that took the lead. Ken Burn collaborated with Felix 
Hobson and Leon Coetzee (also from the ECDALA) to draft the policy, although it 
was considered more of a “desktop study”. Together they formed an ad hoc task 
team under the Economic Growth and Infrastructure Cluster.
9
 The task team would 
provide guidance to the cluster on biofuels and screen various applications of 
biofuels projects within the province, whilst also developing a business plan around 
canola. Once the policy was submitted to the cluster, it is questionable, according to 
this ECDALA official, whether it was taken seriously at all. “It was never really 
endorsed formally by the cluster. It just died a slow death” (ECDALA official B, 
2010). Despite the claims of the ECDC quote above, which suggests work on the 
policy continues, the most important hindrance to the policy’s development appears 
to have been the national policy. When the national government promulgated their 
strategy, it effectively neutered the provincial one, although one cannot discount that 
provincial backing for biofuels seems to have evaporated with the rsk of food-versus-
fuel discouraging full support. (I discuss the food-versus-fuel debate at length later, 
for now it is important to note that the debate in the Eastern Cape followed a similar 
logic, politicians were wary about unintended consequences, whilst local biofuels 
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 The cluster system of government was established during the President Mbeki era and reconfigured 
during President Zuma’s first term to foster an integrated approach to governance that is aimed at 




supporters called on the maxim of market principles to support the need for biofuels 
as a benefit to food security.)  
 
There is more to be gleaned from the apparently swift policy demise. The first is that 
the process has been very similar to the national pathway described in later chapters, 
being concluded in the face of widespread hype by a network of similar interests, 
although encountering political and public objections, around not only food-versus-
fuel but land rights and industrial large-scale approaches too. The second is the local 
contextual mobilising metaphors that deserve some critique. The third and closely 
related is how quickly biofuels narratives were co-opted into the development of the 
provincial biofuels policy but also that biofuels rhetoric informed (and legitimised) 
existing programmes and practices, garnering support for their continuation or slight 
adjustment. Such proposals need to be seen in relation to a wealth of evidence 
suggesting that their forerunners have not succeeded and yet continue to be 
advocated as a means for rural development. In this, my argument is similar to 
Seneque (1982, p.2) who suggests of such planning: 
[a]ll too often development planning is nothing more than problem-solving 
oriented: the problem is identified and described, and the planners put 
forward a solution to solve it. However, for a solution to have even a 
chance of being successfully implemented, the causes and history of the 
problem must be fully analysed and understood. It is just as crucial to 
analyse and evaluate previous attempted solutions to the problem. For, in 
failing, they may have become additional constraints, i.e. in themselves the 
previous solutions may have become part of the problem.  
However, the activity of planning is also perhaps the source rather than the solution 
to such a situation. It is thus that these issues raised above for the biofuels strategy 
were not separate or mutually exclusive but interlinked and overlapping and are 
interrogated as such. They are presented in a general discussion next.  
 
The above suggests an interesting isomorphism between the national and provincial 
strategy developments, until there was actually a re-writing of the provincial policy 
to match the requirements of the national strategy. Given the institutional 
arrangements of the DME, the Eastern Cape process was largely isolated from the 
national one, until provincial proposals were overshadowed by national ones 
following the national Biofuels Task Team’s ‘road show’. That the ECDALA 




fuels with respect to the proposal: establishment of a canola bio-fuel industry as an 
economic anchor for accelerated agrarian transformation” suggests rhetorical 
adjustments to existing logics more than anything else. The language, the meaning-
making processes in the Eastern Cape, which by this time were increasingly 
informed by national prerogatives, include, for example (Hobson 2006): 
 A commitment to alleviating poverty and creating job opportunities 
through the development of the second economy.  
 The availability of underutilised high potential arable land, calculated to 
be in the order of 500,000 hectares of which less than 50,000 is currently 
used for cropping purposes.  
I will return to the second economy in later chapters. The second bullet point, 
however, points towards a policy artefact—emerging apparently from previous 
policy discussions but cemented through reproduction in the current policy—that has 
gained substantial notoriety in provincial networks. Its history and emergence in the 
provincial strategy document is of specific interest, as it reinforces my argument of 
both the expertise (and credibility of experts) and networks through which such 
policy knowledge emerges as being central to the policymaking process.  
 
The calculation of the actual figure of 500,000 hectares has been difficult to trace on 
paper and members of the ECDALA pointed towards GIS studies undertaken in the 
past, which had reflected such a number. In an early meeting between PhytoEnergy 
and the Eastern Cape Biofuels Task Team—part of the screening exercises and 
business plans around canola referred to by Felix Hobson above and indicative of the 
emergent network—there is some debate as to how much of the 500,000 was actually 
available. The half a million hectares is the total estimated land available according 
to the Department of Agriculture, however:  
[t]here is currently 50 000 hectares being cultivated. Of the remaining 
450 000 approximately 100 000 hectares have been cultivated in the past. A 
probable land availability scenario given the socio-economic drivers in the 
region is: 150 000 hectares could be earmarked for maize production, 
100 000 ha for soya, 100 000 ha for canola and 50 000 for other crops. The 
remaining 100 000 could be allocated to canola (PhytoEnergy 
Development GmbH, 2006, p.3). 
There is an element here of rudimentary or arbitrary land partitioning, and, while the 




to look like, it had not been promulgated yet. Vested interests have shown an early 
influence and in many ways have begun to steer policy proposals that would still be 
forthcoming. The rudimentary partitioning of land seems especially premature, given 
somewhat questionable results from winter crop trials (of canola) that had preceded 
this meeting, whereas existing backlogs within the Department present another 
massive challenge. The minutes of the meeting further suggest: 
1200 hectares of canola was planted in the [ECDALA] winter trial. To date 
results are varied with some yields expected to be around 2 tons per hectare 
and nothing in other areas. A key concern for the team was the sale of trial 
canola, which was expected to be harvested in October. In addition, the 
[ECDALA] needs R5m to fund a maize programme that was to follow the 
canola trial. This money has not been allocated and could jeopardize the 
project going forward. Storage of canola prior to transporting is an issue 
that was also raised (PhtyoEnergy Development GmBH, 2006). 
In a country where any debate on land availability is bound to be contentious, one 
would expect that claims around future land use require some evidence to back them 
up. There was, for example, an unpublished study undertaken by the Öko-Institut that 
looked into a range of issues around sustainable biomass production in South Africa. 
In discussions with two researchers involved in this study, they were highly critical 
of the hyped-up availability of 500,000 hectares. One recommended that it was 
probably only a tenth of that number whilst the other suggested that even if it was 
not—there may well be 500,000 hectares available—to develop that amount of land 
would require associated services that are entirely unavailable. The important point 
here is how the 500,000 hectares has formed a recurring policy artefact that carries 
with it certain abstract qualities rendering complexity naught, legitimised more 
through repetition than reality. It also shows the importance of mobilising metaphors 
and what influence project managers and policymakers (who in the ECDALA are 
often the same people) have on each other, through the co-construction of such 
narratives. As one official of the ECDALA suggested, initially it was:  
15,000 hectares of canola to produce biodiesel to export to 
Germany or to Europe. That was their claim to fame. … All of a 
sudden they saw that there was an interest in the province and 
they increased … [because] you can play with figures, they 
increased the plant capacity to equal that of 500,000 hectares of 




Painting the Countryside Yellow: Mobilising Metaphors and Canola Trials (and 
Errors) in the Eastern Cape 
While the need for a well-founded argument in policy is assumed but remains unmet 
in the Eastern Cape, there is an equal need to tread lightly on what is a highly 
political turf within the Eastern Cape. The latter was even recognised by members of 
PhytoEnergy
10
 who were weary of these inflated potentials and equally unrealistic 
objectives of developing them, but found themselves to be cogs in a bigger machine, 
which moved in ways out of their control. One respondent’s self-criticism departs 
from written plans of PhytoEnergy, many of which have coincided with political and 
government interests converging around the “half million”. To provide some idea of 
this respondent’s viewpoint, he was equally critical of the mandatory blending 
consultation meeting lamenting: 
no one in that whole meeting mentioned uplifting farmers or 
mentoring or formation of coops (PhytoEnergy representative A, 
2012). 
As a basis for the biofuels project, growing sufficient feedstock in the Eastern Cape 
should be considered the sine qua non of the PhytoEnergy project. As one of their 
seven initial sub-projects, “Sub-project 3: Feedstock Development, Cultivation and 
Agrarian Supply”, would focus on trials to ensure canola production (and an 
associated multi-cropping programme) would be feasible in the Eastern Cape. 
(KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State were also mooted as potential areas of supply; 
however, these would be in contravention of the licensing criteria stipulated by the 
DoE). Much of the criticism levelled towards the PhytoEnergy project were their 
bold claims that they would be transforming 500,000 hectares of land in the Eastern 
Cape to canola production, amongst others. In an area with a history of problematic 
top-down and modernisation-based ‘betterment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ schemes (see 
Ferguson 1990, pp.260–64; e.g. Letsoalo & Rogerson 1982; McAllister 1992), such 
large-scale proposals were met with widespread suspicion (e.g Amigun et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, at a practical level, one could ask why PhytoEnergy would be making 
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 Meetings with PhytoEnergy actually revealed a deep concern about the “land issue” and how the 
Eastern Cape could be developed most beneficially. Within PhytoEnergy there were also differing 
perspectives as to what would be feasible although recent evidence from their website suggests a 
strict focus on sustainable agricultural practices (PhytoEnergy Group 2012). Whether these 




claims of 500,000 hectares, which not only defies logic but also contradicts the 
portions supposedly rationed out above.  
 
The history of the PhytoEnergy project is important to understanding the emerging 
narratives within the Eastern Cape Province. Although not as long and in-depth as 
Cradock’s plans for sugar (see Appendix D and below), PhytoEnergy’s plans for 
canola were no less contrived and amenable as a basis for a powerful imaginary. 
Plans for canola, especially as a non-food crop resonated through the emerging 
network of interest, although mostly within the province but certainly with tendrils at 
the national level too. As early as 2005, Dr Michael Krummer of PhytoEnergy 
approached KPMG to begin looking into the feasibility of establishing a canola-
based bio-diesel plant in the Eastern Cape. At KPMG at the time, Wayne Jansen was 
brought on board with an associate, Charles Warren-Hansen. Together they would be 
the early project managers and establish the business plan for the project. As Warren-
Jansen (2012, Pers. Comm.) described to me, they then set off to the Eastern Cape 
and met with Ken Burn of the ECDC. Ken Burn then introduced them to Felix 
Hobson and Leon Coetzee at the Department of Agriculture. As I had met with these 
same people on my field trips to the Eastern Cape to discuss the development of the 
Eastern Cape policy, it was very much a case of recurring networks.
11
 It was through 
on-going discussions with these Eastern Cape officials that KPMG developed an 
integrated cropping programme for the province, with early aspirations of rotation 
cropping, “developing local farmers through a mentorship programme” and “creating 
jobs” (ibid). Although starting with good intentions, these plans became increasingly 
obscured through time, as the project became increasingly convoluted and new 
players entered into the picture.  
 
It is useful to isolate two areas of development along which the canola project 
progressed (a supply or farm side and demand or factory side). Feedstock would be 
produced through an agricultural programme, with biofuels then produced at the 
‘refinery’—even if the latter was only a proposal at this stage. Through a close 
working relationship and the inputs of the officials at the ECDALA, the KPMG team 
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 My trip to the Eastern Cape was premised on snowballing techniques and drawing on different 





pulled together a comprehensive business model incorporating a range of crops and 
providing estimates of costs and feasibility of production.
12
 As part of the 
development of the model and interactions with the ECDALA, presentations were 
made regarding the proposals for an integrated cropping programme. Broadly, 
project proposals were made under the name of Project Saturn, an integrated 
cropping programme based on an ‘end to end’ financial model produced by KPMG. 
These ideas clearly resonated with Simpiwe Somdyala, who established Asgisa-EC 
seemingly based on the same plans as the KPMG shortly after. Asgisa-EC was 
established as an Agribusiness ‘special purpose vehicle’ in the Eastern Cape, which 
would build on earlier programmes such as the Massive Food Production 
Programme. At this stage, financial interests such as ABSA and the ECDC were also 
interested in the biofuels-based project, as were the original partnership of Ken Burn 
and Felix Hobson. The following extracts start to suggest the hype was mounting. 
 
A report from South Africa info (Khumalo 2007) explains that: 
‘Felix Hobson, senior manager of the Eastern Cape government’s 
agriculture resource planning and management division, said this week that 
the government had set aside R9.5-million for fencing land and planting 
canola and R8-million for planting sugar beet in the N2 Mbhashe local 
municipality to kick-start the project … one of the Eastern Cape’s priority 
projects under the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (Asgi-SA)… ‘The biofuel project is envisaged to be a major Asgi-
SA project
13
 in the Eastern Cape,’ Hobson said, adding that it would create 
‘a huge market for agricultural products including canola, soya beans and 
sunflower which were not there before.’ This would be achieved through 
establishing 500 000 hectares of currently under-used land for integrated 
rotational cropping within the next five years, Hobson said. European 
investors have reportedly expressed interest in developing the East London 
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 As this model and the associated original business proposals are under intellectual property rights, 
they were not available for further examination. An official of the DTI has remarked that this was 
the best-developed agribusiness plan assessed by the Department, suggesting it was a favourite to 
be supported.  
13
 It is here where the artful naming of the Eastern Cape’s ‘Asgisa-EC’ is best illustrated, as the 
projects in the Eastern Cape are in no way associated with the Presidency’s ASGISA programme 
except in name. One cannot deny, however, that both would be legitimized by one or the other 
and if ASGISA actually continued as a programme there is little doubt that they would gladly 
take on the Eastern Cape projects as their own; especially they were to show signs of success. The 
NPC and New Growth Path have, however, subsumed ASGISA at national level, adding to the 
list of now defunct national plans. The naming and operations of Asgisa-EC have also 
encountered some controversy politically. In a 2010 budget speech, it is remarked that the 
provincial legislature resolved the issue of Asgisa-EC (Pty) Ltd as a subsidiary company with 
effect from 1 April 2010, with remarks stating that “most importantly, this development has 
resolved the issue of the legal status and public accountability of Asgisa-EC, a matter that has 




plant… ‘This intervention will require an investment by government of 
R1.5-billion that will secure a simultaneous R3.82-billion foreign direct 
investment and a R7-billion investment from local financial institutions,’ 
Hobson said. According to Hobson, the initiative would create around 23 
000 new jobs and a sustainable R2.9-billion a year in agricultural 
production and processing in the province.  
This is expressed almost verbatim on the ECDC website (and is still listed as one of 
their success stories despite no actual biofuels being produced): 
The Eastern Cape government has set aside R9.5-million for fencing land 
and planting canola, and R8-million for planting sugar beet in the Mbhashe 
area to kick-start the project. The biofuel project will create a huge new 
market for agricultural products, including canola, soya beans and 
sunflower. It involves establishing 500,000 hectares of now under-used 
land for integrated rotational cropping. These crops would be used to feed a 
proposed 200,000-ton-per-annum biodiesel plant in the East London 
Industrial Development Zone, as well as other biofuel and agro-processing 
initiatives. Linked to this project, ECDC is involved in setting up a number 
of SMMEs, which will assist farmers to access funding for the agri-
equipment they need. 
 
The interesting point, however, is that the original models produced by KPMG did 
not specify 500,000 hectares at all, or at least, it was an “end game”, “something to 
work towards” not but it was hyped up. This was merely a number that became 
fashionable when additional players came on board, used as a selling point by the 
German interests especially. It is totally contrived, and, increasingly unlikely to be 
met in the near future. Politically, however, it is especially provocative and would 
match well with the plans of Asgisa-EC, especially if such proclamations would 
ostensibly improve their actually lacklustre record of accomplishment. Through 
Asgisa-EC, Project Saturn was renamed as the Biofuels Integrated Cropping 
Programme, who then continued to drive the KPMG business plan based on 500,000 
hectares of dry land. An initial trial of 1000ha failed dismally according to four 
respondents from very different sectors. Unsuccessful projects were not something 
new to the province.  
 
Schmeding (2009, p.19) describes the development of Asgisa-EC in terms of poorly 
performing programmes (i.e. the MFPP) prior to it being established and suggests 
that (see also Asgisa-EC 2009): 
Dragging rural developments by 2007 led to the understanding amongst 




more diversification strategies were required
14
. Due to the brief existence 
of the programme, available literature is limited to the Five Year Business 
Plan. Asgisa-EC was formed and given the mandate to develop six pillars 
… Agriculture and agro-processing … Forestry development … Water 
resource development … Hydro-power and alternative energy … Tourism 
development … Addressing unsustainable human settlement patters in the 
province.  
In response to the unexceptional development track record mentioned above (and 
how ‘new’ biofuels approaches may mean more of the same), reports of successes 
achieved by Massive Food Production Programmes (MFPP) emanating from within 
the ECDA (see Schmeding, 2009) need to be read in contrast to other independent 
works (Burgess 2011; Hajdu 2006; Jacobson 2013), which show a very different 
situation. Even Schmeding (2009) provides some useful caveats to canola production 
in the Eastern Cape, alluding to the need for developmental approaches to be 
considered before the technical aspects are. Clearly, one cannot assume that models 
represent reality and, given the structural and capacity deficits in the Eastern Cape, 
there is far less likelihood that production plans will succeed without significant 
development and training provided beforehand. Furthermore, if any argument is to be 
made about the benefit of the MFPP to food security, surely it will need to move 
beyond the relatively innocuous figures of hectares planted (as is the case at present). 
Food security relies on far more than food production, especially if that production 
adds no value to the livelihoods of the food insecure in the region. In the same way, 
biofuels production will mean very little and its potential left unharnessed, especially 
if it falls prey to ‘new’ rhetoric involving the same unsuccessful practices. If names 
are anything to go by, this unfortunately seems more than likely. 
 
While the name suggests some resemblance to the nationally driven ASGISA 
initiative, it is in fact in no way linked to national levels institutionally,
15
 other than 
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 This is characteristic ‘government speak’ in which policies take on (usually only in name) the form 
of ‘integrated approaches’ though little attention is given to how this works in practice. The 
Department of Provincial and Local Government have grappled with this very real problem 
through the implementation of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (DPLG 2008). 
Drimie and Ruysenaar (2010) illustrate similar challenges in the implementation of the Integrated 
Food Security Strategy.  
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 Even the provincial growth plan does not recognize the national ‘ASGISA’ as an integrated 
development plan (Eastern Cape Office of the Premier 2008). It is not clear at all why the new 
funding agency even took on the name of ASGISA-EC for anything but convenience sake. Its 




building on national objectives. It also appears to be yet another reshuffling of 
organisational and institutional structures so common in South Africa’s 
administration, and appears now to be merging with the Eastern Cape Rural Finance 
Corporation. Their glossy pamphlets also appear to exaggerate the success of their 
programmes, and very little actual evidence (other than spending) is provided. One 
also has to question whether any successes gained through Asgisa-EC would have 
accrued regardless of it being renamed as an entity, although that is not the focus of 
this research. (I will briefly return to the rural development discussion in the 
conclusion below). 
 
Despite all these issues, reports from both Asgisa-EC and PhytoEnergy still resort 
publically to faith in this land availability and the potential to cultivate it. The 
implications of this have since been extended into policies at national level, where 
canola production, despite limited success, has become a Key Action Process for the 
2010/11-2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). The ‘Production of biodiesel’ 
is, for example, outlined in the IPAP as follows (Department of Trade and Industry 
2010):  
Nature of the intervention: Providing finance (offset grant of €2million in 
2009) to complete key studies to bring a 400,000 tons of biodiesel refinery 
project to a bankable business plan status.
16
 The feasibility study has been 
completed. Lead department: DTI… Supporting departments / agencies: 
EDD and DOE / NEF and IDC. 
The above is interesting first, as it shows how biofuels are re-entering the political 
and policy spectrum in areas beyond the provisions of the Biofuels Strategy but have 
become mobilising metaphors in the new realms of the bioeconomy and green jobs 
outlooks (e.g. Maia et al. 2011). As one official from the Task Team suggested to 
me, it came as quite a ‘shock” when the canola project (which can only be the 
                                                                                                                                          
project is envisaged to be a major ASGI-SA project in the Eastern Cape" (Hobson cited in 
Khumalo 2007). 
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 This figure itself seems overly ambitious. If one takes an optimistic yield of two metric tonnes per 
hectare total yield (e.g. Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2010, p.3) and 
therefore one tonne of oil per hectare (high yield varieties could produce 1.5 tonnes per hectare). 
To produce 400,000 tonnes you would need the upwards of 1.2million hectares on a three year 
rotation. Given that only 500,000 hectares is available (and supposedly being farmed in rotation 
with other crops) there is a significant shortfall. South Africa only produces 350,000 tonnes of 





PhytoEnergy project) was so central to the IPAP,
17
 especially compared to the other 
biofuels projects that are “on the cards”. “We hadn’t even been thinking about it”. 
The Department of Trade and Industry does, however, have a close connection to the 
PhytoEnergy project, and would of course be interested in seeing it come to fruition. 
They have already provided close to €2million in support for the project (provided 
through offset funding from the highly controversial arms deal according to internal 
DTI documents), even though it has not been spent in ways they would prefer. This 
takes us to the second area in which the canola Project of PhytoEnergy finds itself 
within a close interplay with government; the refinery side.  
 
For a country that has had so much hype steeped towards its potential ability to 
produce biofuels, and a proliferation of proposed refineries, the actual establishment 
of any such refineries has been lacklustre in South Africa, and PhytoEnergy have 
been no stranger to continual delays. As it is not central to the thesis, I will not 
extend on the details. It is, however, worth noting that even with massive support 
from the DTI, PhytoEnergy have squandered time and money in first trying to 
establish a refinery in the East London industrial development zone, which, when 
turned down for unclear reasons, then moved to Port Elizabeth. This relocation adds 
an extra 300km to any logistics, no small addition when transporting feedstock 
across very testing landscapes, while also making a range of costly feasibility studies 
null and void. Internal documents of the DTI, for example, suggest major challenges 
with the financial arrangements in the proposal stages of the project and limited 
reports of successful planting, yet the underlying narrative is the currency through 
which policy rhetoric is traded. As an informant involved in drafting provincial 
renewable energy strategies suggested:  
But then, one of the other things we have is an interest in the 
biofuels. We have the big PhytoEnergy project, a biodiesel 
project. So the province started seeing that we are doing this so 
they gave me budget to develop the energy strategy and we are 
rolling that out now (Independent consultant, EL-IDZ, 2010). 
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 It is also worth pointing out that no mention is made of the two ethanol based projects, which are 





Figure 6: Influences and streams in the Eastern Cape’s policy process 
 
This brief excursion into the dynamics of the actual development of the PhytoEnergy 
project again reveals a situation dominated by important interfaces between 
“policymakers” and policy entrepreneurs and the narratives they share. However, 
issues such as those described have created tensions in the wider support of the 
PhytoEnergy project and led to doubts by original supporters within the government. 
Even members of the IDC, the theoretical industrial champions for biofuels, have 
been critical of the proposed biodiesel project. Again, there are questions of the 
reality of rural restructuring that is achievable, at least when driven by agro-industrial 
imaginaries that dominated the biofuels proposals. The “reality” in the Eastern Cape 
is complex, multi-faceted and well-beyond the models describing input and output 
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meanwhile, narratives continue and governments overwhelming logic is one of 
continual support and certain success. It is not the point of this thesis to argue these 
are wrong or right. That they have driven planning around biofuels in the Eastern 
Cape is far more important. So too is that these narratives have been fashioned by 
close networks of similar mindsets. 
CRADOCK’S BITTERSWEET SUCCESS? 
Cradock is a politically significant town in South Africa. Its history is one in which 
four members of the ANC were abducted and later killed in 1985. It is also a biofuels 
‘hotspot’. There is specific mention of Cradock in the biofuels policy proposals of 
the Eastern Cape. The links are clear in that Roake Crew, the general manager of 
Sugar Beet RSA—the original proponents of the Cradock sugar beet ‘sugar’ 
proposals—originally worked at the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture. When 
the provincial biofuels strategy was being developed, Sugar Beet RSA was (and 
remains) wholly owned by the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture. This 
institutional linkage made Sugar Beet RSA an immediate candidate to be the 
‘umbrella agency’ for biofuels. As the ‘draft’ provincial strategy suggests (Anon 
2007, p.9):  
This body could be Sugar Beet RSA (Pty) Ltd which is one hundred per 
cent government owned, has a Board of Directors appointed by the MEC 
for Agriculture and Chaired by Mr. Sipho Pityana, is already operational 
and active in the bio-fuels industry, has an ownership and development 
model for the sugar beet industry which will promote employment equity, 
BEE in respect of ownership of the processing facility and support 
industries, part ownership of the facility by raw material suppliers, the 
development of up and coming producers of raw material and the 
establishment of commercial black farmers through land redistribution.  
The political support for the Cradock Project has, however, waxed and waned in the 
Eastern Cape. While Asgisa-EC could see great potential in a 500,000 hectare 
biofuels haven (see above), the original plans of the Cradock plant had very little to 
do with anywhere (or anyone) other than Cradock (i.e. it was to be a localised project 
with nowhere near the political leverage something like canola throughout the 
Eastern Cape would garner). Of more interest to this thesis, is that Cradock was 
engaged in a different network as PhytoEnergy, or at least, the network coalescing 




level in important ways. It would thus become embedded (somewhat luckily) within 
national policymaking, far more than the canola project. 
 
I have provided an extended background to the Cradock case study in Appendix D 
but to recapitulate, the current sugar beet-to-ethanol project (which is actually for the 
time being a grain sorghum-based project) was proposed after an unsuccessful 
attempt at marketing sugar from sugar beet. Originally conceived, the project was 
established by the Eastern Cape Agricultural Cooperative (ECAC), as a new crop for 
the Fish River irrigation system. The original plans for sugar were not viable and 
thus the project collapsed. It was then revived as a bioethanol project. Major players 
(see Figure 6) involved in the project included the Eastern Cape Department of 
Agriculture (who bought out the ECAC), CEF and the IDC (see description above), 
some private investors—who have since pulled out of the project— and PGBI who 
were contracted as project managers and later dismissed. The IDC has since taken 
over as the dominant shareholder. The path followed has not gone smoothly and it 
has been hampered with continual delays. According to recent news reports (and my 
own interviews in the field) the project remains shrouded in secrecy, with increasing 
tensions in the community and facing host of challenges in the new land reform 
scheme that has been proposed for the project. This mentor-based land reform 
programme has been led through increasing support from the national Department of 
Rural Development and Land Affairs and presents its own challenges for 
policymaking in South Africa, not least of which is the direction the biofuels policy 
may end up taking in the future. Nevertheless, the potential benefits through land 
reform have been a useful selling point for the project and highlights a recent but 
fortuitous shift in political support. (Gugile Nkwinti, the MEC for Agriculture in 
Eastern Cape from 2005-2009, has been an early supporter of the Cradock project 
and was moved to the national Department of Rural Development and Land Reform; 
he appears to be continuing the support from this new position.) What is of most 
concern in this chapter, however, is the role Cradock has played in the early 





Securing a Market and Policy in Action 
When PGBI took over the project management of the Cradock bioethanol project 
(essentially from the Bankability Phases) there were two main activities proposed, 
both being corollaries of creating a market. The first would be to establish off-take 
agreements with the existing petrol companies (see Appendix E). In this process, the 
PGBI encountered challenges much the same that the policymakers at national level 
have encountered; the petrol industry in South Africa was, to large extent, not in 
support of a biofuels industry and government has been especially hesitant to coerce 
them. Although formerly not ‘against’ the idea of a biofuels industry (SAPIA 2009), 
informally South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) has been in quiet 
opposition to biofuels. (Members of the national Biofuels Task Team were adamant 
that SAPIA and individual fuel companies were actually strongly opposed to 
introducing biofuels, which the experiences of PGBI not being able to secure off-take 
agreements with fuel companies seem to confirm.) In the early stages of the project 
proposal, lengthy consultation between the fuel companies and the PGBI had lead to 
some off-take arrangements being concluded although this only amounted to roughly 
fifty per cent of the proposed ethanol production from Cradock.
18
 Despite securing at 
least some off-take, at this point the IDC dismissed the PGBI as project managers 
(although not for reasons relating to limited success in securing off-take).  
 
The second, which appears to be the only way the first will work (given that only 
fifty per cent of off-take was secured), is to assist in promulgating legislation that 
specifies a blending mandate (although this was neither the job of PGBI nor the 
Cradock project alone). This would ultimately force major refiners to blend biofuels 
and in effect secure a market for biofuels producers.
19
 This process was still in 
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 Interestingly, the Central Energy Fund, which owns Petro-SA (South Africa’s national oil company 
that, according to their website, pride themselves on producing high-quality eco-friendly products 
(PetroSA 2012)) also struggled to secure adequate off-take even though they own the refinery. 
Clearly, there are competing and contrasting interests here. It is perhaps worth adding that ARDA 
(formerly Sugar Beet RSA) has also suggested that blending will be handled by a new refinery 
being built at Coega, despite continued delays by government in deciding whether it will go 
ahead (National Planning Commission 2011c) and numerous logical reasons why it probably 
should not (Wakeford 2012).  
19
 Although ambiguous in its first draft, the draft mandatory blending requirements released in 2011 
include sourcing biofuels domestically and thus ensure uptake for local producers. The draft 
regulations specify, for example, that “a licensee may only purchase biofuels from a licensed 




consultation (in 2012), however, with recent draft legislation on clean fuel 
specifications, it appears that oil companies may have to shift their support towards 
biofuels. Ethanol is an effective octane enhancer, which the fuel companies will 




Two areas of importance need to be outlined from the above. On the one hand, there 
is a clear link forged between the IDC and the Biofuels Task Team by the need for 
promulgated mandatory blending (to ensure the project has a market). This is the 
dynamics at the policy level and the specific area of interest to my thesis. Another 
level, which remains one of importance but apparently all together ignored in current 
policy frameworks, is governance at the project level. The dismissal of PGBI and 
discussions with a few stakeholders has raised concerns about governance and due 
diligence processes at the project level. Here the IDC, as a majority shareholder has 
been “calling the shots” according to one insider, although there is uncertainty as to 
whether those shots have been “by the book”.
21
 I shall not indulge the latter any 
further at this stage, as it is contentious and would be conjecture. I shall, however, 
indulge the policy aspects.  
 
According to an employee of ARDA (the new name of Sugar Beet RSA),
22
 in the 
bigger picture, the Cradock project was a relative unknown until the IDC, along with 
some Brazilian representatives, visited the project and showed some interest. 
                                                                                                                                          
pages of extremely thin details, no discussion is made of what happens when there is not 
sufficient feedstock within the country and whether importing fuel will then be allowed. 
Importantly, there is a clear indication that these draft mandatory regulations are very much 
biased towards securing the markets for (forthcoming) producers rather than detailing the full 
implications and processes, which such blending will incur.  
20
 At least this is the view taken by Sugar Beet RSA and some of the other biofuels producers. 
Interviews with SAPIA have actually suggested that ethanol is not the only solution to meeting 
clean fuel standards per se, and is certainly not as definite as some of the biofuels producers are 
considering (SAPIA interview, 2010). While being contentious in current deliberations, what is 
more important is how mandatory blending and indeed early proposals for biofuels were based on 
the needs for a market, not just of Cradock but also of the entire biofuels imaginary.  
21
As one respondent suggested, when the IDC through Noel Kamraj provided all the seed monies for 
the joint venture, obtaining approximately 46% [unsubstantiated as yet], they became the major 
rather than majority shareholder. The IDC bankrolled the project while CEF and Sugar Beet RSA 
were still sourcing funds. Eventually the IDC said “pay your money or leave and CEF got 
chucked out”. The agreement apparently also puts the Department (who funds Sugar Beet RSA) 
at risk, as they are still part of the agreement and liable for expenses owed.  
22
 ARDA has been described as the new name of Sugar Beet RSA (Somlotha 2011) and as a co-





Without the right legislation, the project would fail in much the same way its 
predecessor did. However, the relationships required to achieve this would be 
challenging at two levels. First, Sugar Beet RSA would have to continually work on 
maintaining political support at the provincial level (even being wholly owned by the 
ECDALA their funding was subject to political discretion), while the IDC working in 
partnership with CEF would do the same at the national level within the Biofuels 
Task Team (and with international players too).  
 
When it comes to the project-policy interface at provincial level, there is, for 
example, an interesting contradiction emanating from an interview with a main 
member of Sugar Beet RSA. On the one hand, he suggests that what they have been 
doing is “lying low” and hoping they manage to “stay of the radar long enough to get 
some real work done” (SBRSA Member A, 2011). The meaning here being that 
when new politicians enter the picture they are able to decide on the fate of projects 
without much effort or understanding. Certainly, perceptions in Sugar Beet RSA 
were that that the minister—Ms Zoleka Capa—taking over from Mr Nkwinti, was 
less supportive of the mentoring programme that was proposed for the project, 
however, has (finally) expressed that the farming operations of the core estate will be 
managed by the Department (Capa 2012). Similarly, this member of SBRSA was 
critical of how the current biofuels policy confuses the role of government and that 
government tries to do too much rather than allowing business to play its own role. 
He suggests: 
If they [business] want to support a processing facility in Coega, 
let them, as long as they meet the environmental requirements 
and stuff, let [them]. [The project] has to find a market for [its] 
product, not [government]. [The project] has to find investment 
money, not [government]. And [the project] has to find [its] raw 
material, not [government] (SBRSA Member A, 2011).  
By this though, he does not dispute the role of government entirely, rather he 
suggests: 
[Government] have to be looking at making [the project] 
profitable and to make [it] profitable you need to look at the 
piece of ground in front of you and say what can I do that’s to the 




In essence, as long as government facilitates the project, as the project manager’s 
conceive it, there is no problem. (On the one hand, government needs to step back 
and let businesses do what they do best, but at the same time, government needs to 
make them profitable). The contradiction, however, is that staying ‘off the radar’ is 
exactly the opposite of what Sugar Beet RSA (and the IDC) has done. Or rather, they 
have attempted to surface on certain radars and not others. That is, they have looked 
for support in different networks within ‘government’, but have succumbed to 
challenges in which the ‘government’ has looked at the land in front of it and decided 
it may actually wish to do different things. The problem here also being that while 
the ‘government’ might be considered as a single, rational actor
23
 (guided by policy) 
it is equally “an array of disconnected specialisations and an arena of rivalry” 
(Colebatch 2009a). While Sugar Beet RSA has certainly informed and been 
prioritised within the early provincial biofuels policy proposals, support has not been 
ubiquitous or continuous. Nevertheless, the important point is that they have initially 
played a central role at provincial level, through close alliances with the Department 
of Agriculture, who at the time had a very similar perspective of how biofuels were 
to be pursued. (Little wonder that bioenergy projects and proposals do not seem to 
have garnered any support in the province.)  
 
Government and its policymaking apparatus is not one monolithic entity but is also 
comprised of multiple interests, internal networks and pathways (including political 
gatekeepers and parallel lines of authority) through which policy ‘happens’ and 
decisions are made. A major challenge in trying to examine and identify these is that 
they are dynamic and change with time. Sugar Beet RSA and the IDC are then one of 
many projects and vested interests, the influence and support of which is equally 
unstable and fluctuating. Yet such a situation needs to be problematised in 
connection with early national processes too; processes that the Cradock project had 
an apparently significant and yet partially redundant influence (considering decisions 
taken have not gone in their favour in the short term).  
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 For example, as Stone (1988) highlights in terms of the ‘rationality project’, the governmental 





The Bankability Study for the alternative sugar mill and the Prefeasibility Study for 
the ethanol plant highlight the prevailing barrier to bioethanol (and sugar) production 
in Cradock is a lack of any markets for the final products. Reflecting on Roake’s 
response above, the issue is that the way the project has found a market is through 
rather than separate to government. The ability to do so comes through the IDC and, 
at that stage, the CEF, being willing to take a more active role in creating that 
market. It is here where the most identifiable connection to policy is found but 
neither policy, nor practice quite reflects the other but are perhaps better considered a 
function of co-production or ‘co-evolution’ when regarding policymaking as a 
complex adaptive system (Sumner & Tiwari 2009). That is, there is a complex inter-
working between the two, from which policy emerges. The crucial link, however, is 
the IDC. Its plans both before government promulgated the final national Strategy 
and in the continuing negotiations around mandatory blending mentioned above.  
 
Other potential players in the biofuels industry, the sugar industry for example, were 
not particularly interested in supporting any biofuels development until they had 
been given clear indications of what the policy was going to say. (Investors were 
looking for surety or rather waiting to see if government would make money 
available rather than putting money upfront themselves; its ‘good business’.) The 
IDC and CEF (and a few other key players – see next Chapter) were weary of this 
and through their networks took a more proactive approach. As one interviewee 
suggested:  
So the IDC said what do you think the policy should be? So we 
had lots of discussions. The IDC, sent [these] back into [the] 
parliamentary committee unbeknown to us, and, [when] the 
policy came out, we looked at it and said this is what we gave the 
IDC (Consultant F, 2012).  
Others have been more upfront (in fact quite proud) that the IDC and CEF took over 
the drafting of the National Strategy. One respondent from the IDC reflected: 
Let me tell you about Noel. He is very passionate about this 
project… He will tell you “I contributed to that strategy, I wrote 
that strategy”, which is true! (IDC official A, 2012).  




[Interviewer]  There has been some suggestion that the IDC and CEF 
wrote the strategy that was passed through the BTT. 
[Respondent] Well that’s because they did, and Noel was especially 
passionate about Cradock by that stage. (SBRSA 
Member C, 2011)  
 
Such quotes suggest that the IDC and their partnership with CEF had far greater 
influence over proceedings within the BTT than I had originally expected. (I later 
came across internal documents from the CEF suggesting it was their role to sort out 
the policy – described in the next chapter). This does, however, need to be contrasted 
with the empirical narrative of the following chapters that indicate far more 
influences than just those around Cradock (and a more nuanced affair between the 
IDC, CEF and Biofuels Task Team). The important point is that through the 
requirements of its Cradock project, the IDC was calling for very similar policy 
criteria as the other projects and had access to the BTT, allowing it to be a far more 
influential policy ‘entrepreneur’. This should not be considered a one sided affair, 
however, as both the above respondents and others have suggested. A former 
Director General involved in the BTT processes before the release of the final 
Strategy suggested in an interview, for example: 
 
[Interviewer] Yes, from the Task Team members I have spoken to it 
seems like there was a number of these debates [interest-
based debates emanating from particular departments, 
such as Water Affairs arguing there is insufficient water 
available] it would have been nice to be the fly on the 
wall. 
[Respondent] Correct, and the Department of Science and 
Technology’s main interest was more in the energy crops 
that were not food crops, the second generation, like 
algae etc., which for the other people it wasn’t about that, 
it was about the sugar beets, the stuff, the crops that are 
being grown today. 
[Interviewer] With mentioning sugar beet, the projects that are on the 
go at the time of the strategy, well the proposed projects, 
what kind of influence do existing proposals around 
biofuels projects have on policy, is there a direct link or is 




[Respondent] Well, whatever we do in policy has to have a semblance 
of reality and that reality is brought to bear by people 
with experience and things. For instance the sugar beet 
things that were going on in [Eastern Cape], pilots or 
whatever, yes that had a direct influence on policy, for 
instance even with maize, they use maize, we are growing 
in the country … we have so much excess with price 
volatility etc. etc. … it was based on practical 
information.(Former BTT Chairperson C, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, biofuels as a new development option resonated with existing or 
emerging government interests and this was not only recognised by policy-makers 
(who would draw on such themes as supporting their strategy) but by project 
managers and proponents.  
“At the same time government policy on the green economy and 
carbon footprint and all this kind of thing was becoming the buzz 
word so [the Cradock project’s shift to ethanol] slotted in 
perfectly with the government’s strategy of renewable fuels and 
green revolution.”
24
 (ECDALA Official A, 2011) 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided some background to the types of biofuels projects in 
Africa, Southern Africa and South Africa. Whereas potential exists for benefits to 
accrue within the rural economy, this does not automatically translate into rural 
development and there are different approaches that can be taken. Each type involves 
tradeoffs, and these need to be accommodated by policymakers. However, there is 
also the situation in which existing projects have far more influence on policymaking 
and the direction policymakers move towards, which also has to be considered. It is 
this latter point that the bulk of this chapter has focussed on.  
 
The importance of such an emphasis—that policy and projects co-evolve—informs 
wider debates about betterment planning in the Eastern Cape. While there has been 
much critique of the plans that have been made, there is little emphasis on how such 
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 It is for the above reason that, the respondent suggested the Department of Agriculture, through the 




planning actually occurs. Although biofuels present new potentials, the rationales of 
‘development’ have remained very similar, and, as I have illustrated, a large part of 
the reason why has to do with the project-policy interface being so porous. So too are 
the networks involved in such planning and the information flowing within them. 
The assumption of 500,000 hectares of available land is a case in point. This land has 
always been ‘available’ but that makes it neither ‘vacant’, nor ‘open to development’ 
though that part of the story is excluded from the narrative. Therefore, while I have 
suggested an agreement with others that betterment planning may be problematic in 
its logic, there is far more need to think not about the content of the planning but who 
and how such planning occurs.  
 
Similarly, if one looks at projects judged to be of most benefit to existing rural 
political economies of small-scale agriculture in Africa—that the Eastern Cape 
resembles closely—the South African proposals depart from these with an 
overwhelming focus on larger-scale agro-industrial projects. Such approaches to 
agricultural reform are likely to reinforce an existing ‘duality’ in South African 
agriculture (Van Zyl et al. 2001; Hall, 2009), which has limited benefits for small-
scale farmers, whilst also substituting capital for labour. Such approaches are 
unlikely to achieve the explicit development objectives proposed by the Strategy in 
the first place but show the inertia that these modes of production have maintained 
through the policy’s development. The challenge is that, if we are to subscribe to the 
allegory of the dichotomous ‘second’ economy, complexity is a given but strategies 
are not built on complexity and rather work towards its simplification. In the new so-
called biofuels hotspot of the Eastern Cape, for example, a long historical failure of 
industrial farming should itself be a major indicator that entirely different approaches 
need to be taken (GRAIN 2008; Mayet 2008; Sugrue & Douthwaite 2007; Cf. 
Ferguson 1990, Burgess 2011).  
 
Importantly, during the provincial policy’s development, there was limited potential 
to include diverse or novel perspectives, although there was nonetheless some 
political disagreement. A dominant issue in the Province was the food-versus-fuel 
debate, although within the Eastern Cape this was more of an internal squabble (the 




ECDALA and other government representatives, the views expressed by the ad hoc 
task team represent a similar approach as the ‘economistic’ perspective I will 
describe in later chapters. That is, biofuels presents a new, untapped market for 
producers, and by allowing them to earn money, it provides greater food security. 
The logic is not entirely incorrect—it makes sense—but it also neglects contextual 
issues. At the very least, agricultural development already faces a number of 
institutional and capacity challenges, especially in more remote areas like the Eastern 
Cape (see Greenberg, 2010), so it is unclear how this would improve in the case of 
biofuels. The provincial Department of Agriculture appears, however, to maintain a 
‘Green Revolution’ culture and when programmes fail, it is ascribed to lack of 
technical expertise or training, capacity, or the market, rather than perhaps being 
incompatible from the outset. A recent edition in a string of such programmes is the 
Massive Food Production Programme, which has been critically assessed and 
described more as a disappointment (GRAIN, 2008; Nilsson & Karlsson, 2008; 
African Centre for Biosafety, 2008). The latest approach in the Eastern Cape—the 
Integrated Cropping and Biofuel Development Programme—takes a more specific 
biofuels focus. No available impact assessments were available at the time of 
writing, however, in addition to existing challenges, complicated land tenure issues 
are likely to arise as much of the land is traditional or communal land, providing at 
least some important livelihood assets for locals (Hajdu, 2006; Mayet, 2008). Large-
scale agriculture in these areas is likely to create indentured labour and 
introduce/exacerbate inequalities between farm owners or local elites and those 
already living in poverty, more than empowering local citizens. Furthermore, for 
industrial biofuels production, producers are unlikely to sign off-take agreements and 
rely on small-scale farmers so they may be marginalised in a concentrated agro-
industrial chain (Cf. Maxwell and Slater 2003).  
 
The importance of the above discussion will be raised again in later critiques of the 
biofuels policy’s objectives of rural development, but also serves as a precursor or 
initial illustration to the way such projects and their proponents have informed the 
biofuels policy’s trajectory, rather than awaiting or reacting to policy outcomes as is 
often claimed or assumed to be the case. The dynamics are, of course, far more 




institutional environment to support biofuels exists in many developing countries 
(Kojima & Johnson 2005) but is this relationship so simple and static? 
Implementation is inscribed within prevailing local operational paradigms and 
counterpart global commodity chains while existing practices (whether real or 
hypothetical) have an important bearing on policy development. To interrogate this 
idea of complexity further, the Eastern Cape provincial strategy serves as an example 
in which there have been mutual interests shared between project managers (the 
PhytoEnergy project and Sugar Beet RSA) and policymakers. These networks have 
(re)fashioned local narratives, though remain quite abstract, and legitimised ‘new’ 
government programmes in place of old ones, although actual processes and 
underlying rationales have remained very similar; only the numbers have changed. It 
is here that discourses of development are important and remain distorted in the 
Eastern Cape; that these so easily merge with international biofuels narrative only 
reinforces or accentuates the distortion. Though, according to Foucault, power is 
everywhere and can take the form of resistance and change as much as it can of 
oppression, it appears that in the Eastern Cape any such resistance has not been 
sufficient to redirect what appears to be hegemonic prescriptions of ‘the way things 
need to happen’.  
 
Brushing much of these intricacies aside, at the provincial level the policy has been 
eclipsed by national processes. By this, canola and biodiesel have been somewhat 
sidelined, or at least were so during the national strategy’s development (see next 
chapter). The same is not true, however, of bioethanol and the Cradock project. 
Although they have had as many delays over the past few years, they have had an 
insider track within the national policy’s development. That the policy turned its 
back on these players is important, but perhaps only temporary. This controversial 
trajectory in the development of the strategy is the focus for the next three chapters 





CHAPTER 5: THE BIOFUELS INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY OF SOUTH AFRICA - 
AN EMPIRICAL NARRATIVE OF ITS GENESIS 
In the introductory chapter, it was mentioned that policies are developed in the face 
of existing operations and institutional configurations in government. Furthermore, 
Walker et al. (2009), highlights biofuels as one of the global-scale challenges that are 
outpacing the development of institutions to deal with them and their many 
interactive effects (see also Lima and Gupta, 2013). The speed at which the 
establishment of biofuels schemes takes place can be particularly damaging to the 
poor (Clancy 2008), so interrogating the development of such ‘enabling frameworks’ 
becomes important and an on-going concern. As Mosse (2004, p.664) further 
suggests ‘policy is part of the context of action’, but not the start of it, as is often 
assumed. Rather, policy is part of a wider political-institutional process of action and 
more often than not follows or represents practice, rather than precedes or guides it 
(Mosse, 2004; see Chapter 4). Much of the intent of this thesis is describing this 
context of action. In the first section of this chapter, I extend on the idea of what I 
call a ‘normalised’ synopsis of the biofuels policy in the introductory chapter. This is 
the summary provided by existing reviews of the South African strategy. At its most 
succinct, the decision emanates from Cabinet in 2005, a draft Strategy is released in 
2006 and the final Strategy, which excludes maize and jatropha, is promulgated in 
2007, much to the dismay of the biofuels industry. A far more complex story of 
policy-making processes in South Africa, challenges this extreme simplification of 
events, which is the focus of the remaining empirical chapters.
1
 Although a useful 
starting point, the Cabinet’s decision even to pursue biofuels in 2005 was far 
‘messier’ than has been considered within existing reviews, and that too was the tip 
of the proverbial iceberg. 
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 In much the same way Dvora Yanow (1996) provides what she calls a realist tale—a seemingly 
objective, historical account of the development of legislation that created the Israel Corporation 
of Community Centers (IIICC)—I consider my extension on the simplified annotation of events 
in the development of the biofuels policy as a similar kind or reproductive historical narration. I 
do acknowledge, however, that this historical reproduction is authored and will include biases and 




The decision-making process has also occurred within a wider context of 
commercial-farmer lobbying, private interests and what Zahariadis (1999; see also 
Kingdon, 1984) would consider to be multiple policy streams. The previous chapter 
has already outlined a project stream at provincial level and its relationship to both 
provincial and national policymaking. In this chapter, I continue the discussion 
looking at the national level. Within government, an assortment of officials both 
political and administrative—or what Masters (2012) calls the centre of manifold 
‘concentric circles’ in policy decision-making—became involved. (The outer circles 
of her model encompass non-governmental organisations, civil society and the media 
but the importance of Masters’ work is working towards an understanding of 
‘agency’ and who is able to influence the decisions made in South Africa.) Where the 
biofuels policy differs from her study of foreign affairs is in the arbitrary boundaries 
that occur between such ‘circles’ and it is networks that allow these groups to 
transcend such boundaries to certain degrees, and equally have varying spheres of 
influence or, simply put, power within them (as Masters herself acknowledges).  
 
It has also been discussed that policies cannot be taken simply at face value and 
biofuels policies are no exception, if not in immediate need of greater scrutiny. The 
challenge is made all the more acute in South Africa, which is known for good 
policies but poor implementation (Freund 2010; Khosa 2003; Chapter 3). What such 
a dilemma means for realising the proposed benefits of biofuels is a critical concern 
but so too is the need to pry open the value-laden term ‘good policy’. The broad 
direction of the enquiry has already been described in the methodology, in which the 
policy process becomes an issue to be problematised. Following from Foucault, 
problematisation in this sense is both a “kind of general historical and social 
situation—saturated with power relations…imbued with relational play of true and 
false…as well as the nexus of solutions to that situation” (Rabinow, 2005, 139). The 
primary task of the analyst is not to “proceed directly toward intervention and repair 
of the situations discordance but rather to understand and to put forth a diagnosis of 
what makes these responses simultaneously possible” (ibid., 138). In other words, it 
is about questioning the status quo such that “what is understood to be normal 
becomes problematic” (Colebatch & Gill 2006, p.255). As a central theme of the 




assumptions), I again flag the issue of rural development and the caricatured outline 
of the process, only in anticipation of more detailed discussion later. For now, it is 
important to provide a synopsis of the Strategy itself, which in effect is to provide the 
brief sketching of the situation of discordance I am aiming for here. I will then begin 
the empirical narrative of the national Strategy. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN BIOFUELS POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE – A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF 
THE POLICY’S DEVELOPMENT 
Although some authors (e.g. Jumbe et al. 2009) commended the South African 
government on promulgating a policy, when other African countries had failed to do 
so, others (both popular and academic) in South Africa have not shown similar 
optimism. The difference of opinion varies between sectors or ideological 
preferences; civil society groups, for example, have dismissed the biofuels policy as 
agribusiness propaganda writ large and doomed to fail the poor and vulnerable 
(African Centre for Biosafety 2008). Others have criticised the rigour of the process. 
As the draft Strategy states that a consultation phase was supposed to finalise the 
draft Strategy, many felt another phase of consultations would occur before 
finalising the final Strategy; it never happened casting an early doubt on the process. 
Others were critical of its potential to establish an industry (Makanete & Kupka 
2007; South African Biofuels Association 2007). The exclusion of maize and 
jatropha as feedstock in the final Strategy also received critical appraisal. The maize 
fraternity
2
 especially resented the restriction as they were relying on a lucrative 
ethanol market to stabilise their markets.  
 
It should therefore be seen that, despite some enthusiasm, the South African policy is 
highly problematic. It should also be recognised that even the more in-depth reviews 
tend to challenge the content of the strategy, rather than dissecting and analysing its 
formative period. One also needs to reflect on the historical context when trying to 
understand the policy’s development. Any focus on ethanol for fuel during apartheid, 
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 Maize farmers (represented as Grain Alcohol Investments) invested R24million with Sterling 
Waterford (through Ethanol Africa) providing another R408million (African Centre for Biosafety, 
2008). Construction was halted after maize was excluded, taking a ‘wait and see’ approach. Now 




for example, would have been eclipsed by alternative synthetic fuels derived from 
coal and gas (Blanchard et al. 2011; see Appendix E), which still provide up to 35 
per cent of South Africa’s transport fuel supply. This makes support for biofuels less 
important in energy-security terms than it would in other countries (Pradhan and 
Ruysenaar, forthcoming). There has also been state supported research into biodiesel 
since the late 90s, however, as one National Department of Agriculture official has 
lamented, “back then it was not sexy to be doing biofuels”, and largely this research 
was not considered sufficient to catalyse a policy process around biofuels. The on-
farm production of biofuels, essentially biodiesel for on-farm machinery, has also 
had some attention but remains financially unviable according to recent studies 
(KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture, Environmental Affairs and Rural 
Development 2010).  
 
What changes this relatively bleak outlook on biofuels I shall discuss later but the 
early history is also reflected by a range of laws directed towards the use of biofuels, 
especially as part of a wider renewable energy target proposed in the Renewable 
Energy White Paper (2003). Even though it was in 2007 that the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME) and the Cabinet promulgated the final Industrial 
Biofuels Strategy, the formal policy process was set in motion much earlier and has 
been directed within a wider political and legal context. A wide arrangement of 
policies and research programmes predating and guiding the formal development are 
provided in Table 3, which highlight subtle and sometimes drastic shifts in the 
preference towards biofuels and renewable energy.  
 
Table 3: Major events and technical details of the BISSA (information here is 
gathered from the following sources, amongst others; Wilson & McDaid 
(2007); African Centre for Biosafety (2008); Haywood et al. (2009). 
Relevant policies and Milestones Date 
The Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (Act No 43 of 1983 as 
amended): 
Jatropha rejected as a feedstock in the final Strategy due to concerns of 
its invasive potential within the country, which this Act oversees. 
1983 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No 108 of 1996): 
Government must establish a national energy policy to ensure that 
national energy resources are adequately tapped and delivered to cater 





White Paper on Energy: 
Sets out the national energy policy with alternative fuels and a 
diversified energy supply mix acknowledged. 
1998 
White Paper on the Promotion of Renewable Energy and Clean Energy. 
Part one: Promotion of Renewable Energy 
Essentially a forerunner (verbatim copy) of the later White Paper on 
Renewable Energy (2003). Also highlights the need for a Clean Energy 
Strategy, which is fulfilled by the Integrated Clean Household Energy 
Strategy (2004) 
August 2002 
Integrated Energy Plan: 
Highlights the need to expand coal- and gas-to-liquid transport fuels 
(synfuels) and introduce policy, legislation and regulation for the 
promotion of renewable energy. The plan is devoid of any mention of 
biofuels; however, biomass energy is highlighted as an important 
renewable energy source in terms of fuel wood. Biofuels were perhaps 
one of the aspects missed due time constraints highlighted within the 
document. 
March 2003 
White Paper on Renewable Energy: 
Set provisions for renewable energy targets (10000GW by 2013) in 
South Africa, which would include those from biomass. 
November 
2003 
Integrated Clean Household Energy Strategy: 
Highlights the potential for alternative fuels as a household energy 
source, however, remains predominantly focussed on clean cook stoves 
such as through the Basa Njengo-Magogo programme. Although 
planned in three phases, the second of which looking into low-emission 
alternative fuels, no evidence for this programme’s continuance has 
been found.  
February 
2004 
National Treasury programmes: 
Fuel Levy Exemption for biodiesel (30% from 2003) increased to 40% 
from 2005. 
South African Revenue Services allows 100% exemption for producers 
of biodiesel less than 300m
3
 annually.  
Renewable Energy Subsidy Scheme with Input Tariffs compiled. 
(These would undergo a range of changes. The Renewable Energy 
Input Tariffs of 2009 are administered through the National Energy 




The Petroleum Products Amendment Act (Act No 58): 
Provided a basis for replacing of fossil-derived petroleum with 
sustainable alternatives and provided for licensing of fuel products 
derived from biomass (subject to further amendments below). 
2003  
Energy Efficiency Strategy 
A programme supported by the Capacity Building Project in Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy and partially funded by the Danish 
International Development Agency. The first phase (2004 – 2007) 
focused on public buildings and industry, while the next phase would 
address the transport and residential sectors. At the time, possible 
interventions under Phase 2 for the transport sector included vehicle 





moving freight from road to rail. 
Strategy for Renewable Energy: 
Builds on the White Paper on Renewable Energy and sets out the 
means by which the national objectives on renewable energy will be 
implemented. 
2005 
The Cabinet establishes a Biofuels Task Team with Department of 
Minerals and Energy as lead. 
2005 
Integrated Energy Plan II: 
This plan incorporates RE into the national energy budget. In terms of 
liquid fuels the plan calls for refineries to increase their capacity and for 
finished product to be imported to meet any shortfall in domestic 
production. The plan points to the limited options for the provision of 
liquid fuels for South Africa, and states that biodiesel production will 
have a marginal effect on the plan, replacing at most 1-2% of diesel 
production by 2020.  
2005 
The Petroleum Products Amendment (2 of 2005) provides a basis for 
fuels developed from vegetable matter.  
Jun 2005 
The Cabinet announces it intends developing a Biofuels Industry 
Strategy (Cabinet Memo (14 of 2005).) 
Dec 2005 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) flags biofuels as 
one of the sectors to propel the country to a 6% growth rate. Biofuels 
with other industries that are considered labour intensive, rapidly 
growing sectors worldwide, suited to South African circumstances, and 
open to opportunities for Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) and small business development are prioritised. 
Feb 2006 
Publication of Petroleum Products Amendment Act: 
In addition to those earlier, this amendment provided specific standards 
for biodiesel and bioethanol (these are undergoing further amendment) 
23 Jun 2006 
Biodiesel declared taxable by South African Revenue Services. 15 Apr 2006 
National biodiesel standards published by DME. 23 Jun 2006 
DME release draft National Biofuels Industry Strategy. Dec 2006 
DME announces dates for feedback workshops on draft Strategy. 9 Feb 2007 
National Biofuels Workshop for Society Groups in Johannesburg. 26 Feb 2007 
Biofuels Conference at Stellenbosch University. 7 Mar 2007 
Final Strategy Accepted by the Cabinet. Dec 2007 
Draft  








Technical details of the Industrial Biofuels Strategy 
Draft Strategy Final Strategy 
• Crops: No specific outline; Surplus 
maize and sugarcane are a key focus. 
• Target of 4.5% (signalling mandatory 
• Crops: Sugarcane, sugar beet, sunflower, 





blending) biofuels (E8 and B2 ratios) in 
the national liquid fuels mix by 2013. 
• A system of subsidies and taxes linked 
to the oil price. These were calculated to 
ensure biofuels remained economically 
viable, supporting producers in case of 
lower oil prices in the future, while 
taxing them on a sliding scale to avoid 
excessive profits. 
• Seventy-five per cent national 
renewable energy target of 10000GWh 
by 2013. 
• The feasibility scenario results in 
55,000 jobs being created (using existing 
commercial farming employment 
intensity for the crops considered), 
reducing unemployment by 1.3 % and 
being largely focussed in rural areas; 
economic growth of 0.12 %, or 6 % of 
the ASGISA targeted increase from 4 to 
6%; an average balance of payments 
saving of R 3.7 billion; and a greenhouse 
gas emission saving of the order of R100 
million pa. 
• Up to 400 million litres of agrofuels in 
national liquid fuel supply per annum = 2% 
of the total consumption. 
• Total national average blending ratios of 
8% ethanol (E8) in petrol and 2% biodiesel 
(B2) in diesel (which, despite the total 
reduction, remains the same ratios as in the 
draft Strategy but area specific). 
• No mandatory blending required but off-
take agreements necessary. 
• 50% fuel levy exemption for biodiesel. 
• 100% fuel levy exemption for ethanol (to 
ensure fairness in gel fuel market – 
illuminating paraffin also has a 100% 
exemption). 
• A fixed margin price of R4.20 per litre for 
ethanol and R4.88/litre for biodiesel to 
guarantee producers a return on investment. 
• Biodiesel plants producing less than 
1.2million litres per annum are exempt from 
fuel tax. 
• Biofuel manufacturing plants must be 
licensed to operate for products to qualify 
for tax exemptions – licenses will only be 
issued to projects located and procuring 
feedstock from former homeland or 
previously disadvantaged farmers.  
 
Having outlined the ‘normalised’ description of the policy in a little more detail, my 
aim in the next section to tease out the early motivations, key agents and agencies 
and the path dependence and trajectories of the policy’s genesis and match this with 
the context described in the previous chapters (and the Appendices). I will focus 
especially on early aspirations as revealed by a technical review and an emerging 
‘jobs’ narratives and highlight where they have emerged from and why. More so, I 
will reflect on the main stakeholders involved in the biofuels policy subsystem in its 
early form up until the establishment of the Biofuels Task Team and the beginning of 
evidence gathering for the policy development, which is the subject of the next 
chapter. Taken together this chapter and the following two are an exercise in 
mapping out what has happened—the biofuels policy problematique—providing 
some interpretation of why it happened and, reflecting back on the contextual 
discussion of Chapter 1&3 (see also Appendix E), what it might mean from a 




A FOCUS ON AGENDA SETTING: MULTIPLE ISSUES; MULTIPLE NETWORKS; 
NOBODY KNOWS 
In linear conceptions of policymaking, the early stages are categorised as an agenda-
setting phase, yet there is some difficulty in explaining how things come to be part of 
the agenda in the first place. In this early research, I was trying to identify where the 
idea for biofuels came from, or rather, why it became a policy idea, largely framed 
around industrial biofuels approaches. The idea was to produce a genesis, that is, 
identify the origins and mode of formation of the idea of biofuels and how these were 
translated into a political issue. The importance of such a genesis, as Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984, p.7) remind us, revolves around “deciding to decide”, which in terms of 
the stages model “involves the identification and anticipation of problems or 
opportunities which suggest the need to consider action”. This deciding to decide has 
similar underpinnings as ‘problem or issue framing’ or ‘issue filtration’; though issue 
framing extends more into the political sphere and is not only about deciding what 
the problem is and how to proceed but also presenting an issue in a way that will 
likely get the most agreement from others. Rhetorical frames especially, are not 
unlike narratives in the way they define problems and propose solutions. As Rein and 
Schön (1993, p.146) highlight, such a frame is a “perspective from which an 
amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on”. 
 
To understand policymaking, such activities suggest the need to go beyond technical 
or rational conceptions of policymaking, which only consider later stages once 
decisions have been made. As has been highlighted in Chapter 2, linear conceptions 
are inadequate as problems are socially constructed and those constructions are 
saturated with power and received wisdom. Social problems and their solutions do 
not evolve into public (or political) problems as a matter of course and many never 
make it to the political stage at all. It would also be convenient to suggest that the 
South African government was influenced directly by the international hype and thus 
began pursuing biofuels but this is only partially accurate. Most reviews (see Chapter 
3) are comfortable proposing that countries see multiple benefits—the win-win 
narratives—of biofuels, which, apart from reifying these supposed benefits in doing 




international discourse and installed into local contexts.
3
 Although the discourse still 
has legitimising consequences. As Michael Hill (2005) reminds us, policy issues 
generally emerge as a confluence or continuance of existing issues on the agenda. 
Delving into such issues guides this chapter but there are two caveats that need to be 
considered first.  
 
Biofuels are particularly complex and thus, first, it must be stressed that considering 
‘biofuels’ as one agenda is myopic. There are different types of biofuels (see 
Appendix B) and each has its own history and associated implications. Indeed, it is 
questionable why bioethanol and biodiesel have been so uncomfortably couched 
within the same ‘biofuels’ strategy given the considerable differences that exist 
between them. This is perhaps a debatable point, as, from an industrial fuels 
perspective, the combination makes sense (both are linked to a wider fuels 
infrastructure and are governed as such). From other perspectives, the approach is 
problematic as biofuels cross many boundaries, spanning especially into the 
agricultural sector, where the assumptions and variables involved in biofuels 
production might be better handled individually. The argument could also be 
extended in the other direction, in that it would be better to ‘frame’ biofuels within 
broader parameters of bioenergy, as discussed in earlier chapters, or disaggregate the 
strategy according to specific activities (rural development, fuel infrastructure and 
blending, et cetera). Ultimately, the next three chapters will illustrate how the 
industrial biofuels approach has become sacrosanct, and that there has in fact been an 
underlying tension both between biodiesel and bioethanol approaches and that of the 
links between different activities. More so, shifting emphases through the 
development process reflect changing discourses and networks involved.  
 
Second, and related, there have been multiple and divergent interests involved, 
making any discussion of the policy’s development convoluted and confusing. This 
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 Initially, I too was guilty of this, as my questions had focused on origins bearing a simple association 
with the overall win-win narratives of climate-change, rural development/jobs and energy 
security, rather than interrogating the individual trajectories each of these had followed in their 
own rights. The importance is that local narratives and ambitions were in place and legitimized 
further by the panacea of ‘biofuels’. This further emphasizes the structuration arguments that can 
be made in that whilst actors may be influenced by overarching discourses, they also act to 





also creates some space for contradictory perspectives to emerge (with equally 
contradictory findings) as different people have different interpretations of what was 
happening at various stages. The dramatic flux within government, both in terms of 
massive changes politically and the ebb and flow of officials within and between 
departments, not only undermines general activities of the public administration (or 
results from existing dysfunction) but the consistency of policymaking too (see 
National Planning Commission 2011c). The Biofuels Strategy was, after all, 
“nobody’s baby” as a former DME official noted. It is for these reasons that I have 
headed this section as I have, and, in the discussion that follows, I will attempt to 
weave together an overall story. I take comfort in the fact that even some Task Team 
members, when asked about the origins of the biofuels policy at the time suggested, 
“nobody knows”. That such little institutional memory exists is a finding in itself but 
there are, of course, better answers than this.
4
  
The Industrial Biofuels Strategy of South Africa: A Genesis of Deciding to 
Decide 
A prudent approach to presenting an outline of the policy process would start at the 
start and end at the end. In this section, however, I will present the early process as it 
was presented to me through the course of the research. That is, the story starts 
somewhere in the middle, with some of the early issues, tangents and threads only 
being identified much later on. At first, the strategy appeared to have a relatively 
simple trajectory, progressing through a variety of regulatory and policy proposals 
from the DME. (It should be noted that, it was also only after discussion with new 
informants that certain responses from earlier on made sense. That is, the clues were 
always there, it only became possible to identify them and how they fitted together 
after further information was grasped.) Nevertheless, the focus is what happens 
before the stages in which biofuels are expressed as an agricultural, energy-related or 
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 Having noted this lack of institutional memory to be drawn from, the shortcomings of the research 
are then, first, limited assurance of when exactly things happened, although it should not be 
assumed that any of the events described occurred abruptly. Policymaking takes time. Second, 
there is an inherent weakness on relying on secondary accounts, even if it is by people closely 
involved. The weakness here can be grouped into substantive inaccuracies in which the details 
provided may be factually inaccurate and subjective, in that they reflect the perceptions and 
biases of the respondent. However, as it was ‘themes’ of the process being interrogated, one could 
relax the need for in-depth specifics and it is of course the perceptions of the policy makers that 




economic problem to be debated by a Task Team, which is where most of the other 
reviews of the South African policy start their analyses.  
 
The first important question to be asked is why the strategy (and its feasibility) is so 
strictly focussed on industrial biofuels, rather than a more generalised framework for 
bioenergy, for example. Answering this question is intrinsically linked to why 
biofuels are being pursued at all. It also signifies the beginning of the highly 
contested policy space into which biofuels entered and how original aspirations were 
changed, added and rejected. Two important influences on the path dependency here 
emerge from an organisational domain and the overarching agro-industrial imaginary 
in South Africa. In the next section, I will reflect on the former first and then the 
latter. 
Policy Entrepreneurs in the DME, Bounded Rationalities and Structural Constraints in 
Deciding to Decide 
Dr Rod Crompton, when working within the DME has played an instrumental role in 
biofuels policies in South Africa. In an interview with him during the early phases of 
the research it was made clear that biofuels had a far longer policy history than just 
the Task Team established in 2005 but more importantly, there have been notable 
inclusions to enable biofuels production in various policies since the White Paper on 
Renewable energy in 2002 (see Table 3). The White Paper sets out a national goal 
that 10,000 MW of renewable energy should be added to the national energy mix by 
2013. Although not explicit in the Renewable Energy White Paper but emerging in a 
later Renewable energy framework, Dr Crompton suggested that the general idea 
was to meet half of this through renewable sources of electricity and the other half of 
it to be met through biomass, mainly liquid fuels.
5
 He further suggested that under 
his leadership amendments were made to the Petroleum Products Act, which allowed 
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 The Renewable Energy Framework actually puts forward a 60-40 split between electricity and other 
energy rather than the more generalised 50-50 split mentioned by Dr Crompton. As an illustration 
of the hype the biofuels strategy created, the DME annual report suggests (DME 2007, p.28):  
[the] strategy will act as a catalyst for the growth of the industry. It is envisaged 
that the bio-fuels industry would meet 75% of the renewable energy target as 
outlined in the White Paper of Renewable Energy. This exercise has stimulated a 
lot of interest, as it, apart from contributing to security of energy supply, also 




for a special dispensation for biofuels (or ‘fuels from vegetable matter’). Then, in 
regulations amending the fuel specifications there are also provisions made for 
biofuels. Finally, he initiated the discussion of biofuels, writing an initial Cabinet 
Memo that lead to the formal adoption of the Biofuels Task Team (BTT). Dr 
Crompton then left the DME.  
 
Possibly the most important factor in moving towards this industrial approach is the 
origins of the strategy’s proposals: the actions of our so-called policy entrepreneur 
and the workings of the DME. Here the determining factor of the policy process 
correlates with the structural organisation of the DME. Initial proposals for biofuels 
in South Africa came from the directorate of Hydrocarbons and Energy Planning. At 
the time, officials in the department were facing limited capacity and, being focussed 
towards liquid fuels by mandate, they identified liquid biofuels (produced by large-
scale producers) as the only viable approach to renewable energy in their line-
function. While other ‘bio-energy’ projects were being undertaken, for example, a 
clean-cook stove project,
6
 there were no resources available for consideration of any 
wide-ranging bio-energy policy (former BTT member B, DME, 2010). Furthermore, 
the responsibility for bio-energy (largely in the form of co-generation) resided in a 
separate line-function and was therefore not included in initial ‘biofuels’ discussions 
within the DME. There were also important political alliances and influences in the 
department at the time. As one informant suggested, the decision was that without 
much trouble and using existing refineries (Sasol especially was already looking into 
biofuels) fifty per cent of the renewable energy targets could be met without having 
to look at alternatives, even if perhaps there were more suitable options (former BTT 
member C, 2010).  
 
Here it is also pertinent to think about the interests involved in managing an industry 
from an administrative perspective. Ultimately, although there were clearly other 
reasons, it is easier to “police” an industrial strategy. As a former chairperson of the 
BTT suggested:  
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 This programme is not a conventional clean-cook stove in which new cooking apparatus are 
distributed to beneficiaries. Rather, Basa Njengo Magogo, which roughly translates as ‘make your 
fire like the old woman’, encourages people to make fires in such a way that smoke is minimized 




In those early days, there was no subsid[y] but there were tax 
concessions, which were more easily attached to industrial 
processes and reconciled later.  
Others have described the industrial focus as necessary as it allows easy (or easier) 
monitoring of success, especially with regard to the 10,000MW renewable energy 
targets. This implicitly neglects any ‘unquantifiable’ energy sources, for example, 
that of cooking using biomass, even though it is increasingly recognised that these 
are important energy sources in South Africa (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2000). The 
importance, however, is that the industrial approach incorporated in this case, makes 
explicit the ability to prove impact with the associated objectives of rendering 
biofuels manageable and controllable. This would be very difficult to achieve in the 
‘second’ economy or in the messy practices beyond industrial approaches, which are 
more likely and probably more relevant at local levels 
Structural Constraints and Old-School Modernisation 
An implicit logic can be identified in the DME’s thinking, which reflects a 
technological lock-in in the wider structural features of the economy. Such ‘lock-ins’ 
are considered as systematic barriers to the uptake of (new) more efficient and 
environmentally benign technologies (Carrillo-Hermosillo, 2006). The existing fuel 
infrastructure and ascendancy of synthetic fuels and domestic refining during 
apartheid (see Appendix E) would certainly have a technological ‘lock-in’ effect in 
the government pursuing industrial biofuels rather than, for example, considering a 
wider bio-energy perspective. In South Africa’s case though, the development of a 
domestic synthetic-fuel sector might not necessarily obstruct the uptake of new or 
sustainable technologies (such as biofuels) but rather limit their diversity to 
petroleum-based mixes commensurate with existing infrastructure. It should also be 
recognised that the production of synfuels and a lesser dependence on imported oil 
than most other countries (Le Roux, 2001) makes energy security slightly less 
important than other developing countries such as Brazil and India, where biofuels 
have enjoyed far greater support (e.g. Pradhan and Ruysenaar 2014). However, there 
is some difference between the priority given to something (energy security) and the 
way it is thought about (industrial biofuels). In terms of the latter there appears to be 




embedded within the ‘win-win’ narratives described earlier and reflecting dominant 
imaginaries within the emerging bio-economy (Birch & Ponte 2014).  
 
The fuel sector in South Africa (see Appendix E) is a highly regulated space and, 
having to work within the realms of the fuel sector, the biofuels strategy had to 
negotiate with a far wider and equally technical assemblage. The inclusion of 
biofuels into the thoroughly regulated and regimented petroleum infrastructure has 
actually presented a major ‘nuisance’ for implementers of the biofuels strategy and 
not all petrol companies were in support, at least not initially. Despite presentations 
made by the BTT in the early stages of the development suggesting that there was no 
objection (Van Coller 2006), negotiations in the background suggested that ‘no 
objection’ was very different to ‘in support’. As one BTT member suggested, the two 
are very different things and the fuel companies “never really came to the party” 
(BTT member C, 2010; see also Chapter 3). Nevertheless, these discussions had 
already internalised that biofuels were an industrial technology, such that biodiesel 
and bioethanol were to be mixed with the national fuel supply; by this stage, any 
other options had been obscured from political focus. ‘Bioenergy’ perspectives were 
to be debated as separate strategies, as the Feasibility Study would later suggest. It is 
thus that “chicken shit and biogas” were not to be part of the continuing calculus, as 
one former BTT chairperson remarked.  
 
While organisational structures have been important, the thinking of the DME during 
these early stages also reflects ideological underpinnings reminiscent of apartheid’s 
modernisation ideology mentioned in Chapter 3. Such an argument resonates with 
Sampie Terreblanche’s (2012) thinking that new paradigms were “lost in 
transformation” and the policies and alliances of the African National Congress elite 
have fortified the minerals-energy complex (MEC). At the centre of the MEC, are the 
close linkages between the state private capital and ‘parastatals’ that emerged 
through key industrial strategies (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; see Appendix E). As 
Marais (2011, p.20) notes, through this process “the economy became characterised 
by corporate conglomeration … cheap coal and a deeply skewed minerals policy”, 
which ultimately curtailed diversification (citing Swilling, 2010). Although 




provision remains transfixed on mega-projects built to allow large “corporate users 
and wealthy white people inordinate access” (Bond & Ndlovu 2010, p.96). The focus 
on such MEC-type projects also continue to impose high environmental and social 
costs on development (Freund 2010). As Ben Fine (2008, p.2) highlights in an update 
to his original work: 
it seems as if policy is now working itself once more towards a state-led 
expansion of the MEC-core, reminiscent of the 1970s, through renewal of 
public investment in state corporations, especially around energy and 
transport but with as much private participation as can be engendered 
(domestic conglomerates, FDI and, of course, parasitic BEE).  
(A similar argument could be made for the presiding agro-economy and continued 
calls for transitions in the second economy to match industrialisation in the first 
economy (see later).) The MEC, or the lingering results of apartheid’s modernisation 
ideology, and, at least in the case of biofuels, its counterpart industrial-agricultural 
fraternity is important not only by laying down the industrial foundations and 
agricultural biases within the economy but also the networks that have been 
established around them. I consider the combination of these two features as an agro-
industrial imaginary, which comprises energy and agricultural interests that have 
very similar aspirations and understandings of the agro-economy and energy supply 
sector, and the potential of biofuels within those sectors. The label ‘industrial’ 
dominates such an imaginary and the visions can be seen in part when looking at the 
proposed projects of the previous chapter.  
 
Early discussions with officials were indicated that the major players from outside 
government were Sasol (and to some extent ‘Big Oil’), the maize lobby, which 
included ABSA and Grain-SA, and from ‘inside’ the IDC, the CEF, the DME and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The confluence of these players is, 
however, more important at later stages of the policy’s development. As such, I will 
return to the supposed bounded-reality of the DME that I have described above and 
how this general perception too may not be entirely correct. Doing so also 
reconfigures the answer to ‘why industrial biofuels’ from one of ‘that was always the 
case because of the DME’ to ‘that was the case that was made by experts’. (Of 




modernisation rational and in some cases the inner working of the agro-industrial 
imaginary). 
Shifting Perspectives, Wider Networks and the ‘Forgotten’ Origins of Science and 
Technology 
Eugene Visagie and Gisela Prasad (2006, p.8) acknowledge a similar trajectory to the 
one I have noted of the DME above, in which the DME has set the policy and 
regulatory framework for the development and implementation of renewable energy. 
Drawing on Wilson et al. (2005), they also recognise the important role of the 
Department of Science and Technology
7
 (DST) in supporting biodiesel during the 
early 2000s. 
At the request of the Cabinet, the Department of Science and Technology 
(DST) undertook a national technology audit of the transport fuel sector 
and recommended that commercial-scale production of biodiesel should be 
supported. The report highlights the benefits to black, previously 
disadvantaged farmers. To this end the DST established the Biodiesel Joint 
Implementation Committee (B-JIC) to coordinate further studies to enable 
the introduction of biodiesel to South Africa (Wilson et al. 2005, p.87).  
There are two important issues raised in the above quotation (three if we read into the 
primacy given to benefits for ‘black, previously disadvantaged farmers’ when the 
original audit does not actually present this as a prime objective). The first, points in 
the direction of energy security and South Africa’s unsustainable dependence on oil, 
which necessitated the audit in the first pace (see Le Roux 2001; below). The second 
is the parallel processes that have occurred during the early phases of the biofuels 
policy development, although with somewhat different approaches between the DME 
and DST.  
The Transport Audit 
The document entitled “A Technology Audit of the Transport Fuels Sector in South 
Africa” is the clearest demarcation of a focus on ‘industrial’ biofuels in South 
Africa.
8
 This document was produced by a panel of experts, headed by Terry Le 
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 The DST was formerly called the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology until it was 
split in 2004.  
8
 The report reflects some of the issues outlined in Appendix E: For example, South Africa is less 




Roux and supported by the CSIR. The motivation for such a review emerged from 
discussions of the Draft Gas Bill and increasing fuel prices and took a “strong slant 
towards transport fuels” (Le Roux 2001, p.15). The report offers three broad 
approaches to reducing South Africa’s dependence on oil:  
 Increasing supply from non-oil sources (that is gas- and coal-to-liquid);  
 Switching demand from liquid fuels (e.g. to electricity or hydrogen) or using 
alternatives (such as ethanol or biodiesel), and 
 Reducing demand on liquid fuels (policy options such as increased taxes or 
switching to rail, as well as technological developments such as vehicle 
efficiencies). 
 
Although the first two are far more reliant on technological developments, all three 
require coherent and coordinated policies to be put in place with impacts only likely 
in the medium to long term.  
 
The important facets of this report for biofuels reside in the discussions of bioethanol 
(fuel and gel) and biodiesel. Of the two alternative fuels, the panel broadly but 
cautiously supports biodiesel as a viable pursuit, although one requiring government 
support to be successful, and are more hesitant towards bioethanol. They consider 
biodiesel production feasible with an oil price of $25/barrel but this also depends on 
the comparative price of diesel, the cost of raw materials (feedstock) and the prices 
of by products.
9
 Yet the advantages for rural development and the varying scales at 
which biodiesel can be produced made it an interesting and potentially important 
alternative fuel source.  
 
Towards bioethanol, the team are apprehensive and suggest that more research will 
need to be undertaken. Interestingly, they provide no detail for maize-to-ethanol and 
                                                                                                                                          
70% of that oil mix is for transport and comes at significant cost). SA also uses more petrol than 
diesel, which implies that it will end up importing petrol and exporting diesel given the refining 
infrastructure and demand. The expert panel also makes some bold (although in hindsight wrong) 
assumptions, expecting the price of oil to be cheaper in ten years (2000 - 2010) if not on par with 
$20.00/barrel and that the exchange rate would be the real problem. They also cut to the crux of 
the matter when suggesting that a fuel bill greater than five per cent of GDP could lead to 
structural problems and deserves attention. 
9
 Without an increase in the selling price (i.e. demand) of oil cake there is little chance that biodiesel 




rather focus on the more likely (or appropriate) use of sugar or molasses. (Their 
apprehension to ethanol will prove important later, given that the focus of the BTT 
moves in the opposite direction, becoming predominantly focussed on bioethanol, 
and using maize). There is the suggestion that there are likely employment benefits 
but following the example other countries—Zimbabwe and Malawi—these benefits 
will only accrue with significant financial support and also depends on the sugar 
price. At that time, the sugar price internationally was artificially high and still 
controlled by the Sugar Act in South Africa. It is for this reason they recommend 





A final issue they entertain, and one of particular interest here, is that there is the 
recommendation that biofuels, biodiesel especially, have associated political 
incentives. That is, through the government’s Integrated Rural Development 
Framework:  
all Science Councils have been tasked to come up with development 
strategies for deep rural areas. Biodiesel represented one such innovation. 
This is a priority area for government and priorities cost money (2001, 
p.67).  
For this reason, they suggest there may be some room for tax allowances, but the 
experts also warn that these should not be to the detriment of the market. Similarly, 
given the then forthcoming Rio+10 meeting (World Summit on Sustainable 
Development) to be held the following year (2002):  
where 130 heads of state are expected to discuss the environment, the 
South African Government would do well to have something on the table 
with regard to environmentally-friendly renewable fuels (ibid., p.130).  
It is interesting to note that a range of renewable energy legislation and projects were 
completed in the run up and during the COP17 agreements in Durban (2011) for 
apparently similar reasons.  
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 During the time of the B-JIC, the DST was also hesitant to work with the sugar sector in South 
Africa given the apparent tensions between various players and a lack of consensus in the way 





The second important aspect of the Wilson et al. (2005) quote above, is that there is 
parallel process that occurs after the audit, in which the DST takes on a biodiesel 
focus, whilst the DME appears to maintain a bioethanol focus and remain in control 
of the policy’s formal development. The latter, becomes explicit later on, once the 
Biofuels Task Team is established but is important also because the DME 
promulgated the Renewable Energy White Paper shortly after the Transport 
Technology Audit. This provides an overall platform supporting further 
developments in the biofuels sector, or at least, sanctions further government review. 
Up until the point the Task Team is established, the DST seems to be the far more 
proactive of the two departments,
11
 largely because of its own policy entrepreneur: 
Ms Marjorie Pioos.  
 
Yet the details of this biodiesel focus is what is important, as it also extends well 
beyond the 2005 Task Team documents and appears to have a far more robust and 
encompassing agenda than the final prescriptions of the draft and final strategies. Its 
tactics were also somewhat different. Again, the trajectory has a lot to do with where 
it emerges from within the DST itself. As the Deputy Director General, Ms Pioos’s 
portfolio focussed on the economic and social impacts of technology. As part of the 
DST, such impact was primarily that of research and development and, in her words, 
of how “to get technology to impact on the ordinary lives of citizens”. When 
discussing the original imperatives of the research, terms like sustainability and 
market failures in existing agro-commodity chains reflected a wider paradigm than 
just energy security per se, but their attention was equally dominated by a focus on 
transport fuels given the original transport audit.  
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 It should also be mentioned that the Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Council and 
other research groups both private and public have looked into various aspects of biofuels, 
biodiesel for on-farm use especially, but were nowhere as comprehensive or at the same scale as 
what the DST would undertake. In interviews, respondents had also mentioned early research into 
biodiesel; At van Coller, a veteran of the Department of Agriculture, mentions projects as early as 
the 1990s. These biodiesel programmes were not ‘mainstream’ and as research-orientated projects 
would be unlikely to win any major political support for a large-scale biofuels industry. As he 




Following the transport audit’s proposals, the DST began a more thorough technical 
evaluation of biodiesel production in South Africa, engaging in an open dialogue 
with non-governmental players. Early on, they realised that any biofuels would 
require a close working relationship with industry in particular, engaging with the 
National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA), 
and the Construction and Mining Equipment Supplier’s Association (CONMESA), 
the South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) and a range of other 
associations representing industry interests. There was also research undertaken on 
standards, types of fuels and potential feedstock. Part of this research focussed on 
jatropha, as well as a number of endemic oil-rich trees, such as Moringa, which also 
showed some promise. According to one respondent, the early approaches of the B-
JIC also made the financing of projects look a lot more promising, as the plan would 
be to develop pilot projects and develop these organically through trial and error; 
starting small and getting larger. There was also far more robust debate around 
issues, which seems to have diminished as one moves to the Task Team phases, in 
which stakeholder inputs were perceived to be ignored. (Two ‘memos’ from the 
Treasury (National Treasury 2007; National Treasury 2006) seem to corroborate this 
perception.) Such views may have slightly romanticised the B-JIC’s approaches, as 
other respondents are more matter-of-fact. The work of the JIC was “mostly 
technical” and because it was technical, there is less room for conflicting debates. It 
is only when deciding on issues such as the second economy that things become 
politicised, as another respondent argued.  
 
All of these research programmes were strategising a way forward and evaluating 
available technologies, feedstock, norms and standards and other technical matters. 
Biofuels had yet to become politicised. There was, however, also early recognition 
that if biodiesel was to be taken seriously, it would require legislative changes, which 
requires Cabinet approval and is formally the mandate of the DME, not the DST.  
 
There are diverging tales of how symbiotic the relationship between the DME and 
DST was, some considering it a likeminded affair others suggesting more political 
tension. In an interview with a long-term participant on the JIC and the Biofuels Task 




issues further, this particular respondent was critical of the discernible shift to 
bioethanol that was considered to reflect the heightened lobbying (for example, from 
GrainSA and Brazilian interests who were no working closely with the IDC and 
members of the BTT) and perhaps an increasing pandering to the global discourse of 
biofuels.
12
 With new agendas and increased politicisation, the contribution of the 
technological aspect was now embedded within broader political processes. The 
Final Strategy, for example, acknowledges this, whereby it states that (Department of 
Minerals and Energy 2007, p.7): 
A Department of Science and Technology (DST) led Bio-diesel Joint 
Implementation Committee conducted a detailed examination and 
concluded that government supported biodiesel production can be justified 
due to its environmental and socio-economic benefits. 
Such broad acceptance also masks one other important difference between the Task 
Team and the B-JIC, which also reiterates the concerns of the long-term respondent 
above and the turn to politicising the process; a million jobs. In these early processes, 
the hype surrounding job creation indicates shifting approaches and the rise of 
‘narrative’ thinking and political aspirations, at least, beyond the technical fact-
finding of the B-JIC. 
 
The myth of the million jobs has also been a difficult one to grapple with, not only 
because its origins are so long ago but also because no documentation has been 
provided as evidence of it.
13
 Some respondents have told me that a cabinet memo 
proposing a million jobs never existed; in other cases, people had contradictory 
memories. For example, 
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 As discussed earlier, there is important links here to the global imperative promoted and sustained 
by a global integrated biofuel network (Mol 2007); or as I discuss later, a local project-orientated 
network or imaginary taking on similar traits. 
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 This is not due to lack of trying. I have submitted four separate information requests to the 
Ministers of Agriculture, Energy, Science and Technology and Trade and Industry. While most 
have responded, the documents are simply not available, or I need to contact relevant departments 
within the line function and/or the cabinet office. (The cabinet office is not at liberty to divulge 
information that is the responsibility or property of individual departments.) The Department of 
Energy, who remains the lead organisation and head of the BTT, is unable to locate these files in 
their archives. To access any files, I have been told I require their identification codes, which 
neither the current officials nor I have. Although out of the realms of an extensive discussion 
here, and much of this may be instances of ‘passing the buck’ the issue of retaining documents for 
future use is a massive struggle within many government bureaucracies in South Africa. A few 
officials have suggested they now keep their own documents, as they know that they will be safe 
rather than being lost in the system. This, however, raises important challenges for institutional 
memory and what knowledge is lost when people move from their departments but more so, the 




there was never a cabinet memo with a million jobs. We never got 
to that stage. That was noise that was been made about this 
million jobs, but we were the ones that went to Cabinet (Former 
B-JIC member, 2012). 
…and later in the discussion… 
So, there were two cabinet memos in actual fact. Energy 
produced one of them with the [million] jobs (ibid.). 
Overall, there is agreement from most respondents that the DME had in fact penned a 
Cabinet Memo suggesting that biofuels could produce a million jobs, although even 
the number of jobs predicted seems to be vague. Most responses suggest predictions 
estimated the employment potential of the policy to be well over one million jobs. It 
is obvious from interviews that certainly before feasibility studies in 2006, there were 
extremely exaggerated estimates of the job potential. As one former employer of the 
DME stated:  
you know in government when we do what is called cabinet 
memos… it was presented to cabinet to say there was so many 
million jobs that are going to be created in this industry. So, 
Cabinet was basically very, very happy (Former BTT chairperson 
A, 2010). 
Another member of the Biofuels Task Team stated: 
The reason for that is because in 2003, when the hype started, 
government promised half a million jobs in biofuels. I then wrote 
to some important people, saying it’s irresponsible … if you look 
at the economics of how much feedstock we can grow. But I was 
told to shut up. Cabinet took a decision. Half a million jobs, cast 
in stone (BTT member A, 2010). 
This was somewhat controversial for the DST, as they had to backtrack on such 
proposals when jointly presenting to the Cabinet later on. Even according to their 
research, such promises were not justifiable. One can of course imagine the appeal of 
such predictions and especially that they would involve low-skilled jobs in the rural 
economy.  
 
How the Cabinet reacted is also difficult to discern. Overall, it seems that, contrary to 




see some ‘real figures’ and some recognised that the DME was only trying to ‘sell 
the strategy’. 
You see, I think it was the fact that minister Manual was the 
Minister of Finance and was a very dominant voice in 2005 and 
he lead the charge to say this is not about job creation, other 
people in government do that, not you! (Former BTT chairperson 
B, 2010).  
 
Another respondent described it as: 
Trevor Manual was very sharp and he wanted to be briefed and 
open to advice. That’s the weird thing [about] ministers, they 
[can be] arrogant and policies are a gut feeling. If you give them 
analysis that shows them something else, that says they are on the 
wrong path, then he [or she] will ignore it. Manual was not like 
that, he wanted analysis to inform it, it wasn’t emotive, and he 
had been part of the process as it unfolded and he had been part 
of Cabinet a long time and saw how energy was exploiting this; 
[selling] employment creation and [that] it was just a ridiculous 
number they came up with (Former BTT member A, 2012). 
 
One has to acknowledge, however, that the job potential appealed to some Cabinet 
Ministers more than others.  
Okay, so then we go away and prepared the energy approach to 
it. Then the subcommittee we had to report to involved the 
minister of agriculture, minister of energy, I know Jeff Radebe 
was there but I am not sure what he was Minister of, maybe 
transport. Anyway, they informed me, they said talk to me about 
jobs, this whole thing is about job creation. It basically differed 
depending on which Minister you spoke to … You know they 
make a decision on one day but then if there are some that are 
absent on another day then they make a different decision 
(Former BTT chairperson B, 2010). 
 
Regardless of estimations, and evidence-based retractions (see also next chapter), 
hype around job creation, especially within the rural (second) economy, was a major 
factor galvanising political support. On the 7 December 2005 Cabinet approved “the 
development of an industrial strategy targeted at creating jobs in the energy crops 




economy status” (see also DME, 2006; Mtwa, 2007 emphasis in original). The 
Cabinet subsequently granted formal support to the development of a Biofuels Task 
Team in 2005, which would then undertake the feasibility studies. 
International Lobbies and Discourse Coalitions: Fuelling the Jobs Hype 
A range of factors have combined to attract the necessary political support for a 
biofuels strategy, giving preference to bioethanol and making biofuels ‘sexy’, 
politically speaking. Although respondents from the different departments have 
somewhat different recollections, they have similar stories. All parties admit that the 
million jobs shifted the discussion and raised the expectations of the Cabinet. 
Whether it was ‘noise’ or a formal Cabinet memo seems less important than the 
implications. There had, up until the supposed memo, been a relatively technical 
review, which then became embedded in discussions that were more political. The 
local hype was setting in, and what makes it more forceful that it was a story being 
compounded by international advocacy and local interests seeing potential new 
markets. 
 
[Respondent]  There were a large number of European businesses 
coming to say they had the technology. 
 
[Interviewer]  And they seem to have also perpetuated the job thing as 
well? 
 
[Respondent]  Absolutely, they came with technology and unrealistic 
technology but what was very frightening was they were 
arguing for jatropha as the cure all, wonder crop! We of 
course had to play the strongest role to come and answer 




Clearly, there were divergent interests at play, which had to be synthesised into a 
consensual and coherent policy. Given the final direction of the Feasibility Study 
(see next Chapter) and strategy itself, it appears that bioethanol has taken centre 
stage (and with Cradock as the vanguard project, ethanol dominates implementation 
too). The reasons for this have been laid down to vested interests according to some, 
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or dollars and cents according to others. The absolute veracity of each of these is 
difficult to assess but it is more likely a case of both feeding off one another than 
anything else (see previous chapter).  
 
For one, prior to the main feasibility, and perhaps even the establishment of the 
Biofuels Task Team, foreign interests were advocating expansion of the biofuel 
sector, which would, in addition to biodiesel interests (PhytoEnergy especially), then 
include bioethanol as well. Brazil, for example, was actively pushing bioethanol due 
to their own successes (with potential for profitable technology transfer), while there 
was also notable pressure from German interests looking into biodiesel (to meet their 
European Union policy obligations). Being high-level agreements involving fact-
finding missions, research visits and workshops, it has been difficult to investigate 
the aspirations and agendas of individual players for the South African context 
(though some of these details are covered in the previous chapter). From the 
perspectives of those members of the Task Team interviewed, the international 
agendas were significant. For example, as one member of the Task Team reported:  
[the Task Team] also worked very closely with Brazil – we visited 
them about ten times. There was a committee and we looked at 
the technical and social structure around biofuels because Brazil 
has a similar economy to SA not in terms of size but in terms of 
poverty et cetera (Former BTT member D, CEF, 2010) 
 
Those involved with the Feasibility Study also suggested the maize–to-ethanol 
projects in the United States of America as providing an example to be followed.  
I think the farming sector was probably the driver behind [the 
policy], like the maize growers in the US and Brazil was pushing 
Sugarcane to basically raise the price of commodities. So you 
had someone pushing it so it became sort of trendy… (Consultant, 
B 2010). 
In lieu of wider lobbying from interest groups in and outside South Africa, the 
hydrocarbons unit of the DME began articulating biofuels in new ways, largely in 
terms of ‘development’ and job creation mentioned above. These development 
narratives were pivotal in harvesting considerable political support and outpaced or 




proposed job opportunities and rural development, advocates latched onto and 
deployed these narratives, which subsequently took on a life of their own; one 
different to the global biofuels meta-narrative in which political support has mostly 
been immediate and extensive (at least in the early stages). Assumptions around job 
creation were embedded in the rationale of pursuing biofuels, with such support 
originating even prior to feasibility (which was supposed to establish the actual 
number of jobs created). And again, these narratives resonate powerfully with 
existing conceptions of rural development in the compartmentalised second 
economy. Biofuels become a neat policy and technology fix, and with projects being 
proposed in the former homelands of the Eastern Cape, they easily become a political 
fix as well.  
Stories from respondents are, however, conflicting. That the jobs narrative played a 
significant role in cementing support has to be considered in the face of some 
respondents considering the political hierarchy to be somewhat ambivalent to the 
DME providing jobs security through the aspirations of a biofuels program. This 
ambivalence, which I have described above already, carries through the process – 
with some Ministers objecting to the strategy throughout (see Chapter 7). Despite 
some cleavages, however, the jobs rhetoric harnessed within the industrial biofuels 
imaginary resonated strongly with the aspirations of the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), spearheaded by the then Deputy 
President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.
15
 Indeed, biofuels became an important 
feature of the ASGISA framework (prior to any investigation of their potential and 
practical successes). The ASGISA discussion document suggests (Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006, p. 7)
16
: 
provinces were asked to propose special projects that would have a major 
impact on accelerating and sharing growth. A set of [biofuels] projects has 
been selected for finalisation of implementation plans. Some of these 
projects are already underway. They are an initiative that will cover at least 
Northern Cape, Free State, KZN, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga.  
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 Mlambo-Ngcuka, the Minister for Minerals and Energy prior to becoming Deputy President, was an 
early advocate of renewable energy, proposing in a parliamentary speech that the share of 
renewable energy, though small at the time, was intended to increase it to about 14% by 2014 
(Mlambo-Ngcuka 2003).  
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 Later on, the final Biofuels Strategy (Department of Minerals and Energy 2007, p.8) would return 
the favour, suggesting: 
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This is important for two reasons amongst others. The first is that there is, before a 
strategy or policy document has been tabled, an implicit assumption that biofuels 
projects will be successful and neatly conform to the aspirations of ASGISA (unclear 
as those actually are). Even though the document later recognises that biofuels are in 
a “less developed stage” they share a common ASGISA orientation by being a 
“labour intensive, rapidly growing sector worldwide, suited to South African 
circumstances, and open to opportunities for Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) and small business development” (Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka, 2006, p. 7). 
 
The second, is that such statements reinforce the argument that projects (or rather 
their proponents) and the buy-in they receive from the jobs hype, reaches beyond the 
realms of the biofuels policy itself and acquire the status of policy artefacts to be 
reproduced within other policy realms. In the same way, the language of biofuels 
began to legitimise programmes in the Eastern Cape, their currency is easily ‘cut and 
pasted’ into national policies too. If one goes by what was planned for ASGISA, they 
almost become the policy. A former BTT chairperson summed it up as follows: 
[Respondent] The way it worked, I look at it from two fronts. When 
Rod sold this, he did so using the jobs in the second 
economy. You must remember also the timing was the 
same as ASGISA which was been pushed by our then 
Minister, Phumzile [Mlambo-Nqcuka], so we were all 
putting forward projects that we thought would result is 
in growth of jobs and clearly biofuels was put forward 
as something that could potentially create 6million jobs 
in the second economy 
[Interviewer] Which is obviously something of a plus...? 
[Respondent] Correct. So it basically appealed to the powers that be on 
that basis (Former BTT Chairperson C, 2011). 
CONCLUSION 
Earlier chapters have considered the global reach of the biofuel discourse (and the 




dynamics of interest too. In South Africa, the policymaking process has 
circumscribed and is indicative of much of these dynamics. A useful way to 
interrogate this process is to start examining how biofuels became part of the 
political agenda or ‘deciding to decide’ in the first place, providing a genealogy of 
their development into policy.  
 
The early research homed in on DME officials, who readily accepted responsibility 
for putting biofuels on the agenda, and, through institutional rationales and 
organisational structures, there were clear reasons for an industrial focus being taken 
(and at that point, unbeknownst to me, bioethanol was the preferred option despite an 
earlier focus on biodiesel). The bounded rationality of the DME itself expresses an 
underlying bias towards the MEC or modernisation ideologies seen also during 
apartheid, with a close-knit network and ideas shared between ‘big oil’, ‘big 
agriculture’ and the DME, suggesting that there was an agro-industrial imaginary 
(political uptake of science and technology) in the making. This was, however, only 
part of the story.  
 
The more apparent locus for industrial fuels was located in earlier studies, when 
issues of oil dependence came to the fore in South Africa. Similar issues were being 
encountered internationally, as can be seen through the biofuels directives in the EU. 
Biodiesel was the preferred biofuel option (which was one of many other options), 
and the DST followed this preference on with a variety of research programmes 
working towards a biodiesel programme. It is noteworthy that the underlying 
paradigm was still that of industrial approaches, and it is the explicit demand for 
transport fuels within the macro-economy that has fashioned the emerging policies 
and practices, which have since then become mixed with other objectives. The 
overriding objective of energy security and developing an alternative fuel has 
therefore been diluted and reconfigured. While the DST were taking a more 
measured approach to biodiesel in various applications, the DME had the idea to ‘go 
big’ and focus on creating as many jobs as possible with biofuels as the vehicle to do 
so. As a former BTT chairperson remarked: 
When we started it, Dr Rod Crompton came up with this target of 




everybody just slashed the target away and eventually it was no 
longer the target. So he said let’s be bold, let’s put it out there, 
and he had the right idea, you know, he said let’s envision it for a 
million jobs. Why shouldn’t we be looking to create a million jobs 
with all the benefits? It was different departments that then 
chipped away the target (Former BTT chairperson, D, 2012). 
While amicable, these goals increasingly competed with aspirations of climate 
change reduction, rural development and many of those proposed within the biofuels 
hype (and overwhelming discourse) and were contrary to what the DST research had 
suggested was feasible (see also next chapter) and some politicians had begun to see 
this. Certainly, potential exists for each of these objectives to come to fruition; 
however, most respondents have suggested that it simply became too difficult to 
isolate what the purpose of biofuels would be (discussed further in Chapter 7).  
 
An important consideration here is the complexity that a simple technological shift 
actually confronts within the policy subsystem. Biofuels not only represented 
different things to different people, and hence a wide array of objectives, their uptake 
was galvanised by narratives of job creation and rural development that permeated 
through government and political realms in very different but equally important 
ways. Overall, there was an appreciation for the potential benefits so political support 
continued and the DME progressed towards an industrial biofuels strategy 
configured around their interpretations of what this should look like. These 
interpretations have been influenced by not only underlying logics and ideologies 
but, as we shall see, have been shifted by interests that built upon the emerging hype 
and would legitimised by the formal Feasibility Study of the Biofuels Task Team 
being undertaken.  
 
In summary then, running parallel to the DST research there were two important axes 
evident in the early development of the strategy. On the one hand, in finding ways to 
meet the renewable energy targets, the DME was engaged in its own ‘technical’ 
process (although with an agro-commercial pre-disposition driven by existing 
networks and influence within the DME), regardless of the job potential but also 
reliant on its discursive power. On the other hand, there was a strong political 




the country’s unemployment woes, especially in the so-called second economy, also 
fuelled by the jobs rhetoric. Foreign involvement is important as a third axis, 
however, has been difficult to actively unpack as part of this early research. All of 
the agendas have, however, coalesced around the narratives of ‘employment’ and 
‘rural development’ but at the same time, the path dependency created by the DME 
and existing networks, following an agro-industrial script, have constrained the 
inclusion of wider perspectives in the formative stages of the policy process. As I 
will argue in later chapters, these issues conflict quite fundamentally, an issue that 
remains unresolved through the rest of policy-making process and ostensibly practice 
too. First however, it is necessary to consider how these narratives were 
substantiated, as Godin (2009) suggests, narratives need to be verified by statistics to 
qualify the new phenomenon. Similarly, policy needs to be evidence-based and a 
Feasibility Study is fundamental to identifying what is viable and what is not, as well 
as steering the policy-makers in the right direction, at least in principle. I shall 




CHAPTER 6: EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING AND THE BIOFUELS 
STRATEGY  
In the early development of the strategy, there were two important axes evident. 
Moving in one direction were the cumulative concerns of meeting the renewable 
energy targets and ‘satisficing’ a range of other issues. Along this axis, there were 
somewhat different perspectives between the DST and DME. The culmination was a 
‘technical’ process exhibiting an agro-commercial and industrial pre-disposition 
driven by existing networks and influence within the DME. The second major 
trajectory had a strong ideological underpinning, with the political hierarchy hoping 
that the biofuels sector would be a quick fix for at least some of the country’s 
unemployment woes, especially in the so-called second economy. Foreign 
involvement is important as a third axis, however, has been difficult to unpack in 
significant detail as part of this research except as has been described along with the 
projects through which their support was manifest. None of these axes is mutually 
exclusive. Narratives of ‘employment’ and ‘rural development’ have provided a 
common thread between perspectives but it is necessary to consider how these 
narratives were substantiated to be sufficient as a basis for the strategy. As Godin 
(2009) suggests, narratives need to be verified by statistics to qualify the new 
phenomenon. Similarly, following aspirations of New Public Management described 
earlier, policy in South Africa should be evidence-based. In the case of the BISSA, a 
Feasibility Study was fundamental to identifying what was viable and what was not, 
steering the policy-makers in the right direction, at least in principle.  
 
The widespread call for evidence-based policymaking in the South African context 
was therefore considered equally essential for biofuels. There has, however, been 
only limited empirical critique of whether this is a possibility for biofuels in general,
1
 
given their complexity, and specifically in South Africa, given the normative calls 
for such approaches. There are two ways one could interrogate this further. The first 
is to propose adequate toolkits with which to undertake policy analysis and provide 
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 While there has been numerous studies looking into the complexity of biofuels, very few have 
studied how such complexity, or rather understandings of such complexity, have been translated 




the best possible information for policy-makers or evaluate those used thus far. This 
is not a direction I intend to take here but is certainly of pressing importance. The 
other, a more critical approach consistent with the original definitions of policy 
studies in Chapter 2, is interrogating the way in which such toolkits and evidence-
producing activities are conceptualised, undertaken and informs the wider 
policymaking process.  
 
There have been some forerunners to such a study. In the case of the European 
Union, for example, Sharman and Holmes (2010) argue that policy has dictated the 
evidence to be gathered rather than the other way round. They interrogate the ten per 
cent renewable energy and concomitant biofuels target, critically assessing its 
political motivations and use of scientific evidence in its formulation. Overall, the 
actions of an individual policy entrepreneur, whose considerable degree of control 
over scientific data and understanding of the established literature, allowed a 
significant degree of command over proposals to “ensure the target proceeded in the 
face of considerable internal and external opposition” (ibid., p.316). This to some 
degree undermines what could be considered the objectivity of social science,
2
 
highlighting a value-laden character, but also raises concerns as to the use of experts 
and the credibility of research undertaken within or for the policymaking process. 
This is an important point of departure from which to consider how such evidence 
gathering or evidence making has occurred in South Africa.
3
 To begin with, I will 
outline some existing theories of the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
policy and from there interrogate the knowledge-policy interface of the biofuels 
strategy. In this instance, it is not so much a question of ‘scientific knowledge’ as a 
basis for policy, but using critiques of the relationship between such knowledge and 
                                                 
2
 I specify social science here as I wish to make no general claims or arguments for the objectivity of 
science in general, including the physical sciences. Much of the discussion of how science is used 
in policy is similar to both physical and social sciences and the evidence they produce. The 
important point being that one should treat all ‘evidence’ with caution not for its objectivity 
(though this is obviously important) but how it is used. Lee et al. (2005 cited in Hodgson and 
Irving, 2007) reflect Yearley’s (2005) findings that scientists do not normally undertake research 
to give advice, whereby, “political decisions about social policies rarely are the direct outcome of 
social science research” (Lee et al. 2005, p.21). There are also earlier criticisms of the ability of 
social (and physical) sciences to provide suitable solutions to (political) problems that will be 
discussed later. 
3
 Drawing on the research from this chapter and the next, Pradhan and Ruysenaar (forthcoming) work 
toward similar conclusions as Sharman and Holmes (2010), however, this chapter elaborates the 




policy to interrogate evidence in policy and the ‘credibility’ it acquires through calls 
to science and expertise and by extension how the Feasibility Study draws on 
scientific ideas.  
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY: SPEAKING (SCIENTIFIC) TRUTH TO POWER OR POLICY-
BASED EVIDENCE GATHERING 
In the theory chapter, it was briefly mentioned that the social study of science has 
important implications for the way we conceive the use of knowledge and evidence 
in policymaking. Why this is important is that South Africa, like many other public 
administrations, premises its decisions on the promises of evidence-based 
policymaking. When the Biofuels Industrial Policy was being developed, there were 
increasing political aspirations for an instrumental policy focus in line with New 
Public Management and its cornerstone, evidence-based policy. This remains the 
case as the current president Jacob Zuma, in his address to the National Planning 
Commission, also isolates an increasingly important aspect of policy-making in 
South Africa. He urges those with expertise to “put forward solid research, sound 
evidence and clear recommendations for government” (Jacob Zuma cited in National 
Planning Commission 2011a, p.1).  
 
Furthermore, according to a CSIR workshop in 2008, there “seem to be strong links 
within the science and policy-making communities respectively (Funke et al. 2009, 
p. 21). While they suggest that links between national-level departments and some 
research agencies appear robust, there are weaknesses too. Links with international 
research findings, which may have important lessons for South Africa, appear to 
have been missed. They then suggest that links may be improved through: 
 better relationship management; 
 knowledge brokering to improve the relevance of science knowledge to 
government, for example between science councils and government, and 
 increased scope for improving the relevance of the science that the science 
councils are doing.  
In many ways, the CSIR’s reflections are indicative of an overarching discourse in 




linkage between social science (evidence gathering) and social action (policymaking 
and intervention). Professor Andries du Toit (2012, p.21) criticises this seemingly 
natural relationship and argues that:  
while the desire to ensure that policymaking is informed by social science 
may be laudable, the assumptions underlying these assertions about the role 
of evidence and science turn out to be dubious, and provide a poor guide to 
the challenges involved. 
From a development perspective, Sumner and Tewari (2009) raise similar concerns 
of whether evidence-based policy will be pro-poor. They suggest two main features 
working against the value of evidence-based policy in that there is both the 
possibility for poor quality evidence and a scarcity of good evidence, both of which 
also depends on the ability of policymakers to use it properly. The use of evidence 
also needs to be considered in more than practical terms
4
 recognising the importance 
of ‘Foucaultian’ power-knowledge and ‘Latourian’ questions of whose evidence 
counts. The potential exists that what classifies as best evidence may be biased or 
structured through existing power relations and local experience is considered less 
important than mathematical models.  
 
The above introduction suggests that the relationship of social science or evidence 
and decisions made using such information is contentious. The difficulty is that, as 
Sanderson (2002) suggests, the continuing call for evidence in policymaking 
“reflects a modernist faith in progress informed by reason”, despite severe criticism 
from constructivist and post-modernist perspectives. The ideas here are similar to 
those captured in Chapter 2, in which there is a cleavage between positivist 
perspectives and interpretivist ones. Rationalists argue objective knowledge is 
translated and forms the basis of instrumental decision making whilst interpretivists 
highlight a process of deliberation that “weighs beliefs, principles and actions under 
conditions of multiple frames for the interpretation and evaluation of the world” 
                                                 
4
 Though outside of the requirements here there has been an increasing turn towards ‘evidence’ in 
development policy, especially through the use of randomised controlled trials, systematic 
reviews and the limited ability to measure the potential impact and efficacy of a given 
intervention. Biofuels are particularly problematic in this regard and their complexity underlines 
the limits of evidence in policymaking to be discussed in this chapter. Arturo Israel (1987), a 
theorist of institutional development, pre-empts such ideas in terms of ‘specificity’ and argues 
that key areas of rural development policy, such as agriculture and natural resource management, 
are inherently of low specificity, as the exact outputs demanded of staff and the steps for 
achieving them are hard to precisely define, making monitoring of performance correspondingly 




(Dryzek 1990 cited in Van der Kaap 1995, p.202).
5
 It would be wrong to forego 
some of the important lessons such criticisms bring to bear on our understanding of 
how science and evidence informs the policymaking process even though, as 
Sanderson (2002) argues, there is still much need and potential for ‘grounded 
knowledge’. (The point really being that whilst normative ideas of evidence in policy 
reflect our best attempts at gathering as accurate a view of objective reality (although 
epistemological disputes continue), there is always room for manoeuvre and 
policymaking realistically does not happen in a perfectly instrumental way.) 
Therefore, before presenting the empirical review of the Feasibility Study and its 
evolution, I will draw out some of the important themes of critique and contention 
relating to scientific knowledge as a basis for policymaking. Whilst not denying the 
importance of instrumentalist objections, several themes may be highlighted when 
considering the use of evidence and the role it plays in policymaking. Such themes 
include what counts as evidence, how it may be produced, how it is used, and how 
people respond to it,
6
 with the historicist insistence that these differ between specific 
spaces and times. 
 
As Andries du Toit (2012) suggests, there are inherently two activities manifest in 
evidence-based policymaking—the social practice of producing evidence and the 
second using such evidence to make policy. In terms of the former, Yearley (2005) 
summarises two conventional understandings of why evidence-based policy can 
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 Post-modernist perspectives take this even further, in which they refute entirely the notion of an 
objective external world and the search for a meta-narrative to provide a secure foundation of 
knowledge (Cf. Sanderson, 2002, p.7). 
6
 I will not dwell on this latter feature in depth here. Yearley (2005) provides a useful discussion of the 
nature of contemporary disquiet with expertise than conventional views. One has to acknowledge 
that people (laypersons) are more involved in many aspects of knowledge creation—sometimes 
working through science and sometimes through local knowledge(s). This is also a more complex 
relationship than just a ‘public understanding of science’ or a deficit model between scientists and 
the lay public. The deficit model, emanating from studies into the public understanding of 
science, hypothesizes that the ‘problem’ with using expert knowledge and science is that people 
do not understand the science and therefore reject it. Scholars working within STS, as described 
in text, argue that this is not always the case and often people not only understand the science but 
also participate in the generation of such knowledge. Additionally, in public contexts, scientific 
assertions often depend on unexamined assumptions about the social world - how people will use 
a product or regulators will perform, as well as how the public have informed the science that is 
made available. One could also include here Beck’s idea of the Risk Society (Beck, 1992, 1995, 
1997; Beck et al, 1994; see also Giddens, 1999), in which what he terms ‘reflexive 
modernisation’, science no longer offers control and predictability but rather creates risks and 
uncertainties that result from scientific discovery and technical change. This changes the 
relationship of science to policy, in which policy now has to account for the consequence of 




become weak in practice in addition to the discussion of Sumner and Tewari (2009). 
The first is procedural and involves circumstances in which a scientist’s 
independence is compromised; that is, their research is partial, or their views become 
partisan or swayed by material interest or incentive. The second is a more 
fundamental disjuncture in which the questions scientists ask themselves are not the 
types of questions that policymakers require answers for. Science has no 
predetermined policy-relevance.  
Considering Evidence and Science 
That policy should be based on researched evidence begs the question of what 
evidence actually is, ontologically, and how it can be derived, epistemologically. The 
former, according to Hodgson and Irving (2007b, p.195) has “taxed philosophers for 
some time, and will continue to do so”. Broadly, one could define evidence as 
anything presented in support of an assertion but some central characteristics are 
important. First, there need not be only one type of evidence. Though scientific 
evidence is sacrosanct within the evidence-based policy discourse, there are of 
course other types of evidence, which may include anecdotal evidence, intuition, 
personal experience, and testimonies emanating from a range of sources, from 
institutional, political and professional origins (and could include that of the 
client/stakeholder/lay public too) (Head 2008). The credibility of these, however, 
may also be subject to widely varying, normative criteria such as accuracy, precision, 
sufficiency, ‘representedness’, authority and clarity (Dyer 2006).  
 
A thorough ontology is outside the realms of this thesis and as Hodgson and Irving 
(2007b) suggest, it is perhaps better to question what evidence is taken as 
unproblematic.
7
 Overall, the credibility or importance of evidence in evidence-based 
policy is directly linked to rational, modernist aspirations, in which science is 
paramount. As Yearley (2005) reminds us, “on the face of it, as science is the best 
knowledge we have of how the world works, it is wholly understandable that 
scientists will be important providers of advice for governments and policymakers”. 
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 One could extend this to ask who takes evidence as being problematic and who does not? As in my 
introduction, this will be considered further in the empirical discussion below. Parallel with 
problematising evidence, one has to acknowledge that many policies develop in the absence of 




Through the scientific method, knowledge and evidence can be produced (in the 
form of published research or accepted causal relationships) that is clear, concise, 
rational and objective. In many ways, subscribing to scientific knowledge in this way 
reflects a long-standing assumption of the ‘purity of science’, hegemony of 
‘scientized’ thinking and the objective function scientists perform in discovering the 
truth. There is of course a controversy of what exactly is meant by ‘good science’ 
(Grundmann 1996 citing Jasonoff 1990, Nelkin 1979, Porter 1995, Wynne 1992; see 
also Yearley 2005 and below). Du Toit (2012), for example, describes evidence in 
evidence-based policy as appealing to a “naïve empiricism”, in which understanding 
social reality is a matter of understanding the evidence, which also depends on 
having enough evidence. Stone (2002) and subsequent scholars have referred to this 
as the rationality project, which reflects a notion of scientific evidence as obtainable 
when this is not always the case, especially when it comes to the needs of 
policymakers and the questions they ask (see also Weinberg 1972). Similarly, 
scientific research can certainly provide a basis for decision-making but is not 
generally undertaken to provide advice. Such sentiment is expressed by Morgenthau 
(1965), for example, who surmised that the social sciences necessarily provided only 
partial guidance in the face of “ultimate decisions” about how we are to live our 
lives. 
Considering Evidence in Policymaking: Understandings from Science and 
Technology Studies  
The situation is thus that evidence, whether science-based or not, is highly 
problematic. It is problematic in and of itself (although one should not automatically 
and unreservedly discount its legitimacy), as described above, but science and 
research—understanding how the world works so to speak—also do not neatly or 
automatically translate into good policymaking (Du Toit, 2012; Yearley, 2005). The 
problem is that evidence does not speak for itself, scientists and knowledge brokers 
do, and hence discursive practices and power-knowledge cannot be neglected as part 
of the science-policy process; that is, the second activity noted by Du Toit (2012). 
Despite the above criticisms of science and normative assumptions of what evidence 
is, the idea of objective evidence becomes even more problematic when it is 




face of contradictory evidence, narratives and worldviews remain steadfast and 
interpretations are sense-making practices rather than instrumental outlooks. Steven 
Yearley (2005) (from whom I have taken the main section heading but see also 
Jasanoff (2003b); Wildavsky (1987))
8
 emphasises understandings of this relationship 
from ‘Social Studies of Science’. Such a perspective is useful as it not only 
interrogates the relationship of science and policy but starts from an understanding of 
science as a social practice, and then moves towards challenges in using the 
knowledge produced by science as a basis for policy (and indeed science’s place in 
wider society). 
 
Before taking a critical tack, others have more optimism of the relationship between 
science and policy. Roger Pielke (2007), for example, provides one view of the 
situation, calling for scientist advisors to be a type of honest broker. He advocates a 
situation in which scientists provide input into policy decisions without 
compromising the sanctity of science’s claims of providing impartial empirical 
evidence. However, in many ways this neglects well-founded suggestions from, for 
example, Collingridge and Reeve (1986) that this is impossible; although to a degree 
Pielke does recognise this. Whereas Pielke motivates a range of ideas as to why 
science matters to policymakers, and how they might use it, he dwells on an overly 
reductionist view of science, even though acknowledging that politicians ultimately 




In countering this optimism, and in addition to the weaknesses of evidence from a 
procedural and content perspective, a ‘science studies’ critique provides a more 
complex but comprehensive grasp of the situation. Drawing on Collingridge and 
Reeve (1986), an ‘over-critical model’ suggests that the actual features of science-
for-policy make it unworthy as an aid to policymaking and the ideal of scientist-as-
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 While knowledge might not get established in policy in a straightforward manner, it is still assumed 
that policymaking pertaining to various fields, particularly science and technology, agriculture, 
and environment is driven by scientific knowledge (Keeley 2003). Hence scientists and experts 
are called upon to speak “truth to power” (Jasanoff 2003a) and based on these facts policy-makers 
choose between or develop various policy options. 
9
As an example one could reflect here on the neglect of a ‘reality-based community’ in United States 
policy-making within the Bush Administration (Suskind 2004) and the general postmodernist turn 
in social sciences that policy makers, actors and analysts are situated in space and worldview, 
rendering impossible the quest for objective information, generalised models and universally 




advisor is inaccurate of what happens and misleading as an ambition. Four 
assumptions underpin this ill-conceived ideal (see Yearley, 2005 p.164-165). First, it 
is assumed that scientific knowledge is developed autonomously and then becomes 
relevant to policy. Rather, scientists investigate issues because of their policy 
relevance (especially topics that in many cases would have been entirely neglected or 
deliberately ignored because of methodological issues or plain disinterest). Second, 
policy questions are thought to conform neatly to scientific disciplines (or are inter-
disciplinarily answerable), when, in practice, such questions cross disciplines (and 
can result in conflict as much as consensus).  
 
Third, there is the belief that scientific answers are conclusive when the 
characteristics of policy-orientated questions may actually lead to interminable 
disagreement. Rather than narrowing down uncertainties, further research may make 
answers even less conclusive and have different interpretations. More pragmatically, 
potential winners and losers of policy proposals can find evidence to back their 
causes and scientists easily disagree as to who is right and who is wrong. Finally, 
scientific advisors are supposed to be impartial but in policy (and thereby political) 
matters indifference is not a possibility. There is also more at stake. Scientists and 
policy advisors have to pay a great deal of attention to the costs of being wrong in 
policymaking, when in normal science such uncertainty is assumed as part of the on-
going knowledge generation process. This changes the approach and redefines what 
findings or conclusions are deemed as appropriate. That is, recommendations are not 
necessarily based on accuracy or evidence but lowest common denominators or 
safest bets.  
 
There is an overarching theme here in which the normative discourse of evidence-
based policy (a policy about policy), that is statements of what the relationship 
between science and policy ‘ought to be’ (Du Toit 2012), does not match with 
‘reality’. Yearley (2005, p.165) sums this up suggesting: “those features of scientific 
expertise which supposedly made it so suitable for advice-giving do not hold true in 




Collingridge and Reeve (1986) ‘mythical’.
10
 On top of dispelling the myth that 
science is capable of generating comprehensive information relevant to a policy 
dilemma, they also suggest that policymakers themselves do not have access to or 
collect all the relevant information to an issue but work in a situation of great 
uncertainty. Whilst doing so they also tend to represent certainty.  
 
The critiques discussed should not be considered part of a one-sided attack on 
scientists and experts and the value of expert advice they provide for policymakers; 
both are of obvious importance. From the above discussion, the “relationship 
between political authorities need for advice and the generation of scientific insights 
is therefore complex and indirect” (Yearley 2005, p.160). On the one hand, 
separating the practice of evidence gathering and then its use in policymaking 
highlights problems in both aspects, individually, but also that the separation of 
providing evidence (speaking truth to power) and making decisions (wielding power) 
are actually not so easily separable and discrete. It should also be remembered that 
criticisms marginalising the value of science and evidence (and thus scientists and 
experts) may also fail to account for the sometimes-significant role that science and 
individual scientists play in framing policy problems. Expertise and evidence, even if 
uncertain, can sway political discussions and decisions (as did the Transport Fuels 
Audit), whilst also creating policy problems when doing so (Neff 2007; Rich 2004).  
Two Examples of the Interaction between Science and Policy 
Two areas of research have begun to illustrate some important practicalities of the 
STS theories mentioned above, namely: technocracy and epistemic communities.  
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 Collingridge and Reeves (1986, p. 5) state it as: “Contrary to the myth of the power of science, there 
is a fundamental and profound mismatch between the needs of policy and the requirements for 





The first example of the role of the scientist and science in the policy process is the 
way in which Epistemic Communities (ECs) inform international affairs, notably 




Peter Haas (1992; 1989), defines the importance of expertise at the international level 
in terms of epistemic communities, which articulate cause-and-effect relationships 
associated with complex problems, frame issues for collective debate and propose 
specific policies in response. To Haas, an EC is a scientific research group with 
shared beliefs, underscored by causal (scientific) understandings and theories as well 
as common assumptions of what is valid (that is, the scientific method).
12
 These 
communities provide expertise and answers to policymakers, helping to legitimise 
the enforcement of international regimes (or other institutional arrangements). From 
relatively clear-cut notions, the idea of epistemic communities and the role they play 
has encountered some critique. Jansen and Roquos (2005) summarise an earlier 
criticism of Haas’s work by Grundman (1996), in which Haas’s theory of consensus-
making is not an inherent characteristic of epistemic communities and their roles. 
Their summary of Grundman (1996) is that he proposes that “reason may not defeat 
economic interests” and denies the “centrality of cognitive elements pointing more 
toward power relations” (1996, p.143). Drawing from Science and Technologies 
Studies, Jansen and Roquas (2005) critique both these perspectives highlighting that 
the polarisation between scientific expertise/truth and policy/politics still clouds 
efforts to understand science advice at the international level. They deny the 
likelihood those scientists in international expertise networks simply translate 
technical scientific arguments into policy advice and regulatory frameworks (Haas) 
or are simply instruments to translate economic interests and regulatory frameworks 
(Grundman). Both Haas and Grundman therefore, “neglect complex combinations of 
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 Epistemic communities may also be understood in one sense as an interpretive community or a 
community of meaning, following Yanow (2007). She also considers these as a discourse 
community or a community of practice.  
12
 In some ways, members of the epistemic community resemble technocrats, not by their location 
within the bureaucracy (which sets them apart) but by characteristics in which they can traverse 
political boundaries and have no specific programme but are defined by a way of doing things. 
They are almost self-contained anti-politics machines, working through certain assumptions, 




internal and external processes that shape the knowledge construct emerging from 
scientific advisory committees” (Jansen & Roquas 2005, p.144). This is where their 
‘third categorisation’ of epistemic communities comes into play, acknowledging both 
cognitive and social—including that of political-shaping—interests.  
 
Notably, scientific advisory committees exist not because of their scientific value but 
because of their political and regulatory value. They legitimise political decisions 
because of their supposedly ‘value neutral truth’ (and where knowledge becomes a 
political resource (e.g. Richardson 2006)). Similar to the proposals of science and 
technology studies, epistemic communities do not operate in closed systems of 
science but in open systems; the ‘messy’ world. These communities also differ from 
political or social groups in terms of their internal hierarchies, arguments that count, 
discursive styles that are accepted and the ways values and interests are recognised. 
The ‘not-pure-science’ and ‘not-pure-politics’ character of ECs makes them an 
institution in itself, continually exploring and balancing the tensions and boundaries 
between science and policy. 
  
While there is much to agree with from Jansen and Roquos (2005),
13
 they also make 
a selective reading of Grundman’s critique. His arguments actually follow closely 
with some of theirs and resonate with the overarching analysis of this thesis. The 
point is that Haas (1992) suggests too much of the consensus-building ability of 
epistemic communities in international regimes for four reasons: 
i. policymakers actually do not necessarily turn to specialists to ameliorate 
uncertainties;  
ii. policymakers rarely act on the consensus view held by specialists; 
iii. consensus might actually never be reached, which aggravates 
controversy; and, 
iv. epistemic communities might emerge before decision-makers realise there 
are problems with uncertainties.  
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 The actual argument the authors make is that within epistemic communities, efforts to establish 
meaningful understandings of local contexts fail not (only) because expertise may be missing but 
expertise occurs in the form of stand-in, detached advice that they call ‘absentee expertise” (the 
idea seems to reflect the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge proposed by Polyani 





So contrary to Jansen and Roquos (2005), Grundman (1996) does in fact 
acknowledge the epistemic community’s role as part of a wider network of 
legitimisation (similar to advocacy coalitions) and require the sanction of power. 
These appear to reflect the ‘messy world’ Jansen and Roquos (2005) consider, 
although Grundman (1996) is taking consensus building and decision-making as his 
point of departure rather than dwelling solely on the causality or sole importance of 
epistemic communities. Furthermore, Grundman (1996) does not “deny the centrality 
of the cognitive element” but suggests that it may lose its privileged role as an 
authority to which policymakers would turn (especially when the science itself is in a 
state of controversy not consistency). In doing so, there are still symbolic resources 
that ECs bring to bear on the process, in the form of principles, ways of framing 
problems, and providing certain solutions. In relation to earlier discussion, there is 
obvious overlap here too with Mosse (2004; 2005), who speaks of a ‘process’ of 
legitimisation rather than separating science and political legitimacy (see also Leach 
et al. 2005). He also notes the importance of actively constructing discourses and 
narratives rather than being passive recipients (drawing on Latour (1996) and similar 
to structuration theories noted above). Similar issues are witnessed when one moves 
from the international realms to local ones, from regimes to bureaucracies.  
Technocracy 
The policy process is deeply embedded in the modern exercise of rational authority 
and its legitimisation (Weber & Parsons 2012)—it is politically important that 
decisions are seen to be founded in accurate rational processes. It is within the realms 
of technocracy in which evidence-based policy and the scientific basis of policy finds 
its niche, if not providing a meta-political project at the forefront of decision-making. 
By this, there is always the concern that technocracy has anti-political (Du Toit 
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 Though such views need to be contrasted with others that suggest that, despite politics becoming 
increasingly apolitical through expertise, increasingly, public and lay participation are playing 
important roles not only in manufacturing knowledge but being embedded within a rising tide of a 




Technocracy is defined as a union between science and politics (Fischer 1990) in 
which science, or rather the scientist, acquires a privileged position in the political 
and policymaking sphere. The way in which technocracy plays itself out, however, 
contextualises to some degree the tension encountered when politics meets science 
and evidence as STS theorists suggest. Jenkins (2007) highlights that the intersection 
between politics and policy largely refutes the technocratic illusion that rational 
policymaking derived from objective knowledge somehow occurs above interests 
and ideologies. It is just that - an illusion!  
 
Kirkpatrick (2008, p.151) provides a useful definition of technocracy from critical 
perspectives and alleges “that modern societies have allowed an increasing number 
of their operations to be taken over, if not by actual technologies then by agencies 
charged with providing solutions that are defined technically, as an alternative to 
those that are reached deliberatively”. Fischer (1990) argues further that 
“technocratic theory and practices are largely shaped at the level of the organisation 
and that much of post-industrial politics can be understood as an attempt to extend 
such technocratic managerial practices to the state” (ibid. 1990, p. 14). In many 
ways, technocracy resembles a continued foray into the rationalisation of government 
through bureaucratic lines, as highlighted by Max Weber. Weber suggests that 
rationalisation —the development of science, modern technology and bureaucracy—
is the organisation of social and economic life according to the principles of 
efficiency and on the basis of technical knowledge (Weber & Parsons 2003). 
 
If bureaucracy and technical knowledge are symbolic of rationalisation, technocracy 
reflects their combination and the elevation of technical knowledge over and above 
others. There is a distinction implicit by this, in that technocrats are, at least in 
principle, distinct from bureaucrats (and ‘econocrats’) through their predominant 
problem-solving approaches, which in turn are derived from technical training. They 
thus perceive many important societal problems as being solvable, often while 
proposing technology-focused solutions. The technocratic “emphasis on rational 
coordination of institutional processes to the functional requirements of the 
productive system, gives rise to a uniquely administrative or managerial conception 




moved towards complex bureaucracies to aid and deliver on decision-making 
processes. In South Africa, the move towards New Public Management during the 
Mbeki era is representative of such principles. In practice, however, and not 
surprisingly, South Africa’s administration poorly reflects the aspirations of the 
hypothetical techno-corporate government described by Fischer, which invites a 
powerful political ideology to reshape the governance sphere along the lines of 
corporate liberalism. The idea of a ‘techno-corporate model’ of governance is used 
here purely as one model of how technocracy may fit into the wider governance 
structure. Techno-corporate government can be understood in terms of three spheres: 
 a top echelon of political and economic elites  
 a technocratic strata of experts and specialised administrators (identified as 
the technostructure), and  
 a largely depoliticised mass public (Fischer (1990) citing Habermas’s 
‘scientisation’ of politics and public opinion).  
It is the politics and search for allegiances between the technostructure and the 
elites—the politics of expertise—that becomes of importance in the case of biofuels. 
As I will show, the final decisions in South Africa did not reflect anything like what 
technocrats would want (except perhaps in the long run but that is a separate 
discussion and a politics-of-expertise debate should certainly be explored by further 
research). Such a situation reconfigures the value technocrats played in the policy 
development and the operations of the political elites rejecting the needs and advice 
of the ‘experts’ (although largely conforming to their rationales … that meaning the 
biofuels strategy remains locked into specific discourses and narratives and ‘ways of 
doing things’).  
At the same time, as these operations occur within wider governance frameworks—
that is operations beyond the confines of government and increasingly involvement 
of non-state actors—experts increasingly come from sectors beyond government 
departments. Therefore, technocracy has to be seen not only as a strictly bureaucratic 
process as outlined by the likes of Weber but incorporates a general movement 
towards expert advice within the nexus between government, civil society and the 
private sector (and hence also the rise of epistemic communities). Within this 




scientists and experts (though see Scoones 2012 for a pithy critique of the UK 
situation). While the role of scientist and advisor has been discussed above, 
technocracy involves an appreciation or model of knowledge and knowledge 
generation processes specific to public administrations, in which there remains the 
pervasive assumption that such processes are value-free and objective. Teik (2010, 
p.2) dispels the neutral nature of technocrats and states: 
[t]echnocracy often holds out the promise of rational, disinterested decision 
making. Yet states look to technocracy not just for expert inputs and 
calculated outcomes but also to embed the exercise of power in many 
agendas, policies and programs. Thus, technocracy operates as an 
appendage of politically constructed structures and configurations of 
power, and highly placed technocrats cannot be ‘mere’ backroom experts 
who supply disinterested rational-technical solutions in economic planning, 
resource allocation and social distribution, which are inherently political. 
Teik (2010) argues that politics and technocracy enjoy a symbiotic relationship. 
Political organisation, in the form of states and regimes, requires technocracy to 
guide complex policy formation and render the policy choices credible with their 
expert knowledge (hence the politics of expertise). Technocrats need politics, that is, 
the sanction of power, to be heeded and to have a powerful claim to the resources in 
their fields (Hart and Victor 1993, Teik 2010). In the same way, the South African 
administration departs from an idealised technostructure (above) it is the symbiosis 
between politicians and technocrats described by Teik that I contend adequately, but 
only in contrast, describes the South African biofuels policy development. When 
technocrats do not have the sanction of power, that is they have no support, their 
proposals are considered ‘failures’. Although, this too is only one construction of 
failure and does not necessarily mean there is still no future for, in South Africa’s 
case, biofuels; support still exists and networks are clearly more complex and beyond 
merely the ‘political’ and technocratic. Of course, it may also be simply stated that 
technocracy is merely a form of politics but working under the guise of value-free 
rational decision-making.  
THE FEASIBILITY STUDY AND EVIDENCE GATHERING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
BIOFUELS POLICY 
The Biofuel Task Team was established to oversee a policy process that would be 




public consultation thereafter, a topic I delve into later on.) A ‘Feasibility Study’, 
entitled “An Investigation into the Feasibility of Establishing a Biofuels Industry in 
the Republic of South Africa” (Biofuels Task Team 2006), was initiated to determine 
the issues that would justify the creation of the biofuels industry, such as 
environmental benefits, supply security and job creation by examining what a South 
African biofuels industry could look like. The approach was one of comparing South 
Africa ‘with and without’ a biofuels industry. This, according to the Feasibility 
Study’s Executive Summary, must form the basis of an Industrial Biofuel Strategy 
(Biofuels Task Team 2006). 
 
The previous discussion suggests that evidence and the process through which it is 
created are both subject to their own internal logics and biases. Similarly, whereas 
evidence might be useful in decision-making, policy is cultural, which Kirkpatrick 
(2008) defines as the realm of meaning, and thus, evidence is better viewed as only 
one aspect of the meaning-making process. Evidence, after all, may be used in ways 
different to that intended by so-called advisors (Hill, 2005; Hodgson and Irving, 
2007b). It is here then that unpacking the process of policy-making becomes so 
important, and it is by referring (perhaps too loosely) to the Feasibility Study as a 
rational or scientific endeavour that the above discussion of STS becomes relevant, 
though as we shall see may be overly ambitious. Its use as ‘evidence’, however, 
should not be neglected. How the Feasibility Study actually achieves its goal—
forming the basis for the strategy—has been scrutinised to some degree in the 
consultation phases when the draft Strategy was released. The next sections give 
such criticisms further attention reflecting also on the Feasibility Study’s position in 
the broader policy development and as a function of its own logics and biases. 
 
It is first necessary to reflect that the industrial rationale had been well established by 
the start of the Feasibility Study. The questions were not the type of approach to be 
followed but what differences the biofuels industry (imagined, one could suggest, to 
match that of countries such as Brazil, Germany or the United States of America) 
would make to South Africa.
15
 Reinforcing such a rational, the Feasibility Study 
would be overseen by the Central Energy Fund (CEF) and the Industrial 
                                                 
15




Development Corporation (IDC), who had a direct interest in large-scale biofuels 
development. There is a discernible conflict of interest here,
16
 given that while the 
CEF enrolled the consultant to undertake the Feasibility Study, it also had an 
investing interest within a range of projects being proposed at the time (Cf. African 
Centre for Biosafety 2008). By enrolment, I mean that the CEF and the IDC were in 
control of the Feasibility Study—its Terms of Reference were entitled “Joint Study 
for CEF (Pty) Ltd and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC): An investigation 
into the feasibility of establishing a Bio Fuels industry in the Republic of South 
Africa”—who then brought on further expertise. The final version of the study 
merely excludes the CEF and IDC in its title. Their interest in biofuel projects 
emanates from progress reports from the CEF itself suggesting that, while it 
appointed consultants who were then housed within their offices and working on 
consolidating information for the strategy, they were also (at least planning on) 
investing in at least six large-scale projects proposed in South Africa (internal 
document of the CEF, 2006). This also necessitated the extensive financial support 
needed from government. As one BTT member criticised: 
in the BTT it turned out that CEF had already lined up projects 
and they were waiting for subsidies (Former BTT member A, 
2012).  
As the ‘implementation arm’ of the Department of Energy, the latter is perhaps 
justifiable but by the former, the CEF becomes somewhat of a ‘player and referee’. It 
should be noted that there was the additional oversight of the BTT, to whom the 
consultant and CEF/IDC reported, however, as the only consultants carrying out this 
type of Feasibility Study there is significant control over framing the process to be 
taken. (Much to the distress of these and other early biofuels advocates would come 
with the realisation that even the BTT was not the only referee and while they would 
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 It is perhaps better to avoid such imposing terms as ‘conflict of interest’. In theory the policy 
process would be one in which such conflicts of interest are ironed out through the political 
process and through the work of the Biofuels Task Team. The more important issue is that even 
though the CEF and IDC, as project managers for forthcoming projects, would have the expertise 
to undertake such studies, their involvement in the BTT and so centrally with decision-making 
(with implications for the direction research and development might take) does make unclear as 
to how neutral any of the processes can claim to be. This is unfortunately not a unique situation. 
As Bond and Ndlovu (2010) highlight for the Coega ‘mega-project’ Aluminium smelter, conflicts 
of interest for key decision-makers clouded its image of good governance. Like Coega, biofuels 
projects in the Eastern Cape seem to have drawn on investment funds from the controversial arms 




take what the Feasibility Study said as a basis for the strategy subject to internal 
oversight, Cabinet still had the final judgement (see next chapter).) That presents a 
question of what the Feasibility Study actually said and whether this would match the 
needs of the BTT and the ‘political’ oversight, or if it did not, what it might mean for 
such oversight.  
Terms of Reference: Contracts or Scripts for the Evidence-making Process? 
A first point of departure in the evidence gathering phases is to unpack the original 
Terms of Reference that directed the appointed consultants. If considering the 
credibility of the feasibility report is critical, the guiding premises are of obvious 
importance as these determine to what the degree ‘the science’ or investigation is 
circumscribed by initial (and potentially non-scientific) aspirations. A copy of these 
Terms of Reference (dated 31
st
 May 2006) highlights a two-fold process and 
requisite outputs. The first would be a review of existing knowledge around biofuels 
and identifying relevant ‘gaps’ in the literature. The second was a more in-depth 
process that would consider the legal, policy and regulatory environment; economic 
and social fundamentals; energy balance; refinery depot and logistics; agriculture; 
feedstock; land and water resources; trade issues; consumer education; 
environmental considerations; risk and risk mitigation and finally some ‘general’ 
issues such as technologies, international trends, and standards amongst others. 
Although a robust set of parameters, perhaps the most noticeable constraint is that all 
this was to be achieved in three months. As the response to the terms of reference 
described below declares (Austin 2006, p.3):  
[i]t will be very difficult to do this in a rigorous manner in under three 
months, hence I trust there is a large enough team with sufficient time on 
their hands to make this a worthwhile exercise.  
The Terms of Reference (ToR) document actually stipulates a period from June to 
October—slightly longer than the three months—but importantly, there were two 
phases and the evidence gathering stage, arguably the more difficult, was what would 
have to be completed in such a short time frame. Raoul Goosen, the lead consultant 





While the short time frame is problematic, such a circumstance is not unheard of as 
decision-makers and government officials often work under significant time 
constraints. A fundamental issue here is whether any of these questions could be 
answered rigorously in any specific timeframe, or at least in a longer timeframe. The 
answer is both yes and no (or perhaps if and maybe), and is probably why 
suggestions from the feasibility appear so indeterminate (see below; though this is 
not the only reason). The issues entertained within the list of requirements noted 
above touch on some exceptionally complicated scientific problems. Take, for 
example, energy balances and environmental issues (which are considered here to 
include at least, issues of climate change given its pre-eminence in existing political 
and scientific debates). The science of both of these is by no means one of consensus, 
and that is from an international perspective rather than taking into consideration 
contextual and ideally far more in depth studies yet to be undertaken for the South 
African case. Smith (2012, p.41) sums the situation up as thus: 
[n]eedless to say, arriving at an analysis that is both accurate and of use to 
policy-makers is exceedingly difficult. Technically, there are limitations 
and trade-offs between accuracy and accessibility in analysing the true 
environmental costs of biofuel production. Scientifically, we may simply 
not have the knowledge or the data we need to fully realise a workable 
analysis. 
In following, Smith (2012) describes challenges in boundary settings; how these may 
be drawn when undertaking life cycle analyses; the difficulty in modelling complex 
systems (and ensuring methodological consistency when doing so); dealing with 
uncertainty (in data and change over time) and flawed analysis of energy returns, 
which are realistically the culmination of all of the above too but also an outcome of 
potential biases on the part of the scientists themselves. Similar arguments can be 
made for reduced carbon emissions and climate change reduction (see for example 
Searchinger et al. 2009). 
 
There is more to glean from the Terms of Reference than a robust set of parameters 
and the inability for them to be adequately researched. Reflecting the shifting 
proclivities of the Biofuels Task Team described in the previous chapter, the Terms 
of Reference reflect a narrowing of scope, aimed towards an E10 and B5 to B100 
blending of bioethanol and biodiesel respectively (Anon 2006b, p.1). The issue at 




bio-energy industry in the country is condemned to include only the two transport 
fuels. As the only feasibility study being undertaken for the strategy’s development, 
this leaves out numerous potentially viable, politically acceptable and identifiable 
industries. It is, however, logically consistent with the internal thinking of the BTT, 
who for the most part were leaning in such directions anyway and had specific 
reasons for the industrial focus (see Chapter 5). There is also some overconfidence 
on behalf of the IDC and the CEF, in which they highlight (Anon 2006b, p. 2): 
[t]he report is intended to provide a macro perspective to further assess the 
desirability proceeding with the projects identified by the CEF and IDC. 
The findings will also contribute to government strategy position on bio 
fuels.  
The underlying motivations of the ToR seem skewed towards establishing the better 
path for the CEF and IDC, with subsidiary benefits of perhaps teasing out some 
strategic direction for the policymakers too. This is not ideal as a ‘basis for the 
strategy’ being developed, despite the strategy documents and the political 
appointment of the BTT suggesting this was its original purpose.  
 
The Terms of Reference were subjected to independent review exposing a number of 
shortcomings (that would need) to be addressed before commencing the study 
according to Greg Austin, who reviewed them (Austin 2006). Important issues raised 
included, inter alia, expanded sustainability criteria to include a diversity of energy 
sources derived from biomass, a range of timeframes for developing the biofuels 
sector, sustainable production systems and calculating externalities (ibid., p.4); 
energy efficiency considerations along the entire value chain, as well as life cycle 
analyses rather than carbon emissions only (p.5&6); centralised agro-industrial 
approaches meaning limited opportunities for rural development (p.3); the neglected 
potential for decentralised approaches incorporating local Small Medium and Micro 
Enterprises (p.4); and the need for job creation by establishing links to small-scale 
farmers and throughout the biofuels value chain. Questions were also directed 
towards how the steering committee would be selected and any disputes resolved.  
 
Another point of clarity Austin (2006) considers is what the overall scope of the 
strategy was exactly. Not only was it uncertain whether the biofuels strategy being 




strategy (as mentioned above), there appeared no real objectives or goals (job 
creation, environmental sustainability, fuel security) that were to be optimised 
through the Feasibility Study. In his review then, Austin (2006) had pre-empted or 
begun to touch on the narrow scope we have seen emerging from the early processes 
discussed in Chapter 5. The review of the ToR then turns to a range of specific issues 
to be dealt with; however, many of these do not appear to have been considered in 
the final version of the Feasibility Study. The content of these is less important (see 
below) than the fact that by neglecting further discussion, the Feasibility Study 
discounts a necessary rigour for such an analysis to be considered expert or 
scientific; yet it was still acceptable as evidence in the broader process.  
 
If one considers the review of the ToR, it brings into light expert controversy in the 
early stages. If science were given the space to work towards some kind of consensus 
(or contest), there would need to be an exchange in which argument and counter 
argument are established, debated and agreed or disagreed (probably the latter). 
However, the fact that there was no further engagement on the Terms of Reference, 
following Austin’s initial review, closes off such a process entirely and begins to 
suggest that, even before we question the evidence, the ostensibly technocratic policy 
process has to some degree already fallen foul of the requirement of impartiality. At 
the very least, there is an increased likelihood that the evidence produced is more 
biased than would normally be associated with scientific evidence gathering. This is 
important as biases, acting through the terms of reference, set the tone of the 
investigation that would follow. One could also argue that the Feasibility Study itself 
is not scientific, which in itself is not problematic until one considers that the 
credibility of the study is based on the rigour of science when gathering the evidence. 
It also reflects challenges outlined in the theoretical discussion in which gathering 
the evidence itself is subject to a range of its own internal shortcomings. It is useful 
then to interrogate what evidence was actually produced.  
What Evidence? 
The Feasibility Study is more a modelling exercise focussed significantly, but not 
entirely, on the financial feasibility of biofuels. To review its content I draw from the 




provides a concise critical appraisal of the Feasibility Study. While the Feasibility 
Study justifies an industrial biofuels development given the financial feasibility, 
there are some major contradictions and there is a strong need to assess the social and 
environmental costs of such development (McDaid, 2007). My reading of the 
Feasibility Study also raises some important contradictions between the early jobs 
and rural development narratives and the actual potential of these to be realised 
through the strategy, which I discuss later.  
 
The ASFC takes as a basis for their critique the objectives of the Feasibility Study, 
which sought to determine three things, by answering the following questions:  
i. Is a biofuels industry in South Africa justified?  
ii. If so, what magnitude and nature is optimum?  
iii. What incentives and regulatory environment is needed to create this 
optimum size industry, and in an optimum manner?  
 
In the Feasibility Study, the justification of a biofuels industry is answered after the 
optimum magnitude and nature are covered in economic terms (as part of a 
methodological discussion) in the first section of the Study. Despite proposing a 
triple bottom line, the social and environmental issues would be applied after the 
financial models have been developed. The implied assumption is that the 
environmental and social outcomes will not have an impact on the financial model 
and are therefore externalities that might be mitigated separately. By raising such 
criticism, the ASFC questions the economic logic of externalities calling for a 
broader view from outside such economic fundamentals. Without venturing into 
value judgments or economic debates around externalities—largely revolving around 
differences between private and public goods and distributive benefits accrued 
from/through each—the importance here is to suggest that such principles are 
wedded to policymaking in extremely early phases of the decision-making process. It 
suggests a naturalised order of things; first make sure that it makes economic sense, 
if it does not, do not proceed (or figure out ways to make it make sense), if it does, 




open to change of course, as later proposals of linking the first and second economy 
(which is financially intractable) suggests.)  
 
The ASFC then critically assesses the six arguments the Feasibility Study puts 
forward as a justification for a biofuels industry. These include:  
i. Meeting the rural energy target: the weakness of this section of the 
Feasibility Study, is that it focuses not on why biofuels is a good method 
of meeting the renewable energy targets (as opposed to other approaches 
that would not require the agricultural sacrifices) but rather details how 
biofuels should be supported.  
ii. Energy Security: here the feasibility recognises the blending ratios 
proposed make little contribution to overall energy security.  
iii. Agricultural support and development: it is acknowledged in the 
Feasibility Study that agricultural support emerges as the primary driver 
of biofuels assistance in all cases and that being reliant on feedstock, 
agricultural subsidies and incentives are a necessary element to any 
biofuels strategy. Whether the subsidisation of the costs of agricultural 
development via biofuels is more efficient than alternatives is not 
clarified. 
iv. Jobs: the need to create jobs and rural development is spuriously based on 
factors that could undermine sustainable development. While the 
feasibility suggests the need to establish the cost of creating jobs in the 
biofuel sector compared to alternatives, it does not do so [except in 
comparison with those within the petrochemical industry]. 
v. Emerging farmers and SMMEs: This section poses the question of the 
extent to which a displacement of crude oil refined products can create 
opportunities and jobs for SMME’s and, as ninety per cent of the jobs for 
biofuels are located in the agricultural sector, for emerging farmers in 
particular. It provides no answers.  
vi. Second economy: this section poses the question “whether biofuels will 
help shift emerging farmers from a subsistence existence to commercial 
production” but provides no answers. [There is, however, explicit 




industrial biofuels strategy, requiring a separate strategy to be developed 
and highlighting a contradiction in the body of the report and its executive 
summary, and in relation to how it is used in the draft Strategy.] 
 
In summary, of the six motivations put forward as justification, three have no 
answer, two state the biofuels will not make a significant contribution, and one is 
ambivalent, stating that a biofuels strategy could provide agricultural support but on 
the other hand, unsure if it should. The Feasibility Study, according to the ASFC, 
therefore fails to demonstrate the necessary justification for an industrial biofuels 
strategy. The study does, however, go on to look at a range of issues that might in 
some way respond to these unanswered questions, but not clearly. It begins to outline 
what kinds of support could be offered, but as only a Feasibility Study it does not 
make any prescriptions.  
 
There is a question, however, as to whether the lack of information makes a strategy 
unjustified, or, whether one then needs to strategise based on the best available 
information to ensure a viable future. Whether this was achieved I will discuss later, 
certainly it seems to be the approach taken.  
It’s a feasibility, by the time you look for your strategic concerns 
you can expect a negative finding in the feasibility but if you 
unpack and understand it then you can determine how to work on 
it, it can become part of your strategy regardless if there was the 
problem or not. So I won’t discount the value of CEFs 
contribution, that consultant did not report to CEF in 
synthesising all these reports, that consultant had to report to the 
Task Team on a regular basis while there was the 
interdepartmental strategy (Former B-JIC member, 2012). 
 
The credibility of the Feasibility Study is dubious and provides a relatively sketchy 
basis to work from but there are also deeper cracks in the overriding philosophy, 
which emerge if one goes further than the Executive Summary. The Feasibility Study 
actually discusses at some length the range of possibilities for conservation 
agriculture (no till, conservation agriculture, et cetera.) and environmental 
considerations that need to be considered but these are not considered in the draft or 




especially me, as I was accustomed to the far more industrial ‘first economy’ 
rationales of the strategy documents and the views of those interviewed. The latter 
issue was also not considered in detail by the ASFC, apart from acknowledging their 
support for such approaches. It was only in discussions with Annie Sugrue, an 
unlikely member
17
 of the consultant team that one grasps the inclusion of such 
conflicting views. There was definitely a clash of ideologies taking place. Her main 
concerns was that this was not a programme that would be of benefit to smallholders 
(hence the first main contradiction mentioned above) and second, she included the 
section of ecological farming as she had concerns of the sustainability of the farming 
practices envisioned. Although being vocal about these issues, they did not fit with 
the general philosophy. The irony is that politicians angling for a ‘jobs solution’ 
meant that a strategy was produced for smallholders that could only work for 
commercial farmers; an argument I elaborate on in later chapters. The initial 
antagonism has been quietly forgotten after the Strategy was released and, it must be 
said, that the bias towards the second economy evident in the draft and final 
strategies does not emanate from these provocations in the feasibility but wider 
political discourses as discussed in the previous chapter. Any discontent or a 
continued debate was short lived as, once the Feasibility Study was produced the 
various consultants parted ways.  
 
I take up the issue of the second economy later, for now the absence of sustainability 
issues from the strategy suggests there was little further consideration about who the 
farmers were going to be and the types of farming that would be used. Indeed, it is 
wondered by the consultant if that section of the Feasibility Study was even read at 
all let alone considered any further. The Draft Strategy (DME, 2006, p.7) states 
boldly that:  
it would not be prudent to drive [the biofuels initiative] without 
consideration of holistic sustainability benefits, at local, national, regional 
and global levels. The Feasibility Study underpinning this draft Strategy 
therefore included a holistic analysis, so that the draft Strategy proposed 
could take account of all factors and impacts.  
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That appears to be the extent of consideration given in the strategy, even though such 
issues were clearly not resolved in the feasibility. From the nature of the projects 
proposed (see Chapter 4), they also do not appear to be considered in practice either 
(though it could be argued that it is up to environmental legislation to ensure 
‘sustainability’ at the project level, this is beside the point and perhaps over-
ambitious). This focus on industrial agriculture is a useful lens through which one 
can highlight the nature of the objections and identify the meaning-making process 
the Feasibility Study and the subsequent Draft Strategy represents. The feasibility is 
rather strictly focussed on economic viability, using commercial production as a 
basis (despite raising environmental and social issues outside of this). Two main 
objections, amongst others, should then be raised. The first involves contextual 
aspects, for example the viability of pursuing commercial agriculture on new land, in 
the face of projections of increasingly destructive climate change (Jones & Thornton 
2003; Lobell et al. 2008; Lobell et al. 2011), with water already a limited resource 
(Jewitt et al. 2009). Additionally, mechanised and large-scale farming is not 
necessarily environmentally and socially sustainable or even relevant for developing 
countries (Woods, 2006) but certainly requires greater scrutiny in the South African 
context. Apart from econometric criteria, there is no real sense of sustainability 
criteria established within the strategy. Not even the energy returns on energy 
invested, which would show whether it is worth pursuing biofuels in the first place 
are interrogated.
18
 These are considered contextual as the degree to which they are 
affected by and impact on biofuels production depends on local contexts. No 
recommendations are provided as to how such contexts will be handled.   
 
There is a lingering question as to why such an abstract feasibility becomes credible 
given the contextual requisites necessary to make decisions. The latter further 
suggests an institutional barrier in that national polices become abstract in their own 
right (if not out of necessity), which precludes any specifics or tailoring towards 
local contexts. This is a more practical limitation or outcome of institutional 
arrangements in the county. As the policymaking realm is at national level, policies 
are national in scope and bear very little resemblance to the heterogeneity such 
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policies are likely to encounter in their implementation. The latter is suggestive of an 
inadequate ‘fit’ (Cash et al. 2006; Young 2002; e.g. Ruysenaar 2009) between 
institutions and the socio-ecological systems they are meant to govern, yet consensus 
prevails. As Richard Rumelt (2011) makes clear, however, consensus, especially 
vague consensus can be a bad thing.  
Evidence as Consensus Building 
Although not providing perfect information, the importance of the Feasibility Study 
was not actually what it said specifically (although these are important in the 
emerging criticisms of the study itself)
19
 but how it was used to validate specific 
policy narratives. It is here where pro-poor or developmental rhetoric becomes so 
important (again), even when such rhetoric contradicts the Feasibility Study 
pervasively. The Feasibility Study itself is actually largely devoid of suggesting any 
kind of pro-poor bias. In fact, despite acknowledging “[j]ob creation and upliftment 
of the so-called second economy are the prime benefits or objectives” (2006, p.1), 
the Feasibility Study goes on to state that there is little room for biofuels to link the 
first and second economy.  
This report’s point of departure is therefore that a biofuel programme for 
the small-scale farming sector must differ from that devised for the larger 
commercial farms if it is to contribution to alleviate poverty and stimulate a 
rural local economy. In the short term, such a programme will unlikely 
bring about the merging of the first and second agricultural economies. For 
that, an intensive long-term intervention is required (Biofuels Task Team 
2006, p.57). 
 
Instead, as the above extract suggests, the Feasibility Study highlights that a different 
strategy will be needed for poverty relief and small-scale farmers than that devised 
for larger farms and that there were other benefits that were still important. Although 
some further attention is given towards opportunities for small-scale farmers, it 
amounts to about three pages of just over one hundred and it emanates from Annie 
Sugrue—the consultant who found herself part of a consulting team, although one of 
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discourse (e.g. Prinsloo 2011) but the final Strategy actually halves this (as it did the proposed 




very different background to the others. It is for this reason revealing that in the draft 
Strategy, the same motivation, transformation and linking the two economies is 
mooted as one of the objectives,
20
 despite maintaining the same rationale and biases 
of the Feasibility Study.   
 
The draft Strategy considers for example:  
[the] biofuels industry, being agri-based, is low technology and job 
intensive, which suits participation by the 2nd economy … The intention is 
to have as light handed a government approach as possible, with regulatory 
and incentive interventions to a minimum and decreasing over time. 
However, where there are market failures, in particular to establish the 
infant biofuels industry, government will regulate as is necessary (DME, 
2006, p. 9). 
 
The Feasibility Study allows some credibility to such pronouncements made in the 
strategy document not by what it says but by it being undertaken. Of course, one 
could argue that even subscribing to the idea of a first and second economy hides 
important cleavages and historical dynamics that have resulted in the rich minority 
(first economy) and poor majority (second economy) or poor black farmers versus 
rich white ones (see Chapter 3), but also shows how the metaphor of the two 
economies neglects the complex historical linkages between the two. Similarly, food 
is produced in the Free State and sold to the former Transkei (in the Eastern Cape) 
because there is requisite infrastructure is in the Free State – and yet the Transkei has 
some of the most fertile land. This is a structural issue and resembles old power 
structures not technical issues of soil fertility. This means there is a need for higher 
order planning that acknowledges the historical processes through which current 
markets have developed, and where necessary replicate or remediate. To simply 
‘bridge’ the first and second economy utilising biofuels as a techno-solution will not 
achieve the transformation of the rural economy, it might allow for some form of 
transition of one form of agriculture (traditional/small-scale) to another (large-scale) 
but there is no guarantee that this will have the ‘developmental’ benefits deemed 
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 When considering objectives in the draft Strategy, it is stated that (BTT, 2006, p6-7) 
“[g]overnments typically have many policy objectives that are pursued concurrently and 
consequently any new intervention runs the risk of being diffused and lost among the myriad 
competing policies. This is especially the case with renewable energy interventions that may meet 
many varied objectives.” It seems here that the strategy itself has fallen victim to this by 
maintaining its developmental stance when the objectives deemed achievable within the 




important. At the same time, as easy as it is to criticise obvious contradictions, no-
one has suggested that there is an automatic acceptance of the two-economies 
rhetoric in the biofuels debate, in which biofuels ‘cannot link the two’ (according to 
the Feasibility Study) and will link the two (according to the draft Strategy). On the 
one hand, the techno-industrial rationales of the Feasibility Study clearly ‘others’ 
what may be regarded as the second economy. On the other hand, the prevailing 
political aspirations make the second economy central to the strategy but erroneously 
based on what is feasible in the first economy. Neither perspective considers whether 
the promotion of two economies or the emerging biofuel discourse is based on 
spurious logics in the first place. 
 
A final issue of the Feasibility Study as consensus building, that has been implicit in 
the differing perspectives of the team members, is whom it brings together. 
Following on from Austin’s quotation above, whether the team was large enough is a 
moot point now. Ultimately, it probably was not but it would be difficult to suggest 
an optimum size regardless. However, there was an interesting composition 
emerging in which the IDC and CEF had had an offer from ABSA to assist with the 
process, and also included a range of other financial and industrial specialists 
(particularly with links to Sasol) as well as some academics from Stellenbosch 
University, Pretoria University and the FAPRI team (described in the next chapter). 
While in a meeting with Raoul Goosen—the lead consultant on the Feasibility 
Study—it was fitting that he was able to point out some of the other members of the 
research team undertaking the feasibility as they made their way down the corridors 
at the IDC. The way he saw it—and from meetings from former ABSA 
representatives he is accurate—ABSA had a lot of debt in the agricultural sector and 
had a vested interest in considering the value of biofuels to maize farming in the 
country. These perspectives merged nicely with the thinking of the IDC as an 
emerging entrant into the biofuels industry on the technology side.  
 
I have encountered varied criticisms that the experts were all like-minded specialists 
from the oil industry or agribusiness. Apart from Annie Sugrue, there is probably 
some truth to the perception, given the experts and their affiliations noted above. 




proceed with biofuels in very specific ways.
21
 This group informed the growing 
imaginary surrounding biofuels in which advocates set out a trajectory for agrofuels; 
that is agrofuels within the confines of the MEC and existing fuel architectures and 
paralleled by support from agribusiness and their counterpart industrial farmers. This 
should not be taken to mean that there were no internal arguments and that some 
were not disillusioned. Not even ABSA necessarily endorsed the findings of the 
feasibility. It seems they too had their objections to what was produced, though these 
became more acute once the strategy was released. As a former ABSA member 
bemoaned: 
We were trying to get some good work done, using private money 
to fund public research and they gave us the middle finger… Real 
research was done, not like government does; we had something 
substantial! (Consultant C, 2010). 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: FROM EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY TO GOVERNING 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
This chapter began with a theoretical discussion about the use of scientific 
knowledge in the policy process. The proposal is that science, almost counter-
intuitively, does not inform policy in ways one would assume. Social science and 
scientific knowledge are in fact problematic; they are neither absolutely objective nor 
are they necessarily amenable to solving policy problems. The same can be said 
more generally of evidence, if not more so. For one, evidence may be imperfect and 
depart from the rigours of ‘science’ (experience and the lay public may also be 
important sources of evidence) but still be legitimised based on presumptions of 
positivistic and objective knowledge. These dynamics can clearly be seen in the 
evidence-making processes of the biofuels strategy. The modelling of the Feasibility 
itself, while represented as best practices, does not examine the full extent of the 
complexities involved in biofuels and, where alternative approaches are considered 
necessary, these are marginalised and left unattended. Granted, it is questionable 
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 Even I had become guilty of talking about biofuels according to its conceptualisation within the 
strategy. This dawned on me when meeting with a consultant from the USA, who was reluctant to 
use the words biofuels in such specific ways and that he had continually had to classify what he 
considered biofuels when discussing them. He took on a far more diverse bioenergy perspective 
and considered a range of fuels incorporated within this overarching category. He was always 




whether it is possible to acquire sufficient information around certain risks and 
complexities of biofuels (e.g. Smith 2010) and, as only a general Feasibility Study or 
modelling, a partial examination of technicalities is perhaps admissible. One of the 
BTT members levelled an extreme criticism pointing towards the circumspect 
evidence provided:  
there was no real science involved and that if you talk to … in 
South Africa … the community of scientists in water and wood 
and all those guys, they think biofuels is completely rubbish. So, I 
think you shouldn’t underestimate that there is a big body of 
intellectuals, or claimed intellectuals, who think biofuels is 
horseshit, because they know better (Former BTT Chairperson B, 
2010). 
His criticism was twofold. First, he reiterated the first conclusion above in that the 
evidence was clearly inadequate and unscientific, even though it was presented as 
rigorous and objective. Second, it suggests that only certain perspectives were of 
value to the Feasibility Study (with limited space for counter evidence). This matches 
with a second conclusion, which, drawing from STS perspectives, shows that it is the 
networks and social construction of evidence that gives it a perceived truth-value and 
in so doing legitimises its passage into the policy sphere. Such a process insists we 
need to look at who produces knowledge and how they come to be legitimate 
providers of such knowledge but also who the gatekeepers are. In the case of the 
Feasibility Study, it is important to first note that this was a study undertaken for the 
CEF and IDC as much as it was a study undertaken for the Biofuels Task Team and 
developing of the strategy. It was a technical review, constructed to fit within an 
overriding and preconceived terms of reference (which were also shown to be 
inadequate) and was handled by experts from the fuel industry, supported by major 
investors in agriculture and investors in large-scale projects, all of whom were either 
part of or had close links to the BTT. (To some, the BTT was perceived to be made 
up of bureaucrats with little understanding of the complexity involved in biofuels and 
thus required expert advice). Little wonder the study comes out in support of a 






Being the basis for the Strategy, the feasibility provides a very shaky foundation but 
does open up the possibility of providing a legitimising or symbolic basis giving the 
resulting strategy a perceived credibility. As the BTT, who would draft the strategy, 
had accepted the Feasibility Study as credible, the two were legitimised by one 
another. There is little chance that the BTT would reject the feasibility, as it was part 
of their imaginary, created not external to but within their confines. What has been 
produced then as a strategy document is based largely on the meanings ascribed to 
certain elements of the Feasibility Study. There is very little tackling of the difficult 
issues but rather a focus on those that allowed shared meaning and consensus, 
however thin that consensus was. This is not policy-based evidence gathering, it is 
policy-based evidence co-production. That is, policy and evidence are both co-
produced and, are themselves socially constructed; they are shaped by the larger 
situation in which they rest, as Jansen and Roquas (2005) suggest in their review of 
epistemic communities.  
 
The latter raises a further conclusion that is perhaps outside of the research findings 
but an important consideration from a policymaking and governance perspective. 
The thrust of this chapter has been towards the use of scientific knowledge in 
policymaking and the challenges and complexity thereof. From another perspective, 
one should also think about the governance of science and technology, indeed 
recognising it as something that needs governing. This seems to be especially 
important in complex case like biofuels and in a country like South Africa where the 
state’s ability to govern complexity faces its own challenges. Science and technology 
within decision-making needs to be underpinned by a decision-making apparatus that 
shapes that science and technology in the first place otherwise it ends up simply 
being reactive and not strategic.
22
 Of course, one could argue that this has been the 
case for the biofuels strategy, the point is asking who (or what) does the shaping, or 
better yet framing and how it changes with political oversight. With this in mind, the 
next chapter will look at how the policy has been reshaped and how such knowledge 
might not be as important in policy as we think anyway.  
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 Expressed in a somewhat different way, we need to question whether it is science and technology 









CHAPTER 7: MOVING BEYOND THE RATIONAL – POLITICS AND THE RE-
FRAMING OF THE BIOFUELS INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
In the previous chapters, the origins of the biofuels strategy and the prevailing logic 
of the feasibility were scrutinised. In so doing I have also begun to highlight some of 
the major stakeholders—those who ‘hold the power’—involved in the early 
processes. Whereas policymaking in these early stages was confined to close 
networks surrounding the Biofuels Task Team, the phases discussed next see the 
onset of a far wider array of actors, with vastly different prerogatives, which would 
also shift as new political challenges came to the fore. In this chapter, I will continue 
to map the policy’s development, analysing some of the significant changes that 
occurred and highlighting the shifts that occurred between the publishing of the 
(highly criticised) draft Strategy and its (business-unfriendly) final version. Most 
commentators consider these shifts being to both the strategy’s and the industry’s 
detriment.  
 
To begin, I first depart from the general empirical narrative and review two existing 
analyses of the strategy’s development. The point is not that the existing reviews are 
incorrect, as they have important findings, but that they do not go far enough in 
examining the nature of policymaking beyond somewhat narrow economic or 
rationalist conceptions or a strict positivistic orthodoxy. For this reason, I will 
present a summary of the two major works delving into the strategy’s development 
and then follow this up with a summary of my findings from interviews with key 
informants involved in the process, contrasting some of the previous findings but 
also bolstering many of them. In essence, the approach continues the overall 
problematisation of the policy process, by interrogating not only what was said but 
questioning why such sayings are considered ‘normal’. The critique is thus not only 
that of the ‘objective’ nature of the existing reviews but the rhetoric of the strategy 
and the negotiations through which it was constructed.  
 
One of the most dramatic shifts during the consultation phases- between the draft 
Strategy and its final version was that of the food-versus-fuel debate. A significant 




substantiates the limitations of purely ‘economistic’ perspectives mentioned before. 
The food-versus-fuel debate is important for two other reasons. First, it further 
documents shifting power structures and underlying narratives and discourses within 
the policy process and somewhat represents the dismantling of the maize lobby and 
its supporters (although this is not the only reason for their ‘disbanding’ or the last 
we will hear of them).
1
 More so, tracing the food-versus-fuel debate allows one to 
uncover and interrogate what was considered purely political forces that have had the 
final say on the matter. That it was a political decision is certain, as I will show, 
however, the motivations behind such decisions need greater inspection, whilst some 
remain hidden if not invisible. Additionally, there is room to step back and reflect on 
what these political decisions suggest of policymaking processes in general, as I will 
do in the concluding section of this chapter.  
EXISTING REVIEWS: GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND MARKET SUPREMACY IN 
FINALISING THE BISSA 
Two major works have already begun to unpack the development of the strategy. The 
first is a Doctoral thesis using Game Theory to model the process, showing what 
should have happened as opposed to what actually did, and provide remedial 
recommendations to the impasse (Funke 2010). The second is an econometric review 
by the Johns Hopkins University that sought to research the potential impacts (or lost 
opportunities) of the strategy on the rural poor (Adams et al. 2009).  
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 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the maize-to-ethanol projects and their demise after government 
passed the final Strategy. Essentially, industry players who were bargaining on greater support 
from government— in terms of incentives and mandated blending—constructed the failure. When 
these pre-requisites were excluded in the strategy, most projects became unviable. One of the first 
projects—now known as Mabele Fuels—has, however, slowly being lobbying government and 
continuing with their plans and appears set to be one of the major biofuels producers in South 
Africa, when the remaining issues of the strategy are sorted out (Brouwer, 2011, Pers. Comm.). 
That the maize lobby respondents have generally referred to this as a ‘policy failure’ is largely a 
construction, given that they had foreseen something different to what happened and that support 
for them within the policy was withdrawn. There was no reason ‘strictly’ speaking that 
government had to provide such incentives, and according to some Task Team members could 
not afford to anyway. The fact that large sums of money were lost by these early investors 
illustrates the importance of policy itself, and the way in which abstract and rhetorical judgments 
have very real implications; but there are no guarantees. It does not mean that the policy failed for 




Playing Games in the Development of the Biofuels Industrial Strategy  
Thomas Funke was a student at the University of Pretoria, working closely with the 
Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP). His Doctoral thesis in Agricultural 
Economics forms part of a wider modelling process undertaken by the BFAP, which 
is probably the most comprehensive modelling of the agricultural sector commodities 
(BFAP, 2012, 2010, e.g. BFAP 2006) and the potential influence of biofuels 
undertaken in South Africa (Funke et al. 2009; Meyer et al. 2008).
2
 The analyses 
also provide a summary of the support necessary to ensure a viable industry. A 
review of the biofuels industry was included in early editions but this has slowly 
turned into paragraph-long generic extracts given the industry’s dismal performance 
(actually non-existent apart from a used-vegetable-oil sector) during the biofuel 
strategy’s pilot phase (e.g. BFAP 2010). Apart from some remarks of the policy as 
being uncertain,
3
 the BFAP reviews have largely focussed more on commodities 
rather than the policymaking process, save for Funke’s Doctoral thesis and 
subsequent peer-reviewed article published the journal Biofuels (Funke & Klein 
2011). In 2008, they also produced a report dealing specifically with the potential 
impacts of proposals made in the biofuels strategy, and modelling some alternatives 
(BFAP 2008). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 there are inherent strengths and weaknesses when using 
rationalistic approaches to model and explain policymaking, especially strictly 
economic game-theoretic models. Inasmuch as theories of instrumental rationality 
have progressed 
this advance comes at the cost of conceptualizing intentionality in terms of 
a relatively thin theory of human rationality… Anyone who has waited at a 
traffic light when no-one else was around, however, has to admit that there 
are dimensions to the relationship between institutions and actions that may 
not be highly instrumental or well-modelled by rational choice theories 
(Hall & Taylor 1996, p.951). 
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 It was the BFAPs work that was used as part of the Feasibility Study discussed in Chapter 6. Their 
less–than-optimistic view of the potential for biofuels lost them some support from industry 
players and policymakers during the process (Meyer, Pers. Comm. 2010).  
3
 BFAP (2010, p.6) suggests for example: “In the case of biofuels, the South African government 
published its industrial strategy in December 2007. This strategy has been incorporated into the 
model. However, a number of issues were not clearly addressed or explained in the industrial 




Nevertheless, as Peter John (2012) highlights, these rationalistic models are one 
mechanism to identify causality and allow for comparison between what would have 
been ‘rational’ and what actually happened (see also Thelen 1999; Koelble 1995). 
This is why Thomas Funke’s work is so important and will be summarised here; as 
he suggests “[t]he game provides an excellent insight into how government actions 
have been unfocused and irrelevant” (Funke 2010, p.15).  
A Commentary of Funke’s Thesis 
Funke begins his thesis by considering the inherent need for biofuels (win-win 
narratives) and insisting that best practices in developing associated industries 
incorporate multi-stakeholder approaches. Best practices such as that of Brazil, the 
United States of America (USA) and to lesser extent the European Union (EU), have 
achieved the necessary support systems, whereas South Africa has failed. South 
Africa’s policy goals are based on too many different interests, resulting in a policy 
of no support. From this backdrop, his problem statement is one of contrasting views 
that need to be accommodated through the policy process, which in South Africa 
includes economic feasibility of production, environmental sustainability, effects on 
food security, energy efficiency of the fuel and the benefits to rural economy and job 
creation. It is also acknowledged that:  
[the] historic development of the biofuels industry in various countries has 
shown that the success of the industry, especially in its developing phases, 
is largely dependent on how the policy development process was handled 
and who was involved in the process. It is unwise to assume that a 
successful policy can be developed and implemented if the development 
process is based on inaccurate and biased information (ibid., 2010, p. 7). 
This quote raises some interesting points of discussion. The first is interrogating 
further the idea of biased and inaccurate information. As I have argued in the 
previous chapter, the ‘biased’ and ‘inaccurate information’, if this refers to the 
Feasibility Study, is part of a process of legitimization and social construction and is 
not easily separated from the successful (or unsuccessful) policy it is used to 
develop. In this chapter, I aim to address also that the biases of the strategy do not 
result from this (mis)information, but from the decisions of policymakers falling 




issue then is identifying what information becomes important and how it may be 
categorised as misinformation and biased.  
 
A second set of issues refer back to the meta-analysis of policymaking described in 
Chapter 3 and the framework provided in Chapter 2. In the above quote, there is an 
implicit understanding of the importance of networks in policymaking—’who was 
involved’— but also an implicit sentiment towards instrumental policymaking—the 
industry would be better if policy was made better based on better information. 
Funke also implicitly acknowledges the importance of power and expertise in 
policymaking, in which he hints that Brazil had the right people at the table and took 
a pro-active approach based on sound evidence whereas, in South Africa the process, 
arguably, was based on flawed information and poor policy processes – supposedly 
with the wrong people at the table.
4
 This further emphasises a reliance on 
instrumental policymaking, but neglects that the right people at the table is a 
subjective or loaded supposition. One could clearly ask who the ‘right’ people are? A 
question to which I will return? 
 
On the appropriateness of the Brazilian example as a suitable policy framework to 
spur on an industry, compared to the dire state of the South African industry, Funke 
is far more explicit. What such a process actually comprises is unclear but that is not 
the point of his argument. It is an important issue, however, as we have seen the BTT 
has aspired towards the Brazilian ideal and South Africa, as a BRICS member, 
continues to use other member states as examples. (As a former BTT member 
suggested, looking at what the other BRICS are doing is a prerequisite when 
developing policy). The comparison is a difficult one when considering Brazil as a 
best-case example directly applicable to South Africa. Though both countries have 
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 This raises the fundamental question of who is better to have involved. Are the ‘right’ people ‘right’ 
because they are experts or because they are powerful (not that powerful people cannot be 
experts)? Such a question, when viewed through a ‘Brazilian prism’ would have to identify which 
actors were the right ones seemingly by whom they represented. As an industrial strategy for 
South Africa, the Brazilian case serves a useful example only in that it has a thriving industry. 
Whether that is a sufficient measure of success is debatable. The weaknesses here are that 
appealing to successful industry as a signal for good policy substitutes outcome for process—a 
process occurring over thirty years and unlikely to be the rational technocratic process advocates 
of ‘Brazil-style-biofuels-development’ assume—but also substituting one outcome for holistic 
success. Brazil may have a ‘thriving’ ethanol industry, but its true costs, environmental, social 
and environmental are disputed (see Wilkinson & Herrera 2010) and, being quite different to 




recently liberalised and face massive inequality and development challenges, Brazil’s 
economy is four times the size of South Africa’s, as is their population, whilst the 
unemployment rates are about half that experienced in South Africa (World 
Development Report, 2005). In terms of Biofuels, the support provided to the 
industry in Brazil occurred under a military-government that was able to enforce a 
highly regulated market and force market uptake (Wilkinson & Herrera 2010). A 
global playing field, as well as local objections, especially from powerful private-
sector interests, has made this far more difficult in South Africa. Such regulations 
have also presented challenges to Brazil, with the country having to import ethanol 
when sugar prices out-compete those of ethanol (ibid.). Second, Brazil is a/the major 
exporter in agricultural/sugar-related products (with a climate to match), well beyond 
the abilities of South Africa. There are also misconceived notions of a successful 
Brazilian agriculture and additional difficulties in both countries to indigenise an 
external agricultural model. Finally, there are political differences between the two, 
especially with regard to the prospects for rural development. There are limited 
counter political movements in South Africa to hold government in check (whilst 
Brazil has the world’s largest Landless Rural Workers Movement) and the Tripartite 
alliance and internal feuding in the ANC undermines democratic institutions in ways 
not seen in Brazil (Africa Research Institute 2007).  
 
The point is that while similar approaches might be taken to policymaking, the 
content and policy choices will be necessarily confined and simply transposing 
processes is as unwise as basing policies on misinformation and bias (though one 
should perhaps interrogate on what basis the Brazilian policy was developed). This 
too is somewhat beyond the scope of Funke’s argument—especially considering the 
strategy is one of ‘industrial’ biofuels and he constructs a picture of what ‘industry’ 
requires—but raises the importance of substantive nuance, especially of political 
deliberation, which I take further in my research.  
 
The value of game theory as a causal analysis and the notion of instrumentally 
improving policy are captured within the hypothesis and aims of Funke’s thesis. His 




to build on the knowledge and experiences gained from the first policy 
development process and to further explore the factors that played an 
important role in the first process, as well as the actions and reactions of 
various role players (ibid., 2010, p. 9). 
The hypothesis is one that instrumental policymaking following the example of 
Brazil will lead to the creation of a successful and sustainable industry. What 
remains for his study is 
to illustrate tools with which an accurate process of policy development can 
be followed; indicating the important role players at each level of the 
policy development process and their roles within the industry, and what 
policies need to be in place in order for such an industry to function 
optimally (ibid., 2010, p. 11).  
The approach is one using game theoretic simulations to “determine the Nash 
Equilibrium at which the various role players should find themselves, given rational 
decision making and strategies”. These rational decision-making strategies are based 
on an understanding gleaned from best practices (notably Brazil, the USA and the 
EU)
5
 that have all, to varying extents, supported industry developments through a 
suite of tools available to fledgling industries (mandates, tariff protection, etc.). 
There is a clear preference given towards establishing the industry in the case 
studies, although in a section entitled ‘rethinking biofuels policies’ some of the risks 
and issues involved in establishing biofuels policies and producing biofuels are 
discussed. However, the logic of ensuring such a wide array of objectives whilst 
accommodating such risks is not included in the game.  
 
In Funke’s model of the policy deliberation, the premise is that the DME propose and 
develop a strategy to establish an industry “in addition to achieving a number of 
other political goals [including rural development and renewable energy targets] in 
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 He provides a succinct summary of these as follows: 
The policy development process for a new and infant industry is one of 
commitment, learning, further development and refinement. Brazil has shown that 
the correct approach leads to a sustainable industry. The US has shown that the 
implementation of a policy can be profitable at first but if the market is not quick 
enough to adapt, problems can occur. The EU has shown that a cautious approach 
is reasonable but not sustainable and that solid goals and objectives need to be in 
place (Funke 2010, p.42). 
  The argument is somewhat tautological as the ‘sustainable’ industry is always going to be 
perceived as the correct one and will positively reflect on the policy but these links may not be so 
clear (e.g. Mosse 2005). Such assumptions completely remove the context in which and processes 




the process”. The main players are the former DME—the first mover
6
—with the two 
others being the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). As the goal of the BISSA was to steer 
biofuel production towards self-sustained development, a first assumption is that the 
DME would want to see some form of production taking place and incentivise. The 
second player in the game is DAFF who took a backward stance on the strategy 
because of the 2008 food-versus-fuel crisis, although as I will argue later this is a 
very simplified description of what had happened. I argue that food-versus-fuel may 
have been one reason but is not the only reason, and was not necessarily a decision 
taken by the DAFF in any case. The third player is the Department of Land Affairs 
(DLA), whose role in the game is largely defined by the DAFF taking a focus on 
rural development. DAFF’s rural development focus pushes up the prices and makes 
rural communities wealthier, thus making Land Affairs successful too. The 
assumptions here take a somewhat biased reading of the food-price-dilemma and 
rural development in general
7
 but the idea is that if the incentives are not provided, 
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 “Since the development of biofuel policies in South Africa have fallen under the control of the 
Department of Energy’s control since 2003, it became clear that the DoE would be a first mover 
in the game”. The nuances of this can be seen in Chapter 5 in which I discuss the path 
dependency or agenda setting phases of the BISSA.  
7
 In a very simplified picture of the food price dilemma (Van Zyl & Coetzee 1990; Cf. Ruysenaar 
2011b), Funke (2010) suggests that higher prices are better, an assumption strongly backed by 
Schimdhuber (2006) who argues “that higher agricultural prices will have a positive impact on 
rural household incomes” (cited by Funke 2010, p.54). Yet this denies the essence of the food-
price dilemma in which the price rise does not automatically lead to benefits for the farmer 
(although this may be likely) and does not benefit the consumer or the labourer; whom may be 
made more vulnerable and be in the majority. Whereas I agree fully that investment in agriculture 
is far below what is necessary to create a thriving rural economy, I disagree that the biofuels are a 
deus ex machina to make that happen, or at least create immediate benefits for all. Government, 
as it happens, came to a similar conclusion although their reasons were very different to mine, as I 
will discuss later on.  
8
 With these three players included, there is one major limitation to the game when compared to the 
shifting dynamics of the policy subsystem (even the inner core of the imaginary) I have discussed 
in previous chapters. That is, the number of players extends well beyond these three, although it is 
granted that they are significant and have the most to gain. The limitation is that the vested 
interests of the other players become subsidiary to these when, as I have shown and will argue 
further, were not the main features of the policymaking process. Again, this should not be seen as 
singling out Funke (2010) as erroneous. His point is that these ‘should’ have been the arguments 
made and why they ‘make sense’; mine is an interpretation of what actually happened, whether 




The purpose of the game, based on the above assumptions is to show that “the rural 
development and self-sustainability goals can be better attained, by both DAFF and 
the DLA, resulting in higher payoffs for them, if the DoE engages in a strong 
incentive driven [BISSA]”. To explain the situation in which this is not the case (as 
the first game and decisions by the Task Team came to), a cost or risk variable is 
added into the game, the so-called ‘z’ variable. As Funke notes:  
the risk variable is perhaps the most important factor affecting the way that 
the government departments, especially the DoE, have responded to the 
calls of the industry. The z variable represents a critical uncertainty 
parameter made up of a number of aggregated factors including an unclear, 
confused information flow from various role players, uncertainty, the 
resultant high costs of attaining a licence as well as the uncertainty that the 
role players face in promoting a policy; which in turn could impact on the 
consequences that they will face from both the public and other 
government departments. In other words, it represents a situation in which 
the government would risk the consequences of making large and 
important uninformed decisions. 
Funke’s work provides an important contribution to explain what happened, or rather 
did not happen, in the policy process, however, it is only a partial explanation and 
leaves open empirical detail of the ‘z’ variable. In many respects, this ‘z’ variable 
points towards the politics of the situation, especially when it is considered that 
politicians do not solely act as pure ‘homo-economicus’. This brings us to the 
econometric review of Adams et al. (2009) and the politicisation of what they 
consider an economic decision.  
Market Logics Versus Politics – This Time Politics Won? 
Adding to the misinformation diagnosis presented in Funke’s game-theoretic analysis 
of the industrial biofuels strategy in South Africa, Adams et al. (Adams et al. 2009) 
suggest that politics trumped economics and consider this a mistake. To a degree, it 
is a mistake, but only if you are uncritical of the market and its ability to develop 
rural areas on its own. As I will show, politicians were critical of this, not because 
they have limited faith in the market per se, but because they are cautious as to how 
the market actually works, who pays for it and in whose favour. The criticism of 






 which for them means policy change is the result of knowledge being 
subordinate to political interest. As Adams et al. (2009) also provide important 
insights as to what was happening during the later phases of the strategy’s 
development, which bolster some of the findings from my own interviews. I will 
provide a synopsis of these briefly before moving on to my own findings and 
discussion of ‘what happened’ and on whose terms. 
 
Adams et al. (2009, p.4) consider three fundamental challenges in the biofuels policy 
process. These included the changing focus from environmental concerns to 
addressing job creation for the rural poor, the “limited capacity of government”, and 
the need to “create a tool vague enough to be applicable to each of the unique and 
distinct regions within South Africa”.
10
 They then indulge a range of issues that have 
been encountered in the previous chapter. The most important of these are the 
influence of BEE and ASGISA, the food-versus-fuel debate in which they support 
the use of maize, structural concerns relating to linking the so-called first and second 
economies, and end off with a cost benefit analysis. Compared to Funke’s PhD, the 
work of Adams et al. (2009) more closely resembles my own exploration into the 
development of the biofuels strategy. They encounter and outline similar debates that 
have been involved but as I shall argue my interpretation of these events and what 
they signify differs to theirs. Adams et al. (2009, pp.33–34) also present some policy 
recommendations, including: 
 a wider target needs to be established that incorporates both rural subsistence 
farmers and commercial farmers;  
 a suite of realistic vehicles to assist the emerging farmers needs to be 
developed; 
 there needs to be a support for extension services (perhaps by commercial 
farmers); 
 a measured inclusion of maize as a feedstock needs to be reconsidered. 
                                                 
9
As described in Chapter 2, a positivist view of knowledge removes the need for excessive 
consultation over technical decisions because any group of experts would eventually derive 
similar recommendations and solutions for policy (see Fischer, 1993). 
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 The latter I have argued is, whether wrong or right, a hang-up from institutional arrangements (see 
Chapter 6) and is a common issue encountered by policy makers. I have interrogated this 
relationship in my MSc. thesis (Ruysenaar 2009; see also Ruysenaar 2010) and subsequent 





It should be noted that, in addition to these two major reviews, there were a 
smattering of MBA’s and Masters dissertations within South Africa, undertaking 
rather rudimentary studies of the fledgling industry and somewhat limited appraisals 
of the strategy. Seemingly representative of the hype around biofuels at the time—
2006/7—much of the research was looking at the viability of biofuels and, 
furthermore, what support the government would need to provide to ensure success. 
The MBAs were especially focussed on supply side issues and funding proposals 
(see the MBAs of Chambers, 2006; Chetty, 2007; and the masters theses of Nolte, 
2007; Roach, 2006; Smith, 2008; Strydom, 2009). They reach very similar 
conclusions and recommendations as those mentioned above and in the wider 
literature covered in previous chapters. Brent et al (2009) also look at the viability of 
the biofuels strategy in terms of the three conditions of sustainability: environmental, 
social and economic factors. In the next section, I shall rejoin the empirical narrative 
of Chapter 5 and explore such issues as they enter the realm of policymaking, rather 
than specifying the expectations that they should. 
FILTERING FEASIBILITY AND CONSTRUCTING A POLICY 
The previous chapter already suggested a more complex relationship between 
evidence and policymaking than the above authors propose. It was also argued that 
the evidence gathering process, although bounded within specific rationalities and 
credible for the networks of support associated with it, was not important for what it 
said but the legitimisation of certain perspectives in the unfolding policy process. If 
we are to take the feasibility at face value, there was actually little motivation to 
continue with biofuels ‘rationally’ speaking, but when couched in terms of potential 
job creation and other advantages, there was an assumed national benefit. In this 
section, I take the idea of legitimisation further, not so much to provide further 
evidence of it but rather to look at how the policy is actually drafted. There is, 




The Drafting Process: Negotiating Beyond what was Feasible 
The following quote by a consultant involved in the Feasibility Study sidelines any 
potential rational or objective approach to the drafting of the strategy, at least in 
terms of directly using the feasibility report.  
Yes, but [the Feasibility Study] was considered as politically 
incorrect so all aspects regarding, well, when you look at the 
draft that was published, they all agreed that feedstock grown in 
former homelands would be the way to go but there is no 
infrastructure etc. they basically wanted it to be politically 
correct (Consultant B, 2010).  
There has been some disparity in the responses from interviewees as to who actually 
drafted the strategy and under what terms. Some respondents from the NGO sector 
suggested early on that the South African Biofuels Association (SABA) had played a 
major role in the drafting process but discussions with SABA leadership indicated 
that this was not the case. Although involved early on in the feasibility studies, their 
criticism of the draft Strategy further substantiates their non-involvement (or that 
they were ignored) as, while clearly advocates of biofuels they felt the draft Strategy 
was inadequate (South African Biofuels Association 2007; see below). I raise this 
issue merely for clarification since there is a perception among civil society that 
SABA played a more direct role. This influence, at least in an overt or covert sense, 
was indirect at most and largely ignored in all likelihood. Their influence on 
‘framing’ through lobbying should, of course, not be ignored but is equally difficult 
to decipher given their unclear interactions with the BTT consultants. 
 
In a discussion with the consultants involved in the Feasibility Study, it was 
suggested that the Feasibility Study was summarised into the policy document that 
was then sent to cabinet. 
… I think we did actually draft it. Oh, from the Feasibility we 
drafted an industrial strategy that we hand[ed] over, like a ten-
pager or something. So that was the draft Strategy and that was 
the consultants view” […which was then submitted to the Task 
Team]… (Consultant B, 2010). 




[Interviewer] So you were around for the Draft Strategy, who crafts or 
writes that up? 
[Respondent] I would say Raoul has the most role in that (Former BTT 
chairperson D, 2012). 
 
Such a situation suggests that the consultants and the IDC/CEF have the greatest 
influence over the drafting process. It also carries a logical consistency, as the 
experts would have had a greater understanding of the emerging issues of most 
importance to the strategy. The power here, again, reflects not that of absolute 





Whereas control by the CEF/IDC seems likely, it is contrasted with officials involved 
in the process who state that individual directorates would have drafted their specific 
sections with final agreements negotiated by the BTT. Given that most of those 
involved in the process (that occurred over five years ago) have now left, it has been 
difficult to gain a clear picture of the actual drafting process; although it is ultimately 
a case of both of the above. What is important is that there was still a vague 
consensus between the Task Team. As one BTT member stated: 
when we did this [Draft Strategy] we had consensus, the 
Department of Agriculture had spoken about some land that 
would have been available for growing of the feedstock and later 
they had a problem with it. I also recall them including maize in 
this document, so we had the land and the maize. We agreed. 
DWAF was upset about the water. And then it went to cabinet 
there was incidents at a higher level, that I was not involved in. 
They may have had some involvement but it was probably the 
DGs or the Ministers (BTT member C, 2010). 
The latter part of the statement refers to the final Strategy that I will return to in due 
course. The importance is the consensus of the original Draft Strategy despite some 
conflicting opinions in the Task Team. This respondent from the BTT also suggests: 
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 One has to locate this in a Task Team environment. The point being that by as the first instigator, 
the consultants and IDC/CEF coalition establish frames of reference and associated anchor point 
of the discussion, even if there was room to negotiate what was put into the strategy (and indeed 
what was looked at in the Feasibility Study itself) thereafter. Negotiations never divert very far 




when the consultant did the consultations with the relevant 
departments and collected the information into the document… 
when the Task Team sat down they looked at what had been 
collected. It’s so funny now that I think about it because when 
this document was actually instigated it was so that the country 
could improve the economy and energy security. But come 
approval time, they put in all that stuff about social impacts and 
jobs and all that is actually why feedstock like maize was there 
because the initial development of the strategy was not so we can 
look at food security and jobs, even though it’s important, 
unfortunately it was not the primary driver at the time (BTT 
member C, 2010). 
Another respondent from the BTT suggested:  
The strategy is very ‘wishy-washy’; they want to make everybody 
happy! (BTT member A, 2010).  
The vague sentiments of the strategy illustrate a weakness in its ability to 
accommodate all the views and interests coherently. As one member from the IDC 
mentioned I think there were too many people that put their two cents in and they 
came up with the rubbish piece of paper they came out with (Consultant D, 2010). 
‘Rubbish’, here refers to the limited details it provides and the lack of discrete 
objectives with which the industry could move forward. As a negotiated settlement, 
there were obvious concessions that had to be made by the DME, although some 
interview responses suggest that these were less than the rational prescriptions game-
theoretic models suggest.  
So this committee [the Task Team] this 12 + 1 committee, and 
there was this guy from Agriculture who was a DDG, he was a 
destructive character, he was just saying you can’t grow 
jatropha. And we would say what’s the scientific basis for that, 
and he would say no there is no scientific basis (Former BTT 
member D, 2010).  
There is also the issue that, although it might be in the best interests for DME to 
establish a thriving biofuels industry, they are reliant on agriculture. Even if they are 
the first movers in the game (which they were not), they are reliant on at least two 
other key aspects – agriculture and water. As one advisor to the Department of 
Energy informed me: 
from a policy perspective there are two crucial areas and neither 




issue, which I am not too worried about, but the more important 
issue for me and I have been making this point to the DWAF and 
the DEAT and now the DME—I sit on the integrated energy 
planning steering committee of the DME and also in terms of my 
advice to the minister at the EDD it has been consistent with all 
of them—is that my personal belief about biofuels, the strategic 
elephant in the room is that I don’t believe biofuels are a viable 
option in a South African environment because we are a water 
stressed country and essentially biofuels is putting rainwater in 
the tank of the car (Consultant E, 2010).  
In the early drafting processes, there were some contrasting opinions, but the BTT 
managed to worked towards consensus by filtering away the most controversial of 
issues. There are two camps of respondents here, one suggesting that the CEF/IDC 
played a paramount role, and the other that the BTT was sufficiently able to steer the 
consultants and the IDC/CEF. In the Task Team negotiations, water, land, crops and 
financial viability appear to have been paramount and the solution to disparities 
seems more about excluding them as issues than prescribing specific ways forward. 
As one informant suggests, changes and comments made to drafts would be 
completely ignored. A former BTT chairperson suggested, “one should not confuse 
conspiracy for cock-up”. As a particularly graphic version of Hanlon’s Razor, the 
argument was that the negotiations were not all cloak and daggers but that issues 
were scrapped because record keeping was slack, there was dramatic flux between 
the people representing departments in the Task Team and of the meetings 
themselves.  
 
The point is that the strategy is increasingly vague because this is how strategies 
have come to work in South Africa, as Adams et al. (2009) have already alluded to 
for biofuels. It is not only that it is an abstract policy that has to cater for the 
complexities of the South African landscape but also about glossing over 
uncomfortable and antagonistic questions and preserving certain approaches; at worst 
considering them solved by the application of some technological intervention. This 
readily conforms to the existing understanding of the work of narratives and in a 
sense is a necessary element of legitimising multiple interests and stabilising a course 
of action. Even when considering objectives for a biofuels industry, the Draft 




[g]overnments typically have many policy objectives that are pursued 
concurrently and consequently any new intervention runs the risk of being 
diffused and lost among the myriad competing policies. This is especially 
the case with renewable energy interventions that may meet many varied 
objectives.”  
Either the Task Team were being reflexive, or those consultants drafting the strategy 
were subtly venting some of their frustration in developing a draft Strategy 
(although, this was just the start of their challenges). The problem is that in doing so, 
it seems here that the strategy itself has fallen victim to conflated agendas by 
maintaining its ‘developmental’ stance when the objectives deemed achievable 
within the Feasibility Study contradict such a notion. At the same time, it panders to 
political priorities in many respects and retains the rationale of the feasibility and its 
underlying agro-industrial stance. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the draft 
Strategy was relatively unproblematic in its content; at least from the perspective of 
the BTT. 
 
Despite negotiations over issues such as water use, including maize and some other 
points of discussion, there was actually limited argument at this stage as the draft 
Strategy still includes maize and jatropha and everyone seemingly had agreed. 
Although the strategy was vague (compared to the Feasibility Study), it still reflects a 
relative coherence on the part of the BTT, with the modus operandi being consistent 
with the agro-industrial imaginary, although sold through jobs narratives and linking 
economies. The above then hints at the importance of discourses and narratives 
within the strategy’s development and it is to these that I now return; throughout the 
process, they proved a long-running motif that has held the strategy (but not 
necessarily all the constituent actors) together. In the previous chapter, for example, 
it was already mentioned that ideas of the second economy are mooted in the 
strategy, even though the Feasibility Study proposed that a different strategy would 
be necessary to allow for any beneficial involvement of small-scale farmers in the 
second economy. This point seems to have been entirely neglected in the draft 
Strategy document. It was also only one element of a much wider debate, which 
would take place once the strategy was pushed outside of the BTT comfort zone.
12
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 Further indicative of the strategy’s neglect of the feasibility, is that those aspects of the feasibility 
needing further consideration, (food security and environmental concerns, the second economy, 




Beyond the Imaginary: Public Consultation, Food-Versus-Fuel and Financing 
Although Funke’s game simplifies the policymaking environment to only three 
constituent interests, he identifies the important role that external interests play. In 
doing so, he focuses more on specific lobbying and misinformation provided by 
vested interests, though there were many. He is correct in that what has been most 
important up to now was that the most powerful interests had largely been contained 
within the vague aspirations of the BTT and its alliances. An imaginary had taken 
shape and despite concerns raised internally, a strategy had been developed around it. 
It is through the public consultations that this imaginary, and the narratives and 
discourses underpinning it begin to unravel. An associated critique is that although 
acknowledging irrational decisions, Funke does not examine what this irrationality 
tells us about policymaking in South Africa. If we engage broader discussions about 
how these decisions may interact with overarching discourses and situations within 
the country, we might see that although decisions may not be rational they may make 
sense.  
Public Consultation in which Cracks Appear 
Stakeholders commenting on the Feasibility Study and the resultant draft Strategy 
varied in opinion; most were in objection, or hesitantly supportive. The Association 
for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas - South Africa (ASPO-SA), for example, are broadly 
supportive of a biofuels industry but raise a number of concerns that are included in 
the feasibility but neglected in the strategy (Wakeford 2007). These include food 
security, climate change, job creation, feasibility versus sustainability and 
transformation of the agricultural sector. They also contest the likely success of 
attaining development goals rather than just those related to biofuels per se.  
 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in contrast, is more 
scathing of the strategy. They state, for example, “COSATU will oppose strategies, 
                                                                                                                                          
criticisms levelled at the feasibility, the draft Strategy failed to include many of the substantive 
cautions raised in the feasibility as the themes emanating from the Consultation suggest. 
Sustainability criteria and normative recommendations (as described above) rely on policy being 





even if cloaked in language that may appear to be developmental and progressive, if 
they cannot live up to their claims and promises” and that they cannot support this 
strategy until the process is reviewed and relevant stakeholders, including labour, are 
included (COSATU 2007). 
 
Even those groups supporting the feasibility studies, namely the South African 
Biofuels Association, highlighted limitations, providing recommendations and 
proposing alternative approaches, for example, for pricing mechanisms to be used 
(South African Biofuels Association 2007). These respondents appear, however, to 
share agricultural worldview supporting large-scale industrial agriculture as the basis 
for biofuels, with close links to GrainSA and farmer lobbies. GrainSA was in fact 
one of the founding members of the SABA and a glance at their website illustrates 
numerous large-scale players of similar mindset (SABA 2010). 
 
While suggesting that policies are written for an intended audience (in this case 
Cabinet), a member of the Task Team highlighted consultation as central to the 
process.  
There is always different perspective when things are introduced 
and basically, you have to take into consideration what these 
different opinions mean. You cannot always accommodate the 
specifics but when issues are raised they have to inform what you 
do, and that is how we formulated the strategy after consultation 
(BTT member C, 2010). 
Although important to ensuring a robust strategy, the majority of these objections 
have not surfaced as important given the limited changes to the final Strategy. That 
negotiation happens after the draft Strategy is developed, makes the content of such a 
strategy the anchoring point for further discussion. This is very different to 
establishing the direction to be taken through bottom-up processes and makes any 
discussion reactive rather than proactive. This potentially suggests that consultation 
characterises little more than a ‘lip service’ being paid to the public (see further 
below). (The fact that there is only one round of consultations before finalising the 
strategy also limits the potential for meaningful dialogue; an issue also encountered 





One issue sits apart from the above discussion. It was apparently the food-versus-fuel 
debate that became the central pivot around which the debate for and against biofuels 
revolved during consultation and beyond. I say apparently, as, although maize was 
removed from the strategy, it was not a simple omission made in response to the 
consultation and it should be remembered that the Task Team was not focussed on 
any crop in particular. If the second economy and job creation were narratives with 
which the BTT could garner support for biofuels, food-versus-fuel was a partial 
source of disintegration and rejection.  
Enter Food-Versus-Fuel 
The challenge of food-versus-fuel is briefly considered in the Feasibility Study but it 
haphazardly sweeps aside the concern of food price rises, replacing them with a 
general accounting matrix showing a more positive picture. If anything, the 
suggestion is that increased prices improves the market for farmers, which is a good 
thing. It is a good thing for farmers but in terms of the food equation, and food price 
dilemma
13
 it hurts consumers, especially the poor. For this reason, there are two 
polarised arguments comprising the food-versus-fuel debate in South Africa. In the 
first case, the Feasibility Study is a preamble to a discernible agro-economist 
perspective, which called for the inclusion of maize based on the interpretation of 
modelling
 
(e.g. Funke et al. 2009; Makanete et al. 2007) and neo-classical 
determination of the value of biofuels to the agro-economy, including the decisive 
role maize plays. Ultimately, mandating biofuels provides a market for surplus maize 
in the country, stabilises prices (though the increase encountered is debatable) and 
potentially allows new entrants into the markets. In contrast, during consultation, the 
policy drew criticism from a range of actors, especially civil society groups weary of 
the impact on food prices (e.g. Sugrue & Douthwaite 2007). The general theme 
running through their counter argument, considering maize is the staple crop in South 
Africa, is that using maize to produce ethanol depletes crops available for food and 
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 Food prices fulfil a dual role (or a food equation) in developing countries and regions: They act as 
incentives to agriculture producers and are major determinants of the real income of consumers. 
Higher prices may be necessary, at least in the short term, to induce increased production, yet this 
poses a high cost on low-income consumers. Timmer (1983) termed this the ‘food price dilemma’ 





therefore increases food prices as had happened internationally. Modelling by the 
BFAP suggested their concerns may materialise
14
 and regardless, the unfolding 
international food price crisis legitimised their arguments in ways better than any 
modelling could have done so. This is not to suggest any personal value-judgement 
on either argument but illustrate that in popular food-versus-fuel discourse there were 
two characteristic polar opposites.  
 
A third category that needs to be included here is the published academic material. 
Much of this has focussed on situational analyses, production potentials, and overall 
feasibility, with modelling undertaken to determine the macro-economic effects, 
support measures, production potentials, impacts on the feed market et cetera (Funke 
et al. 2009; Meyer et al. 2008; Von Maltitz and Brent 2008; Haywood et al. 2009; 
Von Maltitz et al. 2009; Strydom 2009; Strydom et al. 2010; Ngepah 2010). Food 
security is largely considered through ancillary food price effects within the various 
modelling activities or labelled an issue requiring caution. Also notable is a succinct 
paper by Adeyemo and Wise (2009), however, they only consider sugarcane as a 
feedstock for bio-ethanol and sunflower for biodiesel. They conclude that appropriate 
management will minimise significant impacts on food security. They do not 
consider maize ‘empirically’ as part of their review due to its exclusion from the 
strategy; an exclusion they support based on food security concerns. In general, it is 
understood that the increasing price of fuel, mixed with climate change and global 
increases in biofuels production are likely to put a continuous pressure on food 
prices. I have critiqued the nature of this debate in South Africa elsewhere (see 
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 In an optimistic ten per cent ethanol blend (in the national fuel supply) and five per cent biodiesel 
blend scenario, under ‘normal’ weather conditions, with government administering the requisite 
(but unlikely) tariffs to ensure feasibility, the prices of white and yellow maize increased by 12 
per cent and 18 per cent over the long run (2012 – 2015) respectively (BFAP 2007, p.23). Should 
shortages occur, during a drought for example (not unlikely in South Africa’s climate!), the local 
maize industry can be expected to move quickly to import parity scenarios (higher prices for 
maize). Similarly, increased demand for yellow maize (used as animal feedstock and favoured for 
bioethanol) will displace other field crops with a likely increase in the price of white maize (used 
for human consumption in the form of maize meal). In the second, less likely scenario (with no 
protective tariffs provided by government), the white and yellow maize prices are projected to 
increase over the long run by seven and eleven per cent respectively (ibid. 2007, 30; see also 
Strydom, 2009). It is interesting that the BFAP models have been used to both challenge and 





Ruysenaar 2011; Appendix C) in terms of ill-considered focus on either food prices 
or rural development when the two are linked and need to be reviewed as such.  
 
Even the reviews of Funke (2010) and Adams et al. (2009) fall within the relative 
confines of a polarised and partial assessment of the agro-food system in South 
Africa. A lack of certainty, even within the academic literature, of course makes it 
difficult to discern which side of the debate is actually right or wrong. Such a value 
judgment both resides and is validated within distorted discourses, which in many 
ways abstract from or hypostatise the political economy in rural areas.  
 
It should be noted that there is a powerful apparatus surrounding maize, its 
production and place in the agro economy (Bernstein, 2004; 1996) which underpins 
the importance of maize for biofuels (and vice versa). From the Agro-economic 
perspective, for example, one of the early advocates stated: 
There is a reason, perhaps not explicitly mentioned in previous 
papers for using maize. The fact is that if you can’t crack it for 
maize you not going to understand it for sweet sorghum. And this 
is where some of the people who make the argument, why don’t 
you use sweet sorghum. You can’t start your debate at sweet 
sorghum. Who plants it in SA? You literally have to start a new 
value chain for sweet sorghum so for someone, I met someone 
saying they were going to establish new investment climates, 
provide the research, all those other vestiges required the sweet 
sorghum value chain ... I find it hard to grasp. Where is the 
technology? Tell me one big international—Monsanto, Pannar et 
cetera—investing in sweet sorghum. South Africa has stopped 
investing in [the Agricultural Research Council], and the 
[Council for Scientific and Industrial Research] has invested a 
little bit into sweet sorghum but what is the core required to 
produce sweet sorghum, and if you do are you going to be an 
island in this world where nobody produces sweet sorghum. And 
the arguments raised by the NGOs in my view don’t [go] the 
whole way; they are shallow (Consulant C, 2010).  
The above quote hints at the unquestioned power of maize and in some ways updates 
Bernstein’s (2004) discussion of the ‘Boys from Bothaville’ or big maize in South 
Africa, or presents new complications in the spatial and political organisation of the 
maize filliere; though this is a separate debate and taken up somewhat below. The 




In a discussion with a BFAP representative, he suggested that the stories and 
proposals being put forward when arguing for the inclusion of maize from the agro-
economic perspective were contrived from complex (and less supportive) debates.  
The standard argument is South Africa produces this surplus, 
take the surplus away and we are not going to make an impact on 
food, and I said come on let’s be honest, how does futures and 
price recovery work ... if you take away that surplus it implies 
that we are only just barely servicing our own market and we 
then run into import parity and that’s exactly what happened in 
the last six months, and so we have the perfect example right 
there (Agricultural Economist, BFAP, 2012). 
This was not different to what I had found in Cradock, in which a review on food 
price/security concerns was outsourced to look at impacts on food. The confidential 
report emanating from it suggested a far more simplified and unproblematic situation 
(cherry-picking findings) than the actual review (and the reviewer) had suggested (in 
interviews). (This is also not only a feature of the food security debate. It resonates 
with the use of the Feasibility Study in the strategy’s development and has also been 
encountered in NGO reports of the biofuels sector, according to researchers I have 
met with, as well as consultant reports.) On the use of maize, there are, however, 
nuances that also come through from government’s side, though these were not made 
explicit in the strategy itself. Arguments from the DoA members of the Task Team 
were also not against the use of maize per se:  
To me there is not a problem with using maize, it’s the easiest you 
can grow and there are eight million hectares that we can grow 
maize on so if you only get two tonnes per hectare you get 
16million tonnes, excluding what we are already producing. The 
problem with maize is that you talk to the value of the fuel and the 
rest [by-products such as animal feed], then the rest has more 
value so you need to look at the total value chain and then you 
determine what it’s really worth to you (BTT member D, 2010). 
 
It is important to note then that the technical levels of government, especially the 
DoA, were not entirely against the use of maize and supported it on some grounds. 
They were thinking further than just a pre-occupation with producing biofuels, 
although it seems the agro-industrial imaginary were not particularly interested in too 




in-depth analysis is out of place here. What I wish to show is that, first, there is an 
unhelpful and extreme polarisation, and second, there is a lingering question as to 
whether these various actors are not just arguing on the periphery of policy-making 
discussions; that is, they may be involved in heavy debate, but those that decide were 
hardly listening. In terms of the former, the fact remains that much of the discussion 
was fixated on maize and mostly of its use in the existing first economy. The 
proponents take for granted the ‘first world’ situation even though it is fraught with 
difficulties and contra-positives. I have also not interrogated, in as much detail, the 
contrarian argument of potential price increases put forward by civil society groups 
and academics (see Sugrue & Douthwaite 2007) in response to the use of maize. 
Realistically, similar criticisms apply to both, although I discuss the full debate 
elsewhere (Ruysenaar, 2011). In terms of the latter, despite the overriding debate, it 
is the second economy that preoccupies the political hierarchy and decision-makers 
had their own ideas about how food-versus-fuel would play out.  
 
As a basis for my second argument, it is necessary to show that it was not the debate 
that had much impact on the policy process but rather executive decisions. The 
ministers in the Cabinet decided not to include maize. The final Strategy sent to 
cabinet, according to three separate respondents, still included maize. After Cabinet, 
it did not. As one Cabinet minister stated:  
The concern … was that it was driven by the maize industry who 
were concerned about their surpluses and this was something 
that would absorb their surpluses and then came the exclusion—
or some people have spoken about the banning of maize; there 
has never been a banning of maize and people do speak about it 
in an unchallenged way, I don’t know where there is such a law. 
Maize is excluded as a key crop. The maize farmers obviously got 
up in arms about that because they were planning to set up plants 
in Bothaville and now we are saying in terms of our strategy we 
are not supporting that and there were a lot of good reasons. 
They were pushing it for their own reasons and you don’t get 
pushed by vested interests when you are looking at a commodity. 
You get pushed by what the purpose of the strategy is, which I 
will get back onto, such as more renewables and through doing 
so there are job and rural development benefits and lesser 
dependence on fossils. You know the maize farmers are using 
nitrogen to fertilize and using mega fuel to cultivate the land 




Bothaville—a farming town and commercial farming ‘Mecca’ in South Africa—
again reflects the important juxtaposition of white commercial farmers and the ideals 
of the ANC government. Although playing out within the food-versus-debate there is 
a strong polarization on the part of policymakers who were unimpressed by the BTT 
and the predominating agro-industrial imaginary. Another member of the Task Team 
stressed:   
The biofuels strategy was accepted in December 2007, most of 
the decisions taken before the biofuel… well we said we would 
use any extra production over and above food supply, so maize 
was not excluded. Then in November, the times showed a huge 
article on the impact of maize the US, the maize prices increasing 
34% per cent due to ethanol use in America. Other documents 
state between four and eight per cent. So [Tito] Mboweni [who] 
was our reserve bank governor walked into Cabinet with this 
document and said, if you approve maize your [food] products 
will be 34 per cent higher! So, they excluded maize. Although the 
Task Team was not supporting that, but due to outside 
interference, that’s what happened (BTT member D, 2010). 
 
The above quote thus proposes that maize was never really excluded based on any 
evidence or arguments in the consultation. It was politically motivated and was based 
on short-term ad hoc analysis of the situation; perhaps best classified as a mix 
between Khosa’s (2003) Executive-Consultative and Panic models (see Chapter 3). 
The BTT member continued: 
So then food prices escalated, but they didn’t escalate because of 
food. The fuel price escalated and the food prices increased in 
response but nobody blamed the fuel. Everybody blamed 
production. But you cannot produce without fuel. So no, nobody 
wants to use food for fuel [because] the price is so high. The 
price of fuel dropped and maize was at that stage R4300/tonne 
now its R1100/tonne. When we started in 2000 the price was 
R500/ tonne. So if you average this out, then you find the maize 
price hasn’t increased that much but due to these spikes it looks 
terrible at the time. And the only thing they could blame at the 
time was biofuels. And if you take those decisions into long-term 




years and you have to create a scenario
15
 (BTT member D, 
2010). 
Responses again differ, and without access to any kind of documentation, judgement 
can only be made using people’s opinions. Yet another BTT member briefly 
suggested  
The food security thing was a knee jerk reaction from DoA … It 
was the minister of Agriculture during the rapid rise of food 
prices. Not from the department but from the ministry (BTT 
member A, 2010).  
Another BTT member also suggested that: 
And so every minister would want something in the strategy that 
would take particular view on things. And then later on, the 
maize prices went up and government, there was this 
international voice that emerged from the United States about 
when the US introduced this 50c subsidy for 1L ethanol, then 
there was this big demand for maize to produce ethanol. 
Government bought the argument about food security and all 
that. And then they ruled no maize for fuel. The whole food 
security argument was raised and it seemed to have persuaded 
the ministers…. 
They would be debated and the food security argument was 
stopped, you know agriculture crushed the argument by saying 
we are the police of crops, and we decide who can grow what 
where, and we [are going to] decide. There’s nothing for you to 
debate we are going to decide (Former BTT chairperson B, 
2010). 
In the Task Team, there was equally support for the maize lobbies, as one early 
member that left midway suggested: 
At that stage we were engaging with GrainSA and they were 
putting together a very ambitious plan and I think it would have 
been successful, on ethanol from maize, only because it would 
stabilize the market and my philosophy would have been that I 
would rather have them producing biofuels and being able to 
switch to food or even import food than have farmers go 
bankrupt. I would rather see them in business. Nobody gave a 
                                                 
15
 An interesting discussion emerged from some initial viewpoints, in which the timing of decisions 
was crucial. In the earlier phases of the Feasibility Study and when the biofuels hype really took 
off in 2005, the economy was booming and so biofuels looked like something worth pursuing. In 
2007, there was an emerging energy crisis, food prices were starting to rise and suddenly, biofuels 




hoot about that, it was just no you can’t use maize. There was the 
interdepartmental team, and Rod was driving that for a while and 
myself and others but we had to respect the wishes of agriculture. 
Even treasury was supporting, Erwin Obermeyer is a 
knowledgeable guy and making key recommendations. The issue 
with Agriculture was that they said they will determine what the 
strategy can and can’t do and they just turned around and said 
no maize. Then they would come back and say no jatropha, etc. 
etc. There is this paranoia about agriculture, and all we need to 
do is manage it properly. It should have started with pilots and 
then you study and look at what happens. We didn’t want to roll 
everything out nationally – you need to do something and then 
see if it works and what works etc. So what happened actually 
was that government put the cart before the horse. In the push for 
an industrial strategy we never answered all the fundamental 
questions we needed to first (Former BTT chairperson D, 2012). 
I have interviewed four of the various ‘chairpersons’ of the Task Team, all of whom 
have basically supported the idea that maize was largely supported until political 
interventions, more than anything, lead to its exclusion.  
In SA, the food versus fuel debate was championed by minister 
Manual. I am talking at the Cabinet level. But before the Cabinet, 
the scoping study didn’t delve into it in much detail. It was mainly 
looking at what crops could be produced on a sustainable basis 
focussing largely on this thing being supposed to be creating six 
million jobs in the second economy. The commercial versus 
second economy did not come into that because the whole point 
was saying, we are driving this thing to promote development in 
areas in South Africa that could potentially be growing things 
and employing people but those areas are not [producing] 
because the view was that most of them don’t have an off-take for 
the crop that they might grow. It’s only when this thing goes to 
Cabinet that people start to consider the food-versus-fuel thing, 
largely based on what people had seen happening in the US … so 
the actual debate itself was actually not part of the Task Teams 
mandate or ToR (Former BTT chairperson C, 2011). 
 
Ultimately, it is clear that, even through consultation, the agro-economists’ point of 
view was given preference and was the basis of the strategy but this conflicted with 
political aspirations.  
They agreed with all the conclusions, they also saw that there 
was surplus maize and we could do it economically but then the 




an argument saying that we were going to use yellow maize, 
which is not used for human consumption. But the minister said 
no no no, no maize. If you can just leave [out] the word maize 
then you will get the strategy. So [we] went ahead, did the 
strategy … dropped [maize]. I can tell you, cabinet enthusiasm 
just faded. And the biofuel strategy, the document, and of course 
after we finalised the strategy there were a lot of consultations 
that there were a lot of people were interested, but when we 
finished these consultations and the strategy then we had very few 
licenses that were issued. I think there were two people (Former 
BTT chairperson A, 2010). 
A consultant in the process suggested: 
Well look, they took out maize more because the ministers 
decided to take out maize, ok, because it wasn’t politically, well it 
was a nice political statement they could make. That was a bit of 
a political, treasury, agriculture, thing and that scared off a lot of 
the investors because South Africa knows how to grow maize and 
all that (Consultant B, 2010). 
One aspect no one has questioned is that the maize-to-ethanol proposals are the pivot 
around which the food-versus-fuel debate has been hinged. This speaks again to 
power and hegemony, or at least structural features of the agro-economy and its 
effect on policymaking—that is meaning-making—processes. It is the idea of using 
maize that holds significant power over policymakers in South Africa, not because 
they are worried about food security per se, but because of the power structures that 
the predominance of maize represents. (What is ironic is that there may be some 
benefit to growing maize in the second economy under the right conditions for both 
food and fuel markets but the concerns dictated by the implications of production in 
the first economy have closed out such potential; the boundaries between the two are 
ideological and based on warped imaginations of the political-economy more than 
physical conditions or practical concerns.)  
 
Whether maize was removed due to the consultation, political ‘interference’ or both, 
the importance here is what its removal means for the policy process (and indeed 
building on narratives and technical expertise). First, a major problem for the maize 
fraternity was that the majority of its farmers—white commercial farmers—reside 
within the ‘first economy’ and are unlikely to receive much political support. In this 




importance to the country. It also suggests that policy decisions may rely on ideology 
more than technical processes preceding them. That is, given that potential surpluses 
of maize underpinned the Feasibility Study, a techno-rational approach would 
suggest that excluding it as a feedstock would nullify the original Feasibility Study. 
Instead, the narrative of linking economies appears to have remained steadfast, 
embedded within the overarching discourse of an agro-industrial approach, with job 
creation remaining especially salient. The narratives perform incredibly well by 
simply being transposed from the original proposals based on potentials in the first 
economy to the realms of the second economy, where such rationales are in complete 
contrast to what is realistically feasible.  
 
There is another element to the debate. The importance given towards food-versus-
fuel, or rather for or against maize, may be a red herring. While it was important to 
popular discourses at the time, and certainly worried politicians, the reason the 
rationale of the strategy remains steadfast is that the BTT would probably be quite 
happy to disregard maize if it created hassles for them in getting the strategy through 
Cabinet.  
From a food security point of view, you need to look at why 
people took certain positions. The Task Team was looking at, well 
DME primarily, how [to] sell this to cabinet and what are our 
[weaknesses]. Maize with its links to food security and not being 
able to import huge quantities of maize was seen as a weakness in 
the strategy and then the view taken by the Task Team was that if 
Cabinet gets upset we just drop maize to get the strategy through 
(Former BTT member A, 2012). 
Internal Finances and Intervening Factors 
A final issue that has thwarted the drive towards industrial biofuels and an important 
element in the drafting of the final strategy is the interplay of interests and needs 
within the policy sphere and within the Task Team. Though there were concerns over 
land, water and crops (amongst others) these appear to have been negotiable from the 
above discussion. The idea that there is a rational decision that can be taken to 
support a high-incentive policy as has been suggested by Funke (2010) and was 
implicit to the biofuels imaginary, does not consider the cost of such incentives. It is 




… If you asked the people in South Africa to take part in 
introducing biofuels you will have a mass strike or something. 
Politically it’s also not really acceptable, somehow you have to 
carry the costs (BTT member D, 2010). 
This sentiment comes from a senior Department of Agriculture official, who was a 
member of BTT and, although supportive of biofuels, was critical of whether the 
strategy and the advocates had presented accurate measures of the costs involved. 
While Funke suggests that, in his industry-focussed assumptions, incentives are 
clearly the way forward as these are the way Brazil have achieved their success, 
these incentives are ‘only’ one aspect of the equation policymakers needed to decide 
on, and only make sense if it is only a biofuels industry that you are arguing for. As 
one Task Team member stated when discussing providing incentives and the costs 
involved in the biofuels value chain: 
Once you start dealing with one question all the other things are 
impacting on this. None of the issues [are] separate. That’s one 
thing, people want to say let’s talk about this but you cannot talk 
about one issue without looking at the other issues as well and 
the interactions along the value chain (BTT member D, 2010). 
Considering the absence of incentives as a policy failure (see discussion in 
Concluding Chapter) is unfounded. Incentives were never confirmed officially but 
rather imagined optimistically, albeit prematurely by biofuels advocates. This 
respondent also suggested that, although people were quick to see that biofuels plants 
might pay for themselves, they also needed to be bolstered by the agricultural sector, 
which could cost up to R6-7billion to ensure sufficient feedstock was made available. 
That would be a cost borne by government and one they could ill-afford. At the time 
when the Task Team was considering biofuels, the government was also facing 
major challenges with Eskom. As the national energy supplier, Eskom, which has a 
monopoly in South Africa, was unable to meet national power demand due to poor 
planning as much as anything else (see Appendix E). As the passing of the final 
Strategy neared, it became obvious to at least some members of the Task Team that 
there would not be available money for both rescuing Eskom and funding (or even 
powering) large-scale biofuels plants. At the time, there were also plans for a new oil 
refinery in at Coega, which would lead to an oversupply of fuel in the country. The 




surplus of fuel; biofuels clearly take second preference even if industry players were 
expecting otherwise.  
 
According to this respondent the real challenge, however, is that with so much 
money being allocated to Eskom, there was little money available to the Ministry of 
Agriculture - whose budget has been consistently decreasing over the last few years. 
So while many pundits have been quick to suggest that biofuels projects are easily 
established, funding biofuels that would effectively allow second economy farmers 
to become involved is increasingly problematic and unlikely.  
 
Apart from available funds, there are issues around financial planning that extend 
into the practice of policymaking in general but that were a concern in the biofuels 
strategy as well. It is one of importance, as the Treasury has been reluctant to support 
biofuels after the strategy was passed. The fact is that Treasury has been weary of the 
biofuels strategy, as they have to control what funding is made available across 
government. But their involvement in policy processes is symbolic on top of it being 
functional: 
There is a thing in government as well that, if something goes to 
Cabinet, they want to show that Treasury has been part of the 
process. So line departments would often invite you to things so 
then they can say Treasury was part of the Task Team (Former 
BTT member A, 2012). 
This, even though Treasury were not entirely in agreement with the basis of the 
Strategy and weary of the expenses that would be incurred. For this reason too, 
policies have to be motivated to Cabinet to ensure money is made available. The 
rational basis therefore becomes less important than appealing to emotive or 
ideological proclivities to ensure funding becomes accessible.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: THE FINAL STRATEGY 
This chapter began with a review of two major works that have begun to model (on 
the one hand) and evaluate (on the other) the development of the final Industrial 




processes involved in the development of the policy document. The synopsis is that 
the foundational imaginary has broken down as more people have entered into the 
policy subsystem. Political decisions have also entered the process with politicians 
having very different perspectives than those crafting the draft Strategy and 
feasibility, whilst much of the underlying discourse has actually remained prominent. 
The superficial contradictions between the feasibility, draft Strategy and final 
Strategy are obvious here. The Feasibility Study ostensibly appears to support 
biofuels linking the first and second economies, although explicitly states that small-
scale farmers are unable to participate in an industrial strategy (privileging the first 
economy and requiring a separate policy for the second). The draft Strategy makes 
similar assumptions but relies more on the existing commercial agricultural sector 
(most notably through the inclusion of maize) as the major source of feedstock with 
token benefits to the second economy. The final Strategy departs from both of these, 
only supporting projects in the former homelands, and most neglected of rural areas. 
Whereas this latter mandate proposes an admirable pursuit, it does make the prior 
feasibility redundant (however imperfect it actually was), thus meaning a strategy 
has been derived with no real sense of viability. While the drivers of employment are 
important, meeting objectives will be problematic due to the politicisation and 
resulting contradictions in the final Strategy. 
 
The above argument raises the importance of politics or ideology in the 
policymaking process and how they inform the strategic proposals of the draft and 
final Strategies. At the behest of Cabinet, the draft Strategy was submitted for public 
consultation, from which, the final Strategy was drafted. This document is regarded 
by some as being contradictory and more ambiguous than its forerunner and does not 
actually support the biofuels industry, as was the case earlier. There are a few 
reasons one might impart to a degree of apprehension expressed within the final 
Strategy (not only the exclusion of maize but relaxed incentives as well). Of the two 
existing studies of the policy process, Adams et al. (2009) go furthest in their critique 
of the rationales of pursuing biofuels and the conflict that arose between ideas of 
rural development and the others, such as renewable energy targets, economic 
benefits and energy security. In this, despite politics trumping economics the lack of 




politicians feel the strategy was oversold, they were weary that the economics did not 
make sense and that it would do little to transform the existing rural political 
economy.  
 
One can also take the findings of Funke (2010) further, as he marginalises the 
political by constructing the game the way he does, first by only considering three 
main players (of a Task Team of 12 member departments) and second presenting 
assumptions as to what would benefit the players themselves and the industry (or at 
least in terms of an industry), not necessarily what would be more important to one 
or the other. Politicians and members of the Task Team had a far wider range of 
problems to deal with, with no simple economic answers. This latter issue speaks to 
rational choice versus ideology and officials in the Task Team clearly recognise the 
difference. As one Department of Agriculture official lamented of the departments’ 
decision to exclude maize “our policies are ideological, not technical” (National 
Department of Agriculture Informant, 2010). Funke’s ‘z’ variable therefore conceals 
the messy reality of policymaking and opens up an interpretative realm. It is the story 
of misinformation, where it comes from, why there would be apprehension towards it 
and, as is highlighted in the previous chapter how any information is inherently 
biased, that is important. Therefore, although we have sophisticated models of 
human decision-making, they err on the side of rationality while leaving open to 
question why decisions are taken so ‘irrationally’. They are also predisposed to an 
economic logic and modelled on the game developer’s assumptions of what each 
player’s understandings are and what their maximum utilities are likely to be. 
Whether or not it makes economic sense to produce or support the production of 
biofuels, it may, for example, still not make biofuels ‘make sense’ politically, 
environmentally or socially, but are rather competitive or incompatible with wider 
political objectives each vying for available funds. The importance here is that Funke 
(2010) identifies the problem as a technical one, with a technical solution, when it is 
actually a highly political problem and subject to political perceptions and values. 
Far from this being the exception that proves the rule, political aspirations are a 
fundamental and foundational aspect to policymaking. Getting political decisions 




different set of tools or practices, for example, by wider discourses and their 
constituent narratives, amongst others.  
 
In my discussion of food versus fuel, I outline first that the debate has actually been 
an incomplete one (at the technical level) but more importantly that in the 
policymaking process, it was not the outcome of the ‘debate’ that actually swayed 
decision makers in the end. The point here is not to make a value judgement as to 
whether excluding maize was the right or wrong decision (although the cautionary 
principle should be exemplified) but highlight the importance of ideology and 
political processes, which subscribe to prevailing discourses in the face of 
uncertainty. There is no reason that the decision could not have gone the other way 
(that is to include maize), or that it will still not happen given the ‘right’ political 
support and shifting perspectives of the first and second economy or of the food-fuel-
feed system. The decision is then not so much a result of misinformation or about 
politics trumping economics, it is about both. While there is no doubt vested interests 
were feeding government biased information, it is important to interrogate again 
what information or knowledge is credible, which is generally a function of its 
source as much as (if not more than) the content and is subject to shifting political 
narratives through which any (mis)information is defined and interpreted. In this 
case, it was respected politicians of high standing that had insisted that food-versus-
fuel was an unnecessary risk informed not by misinformation but by the fact that 
there was so much misinformation.  
 
The previous chapter has already shown that the process of science (or experts) 
leading to evidence … leading to policy … leading to implementation is far from 
what happens. In this latest chapter, it was not that politics trumped economics; it 
was that the economists were unable to secure political support in the way certain 
economists would have liked. It is also not a question of misunderstanding the so-
called economic as it was politicians with economic backgrounds that made the 
decision to reject support for maize; National Treasury also had their doubts. While 
the economics and feasibility are not at all clear, the political economy of South 
Africa is also not a blank canvas. Although that political economy is dramatically 




they resonate with powerful and emotive ideologies that are reflected in the 
bargaining of the final Strategy. The exclusion of maize thus represents the crucial 
and complex role evidence plays in policymaking but that its interpretation and use is 
a function of the political framings, symbolic value at the time and to a certain 
degree circumscribed within the deliberations of the Cabinet.  
 
It should also be mentioned that the evidence itself played an important (if not 
complex) role in the departure decision-makers make from those of the biofuels 
imaginary in general. Prior to feasibility, for example, the job potential was 
massively inflated to secure political support. Support dwindled after the Feasibility 
Study predicted 50,000 jobs rather than the ‘millions’ hoped for. These estimates, 
while more realistic were also disadvantageous, for politicians at least. Many 
politicians therefore have turned their back on the policy as “they were sold a 
dummy” (Former DME Official C, 2010). Some respondents have added that Cabinet 
seemed especially disappointed, which could be considered one of the main reasons 
for a stagnating strategy. That the policy now seems politically to be a lost cause has 
not meant its outright demise. In fact, there was already a momentum behind the 
Strategy, and even if some politicians had grown weary of its implications for 
employment, there were still enough interested parties sustaining the development of 
a biofuels industry in South Africa and implementation of the final Strategy. It is for 
this reason that negotiation continues, and the recent promulgation of mandatory 
blending and amended fuel specifications suggests that the imaginary, its core 
network of support and most resilient members (or those with financial backing) has 
allowed for a slow renegotiation. New ‘evidence’ will be created, new partnerships 
will emerge, intervening factors will legitimise contrary perspectives and narratives 
and political decisions will change. In my opinion, decisions will probably shift to 
support of the original imaginary (though not necessarily the use of maize) for 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In the previous chapter, I added to the existing analyses of the final Strategy and the 
way in which the contradictions and ambiguities of the final Strategy are understood. 
In this, I have argued that it is not that politics trumped economics but that the 
political decision was a function of the economic evidence advanced to support the 
strategy; evidence that was highly generalised and self-serving for the most part. It is 
also not (only) that industry interests are less influential than political interests are 
but that politicians (and bureaucrats) have diverse agendas and are not solely 
subservient to industry needs. I have also argued that one cannot understand the shift 
in strategy in terms of economic rationality (or irrationality) but that other factors—
the meanings policymakers bring to the table and the discursive practices that define 
them—control decisions, which inevitably includes a politics of evidence and the 
symbolic value of policy.  
 
Evidence has no clearly defined passage through policymaking. Rather, it is 
predicated on and interpreted though networks of support and these are in a constant 
state of flux. As these networks shift through time, so too does their internal power 
relations and that of the wider decision-making apparatus. Furthermore, evidence is 
shaped by, legitimised and imparted with (symbolic) significance through underlying 
paradigms and forms of discursive practice (narratives) within these networks. If 
such ideas are neglected in policy research, so too is the true nature of policymaking. 
It is also easy to criticise politics as irrational, but underpinning this is the importance 
that politics is inherently part of the process. Not only does politics, to a degree, 
circumscribe what may be acceptable as informative (in ways that need to be 
interpreted rather than inferred), the supposed rational passage of science or 
knowledge through policy is also necessarily combined with political oversight. It is 
not something to be done away with but as one Task Team member suggested “a 
necessary evil”. While the role of politics should not be romanticised (it has its own 
challenges) it cannot be neglected, though in South Africa only limited recognition 
has been given to the importance of in examining the complex nexus of narratives, 




contributions I make to such a pursuit within the realms of policy research in South 
Africa.  
 
Examining the development of the biofuels strategy also allows for improved 
understandings of renewable energy transitions and rural development within South 
Africa, especially by using the policymaking process (and resultant policies) as a lens 
through which the battle between competing visions of the future are waged. 
Importantly, the nature of the biofuels assemblage and the networks of power 
illustrate a continuing but shifting composition of the MEC, with major players 
continuing to control fundamental decisions in the industrial sector. While some 
niche players have emerged, the regime and landscape are controlled to a large 
degree by existing technological and institutional complexes that have an influence 
over the (if not any) new technology. By this, what has become the biofuels 
assemblage has marginalised many niche players, with the 'big four' remaining 
projects controlled either by foreign capital or the Industrial Development 
Corporation, which is of direct MEC notoriety. In this, biofuels provide a specific 
example of wider energy transitions within South Africa, though they differ 
significantly to other energy sources given their close linkages to the agricultural 
sector, in which there are also local political-economy factors that add nuance. As 
(Hansen & Nygaard 2013) highlight, a reluctance towards renewable energy policy 
may account for stifled developments in the renewable energy niche but this 
discounts the crucial (if sometimes contentious) relationships that exists between 
niche players, policymakers and political economy of the regime and landscape.  
 
In discussion of the wider implications of the strategy's development, it is then 
possible to illustrate how policies 'mean' in South Africa and equally how they 'act'. 
First, I will reflect back on the initial underpinnings of the research.  
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AIMS AND RATIONALE  
In this concluding chapter, the proposal of Torgerson (1985), in which policy 




are subject to cross-cutting forms of power and the discursive practices involved in 
deciding on ways forward has guided my thinking. Here my research adds to the 
existing understanding of the biofuels strategy. On the technical side of the spectrum, 
investigating the biofuels policy brings into focus the (flawed) processes of 
policymaking in South Africa. It would be wrong to completely trivialise or 
marginalise the technical aspects of 'good' and 'bad' strategy (though see below for a 
critique of such labels). If one considers Rumelt's (2011) Good Strategy Bad 
Strategy, it would appear that even the technical approaches to policymaking and 
strategising around biofuels in South Africa—those embedded within the rationale of 
evidence-based policy—are deeply flawed. When considering strategy as a diagnosis 
followed by policies and actions in response as Rumelt (2011) does, there are 
obvious shortcomings that can be identified. The fact is, when considering the 
potential of biofuels in South Africa, there was very little diagnosis in the first place. 
Or rather, much of the diagnosis was neglected or renegotiated to reflect certain 
perspectives rather than others, no matter how rigorous the analysis was. However, 
the issue involves far more than just poor planning and a matter of obtaining more or 
better evidence. It brings into question the very nature of evidence-based policy and 
the way in which technical problems are framed. This takes us to the political end of 
the spectrum, where we have a highly variable flux of ideas, convoluted narratives 
and values driving decisions. Such issues insist we cast a critical view on the reality 
of policymaking, as was highlighted in the introductory chapter and its aims and 
rationale.  
 
In the introductory chapter, three main concerns are noted. The first was a reflection 
on the importance of international discourses and how these encounter, impact on 
and are taken up by specific actors and networks in local policymaking. Such an 
approach is equally consistent with the way in which local networks are influenced 
by and influence the global assemblage within which they are embedded. This is also 
a theme I have continued to embrace throughout the thesis and has been one reason 
why I have often reflected on the international situation when discussing emerging 
themes within South Africa. The importance of international discourses and their 
counterpart narratives can be seen in the empirical chapters, especially in Chapter 5 




biofuels, created predominantly by European policy directives, is an important part 
of this but so too are the categorisations and storylines embedded within these 
proclamations. Energy security, rural jobs and macro-economic savings, amongst 
others, were reconfigured in South African debates, combined with unrealistic 
aspirations of uniting the dual economy but were, nevertheless, beacons for the path 
forward. Although largely unsubstantiated, 'blueprints' for development and frames 
of reference emerging within the international discourse resonated with interest 
groups within South Africa, who were quick to respond.  
 
To some degree, the disconnected narratives were contested and underwent some 
localisation when embraced by policymakers in South Africa but overall the stories 
informing South Africa's strategy remained familiar. The very power of narratives is 
in the way they have been easily merged with local interests and are easily motivated 
in response to what are actually extremely complex challenges. They become 
especially important for policymaking through 'best practices' and the globalised 
networks and flows through which they are transplanted to local contexts. Networks 
and nodes also imply resources (physical and knowledge-based) are concentrated in 
certain places. An important part of this global-local connection (or Globally 
Integrated Biofuels Network (GIBN) as Mol (2007) would call it) is the 
establishment of what I term a biofuels imaginary and surrounding biofuels 
assemblage in South Africa (see also Birch and Ponte, 2014). The activities of this 
network of likeminded individuals adds nuance to Mol's (2007) description in that 
there is perhaps more regional idiosyncrasies (as in Urry's (2003) category of a 
'regional network'; see also Appendix D) than the ubiquity and uniform outcomes 
expected of a GIBN, though there are also similarities. This group, which 
incorporates local project players and private-sector actors (especially niche players), 
also includes a close network of policymakers and quasi-government representatives 
(especially the Industrial Development Corporation and Central Energy Fund) with 
an interest in agrofuels development, as well as international players, usually 
financiers and project developers.  
 
The importance of this imaginary is twofold. First, it allows some wider discussions 




South Africa (see below). Secondly, the imaginary is an important set of apparatus 
through which narratives and discourses gain traction. The funding and gathering of 
evidence as described in Chapter 6 is one clear example of this.  
 
The biofuels imaginary in South Africa clearly subscribes to practices exported from 
the United States and Brazil (for bioethanol) and Germany (for biodiesel). The major 
constraint here is that in attempting to take advantage of global markets (or 
international development fads), policymakers and project managers alike are 
'straight jacketed' within the existing technical and ideological parameters of that 
market place (not necessarily against their own will). Universalised practices are thus 
enrolled to justify and legitimise particular biofuels initiatives in local contexts 
(though, it should be said, also frame objections to them). In South Africa's case, an 
agro-industrial imaginary has jostled for recognition given their subscription to such 
universalised practices. There is actually very little room for negotiation outside of 
the suggestions of existing expertise, even if there has been some local objection. 
This is important, as, even though early approaches to biodiesel in South Africa 
emphasised locally appropriate products in addition to an industrial focus, there has 
been limited inclusion of the former within the emerging strategies. That is, one 
could argue, after the imaginary had taken shape and solidified their position in 
controlling the technical development of the strategy. The industrial focus then began 
to replicate MEC-like, large-scale, modernisation ideologies, even though these are 
increasingly considered as outdated and impractical for the complex challenges faced 
within the South African context (e.g. Bond & Ndlovu 2010). Although there is a 
wealth of criticism against such development practices, my thesis begins to 
suggest—drawing on scholars such as David Mosse, James Ferguson, James Keeley, 
Ian Scoones and Harry Jones, who all identify the policymaking realm as critical—
that we actually need to unpack the policymaking machinery through which such 
approaches are continuously replicated. (I look at specific mechanisms in the next 
section.) 
 
Contextualising the first aim, the second main aim was to interrogate the complexity 
of policymaking in South Africa, particularly considering what might be meant by 




framing of policy debates in South Africa. While highlighting the dominance of 
technical or instrumental policy analysis, the consensus is that South Africa has 
'good' policies but poor implementation. The institutional diagnostic of the Planning 
Commission suggests (National Planning Commission, 2011a, p. 23), for example,  
“more than refined policy analysis, [the bureaucracy] needs people who can get 
things done”. On the flipside, for some time renewable energy policies have been 
considered quite poor and there remains a need to 'get the policy right'.
1
 Given the 
current level of debate in energy policy specifically, which is transfixed on valuable 
but overly technical, quantitative and prescriptive studies (Cf. Büscher, 2009), the 
Planning Commission may in fact be jumping ahead too quickly. Büscher's (2009) 
critical political-economy approach is an important addition to the literature, in 
which he explores “power structures that influence both energy policies and the 
issues of energy equality and sustainability”. His perspective begins to illustrate that 
considering policy as 'good' or 'bad' is fraught with difficulty and perhaps beside the 
point. In response to the National Planning Commission suggestion, the fact is, a 
more refined policy analysis might in fact allow us to determine why things do not 
'get done' in the first place and moving beyond simple policy analysis, policy process 
analysis can show us why policy and its implementation are not so easily separated 
or automatically mutually dependant.  
 
My approach and contribution—also being critically orientated—was not to invoke 
some normative framework or rating exercise but dissect the characteristics of the 
biofuels policy process in which the outcome, at least in case of biofuels, has been 
considered 'bad'. Such a situation provides an opportunity to open up the 
policymaking black-box and peer into some of the dynamics through which policies 
are made; how certain objectives are legitimised and to consider then what leads to 
constructions of 'good' or 'bad'. The issue here is one encapsulated in the supposedly 
vague and contradictory nature (see Adams et al. 2009) of the final Strategy and its 
lack of support for the industry. On the one hand, industry pundits and the media 
were especially quick to suggest the strategy makes no sense. On the other hand, as 
some policymakers consider the strategy a good one, one can suggest that if policies 
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 South Africa now has one of the largest Renewable Energy Programmes in the world. Whether this 
is a 'good' thing, i.e. successful, remains to be seen and is a function of the dynamics I discuss in 




speak the right language (especially if they reflect alluring narratives that appear 
unquestionable) they are inherently good, despite the fact that the value-judgement 
being made reflects specific world-views. Good and bad, for the most part, are a 
reflection of expectations placed on policies but there are no guarantees and in this 
case, the biofuels industry lost out; at least in the short term. Good or bad, therefore 
becomes a relative notion, defined by who is involved, or rather, who is making the 
judgement, but too quickly substitutes an outcome for 'process'. In this I add to the 
debate around the biofuels specifically (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; Funke & Klein 2011; 
Funke 2010), and bio-economy more generally, moving past the lament that 
policymaking is irrational and rather interpreting why this is so. The problem is that 
many diagnoses trivialise the complexities at work when policies are made. They 
also marginalise the symbolic value policies may be designed to uphold, in which 
implementation is only one of the considerations, if at all was.    
 
Further challenges occur at the technical or operational level—the supposed realms 
of implementation, after a policy has been made. As Mosse (2005) rightly suggests, 
good policies are generally those that are vague enough to subdue contestation, or 
that allow existing actions to be reframed in the new policy terms. That is, policy (or 
policymaking) is an upward-focussed tool for maintaining the legitimacy of 
interventions, projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas and 
discourses are driven by the need to maintain relationships based on existing 
exigencies. These propositions allow us to consider further the division of good 
policy and poor implementation—a common proposal made of policies in South 
Africa. In the case of biofuels, the situation is actually one of supposedly 'poor' 
policy and what this means for implementation. The full answer requires somewhat 
an extension of the empirical material provided in earlier chapters and has to 
consider the shifting terrain of a biofuels assemblage in South Africa. Again, 'poor' 
has to be seen as a relative notion and is subject to alteration. The biofuels 
assemblage comprises the remaining hardcore of the biofuels imaginary, but is 
project-focussed and includes the 'big four' biofuels projects in South Africa. Its 
importance is current manifest in the increasingly close and advisory relationship 
they have with policymakers and the slow renegotiation of the 'poor' strategy to meet 




focus from government making policy and government not having the capacity to 
implement it, to government (and others) making policy, and then industry, at least 
those with the backing to do so, slowly reconfiguring technical aspects. The point 
then is that, while Mosse (2005) suggests good policy may be 'unimplementable', 
'bad' policy, for similar reason, might actually be implementable.  
 
The two issues above (good policy versus bad policy and good policy but poor 
implementation) are closely related and the social constructions of success may be 
configured around differing perspectives of whether implementation may be taken as 
apart from policy, or a part of policymaking. If implementation is considered a 
separate activity, it becomes easy to judge policy (usually the final document) as an 
outcome graded according to how well the process of implementation proceeds (even 
though it is considered a separate activity). Meeting the objectives
2
 of the policy 
through implementation activities implies the strategy must have been successful. If, 
however, policy and implementation are considered part of the same process, such 
grading becomes far more difficult and leads to a discussion of co-evolution similar 
to that in Chapter 4 and hinted at above. One of the main points of my thesis is to 
illustrate how the two activities may be far more intimately connected or heuristic 
than is given credence in the South African literature. The biofuels policy was 
largely developed based on proposals for specific types of project (which were 
emerging before the strategy was finalised), that is, establishing the needs for a 
specific form of implementation. When the final Strategy did not reflect such 
interventions but rather espoused politically symbolic proposals, the policy itself was 
named the failure, though it merely failed a certain group's expectations. At its most 
practical, grading policymaking may rely too much on what people are already 
doing, rather than providing new thinking on what they should be doing. 
Problematising the process, however, insists that it is not only technicalities, such the 
lack of incentives and mandatory blending that are important. It is the taken-for-
granted features making these technical solutions so imperative that need 
consideration.  
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 It is recognised that, if we are to be instrumental about policy, objectives should be broken down into 





Here we then need to add to Mosse's (2004; 2005) ideas that policies, mainly through 
existing interventions and project players, primarily function “to mobilize and 
maintain political support, that is, to legitimize rather than to orientate practice”. 
While such policies may become the discourse and are successful when they reflect 
activities on the ground, there is, for example, room to consider who or what dictates 
what action on the ground is to be in the first place. In some respects then, Mosse 
(2005) is too quick to criticise Ferguson's (1990) anti-politics machine, as the 
development apparatus or existing institutional and technological structures of 
knowledge have an important role to play in justifying and institutionalising certain 
types of activities, which then inform and draw on certain types of policy. Cross-
fertilizing Mosse's work with assemblages (both of which emerge from similar 
origins) begins to show how there is not neatly distinguishable downward or upward 
thrust but complex translations, interconnectivities and implications. The situation is 
perhaps better considered through Giddens's Structuration Theory as has been 
discussed by Keeley and Scoones (2003) and has been considered as the way through 
which translations
3
 between niche, regime and the landscape occur (see Schot & 
Geels 2008); though all theoretical perspectives will necessarily simplify the 
complexity of policy and practice from macro-perspectives and micro-sociological 
ones. Certainly, the various dimensions of power and mechanisms through which 
they occur have all been important in various stages and levels of the policy process 
around biofuels (and not necessarily mutually exclusively). After all, assemblages 
are the product of multiple determinants that are not reducible to a single logic or 
process (Ong & Collier 2006) and policy formation within them are equally complex.  
 
There is something also to be said for the way in which, given the vague nature of 
the strategy, implementation might proceed. As the policy was developed according 
to what project developers were planning to implement, which again matches 
practices and programmes in operation in other 'best case' countries—whose policies 
have all encountered various forms of critique—the successful implementation is 
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 Adrian Smith (2007), for example, suggests three kinds of translations between niche and regime. 
These include the way problems in the regime inform the guiding principles creating the niche, 
reinterpreting elements of socio-technical practice in the niche and inserting them into regime 
settings, or modifying the niche in the light of lessons learned about the regime and finally to 
translations that alter contexts, i.e. changes that bring the regime closer to the situation that 




something that remains to be seen in the South African context and a remaining issue 
to be investigated. The initial signals are not promising. The overall strategy still 
follows an industrial logic replicating highly subsidised and incentive-based markets 
in which, despite all the associated development rhetoric, 'implementation' has 
become focussed on resolving legislative requirements to make producing biofuels 
feasible, rather resolving the contradictions (political aspirations versus technical 
approaches) that the strategy has tried to accommodate and ameliorate (largely 
unsuccessfully). The changes proposed thus far are technical concessions to be made, 
not rearticulating (or clear articulations) of what the government aims to achieve and 
whether the decisions being made about biofuels actually reflect the potential of 
biofuels to achieve them, let alone getting to grips with how those ideas came about 
in the first place.  
 
While a great deal of attention is given towards technical fixes to ensure policies are 
implemented, far less is given to how the decision forward was made and whether 
this may be the problem itself. Even in the current policy negotiations, although 
some projects have shifted to different crops—notably Mabele now basing 
operations on sorghum instead of maize—they continue to mobilise support for the 
industry to match that of the original biofuels imaginary. Given the recent 
consultations around mandatory blending, clean fuel specifications (as well as 
support structures and cost structures being established), the continued lobbying 
seems to have achieved some success.
4
 Again, this speaks to the importance of 
interrogating the process of policymaking (rather than only looking at its outcomes). 
This is the third main concern outlined in the introduction, and is considered next 
through the key theoretical framework established in Chapter 2. 
Key Theoretical Themes Revisited: Narratives, Networks, Institutions and 
Politics 
In South Africa, I have shown that the activity of policymaking is generally excluded 
from discussions of policy failure. The National Development Plan (National 
                                                 
4
 It may not actually be the lobbying that is important but rather a shifting political commitment to 
green development, emerging from COP17 and related commitments, which have provided a 




Planning Commission 2011c), for example, as the most recent and comprehensive 
analysis of the South African politico-administrative situation, suggests that plans are 
only as credible as their implementation strategies, which often fail when 
implementation does not happen or does not happen uniformly. The nearest the Plan 
comes to dissecting policymaking as a possible cause of frustration is the acceptance 
that when consultants are brought in to develop policies, they may increase the gap 
between policy and its implementation.
5
 Policymaking is, however, about mediating 
arguments, and in South Africa, there has been limited examination of how such 
arguments differ according to the knowledge (and ideas) used to support them. In the 
case of biofuels, I have already argued above for the importance of international 
discourses in constricting the perceived options available whilst local narratives 
impart symbolic value to decisions made. I engage with some further issues below.  
 
The discussion within the theoretical chapter culminated in a few themes that 
consistently emerge across the various frameworks and models of the policy process 
and the way certain 'knowledges' are used to make decisions or become the basis for 
policy. Principal among these is the importance of politics (that is the distribution of 
power over decisions, arguably according to one's own interests and ideology), 
institutions as both the formal rules of the game and processes of socialisation (rules 
in use), the importance of networks (through which power is distributed and 
manifest) and the discourses and narratives through which arguments are made (and 
that reflect received wisdom and existing power structures). Their importance to the 
South African context is validated by the empirical material of the previous chapters. 
Complicating the situation, however, is that none of these themes should be taken to 
be mutually exclusive but rather work through and influence each another directly 
and indirectly. It is the nuances of where, when and how they interact—the context 
of action—that provides the most incisive conclusions to be drawn.  
 
The early stages of the policy's development, at least after principles of government 
'protocol' meant, institutionally, that the DME had taken control of the strategy's 
                                                 
5
 It is worth recognising that, as important as it is, the National Development Plan is itself the 
collective output of academics and consultants rather than an articulation of government or 
reflective of what is actually possible. It is a ‘to do’ list with little in the way of how government 




promulgation, allowed for a concentration on large-scale industrial approaches. 
These were legitimised, if not circumscribed by international best practices that 
easily, through the universality of 'win win' narratives, matched with local political 
and socio-technical imaginaries. Proposals for job creation in the 'second' economy 
(which is itself a problematic social construction of the rural political economy in 
South Africa) were sold alongside or as justification for new markets and related 
schemes in the 'first' economy. While there have been institutional and personal 
influences, actors and networks pursuing material interests are equally important in 
the link between knowledge and policy and the creation or influence of power-
knowledge. These actors and networks, a discrete agro-industrial imaginary in the 
early stages, were important in defining the extent and nature of evidence, which, 
when matched to existing political narratives would begin to inform policy based on 
their aspirations and plans. It is not that this necessarily leads to 'bad' practices (this 
is often how policies are made) but the resultant social construction has built into it 
several properties that may, dependant on other factors, limit the development of 
flexible and dynamic forms of regulation and programming that include and benefit 
local needs. Such tensions, however, are hidden rather than resolved within the 
strategy documents. Even the final strategy, as an 'industrial' strategy but based on 
the 'second' economy, suggests that political decisions too, become imbedded within 
specific frames of reference.  
 
The links between these frames of reference and decisions made are not necessarily 
direct and they are subject to certain amounts of change. The Feasibility Study and 
its translation into the draft Strategy is one indication of this complex link between 
evidence and policy (or rather politics). Even though the evidence provided in the 
Feasibility Study is highly questionable (there is little statistical justification for 
biofuels), it appears less important than the political narratives through which such 
evidence is interpreted and legitimised. While it was possible to contain 
contradictions between the agro-industrial approaches and developing the first and 
second economies in the draft Strategy (which had survived some political objection 
but was generally supported) such contradictions would not survive new politically 
sensitive narratives of food-versus-fuel. Such legitimisation and rejection is then a 




easily delineated and are in continual flux. It is unhelpful, for example, to suggest 
that politicians refused to support maize in the final Strategy. It was 'some' politicians 
who took an emotive stance given their own experiences and perceptions. While 
there was significant political support for biofuels through ASGISA, these shifted 
dramatically with outspoken fears of a food-versus-fuel crisis, spurred on by an 
international controversy and politicised by a select few ministers.
6
 The origin of an 
'anti-maize for biofuels' lobby within the Cabinet and Treasury is especially 
important given the centrist tendencies of the government and the power these 
decision-makers wield in policymaking (see Chapter 3).  
 
Networks of a more technical or project orientation—the agro-industrial imaginary 
itself—are far more clear, though also not necessarily stable. The IDC and CEF, as 
well as some officials from the DME and DTI were the hardcore (though the IDC 
and DTI are now seemingly the central players), but others, the maize lobby for 
example, have been somewhat marginalised in the policy process. Whereas this 
lobby was important in instigating and publicising the proposed benefits of biofuels, 
they found themselves on the wrong side of a discursive and material divide. Not 
only were they seen to be too 'white' and thus politically outcast given their 
preferential treatment during apartheid (and resulting dominance in the rural 
economy), they were victims of what may have been an overly emotive food-versus-
fuel debate. Whether or not the debate was rigorous, the strategic vision of 
Bernstein's (2004) Boys from Bothaville has once again outstripped their political 
strength. They have had limited ability in assuring government that food security 
would be maintained, with the ANC-led government remaining highly sceptical. 
Decisions therefore became ideological, in much the same way, one could argue, as 
they were during apartheid, although this time it was subsistence farmers in the 
second economy that captured the political imagination. Whether requisite capacity 
to support such farmers in the same way the National Party supported farmers during 
apartheid remains to be seen.  
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The shifting political terrain and emerging networks is an important feature of 
policymaking and the empirical chapters begin to show why. Although new players 
have entered the game, the hardcore of the biofuels imaginary suggest that 
policymaking at a technical level is circumscribed by specific frames of reference, 
especially those emanating from the industrial modernization and technological 
fetish of the MEC. They are, however, finding greater political resistance or, rather, 
increasingly in contrast to the political vision. Such dynamics require further 
interpretive investigation in areas outside of biofuels but remain a central feature of 
policymaking, not something to be regarded as irrational. As Du Toit (2012) notes, 
evidence-based policy falls into a narrow centrist conception and misunderstands the 
importance of politically and ideologically loaded 'policy narratives' and research 
findings. This thesis has incrementally adds to Du Toit's (2012) critique of evidence-
based policy, suggesting also that it is not only the call to evidence that is a concern 
but the networks involved in its development, the discursive structures through 
which it is interpreted, as well as the wider activities of networks and elites that have 
to be factored in (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, it suggests that while there may be 
some value in categorising policy types (e.g. Khosa 2003) there is value also in 
considering how even apparently technical or technocratic decisions are highly 
politicised and representative of existing tensions in South Africa's development, 
both past and present.   
HOW DO POLICIES ‘MEAN’ IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
As Yanow (1996) reflects in her book of 'how policies mean', policies are expressive 
of identities and societal contexts in which they are developed as much as they are 
instrumentally orientated. Similarly, policies themselves can display their own 
agency much as inanimate objects do within actor-networks. Drawing on the above 
discussion and the empirical material of the previous chapters, it is possible to 
examine some of the ways in which policies reflect nuances of the South African 
socio-technical and political context and have their own agency beyond any 





In brief, there is an interesting trajectory emerging from my analysis of the 
development of the final strategy. Not only does the national picture look very 
different to existing descriptions but also there are forgotten developments at the 
provincial level. The similarities in the types of narratives and supporting evidence, 
the reach of core networks (especially the various 'development corporations') and 
political persuasions suggest that policymaking is well beyond the grasp of the wider 
citizenry and participatory policymaking is marginalising, at best as a function of 
representative policymaking and, at worst and increasingly likely, is subject to the 
whims of 'experts' and the requirements of capital. Furthermore, projects are a crucial 
if not foundational element of the policy stream at provincial (and to a degree 
national) level and yet are too quickly excluded as part of policymaking within the 
existing literature. Policies are co-produced through networks within the policy 
subsystem – projects are not only situated at the implementation end of the spectrum, 
they are embedded within the decisions as to what that implementation should look 
like and are central to knowledge creation processes through which policies are 
derived.   
 
Returning specifically to the national level, in my critique of the Feasibility Study, I 
attempt to answer emerging questions of how expertise informs policymaking and 
what evidence is used in deciding. As has become increasingly apparent in my 
research, the South African situation reflects wider criticisms of evidence-based 
policymaking (EBP) or New Public Management (NPM) in the North. As Bond 
(2005) illustrates for the Reconstruction and Development Plan (NDP) and scenario 
plundering therein (see chapter 3), the technocratic power-structures through which 
policies are made and evidence is produced and legitimised are likely to be more 
rationally deficient than EBP discourse tends to propose. That is, in a practical sense 
the evidence buttressing the win-win biofuels narratives is not important so much for 
its accuracy or robustness—questionable as it is and evidence is increasingly 
becoming partial when confronted by complex problems—but in its potential to 
justify policy-based proclamations. Digging deeper, the research also highlights 
dubious assumptions about the value of evidence in policymaking, showing that the 
evidence does not speak for itself it is spoken for. What is especially interesting is 




groups and academics (with little platform to air such disagreement), it was not 
considered problematic politically or within the networks of support; the same 
networks with close linkages to the policymaking apparatus of government and part 
of the biofuels imaginary in South Africa. Being funded by the Central Energy Fund 
and the Industrial Development Corporation, the feasibility was imbued with an 
industrial logic from its initiation – the questions investigated as part of the evidence-
gathering being clearly loaded but through the apparent credibility of providing 
'evidence' their answers were still able to achieve consensus and legitimacy.  
 
Although there has been some work on renewable energy transitions in South Africa, 
in this thesis, my framing of a biofuels assemblage, with a biofuels imaginary being 
central to policymaking (though not in simple ways) begins to highlight the 
important power dynamics and the most forceful actors within the struggle to define 
South Africa's future energy outlook. What is novel about biofuels is that the 
transport-fuel energy system with which it interacts differs markedly to the electricity 
supply sector and so offers a new arena in which to investigate the existence and 
nature of Minerals-Energy Complex. Although renewable energy in general is seen 
as an alternative to the hegemony of Eskom, it is still subject to the existing political 
economy in which Eskom holds considerable control. Similarly, when considering 
biofuels, though it was considered initially to represent a green alternative, the 
realisation is that this is unlikely from a range of perspectives. However, what I am 
most interested is the close connections between the state and industry when it comes 
to policymaking around major developmental technologies. The clean energy 
transition is then representative of the MEC, though with some new players and a 
shift in the energy source. Similar entities in control of the transition as were present 
in the original developments around coal, which includes coal-liquid and gas-liquid 
synthetic fuels. Ultimately, from the initial development of the biofuels strategy, a 
capital-intensive technological fetish seems to be consistent across both the National 
Party during apartheid and democratic ANC government.  
 
Biofuels are equally novel for their potential role in the agro-economy. My research 
illustrates, however, how old forces within the agro-industrial sector are 




ethanol plants in the country (particularly the Free State Province—South Africa's 
breadbasket), however, there has actually been little shift in rural development 
paradigms or discourses in the country. Acquiescing to a 'dual-economy' logic has 
perhaps sharpened the focus (even if it is a misleading construction; see Appendix 
E), but agricultural solutions continue to be crafted in ways unlikely to achieve 
success in 'bridging' the first and second economy. For the most part, they ignore the 
unlikely success of new entrants and default to plans in which only the existing 
large-scale and well-financed players will be able to succeed. While ecological 
modernisation is pandered to, economic reality is completely ignored or 
unrealistically inscribed within 'pro-poor' and job-creation rhetoric. Given the 
complexity of land reform and rural economies in South Africa, policies remain 
contentious and politically motivated, with job creation a particularly powerful 
symbol and hence totally amenable to 'biofueled' discourses of rural development. 
Unfortunately, this is unlikely to help those that need it the most. Banning maize, for 
example, is extremely myopic given the potential to grow it in the former homelands, 
but what is more important is that such potential has been marginalised from policy 
decisions given the overriding ideologies and prevailing narratives, though given the 
circumstances makes sense (at least politically).
7
 Equally important is the range of 
actors that the supposed 'quick-fix' solution of biofuels brings together—a cohort not 
unlike those of the MEC above and similarly important in the configuration of the 
biofuels assemblage in South Africa.  
 
Whilst highlighting emerging networks and power dynamics within policymaking 
around biofuels, my thesis argues that narratives have become like glue, holding 
together disparate interests, though local complexities and politics can subdue, 
rearticulate and renegotiate the terms and status of such narratives in complex ways. 
They also allow a re-articulation of what has gone before, and can be used to 
legitimise existing failures, reconstructing them as political successes, a neat 
rhetorical trick used in many instances to continue along predetermined or existing 
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marginalised. While white commercial farmers are seemingly indispensible for food production, 




pathways no matter the likelihood of success and the potential for developmental 
benefits upon which policies are proposed.  
 
The above is then particularly important as part of a reflection of the development 
state South Africa considers itself to be. A first issue is the way in which 
policymaking in the country is perhaps unequal to the task of South Africa becoming 
a developmental state.
8
 The rhetorical and discursive practices of policymaking in 
South Africa appear to undermine and overshadow the ability to accommodate 
complexity. Centralising and over-politicising decision-making means that policies 
have to remain vague and open to interpretation. Through successive drafting of the 
biofuels strategy, this has become increasingly apparent. While I cannot deny that the 
vague nature of the policy has been detrimental to the industry, it is almost a 
necessity for policymakers, in that it allows for multiple interpretations and leeway in 
a complex, fluctuating and largely unknown arena, as well as allowing for political 
point scoring. That is, vague policies are still important for their symbolic value 
regardless of their practical value. Such a feature is well recognised of policies in 
general and, while the vague and contradictory nature of the final Strategy may be 
problematic, it may not be very surprising.  
So it's not about if it's going to work or not, it's about how good it 
looks, it has to be vague, if it's too detailed then Cabinet doesn't 
look at things to start off with, I mean we took Cabinet proposals 
and they wouldn't consider it because it's too technical so there's 
a definite shortfall (Former BTT member A, 2012).  
As a particularly complex policy option, with the promises of biofuels engaging with 
multiple and complex systems that are still not fully understood, the BTT have been 
unable to produce a policy that articulates clearly how it foresees biofuels as a 
developmental tool in anything other than through existing political 
conceptualisations of development in South Africa. In this, the veil of policy allows 
both the fashioning and legitimisation of discourses that do not fit with 'reality'. In 
facing multiple challenges, which have been uncomfortably merged with the aims 
and aspirations of a select network, the industrial biofuels policy is trying to achieve 
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 Common to most Development States are technocratic policymaking with strong leadership both 
politically and institutionally (usually with a lead agency) with an associated meritocracy or 




multiple ends through a single technological means. Even though such political ends 
may be contradictory, they make for appealing rhetorical commitments even if 
unachievable in practice. Policies are used to 'politicise' technical solutions, moving 
them from the realms of the technical and making them operable in the 
understandings and imaginations of politicians and practitioners. An overarching 
anti-intellectualism in particular appears to offer fertile ground for homogenising 
narratives to be sown and symbolic policymaking to proliferate; denying not only the 
potential value of new technologies but removing the potential for politics from 
below.   
 
There is also an existing argument that there is the inability to counter elitist and 
hegemonic ideologies, which in turn cast a shadow of doubt on the ability of South 
Africa to realise its potential as a developmental state responding to the needs of its 
poorest citizens. This too can be seen in the biofuels policy, in which appeals to the 
development objectives have to be seen in the face of the underlying discourses and 
external influences through which the strategy has been developed. While it is easy 
to emphasise the importance of political processes and citizen engagement in 
policymaking, such suggestions overlook the less overtly political but increasingly 
influential channels generally not open to the poor and marginalised. Socio-technical 
imaginaries with close links to policymakers have eliminated politics from below and 
closed out exactly who can participate within the policy process, especially in its 
early phases in which policy frames are established and issues are made politically 
relevant. As policymaking is also an on-going process, it is difficult for NGOs and 
civil society to compete with players that are more powerful (i.e. resourced), 
especially through time.
9
 Continued involvement by such players includes shaping 
public opinion through the media and persistent promotion, sustained economic 
pressure through lobbying (at its extreme taking the form of threats of economic 
collapse) and a range of informal social networks that influential elites are able to 
establish. In so doing, an imbalance of who counts in policymaking and the value of 
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There are equally interesting dynamics around NGOs in South Africa. They lack of resources 
appears to direct their attention to ‘what's hot’ and subsequently there is an inherent weakness in 
that business is able to lobby for its interests as a core function of what they do. In the early stages 
of the policy process, biofuels were hotly debated, in later (and arguably more important) 




the knowledge they add to the negotiation persists. Whereas Evans (2010) suggests 
that development strategies cannot be formulated by technocrats but must be derived 
from democratically organised public deliberation, this seems to depart from existing 
practices. Additionally, although many developmental states rely on technocratic 
decisions, the more important issue seems to be the knowledge they bring to the table 
and whether it is fashioned towards a greater good or material self-interest. (The 
same is true of political oversight.) At worst, the biofuels policy appears to be 
representative of an anti-democratic and anti-development state, considering the 
conceptual apparatus of a developmental state (participatory policymaking, 
accountability, benefiting the poorest of the poor, et cetera.) through which these are 
defined earlier.  
 
Finally and summarising the above, we need to look at policymaking within the 
wider processes of government and what it attempts to achieve within such 
processes. There are, of course, instrumental effects to policies and strategies, in 
which they guide the course of action and present outcomes to be achieved. They 
may also act in other ways. Two aspects come to the fore when considering biofuels. 
First, the allure of biofuels as a development solution has legitimised biofuels in the 
first place and has become a mobilising metaphor justifying or rendering achievable 
other plans of action, despite limited evidence to suggest this is possible. The use of 
the biofuels to reframe existing betterment-style programmes in the Eastern Cape 
highlights such a situation. The use of the biofuels policy as a mobilising metaphor 
can also be seen in its use within policies and political statements after its initial 
promulgation. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) provides one example of 
this, in which accelerated development in the biofuels sector is a key action plan. 
Interestingly, it specifically mentions biodiesel and support for the canola project in 
the Eastern Cape with little specific mention of any of the other projects. The 
involvement of the DTI, as the lead department developing the IPAP and a 
significant investor in the canola project, makes this understandable. According to 
this plan, it is assumed that the biofuels sector will lead to up to 150,000 jobs created 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2010 p.70). That is three times what the original 
Feasibility Study suggested. Again, 'win win' narratives are consistently used as a 




development of the biofuels value chain. Such interventions are based on particular 
constructions of the rural economy, which make these solutions an obvious and 
logical choice.  
 
Political statements surrounding biofuels after the strategy has been passed and the 
industry remains in disarray, suggests another way in which policies 'mean' – the 
most notable occurring at COP17. In a keynote address, the Minister of Energy 
suggested that the pilot strategy had been a success and South Africa had resolved 
regulatory challenges surrounding biofuels. Yet, neither was there regulations 
established within this period, apart from rudimentary licensing criteria, nor was any 
biofuels produced during this pilot stage. It is in such pronouncements that the 
symbolic utility of policies becomes most pervasive.  
 
The development of a strategy has practically become a measure of success rather 
than or in addition to being a plan of action to achieve success. We have to accept 
that sometimes policies (rightly or wrongly) are commitments to inaction as much as 
they are commitments to action. The blurry distinction between a strategy and a 
policy is an important part of the symbolism associated with strategies. I am at fault 
as I too have used the terms strategy and policy quite loosely, owing to the fact that 
definitions of policy are themselves quite broad. Although the proposition that a 
strategy is a purposive course of action (or inaction), or declaration and plan justifies 
my position, in government, however, the distinction is far more important and yet 
little understood. The terms are also used interchangeably as part of government 
praxis. The challenge, however, is that the two terms come with somewhat different 
levels of accountability to implement and are thus differing types of policymaking. 
Policies (ideally) are institutionally regulated (especially in the form of white papers) 
and thus impose greater accountability to implementing agencies (though people 
differ in their opinions of this). Strategies are also easier to change and adjust, which 
is both necessary and problematic. It means government gives itself leeway when 
developing strategies but leaves open the question of whether a strategy can become 
a policy or will receive the institutional backing that policies do. Of course it is also 
open to question whether there is any definitive difference as cases of policies not 




far more than just instrumentally defining 'implementation'. It is thus I suggest that 
we need to interrogate how policies mean whilst also reflecting on how they act. 
Final Words 
The core contribution I seek to make in this thesis is that there is a need to review the 
types of discourses and narratives at work and how they are reflected in policy and 
policymaking in South Africa. The similarities of the provincial and national 
policies, which certainly spoke the same language for reasons already mentioned, 
seems to suggest there is value in interrogating these issues further in other areas, 
especially where industrial and highly technological policies and plans are being 
formulated. Similarly, the networks involved in the two strategies are equally alike, 
again reflecting a core imaginary within wider assemblages. The IDC has become 
particularly important here and its influence is thus significant. How this extends to 
areas other than biofuels requires greater empirical attention. While much attention 
has been given to who holds the power politically in South Africa, there is more to be 
said about the composition of the 'elites' and how these quasi-governmental (not 
quite government, not quite private sector) entities operate within policymaking and 
policy implementation. They may turn out not to be the tools that government or the 
public assume they are (or more worryingly and more likely, they are, and everyone 
else is being misled). The above conclusions also unjustly generalise the minutiae of 
policymaking; though all such studies of the process will be necessarily imperfect 
and neglect considerable detail; reality always exceeds our analysis of it. Just as so-
called blueprints hypostatise development contexts and remain incomplete, so too 
will interpretations of how such narratives inform policy and the dynamic processes 
that occur thereafter. Drawing on other peoples experiences adds further filtration but 
does allow for an informative interrogation of the process nevertheless.  
  
In closing, the use of biofuels and the resulting biofuels policy appears a good 
example of what we think modernity and science/ technology as a development 
solution is, and why it is so problematic. While presenting seemingly imaginable 
even if far-fetched solutions, these solutions are delinked from the structural nature 




These too are a function of power and knowledge. As Jones (2009) highlights, while 
multiple theories of power and the knowledge policy interface in the policy process 
are fairly well established, they have not yet been consistently applied in Southern 
contexts. As such, it is not possible to say if/when one dimension plays the strongest 
role in shaping policy in development, which sorts of actors play the more prominent 
roles, what are the key institutions, or the pertinent discursive structures or practices. 
While the quest for an overarching theory of policy may be doomed, our 
understanding is still far reaching and there is no reason the interpretive project 
especially should not be extended within South Africa scholarship. This thesis has 
presented an original if only initial exploration into the South African context, far 
more remains to be done to expand interpretive studies of policy into a large-scale 
empirical project, focussed on supposed development solutions other than biofuels 
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APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL BACKGROUND TO BIOFUELS 
The term ‘biofuels’ is generally used to describe liquid or gaseous fuels that are 
predominantly produced from biomass for use in the transport sector (Demirbas 
2006). Apart from a post-development orientated criticism of the buzzword biofuels, 
as opposed to the more representative label agrofuels,
1
 there is a more particular 
confusion
2
 or misleading overlap in the way in which the terms ‘biofuels’ and 
‘bioenergy’ are used. Such perplexity is important as it blurs what exactly is being 
classified; nomen est numen. The PISCES group (Clements 2008), for example, 
consider bioenergy to consist of bioresources (energy derived from natural sources 
including trees, bushes, grasses), bioresidues (energy derived from left over material 
from existing agriculture, industry or forest practices) and biofuels, which are 
produced from purposely grown energy crops including sugarcane, cassava, maize, 
palm oil and sorghum, as well as wood and forestry cultivation such as coppicing. 
However, the latter two clearly overlap, given that ‘biofuels’, that is fuels produced 
from biological material, may also be derived from ‘bioresidues’, as some (second–
generation) biofuels are. The classification here confuses the source of the energy 
                                                 
1
 There is significant contestation as to the use and definition of the term ‘biofuels’. Entwined into the 
fabric of a much broader debate around ‘what’ and ‘whose’ development, terming ‘bio-fuels’ 
with the prefix ‘bio’ subtly implies that the energy in question comes from ‘life’, but this is 
illegitimate and manipulative (an argument put forward by the Via Campesina movement). For 
Via Campesina, a more accurate term that describes the specific origins of a biofuel feedstock 
would be ‘agro-fuels’. The former representation masks their production as economically and 
environmentally innocuous, disguising their actual commercial interests and resultant capitalist 
exploitation. Following nomenclature within the South African Biofuels Industrial Strategy 
Document, in this thesis biofuels and agrofuels are used synonymously and biofuels will be used 
as the term of choice. This should not be taken as a denial of the important discursive traits 
embedded in the term.   
2
 Although the discussion that follows in this section may be considered superfluous, I have included 
it purely because I have seen and been involved in various debates about this very issue; all of 
which have come to different conclusions and some of which have not been concluded. The 
difficulty it seems is taking what are complex processes and technical terms for specific fuels 
(energy carriers) and using general classifications that indiscriminately cross boundaries into 
utilization and feedstocks as well (not to mention the development orientation being implied). 
The debate might also be further clarified by considering explicitly chemical definitions of 
individual biofuels such as that for biodiesel as a:   
mono-alkyl esters of long chain fatty acids derived from vegetable oils or animal 
fats which conform to ASTM D6751 specifications for use in diesel engines. 
Biodiesel refers to the pure fuel before blending with diesel fuel. Biodiesel blends 
are denoted as, "BXX" with "XX" representing the biodiesel per cent contained in 





with the type of energy source produced. For similar reasons, Magdoff (2008, p.35) 
suggests biofuels be differentiated by “the biological material used (the feedstock), 
the process for conversion of the feedstock to fuel, and the actual type of fuel 
produced”.
3
 It is a useful approach; however, he then specifies four basic types of 
‘biofuels’ as: 
i. direct combustion (of wood products, crop residues);  
ii. ethanol (produced from sugars, starches, or cellulose);  
iii. biodiesel (produced from oil crops or waste cooking oil); and 
iv. methane (natural gas, produced from digestion of animal manures or 
human sewage). 
These I would consider as types of bioenergy, rather than types of ‘biofuel’ as direct 
combustion is an exchange of energy whilst the rest are fuel/energy carriers. Magdoff 
(2008) therefore somewhat breaks with his own convention. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I therefore consider biofuels as those fuels specifically used as a substitute for 
liquid petroleum (a fossil fuel) and derived from purposely grown crops and 
residues; bioethanol (as substitute for but more likely used as an additive to petrol) 
and biodiesel (as a substitute for diesel) being the most important. In addition to 
these first-generation biofuels (derived from the carbohydrates of the crop itself), 
second-generation biofuels are produced from the cellulose of bio-residues or other 
sources of biomass.
4
 Bio-energy then refers to all energy (e.g. liquid biofuels, solid 
biomass and biogas) derived from biomass but focus here will be on bioethanol and 
biodiesel. Bioenergy is therefore a far more encompassing term, and extends from 
small-scale applications (e.g. biogas at household level) to biofuels (e.g. large-scale 
industrial applications).  
 
Bioethanol is produced predominantly from carbohydrate-rich crops including 
starch-rich cereals
5
 such as maize or wheat, and sugar-rich crops such as sugarcane 
                                                 
3
 This appears to be more common in the USA in which biofuel and bio-energy are used 
interchangeably.  
4
 Third- and fourth-generation biofuels have also entered into the lexicon (though are not particularly 
new to the science), referring to algal-based production and advanced biotechnology respectively. 
Neither of these is specifically important for the purposes of this thesis but they are important 
technological endeavours regardless.  
5
 Starches are complex carbohydrates (or long saccharides) that need to be broken down into simple 




or sugar beet (Peters and Thielman, 2008). Bioethanol is derived from alcoholic 
fermentation of sucrose or simple sugars, which are produced from biomass by 
hydrolysis (Demirbas, 2006). Bioethanol, which has a lower calorific value than 
petrol, can be used in combination with normal fuel (typically at a ten per cent 
mixing ratio, referred to as E10) in older petrol-driven engines although mixing 
within the existing fuel supply presents some challenges (see Rusco & Walls 2009 
and below). There has been, for example, some resistance by fuel companies to 
mixing bioethanol into the existing infrastructure given the capital expenditure 
required. Other major issues include: 
 Removing existing aromatics and mixing ratios. Although not a result of 
mixing biofuel per se, South Africa has drafted new regulations moving the 
fuel sector to Clean Fuels 2 (see Appendix E). Octane enhancers such as 
methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether (MTBE) and other aromatics will therefore need 
to be replaced. Bioethanol is a likely but not an automatic substitute. If 
mixing was mandated, some aromatics would have to be removed regardless 
to maintain vapour pressure, volatility and octane, however, depending on the 
mixing ratio, these indices change and thus different refineries react 
differently and require different technological modifications. Other operating 
issues arise with blends above E20, such as (i) higher aldehyde emissions, (ii) 
corrosiveness, affecting metallic parts (iii) higher latent heat of vaporisation 
causing engine-start problems, (iv) higher evaporation losses due to higher 
vapour pressure and (v) requiring large fuel tank due to lower calorific value 
(Wilson et al. 2005). 
 Affinity to water: Ethanol is hygroscopic, meaning it absorbs water. This 
requires the entire fuel system be desiccated and waterproofed, making 
storage especially difficult. It is also not only a problem for refineries but fuel 
systems in vehicles as well. An ethanol blend has a specific ‘shelf life’ after 
which it needs to be replaced entirely. Water absorbed by ethanol can 
produce a ‘slurry’ or phase separation within fuel tanks—the fuel separates 
into a lighter ethanol-gasoline layer and a heavier water-ethanol one within 
the tank. 
                                                                                                                                          
sugarbeet in which the glucose is more readily available, are preferable and more efficient to 




 Blending location and transport infrastructure: Storage issues also depend on 
where the ethanol will be mixed. If it is mixed at the refinery a specific set of 
infrastructure is needed, but this would be different if ethanol is mixed at the 
pump. Wherever it is mixed, there may be fungibility (volumetric 
equivalence) issues unless specific blends are mandated nationally and all 
fuel infrastructures, especially the main pipeline are upgraded to handle the 
prescribed ethanol mixes. As ethanol concentrations change, so too does the 
energy content and volume of the fuel mix.  
 Only modified engines can be run on pure bioethanol6 and there is also only 
limited potential for small-scale refining of bioethanol given the chemistry 
and costs involved. 
 
Biodiesel is produced from oleaginous (oil-rich) crops such as jatropha, canola 
(Rape seed), oil palm, pongamia and soya. Vegetable oils are transesterified (see 
Bridgwater 2006 for discussion), requiring methanol, a catalyst (sodium or 
potassium) and heat. The production process is technically simple and can operate at 
almost any scale and using a variety of fats or oils, which makes it technically 
feasible for farmers to produce their own biodiesel (Von Maltitz & Brent 2008). 
Although technically feasible, recent studies in South Africa suggest that this is still 
not economically viable (KZN DoA 2010). Older indirect injection diesel engines are 
usually able to use pure biodiesel, however, additives are usually necessary, 
especially in direct injection engines to ensure they are not damaged. Biodiesel itself 
may ‘gel’ and degrade over time
7
 causing blockages. In South Africa, biodiesel, and 
bioethanol, are proposed only as additives to fuels and so are unlikely to create 
considerable issues for motor vehicles, however, the National Association of 
Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) has until recently argued 
against the introduction of biofuels.
8
  
                                                 
6
 The main concern here is that pure ethanol or fuel mixes dominated by ethanol might degrade certain 
rubbers, plastics and metals in the fuel system. Conversion kits are available to ensure such 
problems do not arise but come at additional costs.  
7
 When made from oils with high iodine values, (which are the best for cold weather) the fuel runs the 
risk of polymerizing (turning into an insoluble plastic-like material) (http://www.answers-to-
your-biodiesel-questions.com provides a useful overview). 
8
 We will encounter this situation again in later discussions. In short, during the early development of 
the strategy, NAAMSA were reluctant to support biofuels and suggested that car manufacturer 




There are varieties of processes that produce the different biofuels (Figure 7). 
Common to both bioethanol and biodiesel, a six-stage life cycle is followed in the 
production of biofuels. This includes the following (Von Maltitz and Brent, 2008): 
 feedstock production - the cultivation of biomass for feedstock; 
 feedstock processing - the harvesting, storing, transporting and initial 
preparation of the feedstock for conversion to fuels;  
 bioenergy conversion - the process of converting the feedstock bioenergy into 
biofuels, either by mechanical, chemical or biological means; 
 biofuels transformation - the transformation of the primary biofuels into the 
final liquid fuel products; 
 fuel distribution - the distribution of the produced fuels to the market; 
 fuel market - the end user of the fuels. 
 
At this point, it is worth flagging that what sets biofuels, or rather bioenergy, apart 
from other renewable energy technologies, and why it has such important 
implications for rural development, is the first stage of the production process. As 
biofuels rely on feedstock production, increased biofuel production has important 
backward and forward linkages within the wider agro-economy. The advantages and 
disadvantages of such back and forward linkages depends on the type of biofuel 
being produced—first- and second-generation biofuels—the drivers involved (and 
speed of their uptake) and the type of agricultural production followed. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Europe and elsewhere). However, as a vehicle exporting country, car manufacturers were 
producing two standards of vehicle; one for the domestic market that would use Euro 2 fuel 
specifications and a second export standard that would use Euro 5-a cleaner fuel specification 
used in Europe. Obviously producing two standards of car was inefficient so there was pressure 
on for South African authorities to impose new fuel standards, which thus required cleaner fuels 
and has, apparently opened up the gateway for biofuels. NAAMSA now appear broadly in 





Figure 7: Integrated technology pathways to produce biofuels (adapted from Pike et al. 
2008) 
 
The current production of ‘first generation’ biofuels described above depends 
predominantly on feedstock derived from food crops. Production for first-generation 
biofuels therefore competes directly with that for food markets and interacts more 
directly with the existing agro-food system. Magdoff (2008, p.36) suggests that the 
“holy grail” of ethanol production is to find an economically feasible process for the 
conversion of cellulose into ethanol. By using cellulose, a structural material in 
plants, these so-called second-generation biofuels can therefore take advantage of 
what biomass may be left over, once crops have already been harvested for food 




by taking advantage of alternative feedstock for production purposes.
9
 Recent 
proponents of biofuel production use second-generation technology as the ‘end all’ 
of the food security debate, despite the technology still being developed (set to be 
‘online’ 2015 according to IIED (2009); see also Vermeulen et al., 2009). This too 
ignores an increasingly complex interrelationship between food, feed and fuel 
production (McMichael 2010b; Ruysenaar 2011b). Such complexities will be dealt 
with later, beforehand, it is important to acknowledge a second defining feature of 
biofuels, which has both policy implications and results from policy prescriptions; 
their rapid uptake.  
 
Trends in and Drivers of Biofuel Production10 
 
Although biofuel production is in no way a new phenomenon, in recent years it has 
increased significantly.
11
 Since 2000, global bioethanol supply doubled to over 40 
billion litres in 2007 (Renewables, 2007; World Bank, 2008) Global bioethanol 
production is dominated (90 per cent) by Brazilian Sugarcane and US maize (World 
Bank, 2008). Whilst there is a general perception that Brazil leads the market in the 
production and export of bioethanol, the USA has eclipsed them following generous 
subsidies for ‘corn ethanol’ (Balat 2007). (Subsequently, the US Congress allowed 
these subsidies to expire in 2011 (Lever 2012)). Biodiesel production is significantly 
lower but has expanded in the last four years to around ten billion litres in 2007. The 
EU dominates biodiesel use, producing about 75 per cent of the 6.5billion litres of 
biodiesel produced in 2006 (World Bank, 2008). In the future, notable increases in 
demand for biofuels are anticipated from the USA, Brazil, EU, China and India 
amongst others.  
                                                 
9
 Second generation biofuels include lignocellulose digestion, fast pyrolysis, and Fischer-Tropsch 
(gasification) technologies, which suggest that a wide range of fast-growing, non-agricultural 
crops (or crop residuals), including grass, algae or fast-growing trees, may be viable feedstock for 
liquid biofuels in the not-too-distant future. These too are not unproblematic as much of the 
technology may be out of reach for developing countries. Even if the technology is provided, it 
also means that local producers are unlikely to benefit greatly - being exporters of feedstock 
rather than beneficiated biofuels. It would also be myopic to assume that with this new 
technology there are no risks, especially at the scales at which production would have to occur.  
10 
 Although these figures are dated, I have kept them as it was during the period covered by these stats 
in which the South African Industrial Biofuels Strategy was developed. Statistics that are more 
recent can be found in the annual F.O. Licht’s World Ethanol and Biofuels Report. 
11
 Both Henry Ford’s first car - the quadricycle - and Rudolph Diesel’s original engines were designed 





The rise in crude oil prices during the middle of 2000 together with concerns about 
greenhouse gas abatement and energy security has resulted in a sharp increase in 
biofuel production and related policy measures (Hertel et al. 2008; see Chapter 1). 
One of the significant drivers pushing policymakers towards biofuels production is 
declining global oil reserves with increasing consumption. It is predicted that by 
2025 the global demand for petroleum will have increased between 40-50 per cent 
(Rooney et al., 2007, Johnston and Holloway, 2007). At the same time, the rate at 
which conventional oil production can be increased has been reduced by the lack of 
refining capacity, and the fact that nearly fifty per cent of the world’s proven and 
probable conventional light crude oil reserves have already been consumed (USGS, 
2004). Collective fears of diminishing fuel supply and energy security have thus 
pushed up oil prices (although the global recession in 2008 prompted a short-term 
decline), increasingly making biofuels more financially competitive as one 
alternative but remain inadequate as a complete substitute.  
 
The rapid demand and anticipated uptake of biofuels also results from a variety of 
other push and pull factors with policies created to take advantage and compel their 
uptake. In doing so policy has become a major push factor itself. In general, biofuels 
are considered as ‘relevant’ technologies for both developing and industrialised 
countries for several reasons, including energy security, environmental concerns, 
foreign exchange savings, and socio-economic issues related to the rural sector 
(Demirbas 2006; Demirbas & Demirbas 2007; Von Maltitz & Brent 2008). 
Conversely, other authors are critical of the global drive towards a biofuels economy, 
highlighting the potential impacts on food security, poor energy efficiencies and 
potential environmental harm (Gallagher 2008; Mitchell 2008; The Royal Society 
2008).  
 
While drivers provide some idea as to why biofuels are being supported, they lack 
detail as to how such uptake is managed and what the implications might be. In the 
2008 World Development Report, the World Bank (World Bank 2008) outlines three 




large-scale biofuels programmes – those being economic, environmental and social 








APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEMATIC AND LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
Table 4: List of respondents (note: not all respondents are included) 
Respondent Affiliation
1
 Respondent Affiliation 
National Level 
National Level (continued) 
Alf Stevens EPASA Nadia Moosa DME 
Andre Kudlinski DTI Normawethu Qase Department of Energy  
Anthony Butler  Wits University  Phillip Bouwer  Mabele Fuels 





Andrew Makanete SABA/Independent 
consultant 
Raoul Goosen Independent 
Consultant/IDC 
Anthon Moulden SAPIA Rod Crompton DME/NERSA 
Asogan Moodaly IDC/Private 
consultant/Mabele 
Fuels 
Petrus Brits Agricultural Research 
Council 
At van Coller Department of 
Agriculture 
Sandile Tyatya DME/Potchefstroom 
Municipality 
Brett Dawson DME Simon Wilson African Sustainable 
Fuels Centre 
Brian Tait Sasol/Independent 
consultant 
William Gumede DME/Independent 
Consultant 
Charles Siphughu MMI Terry Le Roux Independent 
Consultant 
Charles Cox Nollen Group 
(Bioenergy) 
Vanessa Black Independent 
Consultant 
Derek Mathews Silversands 
(Bioethanol)  
Zakhele Gumede Ubuhle Biofuels 
Ehard Seiler German Business 
Chamber/SABA 
Thomas Funke BFAP/SASA 
Erwin Obermeyer National 
Treasury/SARS 
Thabo Kekana IDC  
Ferdi Meyer BFAP Wessel Lemmer Grain SA 
Greg Austin Agama Energy Somila Xhosa DST 
Graham Von Maltitz CSIR Wolfgang Fechter Tongaat-Hullet 
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 These affiliations are provided for reference sake. They do not mean that the informants were 
expressing the formal positions of the agencies they were affiliated with. Many of these 




Hantie Hoogkammer Mafikeng Biodiesel 
Project 
Xolile Mtwa DME 
Hein Baak DoE Thuthukile Mosia CEF 
Helene Rask Gron DME consultant Julia Kupka ABSA 
Jimmy Weir-Smith Department of 
Agriculture 
Liz McDaid African Sustainable 
Fuels Centre 
Kevin Nassiep DME/SANEDI Manny Singh CEF/Basil Read 
Khanyiso Zihlangu DoE Marjorie Pioos DST 
Mark Beare Independent Consultant   
Eastern Cape Eastern Cape - Cradock 
Andre Bezuidenhout Feedtek/ABAC Albert Van Der 
Walt 
Cradock Coerant 




‘Bull’ Jordan Farmer 
Flippie Marais Farmer 
Hans Vosloo SBRSA 
Charles Warren-
Hansen 
KPMG/Phyto Energy Lusapha and Lucky  Crop Managers at 
ARDA 
Chris Etmmayer East London IDZ 
Jurrie Jordaan 
Farmer 
Dumisa Maliti ASGISA-EC Hilton Collet SBRSA/ARDA 
Fanie Ferraira GeoTerraImage Peter Prince PGBI 
Felix Hobson ECDALA Phillip Antrobus Farmer 
Leon Coetzee ECDALA Riaan van der Walt Cradock Coerant 
Luvo Qongqo Asgisa-EC Richard Schulze Cradock Councilor 
Garth Combray Makana Meadery Roak Crew SBRSA/ARDA 
Jacques Du Preez Contract Farmer Roger McClaughlin SBRSA/ARDA 
Ken Burn  ECDC 
Volker Fischer 
SBRSA/Ind. 
consultant Gary Farr Rainbow Nation 
Renewables  
 
Petrus Fouche Phyto Energy 
Mark Wells Independent 
Consultant 
Nic Hugow Rural Livelihoods 
Programme (East 
London) 






QUESTIONNAIRE USED TO GUIDE INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
 The first few questions I want to go through will take us through the actual 
development of the strategy from its earliest origins to the drafting of the final 
strategy. The second part unpacks current nature of the strategy and resultant 
projects. I will be using this information to gain a nuanced understanding of the way 
policies are created in South Africa, as well as to outline the lessons learned specific 
to biofuels policy (and the inherent challenges to formulating strategies around such 
complex agendas). There are no right or wrong answers and the questions are open 
ended.  
Section 1: Development of the Strategy 
Could you describe to me how you were involved in the phases of the policy 
development and when you became involved?  
 
Depending on this, could you describe your perceptions (briefly summarise) what 
happened in the following stages: 
 
1. Origins, before and up to Task Team? 
- Why was it an industrial focus or only liquid fuels that was 
considered? 
- Who were the main vested interests in the development of a 
biofuels strategy and why?  
- Were there any international influences? 
- There has also been mention of various cabinet memos drafted 
(2004 then 2005 etc.) with job projections but no-one not even the 
DME (split) has got them – do you know of them, their details and 
where I might get a copy of them? 
  
2. The feasibility - who, why, what (How were the initial terms of reference for 
the biofuels strategy or feasibility set up - I want to look at the role of 
discourse and received wisdom when it comes to policymaking... how do you 
know what to put into feasibility). 
- Would anyone in particular have influence of the ToR for 
feasibility or the Strategy at large – details? 




3. Do you think there were any problems with the Feasibility Study itself? 
  
4. Where can I get a copy of the reports that were included but confidential in 
the feasibility [(i) land availability and (ii) potential yields and why the need 
for such secrecy at the time of their development]? 
  
5. Was there any consultation after/during feasibility? 
  
6. The draft policy – who were the main people drawing up the draft policy and 
how was the Feasibility Study included? 
- Key players here in the Task Team and why were they the most 
active? 
- Who was missing from the drafting process? 
- Did civil society play any role and were there any consultants or 
private sector interests drawing up the Strategy itself? 
- Has there been co-operation between multiple-parties and what 
were the successes and challenges? Essentially was the Task Team 
working and why/why not? 
- Is this endemic to all Task Teams in South Africa?  
  
7. Why did the draft policy leave out many of the nuances and issues included 
in the feasibility? It seems to be quite vague? 
  
8. Tell me what you think about the consultation after the draft strategy was 
released – what were the main objections and how was the consultation 
process undertaken? 
- Do you think this was useful? 
  
9. Consultation and the road show – I am interested especially here in the 
Eastern Cape – it seems they had already put their own strategy together- is 
this so and how is this so?  
- Were there any notable challenges and successes of the road 
show? 
- Additionally, there seems to be already very weak foundations to 
the strategy – given the feasibility and draft being heavily 





10. Final strategy – how then were the consultations included in the final 
document. 
- This document seems even vaguer, was that for a reason? Are 
gaps left in the strategy for a reason? 
- There are dramatic shifts in the reasoning and approaches/drivers 
from Feasibility to the Final Strategy – could you outline what you 
think the original approaches were (objectives of the strategy) and 
why the changes have occurred (what they became and why). 
- What role did either the unions or Asgisa (which was been 
developed at the same time) have in the overall policy process?  
- Maintaining the industrial focus in the final strategy, what kind of 
“development” (in terms of job creation/livelihoods) does this 
make possible and did you think that it was the right approach – 
why? 
  
11. Up to now what has happened, have you been involved? (If yes, move to 
Section 2…) 
Section 2: Current “Policy” and Projects  
1. Could you outline the key players in the Task Team currently - Please focus 
on the most active participants and why this is so? 
- Has this Task Team been problematic at all? How/Why? 
- Are there any consultants etc. currently working with the Task Team 
– who and why? 
 
2. Who is missing from the process? 
- Have any departments or groups been sidelined? 
- Has civil society played any role in the current workings of the 
Biofuels Task Team?  
- What has happened to the Task Team – appears to have been a hiatus 
until this year?  
   
3. If not answered in Section 1: What are the major goals or priorities (food 
security, rural development, energy security) of pursuing a biofuels industry 
and do you think these are or will be realised? i.e Why biofuels for SA? 
   
4. What is the nature of a “strategy” in South Africa and how does this differ 




- Does this have any specific implications for the way things are 
implemented and has this been the case for the biofuels strategy? 
- The strategy appears quite vague in terms of operationalisation, is it 
because the provinces need to come up with their own plans and is 
this type of decentralisation likely to happen? 
- What are most pressing challenges in the implementation of the 
“strategy”? 
  
5. Should we be considering alternative policy options and what would these 
be? 
  
6. Could you provide an outline of the major biofuels projects if any and how 
has the strategy affected the industry? 
- Do the current projects match the goals of the strategy – Discuss? 
- Do you think the industry is a sustainable and sensible one – discuss? 
- Is there sufficient technical or institutional oversight of the biofuels 




APPENDIX C: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: A BRIEF 
REVIEW 
As highlighted in Appendix A, the World Bank suggests three emerging themes are 
important in deciding on biofuels, namely: the social, economic and environmental. 
Discussing these three broad categories is important, as policymakers have had to 
deal with such issues in their formulations, but an extensive focus is impractical 
here.
1
 Rather, I will focus on one broad category (rural development), which itself 
incorporates elements of the social, environmental and economic, and locate such an 
aspiration within the South African context. Rural development has been especially 
provocative as a basis for support in the South African case—it is perhaps the most 
alluring of the ‘win-win’ narratives for developing countries—and thus, I will 
examine the South African rural-development context in which various types of 
biofuels projects are being proposed (see Chapter 4). Two issues immediately come 
to the fore: the food-versus-fuel debate and considering the political 
economy/ecology of biofuels. Both are discussed in varying degrees with food 
security being a common thread throughout the discussion. Beyond an instrumental 
level, the social (political) construction of the rural economy, for example in the form 
of two economies, sets out broad categorisations that direct certain strategies in 
response; as do international discourses and counterpart win-win narratives  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Beyond political aspirations and specific government sustainability frameworks that may be put in 
place, there exists a range voluntary sustainability frameworks and certifications (the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Biofuels (2010) with its twelve principles is one example), which allow for more 
instrumental procedures to ensure negative impacts are minimized and benefits maximized 
(Scarlat & Dallemand 2011). As the use of such criteria is voluntary and may sometimes 
contradict political and economic aspirations, their ultimate efficacy cannot be taken as 
automatic. There are a range of other issues that might also make implementing sustainability 
frameworks only partial, such as, lacking government capacity, an underlying conceptual blurring 
and uncertainty in moving from abstract prescriptions to impacts on the ground (neither the 
concepts of sustainability nor the impacts on the ground are clear cut!), and that frameworks are 
largely established to make improvements not necessarily exclude damages. In an approach 
similar to my thesis, Fortin (2011) has proposed examining how dimensions of power and the 
incorporation of the biofuels industry in such processes produces specific ‘knowledges’ in the 




SOUTH AFRICA AS BIOFUELS FRONTIER: THE POTENTIAL FOR RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Very few countries, if any, have been able to sustain a rapid transition out of poverty 
without raising productivity in its agricultural sector. To do so, there needs to be a 
successful structural transformation in which higher productivity provides food, 
labour and even savings to the process of urbanisation and industrialisation (see 
James 1956; Trimmer 2005). There are strong, direct relationships between 
agricultural productivity, hunger and poverty (Von Braun et al. 2004). From a food 
security perspective, as this will be important later, it should be noted that South 
Africa is not in any immediate danger of a (Malthusian or availability) famine (du 
Toit & Ziervogel 2004).
2
 A dramatic consideration of biofuel production is that, if 
the production of biofuels is big enough to effect climate change, one if its greatest 
supposed environmental benefits, it will be big enough to cause global starvation 
(Monbiot 2004). It should be stressed that there are certainly benefits to producing 
biofuels but these come with a number of caveats and as mentioned will depend on a 
variety of contextual factors and contingencies in rural areas (e.g. White & Dasgupta 
2010). The idea of competition between food and fuel, to which Monbiot was 
referring above, is one of the poignant issues when considering the rural 
development potential of biofuels production. As it has been a major subject of 
debate in South Africa, I will discuss it first before moving onto general theoretical 
and country-specific aspects of rural development. 
Countervailing Development(s): The Food-Fuel-Feed Nexus or Food-Versus-
Fuel? 
The production of biofuel from feedstock has had apparently radical effects on the 
global food supply. Powerful and emotive allegories have been used to depict such 
disruptions. “The grain required to fill a tank of a sports utility vehicle with ethanol 
(240kg of maize produces 100litres of ethanol) could feed one person for a year” the 
world development report of 2008 (World Bank 2007, p.71) proclaimed. (A Google 
search of this quote indicates its discursive power.) Globally, the most serious 
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concerns about biofuel expansion therefore focus on the potential impact on global 
food prices and thereby poverty (Eide 2008; The Royal Society 2008). Most 
pervasive was the massive food price increases, beginning circa 2005/2006, for 
which biofuels were considered by some to be the major cause (e.g. Mitchell 2008; 
Pfuderer et al. 2009). From a global perspective, the argument is relatively simple (or 
too easily simplified) and food security—at this level considered a supply and 
demand issue—is dependent only on aggregate availability. Much of the early debate 
for biofuels began and ended at this juncture but as food security researchers have 
shown, the challenge differs considerably at a national and sub-national level, and is 
far more complex (Ruysenaar 2011b). (This is also not to suggest that the global 
situation is thoroughly understood, as significant debate persists around the emerging 
structure of a global food-feed-fuels market (Banerjee, 2011 provides an economic 
perspective; Koning and Mol, 2009 a governance one).) 
 
Considering the definition of food security itself can highlight the complex 
interaction of biofuels with the agro-food system. The National Department of 
Agriculture (2002, p.15; see also World Bank 1986) in South Africa defines food 
security as: 
[p]hysical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious 
food by all South Africans at all times to meet their dietary and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life. 
Implied in this definition is that there are three main tenets to food security; ensuring 
food is available, that it can be accessed when it is available, and that when it is 
accessible it is utilised in ways that assure a nutritious diet. Cutting across each of 
these are issues such as ‘risk’ (Webb & Rogers 2003, p.5) and ‘stability’(Bilinsky & 
Swindale 2005; Food Security Working Group 1997), which affect the surety of each 
component. Although previous paradigm shifts have enriched our understanding of 
food security (see Maxwell 2001; Maxwell & Slater 2003), an important and more 
recent addition is considering food security as the outcome of a complex, adaptive 
food system (Elphinstone 2011; Ericksen et al. 2009; Ericksen 2008; Ingram 2011). 
This is important as it moves from somewhat normative frameworks of what is 
required, to reflecting on what actually happens (with the ultimate goal being to 
combine the two). Although food security is the desired outcome of the agro-food 




the most vulnerable and marginalised are safeguarded. Regardless, the components 
of food security provide important clues as to how biofuels might make an impact. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Ruysenaar 2011b, p.130): 
[i]n a simplified picture, the new food-fuel nexus has been characterized by 
two things: a depletion of what food is available (not necessarily in a neo-
Malthusian sense but more in a speculative market sense), and a subsequent 
rise in food prices, which has eroded accessibility. However, the picture is 
more complicated than simply assuming the accessibility and availability 
arguments. The distinction between them is also arbitrary; biofuels do not 
simply create a trade-off between one and the other. Essentially the price 
fluctuations are symptomatic of the interconnected and market basis of the 
global agro-food system. 
 
Despite the complexity acknowledged by food security scholars, popular discourses 
and narratives remain transfixed on simplified perspectives and a production bias, 
with little emphasis on linkages between increasingly complex, concentrated and 
fragile food markets, feed markets, and energy markets; the latter now more 
intimately connected to the former as a cost driver—by supplying fossil fuels—and 
consumer—by demanding biofuels.  
 
Although sub-Saharan African countries are “feeling the pinch from rising food 
prices, biofuel production at regional and national levels need not diminish regional 
food security” according to Von Maltitz et al. (2009, p. 10; see also Diaz-Chavez et 
al., 2010; Marshall, 2008). The global, regional or national imperatives, depending 
on their approaches, may underplay the very nature of food security (an access issue) 
with profound impacts possible at the local level. Additionally, if biofuels are to be 
developed it could significantly undermine food sovereignty (Mayet 2008). 
Complicating the issues further, the FAO (2008) states that while higher agricultural 
prices could revitalise the role of agriculture as an engine of economic growth over 
the medium- to long-term, urban residents and the large number of net food buyers in 
rural areas are likely to be negatively affected, with the poorest households the most 
affected. The policy question to be answered here is to whom the benefits should go 




A useful concept to consider the food security situation is to consider the food 
‘equation’.
3
 Food availability and access (supply and demand) are the two sides of 
the food (hunger) equation. The first premise is that increasing food production, 
storage and trade can ensure food availability, but this will not automatically ensure 
that all people have enough to eat and end hunger. The second premise is that 
because poverty is central to the cause of hunger and malnutrition, special efforts are 
needed to help increase the access and entitlement to food (Van Zyl & Kirsten 1992). 
Specialists on both sides of the equation generally propose partial solutions to the 
complex issue. A large-scale biofuels strategy should not overlook the lessons 
learned from previous strategies that were aimed at market-related and production-
biased development and the impact they had on food security. For example, 
structural adjustment and accompanying policies aimed at improving economic 
performance were based on several implicit assumptions about how African food 
systems operate (Weber et al. 1988). As illustrated by the ‘food-price dilemma’ it is 
obvious that such approaches do not work as they neglect to include the second 
premise of the food equation. This again insists that local contexts have to be 
understood and complexities unravelled. Only through this kind of analysis can we 
begin to identify pathways for a fair distribution of the benefits.  
Biofuels and Constructing Rural Development 
The issue of food security as described above begins to illustrate how biofuel 
production is intricately linked to other complex socio-political and ecological 
systems, in ways that are still being figured out. What is important then, is to grasp 
the way in which technological shifts, biofuels especially, are subject to and 
influence existing political economies or rather political ecologies in different 
contexts.  
 
Ambitions of rural development, drawing on the mantra of an unlimited market for 
biofuels, have been prevalent within the biofuels lexicon for some time. 
Prophetically, by increasing market opportunities and therefore increasing 
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 Referring to this as an equation is perhaps a misnomer as there is actually no direct equivalence 
between accessibility and availability, however, as it has informed food security thinking it is 




employment or income, rural areas (and food security) will be enhanced. Some 
consider this a ‘paradigm shift’ associated with biofuels that would transform 
hitherto neglected rural economies in the ‘developing’ (and developed) world, 
stabilising commodity (and thus food) prices in the long run (Peskett et al. 2007 
provide a useful overview). The reality of such benefits are disputed or at least highly 
contextual and differ between regions (German et al. 2011). Similar to many 
blueprint development narratives in the past, the beauty of biofuels is the ease with 
which they confront multiple challenges including rural ‘under’-development. The 
popular assumption insists that such under-development is well understood, suffering 
only the absence of suitable ‘agrarian reforms’; or what Scoones et al. (2005) 
critique as ‘quick fix’ approaches. They aptly remind us, however, that  
...there is of course no magic bullet for the problems of African agriculture: 
no technical, market, institutional or policy fix (ibid., p.11).  
 
The main problem with the ‘biofuels equals rural-development’ narrative is that it is 
dominated by a laissez-faire approach to agrarian reform in which the so-called 
‘quick-fixes’, commensurate with current hegemonic liberalization and 
modernization discourses, are relied upon. However, the efficacy, equity, and 
sustainability of market-based and industrial agrarian reforms are questionable; 
markets also fail (see Jacobs 2009).
4
 Even recent proposals to transform agro-food 
commodity chain, based on the World Bank’s (2007) vision of ‘Making Agro-Food 
Markets Work for the Poor’, neglects that such transformation affects the poor in 
complex ways that differ from neo-classical textbook stories. For example, as we 
saw with the food equation above, incorporating food security concerns more 
explicitly into agricultural marketing policies is vital to overcome the contradiction 
in the modern food system in which those working in the agro-food sector tend to 
experience higher levels of food insecurity and are more vulnerable when markets 
fail. Professor Johan Kirsten has described the South African case as one of ‘hunger 
next to the granary’ (see Van Zyl & Kirsten 1992). 
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 The debate is much wider than this and while state failures actually spurred on free-market-based 





The type of agriculture being perpetuated for biofuels production serves as a useful 
example here, by falling largely into ‘agrofuels’ (borrowing from Via Campesina) or 
‘ergronomic’ projects (borrowing from Charles et al. 2007). Agricultural reform in 
this instance is a modernising campaign based largely on capital-intensive 
mechanization and industrial inputs, sometimes framed within the context of green 
revolution. However, evidence suggests such large-scale industrial enterprises and 
the pattern of biofuels production and consumption are unlikely to benefit developing 
countries and especially the rural poor within those countries (e.g. Ariza-Montobbio 
et al. 2010; Dauvergne & Neville 2010; e.g. Matondi et al. 2010; Richardson 2010; 
e.g. Wolde-Georgis & Glantz 2009; Woods 2006). These are especially problematic 
in the form of large-scale land acquisitions, or in the more politically charged term 
‘land grabs’ (mostly foreign acquisitions with production based on industrial-based 
mono-cropping farming for export), not just for biofuels production but increasingly 
for food as well. Others argue that, although the potential for harm exists, foreign 
investment into agriculture has its benefits and need not be an exercise in 
exploitation (Cotula et al. 2008 provide a useful outline).  
 
If anything, concern about biofuels production highlights “the highly questionable 
sustainability of most of modern agriculture” (Moore 2008, p.6) (see also the critical 
appraisal by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development (2009)).
5
 Any calls, for example, for a ‘green 
revolution’ (Conway 1998; Eicher et al. 2006; Mosley 2002; Sanchez et al. 2009) 
should also consider the (infra)structural, agro-ecological, climatic and 
geomorphologic constraints that are particularly common to agriculture in Africa, as 
well as dynamic social, economic, and political diversity at all levels. For one, 
political-economy factors nearly always conspire to return weaker players to their 
marginalised positions regardless of any new technological advantage (Kent 1999). 
Similarly, benefits (essentially profits but food security as well) do not increase 
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 For example, “there is growing consensus that the current model of agricultural knowledge, science 
and technology (AKST) requires revision. Business as usual is no longer an option”. This is not to 










As one way of contextualising the above, White and Dasgupta (2010) provide an 
informative perspective of biofuels and rural development by drawing on political 
economy analyses of non-food agricultural commodity markets. They conclude that 
it is not so much biofuels (as a commodity crop) but the manner in which these crops 
are grown, under which forms of ownership and labour regimes and in what kinds of 
commodity chains. Following from Henry Bernstein’s (1992, p.24) dexterous 
framework that asks: ‘Who owns what?’ ‘Who does what?’ ‘Who gets what?’ and 
‘What do they do with it?’ they narrow the enquiry further to ‘where the land will 
come from’, ‘how will production be organized’ and ‘for whose benefit’? The 
simplicity of these questions is attractive but answering them, whilst giving specific 
and adequate attention to, for example, food security can be a complex undertaking. 
The overall emphasis here overlaps with emphasising and understanding rural 
heterogeneity, which ‘post-Washington Consensus’ thinking embodies (Maxwell & 
Ashley 2001; Scoones et al. 2005). While underpinned by the continued importance 
of the agricultural sector as a driver of economic well-being and rural development, 
there are multiple livelihood strategies and circumstances of considerable flux - 
driven through forces such as globalization, deagrarianization (Bryceson 1996) or 
legislated agrarian labour reforms (Aliber et al. 2009; Greenberg 2010) amongst 
others.  
 
There is an equally important political-ecology critique that requires some 
discussion, as it directly contests the validity of claims made for rural development. 
As an example, Ariza-Montobbio et al. (2010) draw on two main theses of the 
political-economy approach: Foucaultian ‘knowledge-power’ (that is power being 
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 Whereas ‘green revolution’ technologies present technical fixes that need to be adapted to specific 
circumstances, regulating or ‘fixing’ food commodity prices (through increased demand in the 
case of biofuels) have come to represent common practices as policy ‘fixes’. However, one again 
has to raise the food equation, and the associated conundrum of the ‘food-price dilemma’ in 
which rising commodity prices benefit net producers of food but may harm net buyers (Ravallion 
1989; Sah & Stiglitz 1992; Timmer et al. 1983). It is generally assumed that rural people are net 
growers of food so they are most likely to benefit from increased prices. This, however, bears 
little resemblance to what happens in reality (see Van Zyl and Kirsten, 1992 for a South African 




exerted through the realm of ideas and discourses) and ‘marginalisation’. The latter 
refers indirectly to social and environmental degradation due to production at the 
margin and more directly to socially marginalised groups, producing and living in 
marginal ecosystems (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Using these two lenses, Ariza-
Montobbio et al. (2010) then unpack the social construction of pro-wasteland and 
pro-poor discourses by, for example, examining how ‘wasteland’ differs in meaning 
but generally carries a colonial economic connotation while current technical 
meanings are devoid of any recognition of the ‘value-ladeness’ of the term. This 
creates space for single-sided interventions, which are then made more appealing 
based on equally de-contextualised representations of ‘pro-poor’ interventions
7
 (see 
also Pradhan and Ruysenaar, forthcoming).  
 
The above discussion highlights that contexts and their descriptive discourses matter, 
in that they have a profound effect on the technical solutions offered in response to 
apparent manifest challenges. In the next section, I will drill down into the South 
African case and, as I have unpacked some of the proposed projects in Chapter 4, I 
will describe further the agricultural landscape, challenges of change and the political 
economy of agriculture that these projects will need to incorporate or encounter. The 
point here is that there is an important contextual follow on from the ‘second 
economy’ literature in previous chapters, which allows the construction of the second 
economy to be compared to those outlined by political ecologists in other countries 
(e.g. Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010), and with ramifications for the policy process 
described in the main thesis.  
SOUTH AFRICA’S RURAL LANDSCAPES: MOVING BEYOND METAPHORS 
Our people are bound up with the future of the land, our water, 
our sources of energy, and the air we breathe (Nelson Mandela, 
1995). 
                                                 
7
 The pro-poor discourse is based on three main arguments, the short maturation period of jatropha, its 
‘low-input crop’ characteristics, and the associated promotion of ‘small-scale decentralised 
energy production’. Narratives of less water, fertilizers, and labour being required and jatropha’s 
convenient harvest season (Cf. Kumar-Biswas et al., 2010) further solidify its position as pro-
poor crop, especially for small or marginal farmers and the landless. The research findings of 




First and foremost, it should be stressed that, from an agricultural perspective, South 
Africa is not particularly blessed with an overwhelmingly fecund natural 
endowment: it is a water-stressed, semi-arid country receiving on average 497mm 
but being prone to severe droughts
8
 (Nieuwoudt & Groenewald 2003, p.21), although 
with pockets of fertile soils and, areas of well-connected rural infrastructure. 
Variable climate and soil combinations leave only twelve per cent of the country 
suitable for rain-fed crops and only three per cent considered truly fertile or high-
potential land (Goldblatt 2010, p.2). Despite significant environmental constraints, 
South African farmers regularly produce surpluses for export markets over and above 
satisfying local needs. Indeed, “physical output increased from around 18million 
metric tonnes in 1975 to 28million metric tonnes in 2006 with an increase in 
agriculture’s total factor productivity (Vink & Van Rooyen 2009, p.5). Animal 
production dominates this output (c. 43%) with field crops (c. 30%) and horticulture 
(c. 27%) following respectively (ibid., p.6). By value maize, Sugarcane, wheat, hay, 
sunflower seed, tobacco and groundnuts are the top field crops, whilst slaughtered 
fowls, slaughtered cattle and calves, fresh milk, eggs, and slaughtered sheep and 
goats were the top animal products (Pieterse & van Wyk 2005 citing Nyes and 
Meyer, 2001). 
 
A variety of factors— increasing trade liberalisation and international competition, 
market deregulation and democratising shifts—affect the agriculture sector, which 
translates into difficulties in developing rural areas in general (De Klerk et al. 2004; 
Kirsten et al. 1998; Nieuwoudt & Groenewald 2003; Pieterse & van Wyk 2005; Vink 
& Kirsten 2003). Much of these shifts have accompanied new legislation and policies 
around trade; marketing and deregulation; land and resource management; labour 
policy; farmer support and extension services; agricultural finance; agricultural 
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 South African agriculture is influenced by weather occurrences more than any other factor. As Vink 
and Van Rooyen (2009, p.4) remind us “there has been a severe country-wide drought in at least 
one year of each of the preceding decades (the most severe being in 1966, between 1982 and 
1984, and from 1992 to 1993). The period from 1994 to 2008 is an exception to this trend, as 
there has not been a country-wide drought for more than a decade”. There have still been 
localised droughts and there are concerns that maize farmers consider drought more of an 
aberration than a given and therefore do not adequately plan around it (Marcus et al. 1996). 
Climate change predictions are that rainfall in South Africa will become more erratic and 
droughts more likely, putting further pressure on any (surplus) production. Significant reductions 
in maize production in southern Africa have been projected (Jones & Thornton 2003) with South 
Africa suffering the highest gross loss of 871,500 tons of maize in 2055. Although maize 




research and technology development and Black Economic Empowerment 
(AgriBEE) (Vink & Van Rooyen 2009 provide a succinct overview). Others, such as 
The World Future Society of South Africa suggest five continuing concerns for the 
future: energy; climate change; immigration; employment and ethical values 
(Breytenbach, 2010; see also BFAP, 2010). To this list, Prof Breytenbach (2010) 
adds the unpredictable political future, whilst advocating agribusinesses greater 
involvement in assisting and solving on-going schisms in the agro-economy and 
policy thereof. Each of these is important, however, following the logic of win-win 
narratives, in this section I will focus on employment and the political economy of 
agricultural sector in general. 
 
The agriculture sector in South Africa is characterised by a pronounced duality 
resulting from decades of exclusionary government policy under apartheid, inspired 
by the political and economic philosophy of White domination and not by genuine 
economies of scale (Pieterse & van Wyk 2005). “The evolution of South African 
agriculture during the twentieth century witnessed three major trends” (Vink et al. 
2000, p.44). First, the development of the agricultural sector was initially 
characterised by strategies aimed at territorial segregation of white and black 
farmers. In the second phase, considerable state support
9
 contributed heavily to 
commercialisation of White agriculture and the formation of large-scale farms 
utilising (mostly black) wage labour (Vink & Kirsten 2003). Because of this 
restructuring of the sector, the majority of the black population were unable to afford 
food, due to artificially low wages, while also being unable to produce food due to 
forced removals (Greenberg 2003). At the same time, the significant state support did 
not allow for an efficient sector. South Africa’s agricultural marketing system proved 
to be financially, economically and politically unsustainable (Bayley, 2003). 
 
The third trend was a reversal of the “distortionary policies up till the 1980s, brought 
about by external and internal pressures on the sector” (Vink et al. 2000, p.44). The 
changes have consisted of trade reforms, a revision of policy toward economic 
liberalisation, extensions of farm worker rights, legal frameworks and programmes 
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 Consequences included distortions in land and labour markets, input and output markets, 
infrastructure, agricultural credit and services, as well as the creation of large-scale white farms 




for land reform, and redressing inequalities. While showing significant signs of 
change and greater efficiency, the sector still displays a bias towards capital intensity 
and commercial agriculture dominated by White farmers, with limited changes in 
terms of improved equality and living conditions of the rural poor (Vink et al. 2000; 
Van Zyl et al. 2001).
10
 Greenberg (2003; see also Jacobs 2009) argues that continued 
agricultural restructuring programmes, initiated by the apartheid government, have 
skewed the concentration of resources in the agricultural and agri-processing 
industries towards that segment of the population with relatively greater wealth and 
resources at their disposal (see Bernstein 1996 for a discussion of maize).
11
 As Van 
Zyl et al. (2001, p.725), suggest, subsequent to the disbanding of the GNU, important 
policy initiatives “included land reform, institutional restructuring in the public 
sector and the promulgation of new legislation and labour market policy”; the major 
purposes to “correct the injustices of past policy” and make the sector less capital-
intensive and more internationally competitive.  
 
The agricultural sector, however, remains important. It represents a central, strategic 
way in which to empower economically vulnerable groups. Given the historical 
context, the situation now is that the agricultural sector must be de-racialised while 
maintaining a national priority towards food security or self-sufficiency (at least at 
national level). At the same time, there is a focus on poverty alleviation and food 
accessibility necessitating a revision of agricultural policy, though the link between 
these remains poorly conceptualised (Nieuwoudt & Groenewald 2003) and extremely 
tricky; the biofuels narratives of rural development appears to provide a simple 
solution to the situation through proposals of significant employment potential 
(Chapter 1, 4 & 5).  
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 Small farmers as a group have not benefited from reform processes (Pieterse and Van Wyk, 2005). 
11
 A similar situation has been shown in the urban context in which Tomlinson (2002, p.380) suggests 
“[e]conomic and social exclusion, deliberately fostered under apartheid, is being accentuated in 
the post apartheid era. The Urban Development Framework, self-evidently, proved illusory.” In 
housing policy, definitions of delivery are adapted to meet exiting outputs (subsidies provided) 
rather than outcomes (houses actually built) and development criteria are neglected, proposing 
developments away from job opportunities, schools, medical services, and shops (i.e. 
marginalized) to decrease the risk of political opposition, associated legal action and benefit from 




Of crucial importance then, is employment within the agricultural sector itself. 
Commercial agriculture represented almost one-third of formal sector employment in 
rural areas in 1998. Despite this, the regular employment on farms has declined by 
about twenty per cent during the 1990s (Aliber 2003). Data presented in Van Zyl et 
al. (2001, p.731) show that the agriculture sector shed approximately 200,000 regular 
employees between 1985 and 1996, and a further 200,000 casual and seasonal 
workers. In a presentation by the National Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry, formal agriculture has made a decreasing contribution to national 
employment dropping from 11% in 2000 to 5% in 2010 (Ngqangani 2010). This 
suggests not only an absolute sectoral decline within agriculture over the long-term 
but also a declining total employment contribution to the national economy (see also 
DAFF 2010). In addition to declining employment in the sector, a second major trend 
is an increasing ‘casualisation’ and expansion of non-permanent jobs. Furthermore, 
increasingly draconian labour laws have had adverse effects. Former farm workers 
are particularly susceptible to social exclusion, especially when evicted from the 
farms where they used to reside and work. Many retrenched farm workers were born 
and raised on the farms from which they were eventually ejected; thus they have no 
‘roots’ elsewhere, to which they can return (Bekker et al. 1992, in Aliber, 2003).  
 
From a regional perspective (including South Africa and its neighbours), it is 
important to note two things. First, there has been a general decline in agricultural 
investment within the SADC
12
 since the 1980s, although the food crisis beginning 
2006 has accelerated a reversal in official development assistance, which has begun 
to increase (Cheru 1992; World Bank & DFID 2011). South Africa, to some degree, 
has also neglected its agricultural sector in recent decades, although there are various 
distinctions to be drawn between the types of reforms that have taken place and their 
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 This is not only a SADC phenomenon but one widespread. The World Development Report 2008 
(World Bank 2007) propose three main reasons for underinvestment in Agricultural Research and 
Development despite the well-documented high rate of returns. The World Bank (2007, pp.166–
167) suggests:  
 “First, the political economy of public expenditure decisions tends to emphasize short-term payoffs 
and subsidies that are ‘politically visible’ while agricultural R&D investments are both long term 
and risky. Moreover, in agriculture-based countries, the political power of farmers is low anyhow. 
Second, trade distortions and national policies that reduce incentives to farmers in developing 
countries are a disincentive to both public and private investment in R&D. Third, because the 
benefits of much public R&D spill over to other countries, it might not make much economic 
sense for small countries to spend their scarce resources on agricultural science, on their own 




cost-benefits (Nieuwoudt & Groenewald 2003). Liebenberg et al. (2011, p.23; see 
also Vink & Van Rooyen 2009) suggest that: 
[t]he amount of real funding for public agricultural R&D failed to grow 
since 1992; the intensity of investment in agricultural R&D also stagnated; 
and the country lost a substantial number of well-trained and experienced 
agricultural scientists.  
In the 2013 budget speech, Minister Pravhin Gordan failed to even mention 
agriculture, a glaring omission and neglect for an increasingly important sector 
(Worrall 2013).  
 
Second, and more important, is that regardless of their ideological orientation, most 
governments have failed to recognise the importance of small-scale farmers, 
particularly women, when setting their development priorities (Cheru, 1992). The 
South African case is one in which there has been an institutionally and calculated 
demise of the peasantry through a barrage of administrative and punitive measures, 
which transformed them into surplus labour for the mines (Marais 2011). It is also 
worth mentioning that, historically, the growth of commercial agriculture lead to 
many Afrikaners being pushed off the land creating a poor (urban) White problem as 
they couldn’t compete with immigrant Europeans (ibid). From the 19th century 
onwards, the policies of successive White governments sought to create wealth for 
the small population of White commercial farmers by destroying independent 
African farming communities (Moeti 2007). 
 
Although recognised as important, there has until recently being only limited 
investigation into employment potentials of small-scale agriculture. There are, for 
example no credible, long-term data on a national scale that establishes trends in the 
subsistence / small-scale sector (Aliber et al. 2006; Jacobs 2009) although there are 
case studies of land under-utilisation in former Bantustans, as well as anecdotal 
information that agriculture in these areas is undergoing a decline. The Labour Force 
Surveys of 2002 and 2003 provide some insights into transitions into and out of 
agriculture (Aliber et al. 2009). Half of respondents to these surveys did engage in 
agriculture in one or other period (February 2002 or March 2003). Only eighteen per 
cent engaged in farming in both periods, indicating a remarkable fluidity in and out 




in the second (16%), and those who did not farm in the first period but did farm in 
the second period (14%).  
 
The implication is either that farming is very much a residual activity, or that people 
experience fluctuations from year-to-year in having the means to engage in 
agriculture. The limitations of this research should not overlook a comparatively rich 
literature reviewing (especially from an agricultural economist perspective) the 
successes and challenges to small-scale farmers in the country (Ortmann and King, 
2010; for an extensive summary see Vink, 2001). Despite widespread reforms since 
the 1990s yielding a far more efficient agricultural sector, there have been winners 
and losers, with small-scale farmers seeing very few if any benefits (Van Zyl et al. 
2001). If anything the market-based, neoclassical approaches of ‘getting the price 
right’ affects poor and non-poor social groups in complex ways (Jacobs 2009, p.2). 
As an example, he suggests of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996, 
“small-scale farmers seem to be equivalent to other actors along the agricultural 
marketing chain. Whilst this notion of equal treatment is commendable, the ‘level 
playing field’ decreed in policy does not immediately mirror what actually existed in 
the real world” (2009, p.11). 
 
Despite the evident diversification out of agriculture, rural production remains an 
important component of many rural livelihoods in South Africa. “African rural 
dwellers …deeply value the pursuit of farming…food self-provisioning is gaining in 
importance against a backdrop of food inflation and proliferating cash needs” 
(Bryceson 2000, p.5). Participation in “small-plot agriculture” is also highly 
gendered, with women taking major responsibility for it as one aspect of a multiple 
livelihood strategy. Furthermore, Peter Hazell (2001) suggests that to ensure 
pro-poor development, high priority has to be given to small-scale farmers through 
broad-based agricultural development. There is a challenge here, one that agricultural 
economists have cautioned before. Professor Nick Vink (2001, p.178), for example, 
suggests: 
…agricultural economists have failed to distinguish between small farmers 
in the former homeland areas and the desirability of the creation of small 
family farms in the commercial farming areas. More particularly, we as a 
profession still use the rhetoric of the role of agriculture in development in 




fact that the land reform programme has thus far succeeded only in 
duplicating the conditions in the former homelands, where it is still all but 
impossible to farm commercially. The result is that agricultural economists 





APPENDIX D: THE CRADOCK CASE-STUDY 
Whereas there has been a so-called rise and demise
1
 of biofuels, it should be 
remembered that individual projects themselves have histories and Cradock is 
especially peculiar in this regard. As much as I have insisted that there has been a 
project stream involved in the policymaking processes, so too are there multiple 
dimensions and intricate histories and plans for sugar beet in Cradock, which extend 
well beyond the latest plans for bioethanol. The main focus in Chapter 4, was to 
show that, as the governments’ vanguard project in the Eastern Cape, the Cradock 
sugar beet project is an element within the wider biofuels assemblage but also as a 
type of boundary organisation or contact zone in which implementation (and more so 
the project supporters) are fulfilling not only practical aspects of implementation but 
renegotiating the very foundations of the strategy. The project is therefore part of the 
policy process (an on-going one), or at least is an integral part of the policy system 
and associated policy community. In this Appendix, I will provide some detail of the 
project’s history and the networks involved in its own development.  
 
Arriving at Cradock, a far wider scope for the focussed policy research was 
discovered.
2
 While discussions with policymakers at national level had raised 
numerous issues around Cradock, especially continuing delays in the project’s 
implementation due to challenges in the strategy, no one mentioned either the 
historical aspects of the project, or the local contestation that surrounded it. I find 
these important as, if policies are the outcome of co-production and acts of meaning 
making, local contestation is surely a means through which certain ‘meanings’ and 
imaginaries are articulated and reinforced, potentially being where they are 
established. That is to say, the policy process should not be dislocated from the more 
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 Considering the 2007 Strategy as the final decision is ahistorical and fatalistic. Although many 
projects never materialised, there has been on-going reworking and negotiating of the final 
decisions taken with the ‘Big Four’ have been continuing to lobby with the Biofuels Task Team 
and have managed to, along with other factors, sway decisions and shift the level of support 
provided in ‘the policy’.  
2
 Prior to this, there was an earlier aim to do an impact assessment of some of the projects in terms of 
‘development’ benefits. The objective was to identify how the benefits reflected the original 
aspirations of the strategy. Since there were no such projects actually in production this was not a 
possibility and instead I pursued looking at how the remaining projects and actors within the 




specific processes, struggles, and competing interests that occur at the project level. 
They are not simply attributes of the project but interdependent and mutually 
constitutive within policies, even though they maintain their own history and 
specificities.  
CRADOCK IN CONTEXT 
A recent newspaper article entitled ‘Biofuel Plant Backfires on Community’ states:  
[i]t started out with a bang, but land deals went sour and farms lie barren as 
the project stalls (Kings 2012). 
The newspaper report goes on to discuss the paranoia of local farmers to openly talk 
about the project due to their vested interests; the hype of the project as the new ‘big 
thing’ in 2007 and the potential of the soils to produce oversized sugar beets. The 
report also discusses the ‘source of contention’ being the land reform project—a core 
estate of 6,000ha—that is supposed to supply feedstock to the plant but has been 
handled poorly by the Department of Land Affairs. The department, which changed 
the valuations “destroyed any goodwill it had” with the farmers according to one 
respondent cited in the article. Those farms that have been bought are in disrepair. 
Finally, the report mentions the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the 
continued delays in setting up the plant. The IDC, who essentially own the Cradock 
project, argue that remaining issues with the strategy are the key concern. The report 
concludes suggesting that a biofuels revolution ‘lays in waiting’ (sic) with Cradock 
residents left angered.  
 
As a newspaper article, the report necessarily lacks detail but situates the focus of 
this chapter. The importance of the Cradock case study to this thesis can already be 
noted within the above article, in that the IDC are closely entwined in the 
policymaking processes; at this stage working towards resolving the remaining 
‘issues’. However, Cradock, with its land reform programme and local contestation, 
is important as a case study in its own right. Little regard has been given to how 
technology such as biofuels has encountered social and political forces constraining 
and transforming its final use. An adequate understanding of the coalition of interests 




surrounding them), remains largely undocumented in both popular and policy 
literature and has escaped any scholarly attention thus far.  
Power is Sweet – Sugar Beet Production in the Great Fish River Valley  
One does not expect to learn that the sugar beets grown in the seemingly infecund, 
semi-arid landscapes of the Karoo are amongst the best in the world. ‘Best’ meaning 
not only that they outsize their global competitors but also have superior 
concentrations of sucrose and can be produced at competitive prices. 
 
As a low-rainfall area, commercial farming in the Karoo requires irrigation; however, 
the major river systems in the area are saline, with limited ground water available 
from the underlying minor aquifer (Vivier et al. 2009). In response, like many 
farming regions in South Africa, the Great Fish River Valley (GRFV) has benefited
3
 
from water transfer schemes, which have allowed for sustained commercial 
agriculture production (Figure 8). Sourcing water from the Gariep Dam, a tunnel 
82,8 km long—the longest continuous enclosed aqueduct in the southern 
hemisphere—supplies water to the Great Fish River and Sundays River(Department 
of Water Affairs 2012).
4
 Earlier irrigation dams and canals transformed the 
landscape into a ‘Lucerne Paradise’ in the 1920s (Eastern Cape Herald cited in 
Beinart 2008) with orange and apricot plantations proliferating in the predominantly 
English and aptly named Golden Valley. As William Beinart recounts of the period, 
after the three major dams—Grassridge, Lake Mentz and Lake Arthur—were built, 
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 Benefit here only refers to increased water availability – there has been ecological damage 
associated with such transfer schemes that should not be discounted (Bohensky et al. 2004), as 
well as potentially higher rates of mineralisation (Hall & Gӧrgens 1978).  
4
 This tunnel system is part of a longer history of water transfer schemes and irrigation in the area. As 
William Beinart (2008, pp.188–192) discusses, water infrastructure such as dams and irrigation 
canals were built to sustain increasingly profitable citrus and deciduous fruit farming in the Fish 
and Sunday’s River Valleys. In the 1920s a major dam (formerly Lake Mentz now Darlington 
Dam) was built to supply citrus plantations—involving author of ‘Jock of the Bushveld’ Percy 
Fitzpatrick—in the Sunday’s River Valley. Grassridge Dam on the Groot Brak (lit. Great Salt) 
River and Lake Arthur near Cradock, further allowed diversification from stock farming into 
deciduous fruits—apricots in particular—within the Fish River Valley. Although diversifying into 
smaller crop-based farms, Lucerne production remained dominant and the new irrigations 
farmers—mostly of English descent such as the Collets and the Barbers—remained closely 
integrated with the livestock economy. An even earlier history shows the strategic importance 
(and struggle for control) over the Fish River Valley. Prior to Europeans arriving, the Xhosa 
displaced local Bushman in order to heard cattle, while frontier wars fought between European 




the massive injection of state capital into the Karoo facilitated intensive commercial 
production of citrus, apricots and Lucerne but “there was never enough water to 
unlock the supposed riches of the Karoo soil” (Beinart 2008, p.191). Investment into 
large-scale water works atrophied in the 1930s and 1940s. A drought in the 1950s 
forced many of the remaining English farmers to leave the area, which, according to 




Figure 8: Cradock and surrounds (author’s own work; inset copied from Somlotha (2011)) 
 
Subsequent to the 1950s drought, the National Party government bought up to 70% 
of the farmland in the Fish River Valley (Water Research Commission 2004). The 
land was then reorganised into more economical parcels—85, 60 and 45 hectares in 
                                                 
5
 Droughts and late frosts had constrained fruit production and increasingly saline soils from the water 
scheme hampered production, however the latter problem may have been localized to specific 




the north, central and southern parts of the valley respectively—and redistributed to 
farmers mostly of Afrikaans descent. After the Gariep Dam and Orange-Fish-River 
transfer scheme were completed in the 1970s, and with continuing support from 
government, many of these smaller lots have amalgamated into much larger 
commercial farms (ibid.). However, as one of the local commercial farmers 
described, despite significant potential irrigable land there has been no crop 
production taking full advantage of it.  
[The Great Fish River Valley] is the only irrigation area in this 
whole country that has not been earmarked for something like 
grapes, sugarcane or whatever! (Cradock farmer A, 2011). 
In the late 1990s, (if not somewhat earlier) farmers in the Golden Valley area (part of 
the wider GRFV) were looking for a new crop.
6
 The apricot and citrus plantations 
were in decline or outright failing because of transport costs and progressive 
salination of the soils (depending who one talks to); the region as a whole was in 
need of a new commodity with a new market. This was the predicament
7
 facing the 
Eastern Cape Agricultural Cooperative (ECAC), which included Cradock and 
extensive farming areas of the Eastern Cape Province in its operations. Following 
from trials by farmers near Maclear to the northeast, Hans Vosloo, a member of the 
ECAC considered sugar beet as a possible alternative crop and future venture for the 
Golden Valley. Some successful plantings soon after suggested sugar beet was 
something the ECAC should indeed pursue. Under the leadership of George Ward, 
the ECAC subsequently began taking an interest in the potential for sugar beet 
production in the area. The ECAC then collaborated with the German seed company 
Klein Wanzlebener Saatzucht (KWS),
8
 which specialises in sugar beet. KWS 
seconded Dr. Volker Fischer to the area, who began formal trials to verify the 
growing potential for sugar beet and develop hybrid seeds for use in the Great Fish 
River Valley. In a discussion with Dr Fischer (Pers. Comm. 2011), he suggested that 
over 140 trials were undertaken on approximately 30 or so farms. According to a 
report on the farmers weekly website (Hendrickse 2007):  
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 This section draws heavily from discussions with a former member of the ECAC. 
7
 The cooperative would support farmers financially and thus mounting debt and limited productive 
use of the land meant the ECAC would be keen to find new ways to generate income, becoming 
weary of limited growth of the agricultural economy in the Valley. 
8




Claims of spectacular results achieved by his trial plantings were initially 
met with widespread scepticism by local farmers. In Europe, the US and 
Russia—which together account for 80% of world sugar beet production—
average yields of 50t/ha are reached, although recent trials in Australia 
achieved an average yield of 77t/ha, peaking at 100t/ha. But in seven years’ 
of trials in the valley covering different planting and harvesting dates, seed 
varieties, fertilisers, herbicides and growing lengths, Fischer claimed 
average yields well in excess of 100t/ha, with high sucrose levels.  
The Golden Valley had seemingly found its new crop but still required a market. 
This prerequisite has not only stifled the current ethanol plant being proposed (see 
Chapter 4) but its predecessor—a sugar refinery—as well.  
 
Initially, the ECACs plans for the area revolved around sugar production
9
 as ethanol 
had not entered the discussion yet. Seeing value in Volke Fischer’s agronomic 
success with sugar beet, the ECAC established Sugar Beet RSA in 1999, a shell 
company that would promote further development, secure government backing and 
draw in private-sector investment. As Hendrickse
10
 (2007) reports: A [consortium] 
involving German and South African investors would begin building a R420 million 
sugar beet mill in Cradock [in 1998], with completion expected in 2000. Funding 
would come mainly from the German firms Nord Zucker und Kleinwanzelbener 
Saatzucht and ACE Agrar Consulting, who would own a 53% stake. The deal was 
dependent on sourcing 10,500ha of irrigated land—virtually the entire Great Fish 
River Valley irrigation scheme—but it eventually fell through when too few farmers 
were willing to commit. In the Executive Summary of the Sugar Beet RSA sugar 
mill’s Bankable Feasibility Study, it is stated that:  
The [initial] project reached an impasse in March 2002 when efforts to 
recruit beet farmers in sufficient numbers to sustain the proposed beet sugar 
project failed. The [Sugar Beet RSA] consortium terminated its support at 
this stage (Sugar Beet RSA, 2005, p. 1–1).  
 
This synopsis illustrates the early challenges in gaining support from the farmers. 
Such a failure of support, which seemingly goes against commercial farmers best 
interests, requires greater scrutiny given the persistent proposals for an ethanol plant 
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 In brief, the project has evolved from a large sugar plant based on over 10,500ha and using existing 
commercial farmer production, to an alternative sugar mill requiring less feedstock and based on 
a core estate, and finally into and ethanol plant that, although provisioned to begin operations in 
2008 still awaits construction (at the time of writing in 2012).  
10




in Cradock. A related question, or rather part of the answer, lies in why Cradock was 
the preferred location. What is missing then, in Hendrickse’s (2007) description, lies 
beneath the figures and begins to illustrate local power struggles, interests and 
processes that have shaped and been reshaped from these early stages up to and 
including the challenges of the proposed bio-ethanol project. They are also important 
with regard to links to the policymaking processes, a point to which I shall return to 
in later discussions and in the main thesis.  
Sites of Contention: Piecing Together Broken Promises in the Great Fish River 
Valley and Getting Farmers to ‘Play Nice’ 
One version of the early history of the Cradock ‘debacle’ was described to me by a 
local newspaper editor, which has been roughly substantiated by a range of other 
respondents in the area. I detail it here not because it is comprehensive but to provide 
a generalised (constructed) view from members of the community, providing (one 
version of) ‘their’ history. ‘Hard evidence’ is also hard to come by as, as the 
respondent suggested, 
it’s not all stipulated down in print... because they said I must 
keep a low profile and you know we in this whole vicinity were in 
favour of Golden Valley you see (Local newspaper editor, 2011). 
Golden Valley here refers to an area surrounding Somerset East (see Figure 8 above) 
approximately 100km south of Cradock, where the ECAC originally planned to 
establish a sugar refinery. It is also where Hans Vosloo had originally begun growing 
sugar beet. There was excitement brewing in the area because Sugar Beet RSA was 
going to buy a second-hand plant from Germany and rebuild it in Cookhouse. 
Cookhouse was also where George Ward wanted the factory as it had access to the 
railway line and was centrally located but the decision became more complicated.  
There is also a lot of unemployment in Cradock so they wanted it 
there, but there is a lot of unemployment in the Middledrift and 
Fort Beaufort and those areas...there was a hell of a feud about 
this factory and Cradock wanting the factory (Local Newspaper 
editor, 2011). 
The decision for Cradock as the preferred location was borne out of negotiations 




Growers Association—that was established to interface between the farmers in the 
area and Sugar Beet RSA. The challenge for Sugar Beet RSA in developing a sugar 
mill was that it required dedicated feedstock. It was at this stage that Roak Crew 
began investigating potential sugar beet supply agreements with local commercial 
farmers. Roak Crew was “secretary” to George Ward; another respondent 
suggested—light heartedly—”he carried his bags around for him” (Consultant F, 
2012). One major opponent, though stories differ, to Sugar Beet RSA at this point 
was a Cradock-based farmer named Hilton Collett. In the words of a former Sugar 
Beet RSA representative, Hilton Collett 
was dead against this thing. We travelled to his area … to 
convince those farmers and then he was elected, we also applied 
a little bit of politics. We said, listen guys, we had a Sugar Beet 
Growers Association and we said to the farmers listen get Hilton 
Collett onto this thing because he is quite a bright guy but very 
conservative and we got him on the board and then they elect[ed] 
him as the chairman of the Growers Association and that’s where 
the [trouble] started (Former SBRSA member, 2010). 
As farmer support was needed to ensure sufficient feedstock, a contract was drawn 
up in which commercial farmers would provision a third of their land
11
 to grow sugar 
beet to supply the factory. Before doing so, Hilton Collett had acquired land from the 
municipality in Cradock. This was despite the ECACs preference for Cookhouse as 
that is where they owned land (implying automatic share capital).
12
 Having the 
support of the farmers within the Sugar Beet Growers Association, Cradock became 
the preferred location, but this meant wider support from farmers outside of Cradock 
(but within the Fish River Valley) began to wither. It was also an initial cause of 
delays in the project’s development, the first of many. When it came time to sign 
contracts, as Hendrickse (2007) points out, there was not enough interest from the 
farmers. As a local agricultural supplier in Cradock bemoaned:  
I have been more optimistic about [the project] ten to fifteen 
years ago but the thing is dragging and dragging on. So, ja, in 
one sentence, you must not bullshit the commercial farmer. I am 
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 Sugar beet has to be grown in rotation of one year in three and cannot be grown consecutively on 
the same piece of ground due to pathogens building up in the soil, hence not all land can or will 
be devoted to sugar beet production in any given year.  
12
 Further suggestions for locating the project in Cookhouse included better growing potential and 




not saying they have been bullshitted but you must have a 
complete structure (Cradock Farmer B, 2011).  
The picture is a little more complicated as clearly the commercial farmers were not a 
homogenous group all equally in support of the project. Rather, there were many 
conflicting arrangements being proposed and contested between the interests of the 
Sugar Beet Growers Association and Sugar Beet RSA. The movement of the plant 
from Golden Valley to Cradock is clear indication of this. Declining support from 
farmers worsened when George Ward died in 2002. George Ward had been central to 
the project and had gained the respect of the majority of the people involved. 
Following his death, deteriorating relations between some of the commercial farmers 
and Sugar Beet RSA and the IDC, the project stalled entirely. Commercial farmers 
were beginning to resent the constant delays and began to withdrawal support on any 
proposals for sugar beet. Commercial interests such as KWS also then withdrew.  
 
Not having the support of farmers, but with a continuing interest in sugar beet, Sugar 
Beet RSA secured new support from the Provincial Government to continue with a 
Bankable Feasibility Study to explore an alternative project, still revolving largely 
around sugar production but requiring less feedstock (Sugar Beet RSA 2005). The 
revised approach rested on the idea of less acreage being needed and also sourcing 
feedstock from former homeland areas within the Eastern Cape; some of the poorest 
regions in the country. A representative steering committee chaired by Zukile Pityi of 
the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs (ECDALA) was 
established, which included Sugar Beet RSA (Roak Crew) emerging farmers’ 
representative Lusapo Bengu
13
 and the Sugar Beet Growers Association (Hilton 
Collett). Roak Crewe and Hilton Collett had thus managed to maintain some control 
of the project but by leveraging support from new arenas, an entirely new branding 
of the project came to the fore. The involvement of these players was precipitated on 
narratives of rural development that would resonate with the ECDALA, for example 
Furness (2004, p.1) suggests: 
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 Muddying the credibility of this steering committee, Lusapo Bengu has been embroiled in 
allegations of mismanagement and is implicated in financial wrongdoings as secretary of Qamata 




The empowerment of black farmers and the upliftment of previously-
disadvantaged communities are reportedly important elements that will be 
considered if the sugar beet project is approved.  
 
Similar sound bites (e.g. Hill, 2005) in the media from the project managers and 
IDC, reiterated the potential for development in the second economy of the Eastern 
Cape based on this promising new enterprise. (Although widespread benefits are 
hard to conceive at this point, as sugar beet production would have to be 
concentrated in the vicinity of the project itself.) At this stage then, the core estate 
(see below) was the vehicle through which development would occur, based on the 
expertise of the project managers and the involvement of PGBI. Sugar Beet RSA and 
PGBI had the knowledge through which the Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
could begin achieving its own objectives. However, the question has to be asked, was 
any of this actually feasible? 
Fuelling Discontent – Evolving Sugar Plans Shift to Ethanol 
A pre-feasibility study completed in September 2004 warned that given the 
high cost of building a processing plant, viability would depend on 
government allocation of financial support, land and water – and good and 
reliable producer prices. A full bankable study finalised a year later … gave 
the proposal the thumbs down. The plant needed would cost R1 billion but 
the strong rand, depressed world sugar prices, and having to compete 
against highly subsidised foreign beet producers would turn it into a white 
elephant. “They said to us: sorry, this is not going to fly,” says Crew. On 
the plus side, PGBI pointed out that production costs per unit of sucrose 
were among the lowest in the world. “They told us to try and find an 
alternative use for this product”. (Hendrickse, 2007). 
The above quote sums the situation up nicely. The challenge for Sugar Beet RSA 
was that they were attempting to manoeuvre into an oversupplied domestic sugar 
market and highly competitive international one. When Sugar Beet RSA approached 
Tongaat Hullet, for example, they unsurprisingly met with opposition.
14
 The sugar 
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 Prior to legislative changes in 2000, it was (and remains) the domestic market in which higher 
profits could be made as the price was determined by the South African Sugar Association and 
with inelasticity in the domestic market local prices could be forced higher than those of the 
international market. After the amendment of the Sugar Act (Sugar Act of 1978 (as amended) and 
the Sugar Industry Agreement of 2000 there are three main regulatory provisions within which 
the pricing of refined sugar in SA takes place, including: a tariff support relative to a US dollar-
based reference price; a single channel export mechanism, and a local market proceeds-sharing 
agreement whereby proceeds earned by the SA sugar industry are divided amongst growers and 




industry would resist a major new sugar producer and, according to one former 
member of Sugar Beet RSA, they “fought it tooth and nail.” However, according to a 
former member of Tongaat Hullet (2012), despite initial apprehension, the 
“inevitability” of the project shifted their view to one of “being involved and 
controlling it” rather than being in competition with it.
15
 Indeed members of Tongaat 
Hullet doubted the seemingly outrageous claims that Cradock could produce sugar 
beet in the quantities Sugar Beet RSA was suggesting. Regardless of the production 
potential within Cradock, sugar is a vastly overproduced commodity and an 
interview with one of the Sugar Beet RSA managers suggested that it was the 
monopoly over sugar that lead to the downfall of the initial Sugar Beet RSA project 
(SBRSA Member B, 2011). Additionally, unlike Brazil or the EU, South Africa 
plays only a marginal role in the world sugar market. South Africa is essentially a 
price taker in a global market characterised by protectionism, skewed international 
markets and depressed world sugar prices. These two issues—the South African 
sugar market structure and prohibitive international markets—alone make the 
prospects for sugar production bleak.  
 
Hendrickse (2007) continues: 
Late in 2004 national government launched its biofuels initiative, and 
Sugar Beet SA started negotiations with the Central Energy Fund and IDC. 
By the end of 2006 the co-op had sold Sugar Beet SA to Eastern Cape 
finance parastatal Uvimba, and the IDC had committed funds for a full 
feasibility study for building a sugar beet biofuels production facility. The 
study should be finalised in September, with construction starting in 
January 2008. 
Clearly, the plans had begun to evolve in ways quite different to how the ECAC had 
imagined. The prior machinations around the original sugar mill had somewhat 
damaged the prospects of a feasible sugar project but biofuels had begun to provide 
new and lucrative opportunities. It is interesting to note the way in which 
respondents have described the process of requesting ‘permission to seek an 
alternative’ and the way in which ‘the Sugar Beet RSA consortium agreed’ (as is 
                                                                                                                                          
  The domestic market remains at close to import parity prices maintained through a local market 
proceeds-sharing agreement (that is, millers that sell more than their allotted local market share 
compensate millers that sell less than their allotted share). As there is already a surplus, any new 
projects will decrease proceeds in the domestic market and force more sugar into the export 
market, which would be to the detriment to the rest of the producers. 
15
 This statement should not be read out of context. “Controlling it,” means being a part and 




noted above). One respondent continued along similar lines suggesting that the 
ECAC had spent a few million Rand and when George Ward died the other directors 
of the coop said “well that’s very well guys but we are actually a coop, we are not in 
the business of making biofuels” (Consultant F, 2012). The ECAC then floated off all 
the intellectual property to Sugar Beet RSA, which then sold it to the ECDALA as 
noted by Hendrickse (2007) above.
16
 The ECDALA then hired (retained) Roak Crew 
CEO of Sugar Beet RSA. On the other hand, a former director of Sugar Beet RSA 
(2010) was far more critical of the transfer of ownership, suggesting a more 
contentious situation. In this alternative version, Hilton Collett and Roak Crew had 
begun making decisions without the involvement of the other Sugar Beet RSA 
directors or the ECAC, manoeuvring towards and working with (securing financial 
support from) the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture. For this reason, the 
ECAC “wanted out” of the project and asked to be paid the money they had invested 
in it already (Former SBRSA member, 2010). Yet another official from the 
ECDALA suggested that 
sugar from sugar beet fizzled out, and then these guys [Sugar 
Beet RSA] were in trouble because they had spent their 
R5million, so then they knocked on the doors of government, 
which found the project to be potentially in line with objectives of 
land reform … That is how it was perceived, resulting in the 
department buying all the shares from Sugar Beet South Africa 
[RSA]; that R5million. The government, in the truest sense of the 
word, is not allowed to buy private company shares; they have 
got to use entities, which resulted in the ECRFC, being funded 
with the R5million to buy the shares. So now … AsgiSA belonged 
to the ECRFC, Sugar Beet [RSA] belonged to the ECRFC. So it’s 
a vehicle for the department to do what it wants to do (ECDALA 
official A, 2011). 
It is in these early processes that the vision for the ethanol plant is inscribed. 
Bringing on government support was a necessary and insightful decision by members 
within Sugar Beet RSA. Although the Bankable Feasibility Study showed sugar not 
to be viable, bioethanol was an emerging topic in government (see Chapter 5) and in 
the popular media. Conferences on biofuels were also taking place at the time and, 
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 The link here is not obvious. Hendrickse suggests that Sugar Beet RSA was sold to Uvimba. 
Uvimba in turn is a financial arm of the Eastern Cape Rural Finance Corporation (ECRFC), 
which is an organ of the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture.  So essentially, Sugar Beet 




having seen the potential for sugar production, clearly biofuels would be a suitable 
market as well (ECDALA official B, 2010). A suggestion was made to rather focus 
on producing ethanol as a feasible alternative. The suggestion for ethanol clearly 
resonated with key interests in Sugar Beet RSA and yet another Joint Venture, would 
pursue a biofuel project using sugar beet from the Great Fish River Valley.  
 
In the words of yet another respondent from ARDA (Sugar Beet RSA),
17
 when the 
sugar project was finally “scrapped … a couple of the guys hung in there and sold 
the concept to government” (SBRSA Member B, 2011). The importance of the latter 
is the idea that projects need to be sold. Another member of ARDA suggested that 
“we sold this project to [Min. Nkwinti] when he was MEC of Agriculture, and we, 
it’s a liars contest, whoever pulls the right heartstrings on the right day gets 
allocated the money (SBRSA Member A, 2011).” After ‘selling’ the project, Sugar 
Beet RSA—now wholly owned by the ECDALA—established a joint venture with 
the IDC (as the main but not major shareholder), the Central Energy Fund (CEF), 
with additional financiers planned to take on remaining equities. At this point, PGBI, 
who had been involved in earlier bankability studies and research phases of the 
alternative sugar mill, were appointed as project managers for the ethanol plant. It is 
here where the story of Cradock in Chapter 4 begins. Far more could (and should be 
said) about its turbulent trajectory and the trials and tribulations of establishing the 
‘core estate’ and unfathomable shifts from sugar beet to sorghum but these are 
beyond the realms of this thesis. They are, nonetheless, critical to the emerging 
biofuels assemblage in South Africa and, in all likelihood, will continue to modify 
the very foundations of the biofuels strategy in the country, as the project has done so 
in the past.  
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 ARDA is the same ‘company’ as Sugar Beet SA. In a presentation by an ARDA representative at a 
workshop in Rhodes, it was suggested that the name was changed because Sugar Beet RSA 
suggests that they only deal with sugar beet, whereas they are also working with sorghum and 
thus required a more appropriate and comprehensive name (Somlotha 2011). They are not able to 
source enough sugar beet to run the factory and thus will rely on rotation with sorghum in the 
Great Fish River Valley and from imports from emerging black farmers in the former homelands 








APPENDIX E: ENERGY IN SOUTH AFRICA, ‘BIOFUELING’ COMPLEXITIES 
AND THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX 
The energy sector, as a part of a wider macro-economic constellation is also bound 
by specific rationalities and technological lock in, which are important considerations 
when considering the biofuels problematique. As Carolan (2010) describes in his 
paper on the United States, ethanol (although biodiesel is much the same) has had a 
meteoric rise partly because of the socio-technical system in which they reside, that 
is, they are an effect of their broader infrastructural, organizational, regulatory, and 
symbolic environments as much as they affect them through their introduction. In 
this Appendix, I will describe some of the complexities of the energy sector in South 
Africa, broadly outlining the details of the socio-technical system surrounding energy 
production and use in the South African context.  
ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL AND SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 
Money allows agreements on relative “value” (how much of one thing will 
be exchanged for another) but it has no intrinsic value itself. It is simply a 
mechanism that allows the distribution of real “stuff”. So if the economy is 
crashing, what is this “stuff” that is disappearing? It can be summed up in 
one word - energy (Lardelli, 2009 (ASPO)). 
Energy is an essential component of human activity, also not due to any inherent 
value, but for the services it provides in the form of heat, light and motive power 
(Spalding-Fecher et al. 2000). It is central to achieving the interrelated economic, 
social and environmental aims of sustainable development (Cassim & Jackson 2003, 
p.2). Whereas ‘energy economists’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971) have long recognised 
the role (or rather basis) of energy in economic development,
1
 it has only recently 
being taken more seriously politically. Increasing (global) concerns of peak oil (and 
increasingly peak coal), inefficient energy systems being in use, and the devastating 
knock-on social and environmental effects or externalities of transforming and 
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 Some insisting that the economy is essentially a pastiche for the more fundamental transfer of 
energy. By way of example, Fernandez Duran (2012) provides a somewhat ‘dystopian’ outline of 
this in his book the Breakdown of Global Capitalism, based on declining surplus energy/oil. See 





consuming energy (Davidson 2006a),
2
 have presented humanity with new and 
complex challenges. The energy debacle, when combined with food and water crises, 
warns of an impending ‘perfect storm’ according to Jon Beddington (2009).
3
 The Oil 
Crisis of the 1970s was particularly instrumental in bringing issues of efficiency and 
finite resources to the fore globally. New energy futures—the bio-economy for 
one—may well present new problems but reforming the system is necessary 
nevertheless. Whether we are headed toward a Rifkin’s (2011) Third Industrial 
Revolution or a rapid deterioration of geopolitical relationships and resource 
conflicts suggested by Beddington remains to be seen (see Sample 2009); inevitably 
the situation requires a political solution to what is an anthropomorphic problem.  
 
There is, in this wider discussion of energy for development, an increasing reflection 
also on the political economy of the energy-economic system, viewed through the 
increasing recognition of energy services as a basic human need (O’Brien et al. 
2007; Sanchez & Scott 2009; Wilson et al. 2012; Practical Action 2013). There are, 
for example, massive disparities between and within nations, as to who has access to 
energy and what is done with it. Increasingly it appears too that there are many 
lessons to be learned by the developed countries, from energy solutions developed 
for (and by) the poor, especially off-grid and integrated technologies. There is, of 
course, also the potential for further marginalisation not only through continuing 
depletion of energy sources but increasingly oppressive ownership of what remains. 
This latter point is especially relevant to the South African situation, which, despite 
being technologically advanced, has an exclusionary economy, based largely on 
energy-intensive industry, and that has struggled to translate cheap energy into 
widespread prosperity.  
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 Environmental impacts may be local, such nitrous oxide and sulphur dioxide from coal combustion, 
or widespread, such as from carbon dioxide, also emitted during combustion (Davidson 2006b). 
3
 Beddington’s (2009) perfect storm combines water, food and energy crises; at the very least, the 
combination of rising energy prices, a desire for energy security and the threat of climate change 





South Africa’s Macro-economy and the Minerals-Energy Complex 
The South African economy experienced high growth rates in the 1960s, because of 
mining and exporting raw materials within a regulated economy. Factors such as the 
world oil crisis and the changing gold prices added to the economic slowdown of the 
1970s. From then on until 1993, increased public spending, economic sanctions and 
the effects of political instability stifled the economy. The period was characterised 
by poor growth performance, low levels of investments, rising unemployment, 
political instability, currency instability, widening deficits, falling living standards 
and growing inequalities. Growth rates have been relatively low since 1994 (Nkomo 
2005) peaking in 2007 and declining with the Global financial crisis in 2008, though 
showing itself to be resilient since the global downturn.  
 
As Philip (2010, p.7) describes the South African economy: the “commanding 
heights” are highly centralised, there are “high levels of concentration of capital and 
limited levels of competition in key sectors”. This includes the energy sector 
described below. Small enterprises tend to be excluded from participation, while 
capital-intensive industries dominate, making employment creation expensive. Red 
tape makes establishing small-scale enterprises especially difficult (e.g. Mungadze 
2013). Philip (2010, p. 7) further suggests that:  
the negative impacts of this economic structure on job creation and also on 
small enterprise development in the core economy are relatively well 
understood. However, the extent to which this economic structure 
constrains options and opportunities on the margins—including for 
subsistence and livelihood activities—is often overlooked.  
Other descriptions concur and give an insight into the structure and output of the 
economy. For Bond (2005), the economy operates broadly with the MEC at its core 
or as its foundation (see Fine & Rustomjee 1996). Intermediate capital goods remain 
underdeveloped while luxury goods are produced locally at close to world standard 
(because of White demand and huge income disparity), whereas basic needs 
industries are extremely sparse. With increasingly deregulation these industries have 
also suffered, the textile industry being a case in point. Other challenges confronting 
the economy are stagnant levels of private investment, falling growth rates, limited 
employment creation and improving state capacity to increase the rate and quality of 




put on black economic empowerment, this empowerment has neither percolated to 
the majority, nor allowed for widespread inclusion of the black majority in the 
economy. Aubrey Matshiqi (2013), a political analyst in South Africa suggests:  
2013 must also be the year in which business and government start tackling 
the deficit of trust and confidence in the interests of inclusive economic 
growth. If the ANC government and business fail to unite behind a 
common vision for the future of our economy, other economies on the 
continent will leave us behind and the highest price will be paid by those 
who remain economically marginalised. 
 
The global convention of following an energy-intensive development trajectory is 
manifest in South Africa in the form of the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC). The 
MEC is a form of capital accumulation in South Africa that incorporates a core set of 
industries associated with large-scale mineral extraction and energy provision (from 
cheap coal), while reaching beyond them in terms of corporate control and influence 
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; Fine 2008). The central tenet was that “the MEC lies at 
the core of the South African economy, not only by virtue of its weight in economic 
activity but also through its determining role throughout the rest of the economy” 
(Fine & Rustomjee 1996, p.5).  
 
Eberhard and Marquard (2000) provide a useful reflection of the MEC—although do 
not name it as such—in their examination of apartheid energy policy. In this case, 
energy policy in South Africa closely reflects by (if not articulated) the 
“modernisation ideology” mentioned above. They highlight two recurring themes of 
this paradigm, which advocated state-led heavy industrialisation, based on South 
Africa’s extraordinary mineral wealth with low cost energy as an input on the one 
hand, and increasing attention to energy security on the other. The approach was 
techno-centric and focussed on supply-side issues, given that during this time the 
demand side (other than industry) only consisted of a small, predominantly White 
domestic and business consumer base (ibid).  
 
Even the most recent overriding government provisions of the National Development 
Plan (NDP) describes the situation in which “the size of the energy intensive mining 
industry and the fact that domestic energy prices have been underpriced, has resulted 




development challenge linked with the Minerals-Energy Complex. Edigheji (2010a), 
for example, argues that restructuring the economy through a reduction in the 
reliance on the MEC and reversing deindustrialisation will be critical to South Africa 
becoming a development state (see also Fine 2010). However, as is the case with 
many of the proposals in Edigegheji’s (2010) collective volume, this needs to be 
complemented by a competent bureaucracy, political support and adequate 
institutions and policies. It ignores that significant political and economic 
obstructions also militate against such a feat. 
 
The sustainability and some immediate consequences of the economy’s rapacious 
energy intensity are easily found. Rolling black-outs in 2008 and fuel shortages
4
 
prior to this were a vivid testament of burgeoning demand beginning to outstrip 
available supplies. More so, dramatic losses to the economy estimated at R50 billion 
(NERSA 2008, p.12) highlighted the central role of the energy sector in fuelling 
economic growth, whilst also encountering a similar range of challenges as those 
globally. The energy sector as a whole suffers some imposing challenges, which 
include (Cassim & Jackson 2003; Davidson 2006a; Nkomo 2005; Winkler 2006): 
 the limited understanding of how the current structure of energy production 
acts as a disincentive to other energy forms; 
 electricity pricing needs greater attention (low prices have also squeezed out 
energy efficiency and renewable energy focus); 
 subsidization of the major energy industries has negatively affected more 
efficient sectors by diverting resources away from them; 
 there is an urgent need to deal with the problem of carbon-intensive coal-
based energy in light of various developments, such as growing domestic 
awareness of the damaging health and environmental effects of coal-based 
energy—pollution, especially from the four major refineries is a problem—
and a heightened awareness by SA exporters of energy-intensive products 
such as steel and aluminium of increasingly stringent regulations in 
international markets; 
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 It should be noted that these shortages were not an absolute shortage but rather a temporary supply 
shock when the government imposed new clean fuel specifications. If anything, these shortages 
(re)established SAPIA and the petrol industry as a power-party within the country’s economic 




 the meeting of social goals and public benefits has been independent of 
industry structure, which means electrification has been carried out by the 
old, vertically-integrated, publicly-owned utility Eskom and by local 
government distributors; 
 identifying possibilities to restructure the electricity supply industry (ESI) and 
to continue to improve social equity through providing benefits for the poor 
and increasing access to affordable energy services; 
 electricity access will not necessarily result in development and needs to be 
one part of integrated development strategies; 
 energy efficiency standards are generally lacking; 
 governance needs to be improved, which entails designing and making policy 
changes to free both the internal and external markets for goods, services and 
capital; 
 macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite. 
Renewable Energy Dynamics in South Africa 
Ensuring sustainable
5
 alternatives to South Africa’s fossil dependence and 
dismantling the constraints of the MEC depends, in part, on ensuring social equity 
and economic efficiency and thus choosing appropriate economic models and policy 
instruments to minimise negative impacts (Nkomo 2005). Scholars in South Africa 
(Bekker et al. 2008; Eberhard 2004; Nkomo 2005; Spalding-Fecher & Matibe 2003; 
Winkler 2006; Cassim & Jackson 2003) have also begun engaging with the 
importance of energy for development, especially post-1994 when massive rollouts 
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 There has been an increasing usage of the term ‘sustainable’, as in sustainable development, and now 
‘sustainable energy’, despite being a physical misnomer (energy cannot be created or destroyed), 
is associated with increasing awareness (and anticipated reduction) of the damaging or 
‘unsustainable’ externalities associated with energy use. Whilst on the matter of definitions, it is 
also useful to suggest that the term ‘energy’ may be conceptually useful but is also imprecise in 
the way in which it is used in popular and political discourses. ‘Energy’ is transformed and 
theoretically constant so what is important is entropy, a thermodynamic property analogous to 
order and disorder in which a unit of energy of low entropy (order) is converted into the same 
amount of energy but with higher entropy (disorder) (see MacKay 2009). It is also better to 
differentiate between ‘energy’ and ‘energy services’ such as cooking or lighting, which 






 became important to undoing the injustices and neglect suffered 
during apartheid (see above).  
 
From an energy poverty perspective, the goals of universal access to electricity has 
become a dominant feature of energy policy but ‘free electricity for all’ has not been 
delivered and is inoperable in South Africa; alternatives will be needed where the 
grid cannot be established (National Planning Commission 2011c). Recent research 
also highlights that the linkages between energy and development outcomes in the 
South African case are complex and not deterministic (Matinga & Annegarn 2013), 
reflecting a general critique of the ‘energy ladder’ and the expected processes and 
outcomes of transitioning from one energy type to another (Hiemstra-van der Horst 
& Hovorka 2008; Masera et al. 2000).
7
 Furthermore, “useful research into household 
energy in the 1990s has had little follow through but could be used to develop 
integrated programmes to tackle poverty” (National Planning Commission 2011c, 
p.147).
8
 Alternative renewable sources of energy are also only in their infancy in 
South Africa and only since COP17 has there been increased engagement and 
decisions being made.
9
 Although various technologies have been available for 
decades,
10
 their use has not had significant political support and has thus lagged 
compared to leading industrialised countries, such as Germany and even fellow 
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 Access to energy took a predominantly ‘on-grid’ direction. Proposals prior to 1994 of accelerated 
electrification lead to a national electrification programme implemented by the Government of 
national Unity. Eskom had also undertaken electrification programme under the banner of 
‘Electricity for All’ with significant progress made—3million houses connected— before phase 1 
of the National Electrification Programme in 1994 (Davidson 2006b, p.7). 
7
 There is an associated debate here, in which there is some criticism of the actual transitions that 
occur that do not necessarily or automatically reflect the neat prescriptions of the ‘energy ladder’ 
(Hiemstra-van der Horst & Hovorka 2008; Howells et al. 2010) in addition to that of the impacts 
of making such a transition as described in the text. Additionally, one has to concede that 
providing electricity means very little unless it is part of a wider development programme. 
Electricity provision relies on extant income generation possibilities and the ability to accumulate 
‘white goods’ and associated technologies, which allow the benefits of electricity to be realized.  
8
 This would most likely be referring to the work of Prof. Anton Eberhard, who is now a national 
commissioner and an expert in diverse features of South Africa’s energy sector.  
9
 Strategically, it was at the COP17 negotiation that the Department of Energy finally announced its 
preferred renewable energy bidders as part of an on-going independent power producers bidding 
process (South African Government News Agency 2011) . 
10
 Although efficiencies are continually improving, most renewable energy technologies could be 
considered as relatively mature. To confuse matters the International Energy Agency has 
separated renewable energy technologies into three generations (not to be confused with the 
‘generations’ of biofuels described above) in which, apart from third generation technologies—
still under development and include concentrating solar power, ocean energy, enhanced 
geothermal systems, and integrated bioenergy systems— renewable energy technologies are 




BRICS states such as Brazil. According to some officials from the former DME, 
renewable energy and rural energy were considered one and the same and 
electrification was the only priority. As a former secondment to the DME suggested: 
I came to the department and my task was support the 
government to formulate a renewable energy strategy and energy 
efficiency strategy, and from there prepare implementation 
plans...And I mean they were laughing at me … Basically there 
wasn’t any need for what I was talking about… a few years ago 
in the Department, the people, they couldn’t even pronounce the 
word renewable energy, they used to call it rural energy… They 
couldn’t get it round their head that there was a difference 
between rural and renewable energy.  
This essentially relegated renewable technologies to rural areas rather than being 
considered potentially useful in all areas.
11
 Davidson and Winkler (2006b, p.12) 
corroborate this to a degree by suggesting that:  
[T]he expansion of renewable energy in South Africa is mostly in the rural 
areas, where poor households are electrified with solar home systems 
(SHSs) where the national grid cannot economically penetrate.  
They also go on to suggest that:  
a broader approach of ‘energisation’, combining renewable energy 
technologies with other sources, for example [liquid petroleum gas] LPG or 
wind, has been also been contemplated.  
A White Paper on Renewable Energy was developed in 2002 setting out 
government’s strategy. Some effort has, however, gone into individual projects, 
especially given power shortages since 2007; though most of these fall within 
demand side management rather than transforming the supply side. Certainly, while 
the biofuels strategy was being developed and there was calls for 10000MW of 
renewable energy, very little else was considered by the DME. Having very few staff 
dealing with renewable energy (at one point only two officials) and considering other 
projects as “chicken shit”
12
 compared to biofuels, one can begin to see why (see 
Chapter 5).  
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 There has been a perception that ‘electricity for all’ means grid electricity for all. The situation is 
one where there are also off-grid systems being pursued, largely through support from Eskom, 
such as the solar home systems (solar water heaters especially) that the government is presently 
supporting (Davidson 2006b), with mixed results and much expense (Afrane-Okese and Muller, 
2003).  
12
 In a discussion of government’s programmes, there were a few projects including a clean-burning 





In 2004, the International energy agency (IEA 2007, p.3) described renewable 
energies as being "essential contributors to the energy supply portfolio as they 
contribute to world energy supply security, reducing dependency on fossil fuel 
resources, and provide opportunities for mitigating greenhouse gasses. At this time, 
they suggested renewable sources comprised 13.1% of the total fuel share globally, 
with a growth rate of 2.3% over the last 33 years (ibid., p.3-4). However, when 
looking into specific sectors, such as energy supply, figures differ and, for example, 
17.9% of electricity was produced from renewable sources.  
 
While there is some indication renewable energies are finding some niche within the 
global energy mix, the IEA fact sheet points towards an interesting contrast in South 
Africa. Whereas the overall contribution of renewable energies in total account for 
10% of the total energy mix, when one excludes traditional biomass combustion, this 
figure drops to as little as 0.2% (IEA 2007, p.6; Winkler 2005). Further to this, 
renewable energies in South Africa have generally been focussed within niche 
markets13, for example around non-grid electrification, given the lack of incentive 
and an encompassing renewable energy policy (Holm & Agert 2002; Winkler 2005). 
Initially policy proposals to support and expand the fledgling renewable energy 
industry was one of Renewable Energy Feed in Tariffs (REFIT), though this was 
subsequently changed to a 'preferred bidder' programme in the form of a renewable 
energy independent power producer procurement (REIPPP) process. This latter 
process has become part of the South African Renewables Initiative, signed at the 
COP17 in Durban. Additionally, the Integrated Resource Programme 2010 proposed 
adding approximately 42% renewable capacity by 2030. 
 
There are a few major types of constraint or barriers to renewable energy uptake. 
Physical constraints suggest that countries with a rich resource endowment (wind, 
water, sunlight et cetera) that can be converted into renewable energy will enjoy a 
                                                                                                                                          
were failing due to local preferences for the grid. It is thus that the comparison of chicken shit 
comes about.  
13
 Some for-grid renewable energy does exist, for example, co-generation using bagasse and small 
hydro facilities (Winkler 2005) with more expected as the IPP power-purchase agreements are 




competitive advantage above others. As an example, South Africa has one of the best 
solar resources in the world (Fluri 2009), whilst hydro and wind resources are more 
limited ((Banks & Schäffler 2006). Other constraints to the uptake of renewable 
energy sources include cost effectiveness and financial risk and lacking policies or 
political will, whilst in South Africa limited innovation and path dependency are also 
problematic (e.g. Pegels 2010). Increasingly, international political pressures and 
growing environmental concerns have raised expectations around renewable energy 
and have meant policies are being devised to incentivise their use (thus overcoming 
the cost-constraints) and bolstering research and development of technologies. Here, 
it is imperative that cost-related and R&D policies complement one another though 
in South Africa, the domination of fossil fuels industries have curtailed such 
innovation (ibid.). In the next sections, these fossils-based energy sectors are 
described in greater detail.   
The Electricity Supply Industry in South Africa and Some Policy Perspectives 
In general, South Africa’s energy consumption per capita is high compared with the 
world average: 2.7toe
14
 versus 1.8toe with demand increasing at approximately 4% 
(ABB 2011). South Africa’s energy sector is characterised by a wealth of natural 
resources including both fossil fuels (cheap coal being the most widely exploited) 
and renewable sources—solar especially (Kenny 2006). Here it is important to 
distinguish between energy resources and energy supply services. Despite multiple 
energy resources, coal dominates the energy mix in South Africa, accounting for 
seventy per cent of energy consumption followed by oil (13%), biomass (10%) gas 
(3%) and nuclear (3%) (ibid.). A well-developed infrastructure for both transport 
fuels and grid electricity is continually being expanded; the energy supply sector is 
also undergoing significant reforms, albeit slowly in some cases (e.g. Eberhard 
2004).  
 
Eberhard (2004, p.37) outlines the most prominent changes, in which post apartheid 
“it was inevitable that energy policy would be transformed from a defensive 
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 Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy equal to burning one tonne of oil. In South Africa, 
this follows the European standard of an assigned calorific value of 41 868 kilojoules/kg or net 






obsession with security to a new focus on promoting social equity and improving 
economic competitiveness as South Africa re-integrated with the global economy”. I 
will look into these main reforms when discussing the two major energy 
infrastructures in South Africa, transport fuels and the electricity supply industry 
(ISI). 
Eskom’s Powerful Grip on Power and Policy  
Although the focus of this thesis is focussed on biofuels and therefore discussion of 
the fuel infrastructure is necessary, first, the importance of coal as the dominant 
energy source deserves some attention too. In 2006, when the DME presented the 
draft Industrial Biofuels Strategy, coal was the major primary energy supplier with a 
contribution of 65.9% to the total primary energy supply (DoE 2009, p.3). (Crude oil, 
the second largest supply, accounted for 21.5% during the same period.) Not only is 
coal actually a critical feedstock for manufacturing fuel in South Africa, a discussion 
on reforms in the energy sector by Anton Eberhard—a leading academic in the 
sector
15
—is informative for what he suggests of policymaking (in much the same 
way Patrick Bond is important for his critique of development policy). Though not 
explicitly focussed on the process of policymaking, his discussion is revealing.  
 
In South Africa, one major, vertically and horizontally integrated operator, Eskom, 
dominates the generation and transmission of electricity. They are also largely in 
control of distribution and retail too, although most consumers buy electricity from 
municipal distributers, who buy their electricity from Eskom. Following international 
practices but more so a result of internal political and economic drivers,
16
 over the 
last fifteen years there has been increasing interest from the State to reform the 
electricity sector and restructure the monopoly of Eskom. Eskom has already been 
corporatised as part of wider structural adjustment plans in the economy (along 
neoliberal lines), while massive improvements in access to electricity has 
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 No doubt, being a member of the University of Cape Town’s Energy and Development Research 
Centre, who were closely involved with the ANC and a variety of energy forums has informed his 
perspective. These forums involved significant policy debates leading to, for example, the 
accelerated electrification programme as well as the energy section of the RDP (Marquard 1999). 
16
 The most important of these is the desire to restructure four major State Owned Entities—Eskom 




accentuated the commitment to social development goals and, symbolically, creating 
a modern state (Matinga et al. 2014). Professor Eberhard (2004) considers this 
(especially the macroeconomic focus) indicative of a paradigm shift, emanating from 
the Energy White Paper (DME 1998). The paradigm shift here referring to a move 
from apartheid-style (secret and un-debated) planning focused on providing low-cost 
energy supplies to power mining and primary industry and energy security for the 
apartheid state (see discussion on the minerals energy complex above) while 
neglecting the poor majority. The new paradigm:  
was supported by three developments: first, the intellectual development 
(mainly through an ANC sympathetic research group) of a new paradigm 
with emphasis on the “three E’s” (economic efficiency, social equity and 
environmental sustainability); second, the political process of legitimizing 
the new paradigm (though public consultation and publication of a White 
Paper); and, third, its structural realization in the economy and society – 
such as the shift in funding to the national electrification programme 
(Eberhard 2004, p.31).  
 
In the development of the White Paper, there are again commonalities with some of 
the key themes this thesis interrogates for biofuels. The importance of technocracy or 
expert opinion is tantamount, as are mobilising metaphors or the narrative of the 
‘Three E’s’ but more so it is the networks surrounding such expertise and storylines 
that are crucial. Experts’ access to the policymakers grants them special privileges in 
policymaking processes (they are the policymakers!), with important implications for 
the direction and feasibility of policy implementation. Importantly, Eberhard was 
part of an intellectual pool that had begun doing research on energy challenges of 
low-income households during the 1980s. Despite or perhaps ironically, being 
funded by the apartheid DME lead to some tensions, especially given the closeness 
between these scholars and the ANC at the time. The influence of this pool of 
researches is clear from the above discussion and the structure of the resultant White 
Paper (see Box 2). As Marquard and Eberhard (2000, p.5) further describe:  
A pool of expertise in this (for South Africa) new area of energy policy was 
built up at the Energy and Development Research Centre at the University 
of Cape Town, which launched a massive policy research project in the 
early 90s in anticipation of a new government. This project defined the 
principles of the new paradigm, and expanded the original emphasis on 







The White Paper became a reference point for further reforms that, although not all 
were implemented, were broadly consistent with the government’s macroeconomic 
focus on liberalisation, improving social equity, environmental sustainability, energy 
sector governance and energy security. Whilst providing some remarkable 
objectives
17
, Eberhard notes that:  
These bold statements originated not from any commissioned studies, 
neither did they emerge from a formal consultative process with industry 
members. They were the result of the convictions of a small group of 
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 Including, for example, “giving customers the right to choose their electricity supplier; 
[i]ntroducing competition into the industry especially the generation sector; [p]ermitting open 
non-discriminatory access to the transmission system, and encouraging private sector 
participation in the industry”. 
Box 3: The White Paper on Energy (1998) 
EDRC were contracted to develop the White Paper first involving public consultation (including a National 
Energy Summit), writing and then production and approval. The production and approval component of the 
process involved several consultation meetings that led to a draft paper in June 1996; this became public only 
in July 1998 due to several political and administrative problems. Under the auspices of the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee, public hearings were held and the final paper was published at the end of 1998. 
The White Paper has four parts: context and objectives for energy policy, demand sectors, supply sectors, and 
crosscutting issues. 
In the context and objectives, five policy objectives were agreed on: 
i. Increasing access to affordable energy services; 
ii. Improving energy governance; 
iii. Stimulating economic development; 
iv. Managing energy-related environmental and health effects (including access to basic energy services 
for poor households while reducing negative health impacts arising from energy activities); 
v. Securing supply through diversity. 
Energy efficiency and free-basic energy were important issues. The need to provide of equitable access to 
affordable public transport was noted, as were the challenges in doing so. The provision of energy for 
smallholder agriculture, rural schools, clinics, roads, and communication infrastructure were also addressed.  
Supply sectors provided an outline of issues pertaining to electricity, coal, liquid fuels, gas and other energy 
suppliers in the country.  
Cross-cutting issues include: 
• integrated energy planning; 
• good statistics and information; 
• the promotion of energy efficiency; 
• a balance between environmental, health and safety and development goals; 
• energy supplies and the private sector to carry out appropriate research and development; 
• development of human resources; 
• capacity building, education and information dissemination; 
• the facilitation of international energy trade and co-operation; 
• the alignment of fiscal and pricing issues by the use of levies, tax differentials and support for more 




analysts and government officials
18
 that were observing international trends 
in power sector reform, and were beginning to be concerned with the 
potential problems of monopoly power (2004, p.31). 
 
It is thus not only a network in place but also the political legitimisation of the 
network and its proximity to the bureaucracy that provided the platform from which 
policies would be development. Marquard and Eberhard (2000, p.5) add that:  
the political aspect, crucial to the adoption of the new intellectual 
orientation, began with the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. A productive 
relationship between researchers and ANC activists led to collaboration in 
the policy processes that surrounded the negotiations preceding the 1994 
elections. Crises in a number of areas of energy policy, notably the petrol 
price and the issue of electrification, led to the formation of multi-party 
task teams to negotiate stop-gap energy policies in the run-up to the 
elections. 
 
When the White Paper was finally released it was “big on principle but not on 
specifics, and implementation, especially in the area of restructuring, is proving 
complex (Marquard & Eberhard 2000, p.5). Professor Anton Eberhard also provides 
an important insight into how such policy has been operationalised. He suggests that, 
despite some impressive reforms, these are somewhat ‘token’, or only the start of 
what remains an enormous project. So, while:  
the urgency of promoting social equity and extending improved 
infrastructural services to the majority forced Eskom and the large 
municipalities to respond to the challenge of electrification … the reform of 
the overall [electricity supply industry] lagged behind … the process of 
reform of the distribution sector [for example] has been slow and has been 
frustrated by the complex web of political interests at local government 
level and the fear of loss of control of an important infrastructure service 
and large income streams” (Eberhard 2004, p.37).  
 
The success of this paradigm shift must, to a large degree, be measured by structural 
realisations within the economy. One of the most impressive impacts, although 
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 In one respect, these analysts were later vindicated. According to Eberhard (2004), they argued that 
“South Africa is living on borrowed time in terms of low electricity prices” and that “a vertically 
integrated, state-owned, monopoly industry, even if it is corporatized, is unlikely to make 
efficient investment decisions”. Such sentiments resonate predictions made in the White Paper (in 
which Eberhard and other experts were involved) that South Africa would run out of power by 
2007. Dramatic blackouts in late 2007and concomitant load shedding in early 2008 (e.g. 
Hlongwane 2013), as well Eskom’s recent application for tariff increases (Njobeni 2012) seem to 





arguably this was characteristic of the emerging paradigm shift than as a result of the 
White Paper, was the massive role out of electrification in the country. Whereas there 
has been considerable reform in the electricity supply industry, the same is not as 
true for the liquid fuels sector.  
South Africa’s Transport Fuel Sector 
In contrast to the monolith of Eskom, the fuel sector in South Africa comprises a 
number of multi-nationals, including the former parastatal Sasol; a chemical 
company now with international reach (see below). There are also remaining state-
owned operations involved in the supply side. Mossgas was established by the 
government in 1992, which converts natural gas sourced in Mossel Bay into liquid 
synthetic fuels. Its production capacity is 45,000 barrels per day of crude oil 
equivalent; the product is refined to produce petrol, diesel, kerosene and LPG from a 
feedstock comprising 4.9million m
3
/day of natural gas (IEA 1996: 180). The 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA), was established in 
July 2000, merging Mossgas and Soekor.
19
 The goal of the PetroSA is to be a leading 
integrated provider of oil, gas and petrochemicals competitively in African markets 
and beyond. The overall production of PetroSA is eight per cent of the liquid fuel 
requirement of South Africa. Alcohols and small quantities of transportation fuels are 
exported worldwide. Nevertheless, South Africa still imports most of its fuel 
requirements. Local reserves are limited to small fields in the Bredasdorp Basin off 
the south coast: the Oribi/Oryx Fields and the Sable Field, with proven reserves of 
49million barrels in 2002(Kenny 2006). 
 
Another important state institution is the Strategic Fuel Fund, a subsidiary of the 
Central Energy Fund, which stockpiles strategic reserves of crude oil. In 1988, it 
stocked up to one-and-a-half-years’ supply, which was reduced to about a third by 
1995 when government approved a stock equivalent to four months supply, about 
35million barrels (Trollip 1996). There is currently draft legislation revising this 
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 Soekor (Pty) Ltd was formed by the government in 1965. It is responsible for the control and 
coordination of petroleum exploration and offshore activities in the country, including policy and 




downwards and holding a strategic stock equivalent of sixty days of net imports 
(DoE 2013). 
 
There are currently seven major oil companies operating in South Africa: British 
Petroleum (BP), Caltex, Engen, PetroSA, Sasol, Shell, and Total. All of these 
companies, except PetroSA (see below), are vertically integrated in South Africa, 
that is, they operate at each stage of the supply chain—refining and production, 
storage, wholesale marketing and retail. There are four crude oil refineries (Natref, 
Calref, Sapref and Enref), one synthetic refinery utilising natural gas (Mossref) and 
one synthetic refinery currently utilising coal (Secunda).
20
 Although synthetic fuel 
and crude oil refineries use different inputs and technologies in their production 
processes, they nevertheless produce similar products. The composition of the output 
of a refinery is, within narrow limits, fixed by the technology used at the refinery and 
the composition of its raw materials. Coastal refineries typically produce a balance of 
high-value and low-value products, based on the need for bunker oil (a lower-value 
product). The inland refineries typically produce more high-value products than the 
coastal refineries. Our interest here resides in the so-called high-value or ‘white 
fuels’, which are described next.  
The Changes and (Peculiar) Structure of South Africa’s Fuel Terrain 
One could delineate, broadly, three main shifts in the development of the South 
African liquid fuels market (Swart 2010). The first was a situation of complete 
international reliance. Prior to 1954, South Africa had no refining capacity and 
imported all its petroleum. In the second phase, domestic production of fuel was 
prioritised. An important government decision in the 1950s, made for political and 
economic reasons, was to embark on a programme of producing liquid fuel from coal 
(Davidson 2006b). The latter lead to the formation of the South African Coal, Oil 
and Gas Corporation Limited, later Sasol Limited, initially funded by the Industrial 
Development Corporation (the same corporation now investing in Biofuels). 
                                                 
20
 It should be recognized that, because these fuels are produced from existing fossil fuels, and are 
then burned as fossil fuels, their associated carbon dioxide emissions are higher; roughly double 




Production of liquid fuel started at Sasol One in 1954.
21
 In this year the multinational 
fuel company Mobil commissioned the Genref refinery, later to be called Enref 
(when Mobil changed its name to Engen). At this stage, all refined products used 
were imported and distributed by BP, Caltex, Mobil, and Shell (Trollip 1996) but the 
growing demand for liquid fuels justified the development of local refineries as much 
as it did a synthetic fuels industry. One could then match this second phase with the 
general securitization philosophy of the apartheid government in which, like other 
energy policy, liquid fuels policy was structured towards achieving security of 
supply (Marquard & Eberhard 2000). The formation of the synthetic fuels industry 
encapsulates the apartheid state’s affinity for technological solutions although deals 
struck (see below) between the state and ‘big oil’ ensuring profits and obliging the 
uptake of Sasol’s production highlights the state-led approach to industrialisation.  
 
The security of supply approach has important geographical implications, as Sasol’s 
refineries were developed in the inland regions adjacent to coal mines. This led to 
complex ‘locational’ economics, concomitant regulatory systems and logistical 
infrastructures (Competition Commission 2006), all heavily subsidised by the 
apartheid government. Sasol One, the first synthetic fuel (or ‘synfuel’) refinery was 
built in Sasolburg, backed on the 1954 Main Supply Agreement (MSA). Also known 
as the Sasol Supply Agreements (SSA), the MSA split the country into two areas—
an inland Sasol Supply Area and a coastal belt handled by multinational 
refineries
22
—and obliged the oil companies to service their marketing requirements 
in the inland or ‘Sasol supply area’ by purchasing all of Sasol One’s production 
volumes, pro-rata to their market shares. After the global fuel crisis and a fuel 
embargo in the 1970s, Sasol Two and Sasol Three were commissioned in the early 
1980s. These two refineries were built in Secunda, also within the Highveld region. 
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 The synfuels project was also extended to include gas-to-liquid technologies with Mossgas, also 
heavily subsidised by the government, developed in 1992 (Trollip 1996). 
22
 The refineries of the coastal region some considerable distance from the country’s inland industrial 
hub and the major market for fuel are a testament to South Africa’s historic reliance on imported 
crude-oil products (Competition Commission 2006). 
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 The MSA was effectively a market share agreement that stipulated the following until it was 




The third phase noted by Swart (2010) was the dismantling of the MSA in 2003. The 
petroleum sector is still, however, governed by a labyrinth of agreements
24
 between 
government and the oil industries, which essentially regulate the price of petrol and 
diesel (Figure 9) and how it is distributed, produced, transported and sold. Within the 
gamut of regulations pertinent to the fuels sector—pricing; strategic stocks; 
specifications and standards; import and export; manufacturing; wholesale and 
retail—standards and specifications are becoming increasingly important and 
stringent within the fuel market and are especially important to the uptake of 
biofuels, as are taxes and incentives. South Africa, although nearly a decade behind 
in any fuel-grade improvements, is following European clean-fuel specifications in 
order to minimise environmental damage, as well as provide better performing fuels 
for vehicles.  
 
The current clean-fuel specifications in South Africa (CF1) are of equal quality 
criteria to Euro 2, which was enacted by the European parliament in 1996 (Directive 
96/69/EC of 1996). These were subsequently upgraded to Euro 3 in 2000 whilst 
South Africa’s specifications remained fixed.
25
 Draft documents, released by the 
Department of Energy in 2011, have confirmed a commitment to cleaner fuels in 
which the CF2 specifications (as adopted) will match those of Euro 5. The reason, 
however, may be as much (if not more) about economics than minimising pollution. 
                                                                                                                                          
• oil companies were obliged to purchase Sasol product up to a maximum of 7 740 million litres 
per year; 
• each individual company would ‘uplift’ a volume of Sasol proportional to their respective 
market share; 
• the price mechanism was remained based on the principle of import parity pricing through the 
‘in-bond landed cost’ (a formula for calculating retail fuel prices in South Africa since the 
1950s). 
• a revision of the ‘Blue pump agreement’ in which Sasol’s retail presence (at petrol stations) 
was limited ‘blue pumps’ at each station with the new agreement did afford Sasol certain 
marketing rights. 
The effect of the MSA was that other oil companies purchased 90% of Sasol’s white fuel output. 
Sasol’s market share at the “blue pumps” at other oil companies’ service stations was capped at 
9.23%, while Sasol was also permitted to market 22.5million litres of diesel into the commercial 
market. 
24
 For example, the ‘upstream’—exploration and production rights, technical co-operation permits and 
reconnaissance permits—is controlled by the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act of 2002. The ‘downstream’ industry and fuel prices are controlled by the Petroleum Products 
Act (Act no. 120 of 1977) and a number of industry agreements such as the former MSA (Cassim 
& Jackson 2003). 
25
 In brief the evolution of the European Fuel Specifications are Euro 1 (1993), Euro 2 (1996), Euro 3 
(2000) Euro 4 (2005), Euro 5 (2008/9) and Euro 6 (2014) with individual regulations also 




South Africa car manufacturers are producing two types of vehicle for the domestic 
and export market, which is uneconomical.
26
 These draft regulations have become a 
‘glimmer of hope’ for the biofuels industry, as they suggest biofuels will play a role 
as a replacement to the existing aromatics, which will need to be removed. Their 
hopes are somewhat premature though. As an environmental consultant at SAPIA 
suggested, “there are many ways to skin a cat”. I will return to the specifications later 
on, as it is an important yet neglected issue in the biofuels policy’s development.  
 
Figure 9: Schematic overview of the fuel price (author's own work) 
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 A similar thing can be seen by the introduction of 95 octane fuels and the removal of lead from fuel. 
While there are obvious environmental benefits, it also allows the expansion of Euro 5 rated 
vehicles in South Africa (e.g. NAAMSA 2005). The importance of these aspects is also 
acknowledged within the discussion document for fuel specifications released in 2011 
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Demand for Liquid Fuels 
In 2006, the transport sector (26.8%) was second to industry (32.2%) in terms of 
energy consumption in the country (DoE 2009, p.7). Most of South Africa’s liquid 
fuel requirements are imported in the form of crude oil. Approximately thirty per 
cent is sourced from coal through Sasol’s coal-to-liquid refineries and all of the 
natural gas production from PetroSA is converted into liquid fuels, supplying about 
seven per cent of national liquid-fuel requirements (DoE 2009, p.2). Demand for 
liquid fuels is dominated by petrol and diesel.
27
 The transport sector accounts for 
some 75-80% of the demand for these fuels, with most petroleum products being 
used in road transport (DME 2002a; DoE 2009). The situation is, however, in a 
constant state of flux.  
 
An important trend is that the consumption of petrol has been declining in relation to 
diesel since 1995; this trend then reversed in 2010 (SAPIA 2011). In absolute values, 
however, petroleum refining capacity in 2006, (including gas- and coal-to-liquids) 
reached 10,954,815 kilolitres of petrol, compared to 7,457,922 kilolitres of diesel 
(DoE 2009, p.31). In their Mthombo Refinery proposal document, PetroSA forecasts 
that diesel consumption will grow at 4.5% per annum and petrol consumption at 1% 
per annum between 2012 and 2020. It should be recognised that these figures might 
be completely unrealistic as they take little recognition of potential price fluctuations 
in the international oil prices and their attenuating impact on demand. The depressed 
oil demand after the price shocks of 2008 provide ample evidence of this (Wakeford 
2012).  
 
Whereas price fluctuations are important in the short term, equally serious are 
general trends. Reflecting increases in crude oil prices. In 2005/6 petrol prices were 
rising dramatically. Petrol prices (coastal) increased from 429c/l in 2004 to 612c/l in 
2005 whilst temporarily dropping to 585c/l in 2006 (DoE 2009). The South African 
Petroleum Industry Association reports different (cumulative) figures of 471c/l, 
506c/l and 636c/l respectively (SAPIA 2011). Diesel, while cheaper, had similar 
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 Consumption of other liquid fuels is an order of magnitude smaller than those for petrol and diesel. 





price changes. Internationally, oil was approaching $65 bbl, a price at which biofuels 
looked particularly lucrative. The rises seen in 2005/6 were nowhere near as severe 
as the near doubling of that price in 2008 (see SAPIA 2011). By this time, the 
biofuels strategy/industry was in disarray and more than anything the price shock of 
2008 brought other priorities, namely food security, to the fore; so too did other 
intervening factors (see Chapter 7). 
 
Also weighing on policymakers decisions in South Africa is that the country is close 
to outstripping its refining capacity.
28
 It is here where Mthombo refinery, mentioned 
above, is important. This is PetroSA’s proposed response to such incapacity. The 
proposal for Mthombo emerged out of the DoE’s Energy Security Master Plan in 
2007 but the issue of shortfalls in refining capacity was increasingly being 
recognised (e.g. Planting & Smith 2007) and remains important in news articles 
(Wakeford 2012; Creamer 2012) and the National Development Plan (National 
Planning Commission 2011c). The basic issue is that the proposal for Mthombo 
Refinery—increasing South Africa refining capacity—is only one solution rather 
than the solution. It is also only one means to increase refining capacity; individual 
refiners, for example, can also upgrade their existing capacities and in any event, it 
still leaves South Africa vulnerable to international oil markets. The economics of 
refining are complicated, especially given the very modest increase in demand from 
South Africa, highlighting the potential for alternative solutions, and the weakness of 
PetroSA’s business case for Mthombo in the first place (Wakeford 2012). The 
challenge does, however, reinforce to some degree the importance of biofuels (or any 
alternatives for that matter) but at the same time ‘Mthombo-thinking’ might well 
have overshadowed biofuels both as a policy issue and as a viable competitor to 
refined products (e.g. de Bruyn 2009). Such standpoints remain speculative but 
highlight an increasingly tense situation that remains unresolved.
29
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 It should be noted here that with excess refining capacity the fuel market of South Africa also 
includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland exporting 1.3billion litres of fuel to these 
countries in 2009 (Department of Energy 2011a). Shortfalls in the domestic market is therefore 
equally serious for the region.  
29
 It is also worth noting that the IDC has become involved in the continuing feasibility studies 
(Creamer 2013). Their involvement is interesting given the proximity of Coega, the proposed site 
for the new refinery, to the Cradock biofuels plant, which, as yet, has received insufficient off-




 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
While no country has made a successful industrial transition without investment into 
agriculture, humanity has only ever evolved to new systems of manufacture and 
development through changes in energy use. Currently, South Africa has a fossil-fuel 
intensive economic trajectory controlled by powerful interests, from ‘Big Oil’ and 
the monolith of Eskom. There has been some rhetorical shift in policy. The National 
Development Plan makes it clear – the green economy emerges from environmental 
necessity but also South Africa’s increasing energy shortages. The NDP suggests that 
the state will be ‘procuring about 20,000MW of renewable electricity by 2030, 
importing electricity from the region, decommissioning 11,000MW of aging coal-
fired power stations and accelerated investments in demand-side savings, including 
technologies such as solar water heating. Such goals seem optimistic, given that the 
10,000MW proposed for 2015 in the Renewable Energy White Paper seems unlikely 
to be reached. Overall, the NDP at least suggests new commitments towards 
renewable energy and a transition to low carbon economy, which may be a catalyst 
for wider support. There is even mention of biofuels in later sections of the Plan, 
through the contribution of agriculture to a ‘green economy’; however, in a much 
later section focussing on liquid fuels, biofuels are not considered an option because 
of water issues. (That is, if biofuels are to be used, they will more likely be produced 
elsewhere; once again, lofty documents produced by a task team appear to 
contradictory in different sections.)  
 
In a sense, the NDA expresses ambivalence to biofuels that the contents of this and 
prior appendices and chapters somewhat present as inevitable. There is potential for 
rural development but how this is to be understood and is understood by government 
is unclear and often oversimplified. Although there are clear expectations and 
pronouncements of what policies need to do (e.g. Freund 2010, p.23), there is far 
more that needs to be done to examine how these policies are made. This is not a 
new sentiment. Margquard and Eberhard (2000, p.7) conclude: 
The main challenges which lie ahead are all focused on the policy process: 
how to match policy with capacity, with resources, and with real structural 
                                                                                                                                          
interests of the IDC, if, for example, the Mthombo refinery could ultimately squash the fledgling 




transformation … Global challenges such as international competitiveness 
and climate change will require a degree of coordination within and 
without government unprecedented in the energy policy process. 
Whilst energy security is a priority, for both rich and poor, it is unclear where 
biofuels (and renewable energy in general) actually fit in, given the continued 
emphasis on and control by powerful vested interests within the energy sector.
30
 It is 
hoped that this thesis has added some further insight into the nature of the policy 
process, and suggest that while Margquard and Eberhard (2000) are indeed correct, 
perhaps policy and policymaking are the problem, and better processes are only part 
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 The skewed nature of the industry is most evident when considering the government’s R47-billion 
worth of investment in renewable energy, which appears to be substantial (SACPN 2012), 
compared to the under-estimates of R200-billion to be spent on Medupi and Kusile, the new coal-
powered stations (Donnely 2012). However, of course, I do not wish to misrepresent the 
importance of a consistent and reliable electricity supply system.  
